Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Swecker farm in Iowa has a wind generator and is a qualifying power production facility certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Sweckers sell surplus electric energy to Midland Power Cooperative at a rate established by the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB), implementing FERC rules and regulations, 16 U.S.C. 824a-3(f). For many years, the Sweckers and Midland have litigated rate disputes. The district court dismissed their current suit against Midland and its primary supplier, Central Iowa Power Cooperative (CIPCO), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Midland “to purchase available energy from plaintiffs . . . at Midland’s full avoided cost, rather than CIPCO’s avoided cost.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. FERC’s interpretation is controlling and forecloses the contrary interpretation of 18 C.F.R. 292.303(d) urged by the Sweckers. View "Swecker v. Midland Power Coop." on Justia Law

The Public Regulation Commission (PRC) granted Southwestern Public Service Company’s (SPS) application to: (1) include a prepaid pension asset in its rate base in order for SPS to earn a return on this asset; and (2) obtain a renewable energy cost rider to recover approximately $22 million of renewable energy procurement costs from those customers who did not have a legislatively imposed limit on their renewable energy costs (non-capped customers). The Attorney General appealed the PRC’s final order granting SPS’s application, arguing that the approved rates were unjust and unreasonable because the inclusion of the entire prepaid asset in the rate base was not supported by substantial evidence, and the PRC acted contrary to law in allowing SPS to recover the aforementioned renewable energy costs from non-capped customers. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the PRC because: (1) SPS was entitled to earn a reasonable rate of return on the investor-funded prepaid pension asset; and (2) SPS could recover its renewable energy costs in excess of the large customer cap from non-capped customers because such a recovery mechanism was the only viable method of cost recovery that was consistent with the purposes of the Renewable Energy Act. View "N.M. Att'y. Gen. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

At the center of this an appeal was the superior court's de novo valuation of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) for tax assessment years 2007, 2008, and 2009. In February 2014 the Alaska Supreme Court issued a decision affirming the superior court's de novo valuation of TAPS for the 2006 assessment year.1 The parties introduced considerably more evidence during trial for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 years, but the operative facts remained substantially the same and the superior court applied similar standards and methods for valuation. Many of the issues raised on appeal were similar or identical to issues raised in the 2006 appeal and thus are partially or wholly resolved by the Court's prior opinion. Because the superior court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion with regard to any of its findings or its methodology, and because it committed no legal error in its conclusions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alaska Dept. of Revenue v. BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc." on Justia Law

MISO, an organization of independent transmission-owning utilities, has linked the transmission lines of its members into a single interconnected grid across 11 states. The Generators, which operate 150-megawatt wind-powered electric generation facilities in Illinois, wish to connect to the system run by MISO. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), acting under 16 U.S.C. 824(a), has standardized the process: the Generators submitted requests to MISO, which then produced studies (paid for by the Generators) to assess potential impact on the grid and calculate the cost of necessary upgrades. After the studies were complete and agreements signed, MISO notified the Generators of a “significant error” that failed to include certain upgrades and that the Generators would either have to agree to fewer megawatts or pay for additional upgrades estimated to cost $11.5 million. MISO presented superseding Agreements to both Generators. The companies refused to sign. FERC found that the Generators should pay for the additional network upgrades. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The record failed to show that the Generators relied on the original, mistaken studies or that reducing the output would have made their farms economically unsustainable. They also had an exit option. The court noted that the Generators apparently built their wind farms despite the dispute. View "Pioneer Trail Wind Farm, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

The South Dakota Department of Revenue assessed Northern Border Pipeline Company, the operator of an interstate pipeline that provides transportation services to natural gas owners who desire to ship their gas, for use tax on the value of the shippers’ gas that the shippers allowed Northern Border to burn as fuel in compressors that moved the gas through the pipeline. An administrative law judge affirmed the assessment. The circuit court reversed, holding that Northern Border’s burning of the shippers’ gas was exempt from use tax under a tax exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Northern Border did not own the gas, use tax may not be imposed under this Court’s precedents. View "N. Border Pipeline Co. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

After PG&E's natural gas pipeline ruptured in San Bruno, killing and injuring several people, San Francisco filed suit against the Agency, alleging that the Agency failed to comply with the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq. The court concluded that the plain statutory language, the statutory structure, the legislative history, the structure of similar federal statutes, and interpretations of similar statutory provisions by the Supreme Court and its sister circuits lead to the conclusion that the Pipeline Safety Act does not authorize mandamus-type citizen suits against the Agency. The court also concluded that San Francisco's claims that the Agency violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), by unlawfully withholding the action of deciding whether the CPUC adequately enforces federal pipeline safety standards, and arbitrarily and capriciously approving the CPUC’s certification and providing federal funding to the CPUC, were not cognizable under the APA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit. View "City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S. D.O.T." on Justia Law

Lion Oil, a small Arkansas refinery, petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency for an exemption from the 2013 Renewable Fuel Standard program, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o), under which refineries must blend their share of renewable fuel or buy credits from those who exceed blending requirements. Congress exempted “small” refineries—75,000 barrels of crude oil or less per day—from RFS obligations until 2011. The exemption can be extended. Lion cited disruption to a key supply pipeline and argued that RFS compliance would cause disproportionate economic hardship. Before EPA considered the petition, the Department of Energy determined that Lion Oil did not score high enough on the viability index to show disproportionate economic hardship. EPA “independently” analyzed the pipeline disruption and Lion Oil’s blending capacity, projected RFS-compliance costs, and financial position. EPA denied the petition. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, first holding that it could consider the matter because EPA had not “published” a determination of nationwide scope or effect. The denial was not arbitrary or inadequately explained. View "Lion Oil Co. v. Envt'l Protction Agency" on Justia Law

The City of Osceola purchases wholesale energy from Entergy Arkansas under an agreement filed with and approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Osceola sued Entergy in Arkansas state court, seeking reimbursement for charges allegedly in violation of their agreement. Entergy removed the case to the federal district court which denied Osceola's motion to remand, granted summary judgment to the defendant energy providers, and dismissed the case. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that FERC has primary jurisdiction to determine the appropriate treatment of the bandwidth payments under the parties' agreement. View "City of Osceola v. Entergy Ark., Inc." on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act (CAA) directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants from stationary sources, such as refineries and factories, 42 U.S.C.7412; it may regulate power plants under this program only if it concludes that “regulation is appropriate and necessary” after studying hazards to public health. EPA found power-plant regulation “appropriate” because power plant emissions pose risks to public health and the environment and because controls capable of reducing these emissions were available. It found regulation “necessary” because other CAA requirements did not eliminate those risks. EPA estimated that the cost of power plant regulation would be $9.6 billion a year, but that quantifiable benefits from the reduction in hazardous-air-pollutant emissions would be $4-$6 million a year. The D. C. Circuit upheld EPA’s refusal to consider costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. EPA interpreted section 7412(n)(1)(A) unreasonably when it deemed cost irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants. “’Appropriate and necessary’ is a capacious phrase.” It is not rational, nor “appropriate,” to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits. That other CAA provisions expressly mention cost indicates that section 7412(n)(1)(A)’s broad reference to appropriateness encompasses multiple relevant factors, including cost. The possibility of considering cost at a later stage, when deciding how much to regulate power plants, does not establish its irrelevance at the earlier stage. Although the CAA makes cost irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate sources other than power plants, the point of having a separate provision for power plants was to treat power plants differently. EPA must decide how to account for cost. View "Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Shields and Wilson are Indians with interests on the Bakken Oil Shale Formation in the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota, allotted to them under the Dawes Act of 1887. Such land is held in trust by the government, but may be leased by allottees. Shields and Wilson leased oil and gas mining rights on their allotments to companies and affiliated individuals who won a sealed bid auction conducted by the Board of Indian Affairs in 2007. After the auction, the women agreed to terms with the winning bidders, the BIA approved the leases, and the winning bidders sold them for a large profit. Shields and Wilson filed a putative class action, claiming that the government had breached its fiduciary duty by approving the leases for the oil and gas mining rights, and that the bidders aided, abetted, and induced the government to breach that duty. The district court concluded that the United States was a required party which could not be joined, but without which the action could not proceed in equity and good conscience, and dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The United States enjoys sovereign immunity for the claims and can decide itself when and where it wants to intervene. View "Two Shields v. Wilkinson." on Justia Law