Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Linda Golden owned a fifty percent mineral interest that was within a “spacing unit” in which Luff Exploration Company desired to drill for oil. Golden declined Luff’s offer to lease her mineral interest or participate with Luff in the cost of the drilling. After Luff decided to proceed with drilling, it filed a petition with the South Dakota Board of Minerals and Environment (Board) seeking to “compulsory pool” the mineral interests in the spacing unit and seeking “risk compensation” from Golden. The Board issued a compulsory pooling order and found that Golden should pay 100 percent risk compensation. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board failed to comply with the plain language of S.D. Codified Laws 45-9-32 by granting a pooling order that contained no provision specifying a time and manner for Golden to elect to participate in the well by paying her proportionate share of the cost of drilling, equipping, and operating the well. View "In re Petition of Luff Exploration Co." on Justia Law

In 2004, the Ninth Circuit decided California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, which held that FERC may authorize market-based energy tariffs so long as that regulatory framework incorporates both an ex ante market power analysis and enforceable post-approval transaction reporting. In the instant case, Petitioners, the people of the state of California and related parties, sought review of a series of orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on remand following the Court’s decision in Lockyer, arguing that FERC failed to follow Lockyer and violated the Federal Power Act by requiring proof of excessive market share as a necessary condition for relief for transaction reporting violations. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for judicial review, holding that FERC structured the remand proceedings in a manner contrary to the terms of the Lockyer decision. Remanded to FERC for further proceedings. View "People of State of Cal. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has regulatory authority over interstate aspects of the nation’s electric power system, but not over “facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce,” 16 U.S.C. 824(a). FERC entered orders adopting standards and procedures for determining which power distribution facilities are subject to the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction and which facilities fall within the statutory exception for local distribution of electric energy. The state and the Public Service Commission of the State of New York challenged the standards and procedures as an unreasonable interpretation of the agency’s statutory grant of jurisdiction and as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Second Circuit upheld the orders as reasonably interpreting the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act as amended by the Electricity Modernization Act of 2005 and supported by sufficient explanation and substantial evidence as required by the Administrative Procedure Act. View "New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders issued in 2013 and 2014 approved the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) creation of a new wholesale electric power “capacity zone” comprising areas of Southeastern New York, including the lower Hudson Valley. The orders followed NYISO’s identification of areas in which customers received power from suppliers located on the other side of a “transmission constraint” in the electrical grid. Because of the way New York’s capacity markets work, NYISO concluded that financial incentives for capacity resources in the transmission‐constrained area that became the Valley Zone were inadequate, jeopardizing the reliability of the grid. FERC’s approval of the Zone, with a new “demand curve” to set capacity prices, were designed to address the reliability problem by providing more accurate price signals to in‐zone resources, but were expected to result in higher prices to customers. Utilities, the state, and the New York Public Service Commission alleged that FERC failed adequately to justify the expected higher prices, particularly without a “phase‐in” of the new zone and its demand curve, in violation of FERC’s statutory mandate to ensure that rates are “just and reasonable,” 16 U.S.C. 824d(a). The Second Circuit rejected the challenge. FERC adequately justified its decisions. View "Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) led the effort to clean up nuclear waste at the Hanford Nuclear Site in Washington state. URS Energy & Construction, Inc. (“URS Energy”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of URS Corporation, worked as a subcontractor on the project. An employee of URS Energy brought this action alleging violations of the Energy Reorganization Act (“ERA”) whistleblower protection provision concerning the cleanup efforts. The district court dismissed the DOE from the suit and granted summary judgment in favor of URS Corp. and URS Energy. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the DOE and URS Corp. were correctly dismissed for lack of administrative exhaustion, but administrative exhaustion was sufficient as to URS Energy; and (2) the employee introduced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue as to whether his whistleblowing activity was a contributing factor in the adverse employment action URS Energy took against him, and there were other existing genuine issues of fact that precluded summary judgment to URS Energy. Remanded. View "Tamosaitis v. URS Inc." on Justia Law

In these consolidated petitions, Carriers challenged FERC's authority to approve a cost pooling agreement among the Carriers that allocates most fixed costs on the basis of each Carrier's share of combined interstate and intrastate utilization of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). The court found that the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), 49 U.S.C. App. 13(6)(b), permits incidental regulation of intrastate commerce pursuant to approval of a pooling agreement under section 5(1); that any regulation of intrastate commerce challenged here was incident to the Pooling Agreement that FERC found just and reasonable for interstate commerce; and that the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the Pooling Agreement or make findings unsupported by the evidence. Therefore, FERC did not have statutory authority to approve the settlement; did not improperly regulate intrastate commerce; and did comply with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., requirements in reaching the order challenged in this case. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions. View "Tesoro Alaska Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2008, the General Assembly passed a senate bill that was codified as Mo. Rev. Stat. 393.1050, a statute exempting electric utilities that met a certain renewable energy target on a certain date from any solar energy requirements. A ballot initiative (“Proposition C”) was subsequently passed that imposed solar energy requirements on all electric utilities. Earth Island Institute, doing business as Renew Missouri, and additional parties filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission claiming that section 393.1050 was invalidated by the passage of Proposition C. The Commission determined that Proposition C did not impliedly repeal section 393.1050 because the two laws could be harmonized. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 393.1050 was impliedly repealed by the adoption of Proposition C because section 393.1050 in its entirety was in conflict with Proposition C. View "Earth Island Inst. v. Union Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Power Fuels, operator of a facility that receives, blends, stores, and delivers coals for a power plant located across the road, petitioned for review of the Commission's final order, challenging the Secretary's assignment of jurisdiction to the MSHA, rather than to the nonspecialized OSHA. The court held that the Secretary permissibly concluded that a facility that blends coal for a nearby power plant was subject to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 802(h)(1)(C), (i). Therefore, the MSHA's assertion of jurisdiction was proper because the Mine Act covers this kind of activity. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Power Fuels, LLC v. Federal Mine Safety & Health" on Justia Law

In 2013, Duke Energy Carolinas filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting authority to adjust and increase its North Carolina retail electric service rates. The Commission entered an order granting a $234,480,000 annual retail revenue increase, approving a 10.2 percent return on equity (ROE), and authorizing the use the single coincident peak (“1CP”) cost-of-service methodology. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission made sufficient findings regarding the impact of changing economic conditions upon customers, and these findings were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record; (2) the use of 1CP did not unreasonably discriminate against residential customers; and (3) no improper costs were included in the Commission’s order. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law

In 2006, Tellus Operating Group, LLC, sought to integrate the interests of various owners for the purpose of drilling a well unit in Jefferson Davis County. In accordance with its statutory duty to make a good-faith effort to negotiate the voluntary integration of the owners’ interests on reasonable terms, Tellus mailed option forms to the owners in June and July of 2006. In this case, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was a challenge to a Mississippi Oil and Gas Board pooling order force-integrating various owners’ interests in a proposed drilling unit. After review, the Court held that the Board’s order was supported by substantial evidence. The Court also found that one owner’s attempt to voluntarily integrate his interest within twenty days of the Board’s pooling order did not satisfy Section 53-3-7(2)(g)(iii). View "Tellus Operating Group, LLC v. Maxwell Energy, Inc." on Justia Law