Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the siting of a wind powered energy facility under the energy facilities site locations act (EFSLA). The State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC), after reducing the scope of the project applied for, recommended that the governor approve the project, which she did. Opponents of the project then sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The superior court certified the issue directly to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found no basis to reverse the EFSEC's recommendation or the governor's approval of the project. View "Friends of Columbia Gorge, Inc. v. State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council" on Justia Law

Appellants, the New Mexico Attorney General and New Mexico Industrial Energy Consumers, asked the Supreme Court to vacate and annul the final order in PRC Case No. 11-00308-UT (Case 308 Final Order) because it permitted Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) to earn returns on the operating expenses incurred from energy efficiency programs. Appellants argue that such returns are inconsistent with New Mexico law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Case 308 Final Order was consistent with the PRC’s ratemaking authority under the New Mexico Public Utility Act, the New Mexico Efficient Use of Energy Act, and with the Court's holding in "Attorney General v. New Mexico Public Regulation Commission" (258 P.3d 453). Furthermore, the Court held that Case 308 Final Order was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Case 308 Final Order. View "NMAG v. NMPRC" on Justia Law

In the 1960s Penelec and NYSEG built the Homer City coal-burning power plant in Indiana County, Pennsylvania. The Clean Air Act of 1970 subsequently charged the EPA with setting national maximum permissible levels of common pollutants, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)–(b). In 1990 the CAA was amended by Title V, the Operating Permit Program, which requires all major sources of air pollution to obtain operating permits. The Plant’s “grandfathered” status ended in the 1990s, when Penelec and NYSEG made changes to boilers that increased emissions of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. Penelec and NYSEG believed the changes were “routine maintenance” and did not apply for a permit. In 1995, Penelec and NYSEG applied for a Title V operating permit; they subsequently sold the Plant to EME, which then sold to OLs, which simultaneously leased it back to EME. By 2004, the Plant had become “one of the largest air pollution sources in the nation,” and was a target of the EPA’s new enforcement initiative. In 2008 the EPA filed suit, alleging that the former owners had modified the Plant without a permit and without installing required emissions controls. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. The relief sought would require distortion of plain statutory text to shore up what the EPA views as an incomplete remedial scheme. View "United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the EPA's permit allowing Shell to construct, operate, and conduct "pollutant emitting activities" associated with a drill vessel (the "Kulluk") in the Beaufort Sea off Alaska's North Slope. The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the Environmental Appeals Board's (EAB) Decision was not entitled to Chevron deference; Section 7661c(e) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7661c(e), was ambiguous, and the EPA's interpretation was reasonable under the applicable statutes' plain language; the court owed Chevron deference to the EAB Decision not to require a preconstruction increment analysis for the "Kulluk;" and the EPA permissibly granted a 500-meter exemption to the "Kulluk" from "ambient air" standards. View "Alaska Wilderness League v. EPA" on Justia Law

REX was unsuccessful in privately obtaining easements from defendants to install an interstate natural-gas pipeline authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under a coal mine in Ohio and had to condemn the easement, 15 U.S.C. 717f. REX built the pipeline and gas began flowing in 2009. Defendants believed that safety concerns regarding the pipeline would delay its mining permits and accelerated its mining, resulting in unanticipated costs associated with inefficient mining techniques. In valuing the easement, the district court determined that the defendants suffered no compensable damages to its coalmining operations as a result of the pipeline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that FERC found as a matter of fact that the pipeline would not compromise mining and that the two operations could co-exist. View "Rockies Express Pipeline, LLC v. 4.895 Acres of Land, More or Less" on Justia Law

In assessing the value of electric power plants for purposes of property taxation, assessors may not include the value of intangible assets and rights in the value of taxable property. An electric company purchased "emission reduction credits" (ERCs), which the company had to purchase to obtain authorization to construct an electric power plant and to operate it at certain air-pollutant emission levels. These ERCs constituted intangible rights for property taxation purposes. In assessing the value of the power plant using the replacement cost method, the State Board of Equalization (Board) estimated the cost of replacing the ERCs. In also using an income approach in assessing the plant, the Board failed to attribute a portion or the plant's income stream to the ERCs and to deduct that value from the plant's projected income stream prior to taxation. In analyzing the Board's valuation of the power plant, the Supreme Court held (1) the Board improperly taxed the power company's ERCs when it added their replacement cost to the power plant's taxable value; and (2) the Board was not required to deduct a value attributable to the ERCs under an income approach. Remanded. View "Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Petitioners and intervenors petitioned for review of FERC's orders (1) approving PJM's method of disbursing a monetary surplus that resulted from the way it operated its markets, and (2) requiring PJM to recoup money refunded to the virtual marketers in connection with the administrative dispute over the surplus. The court held that FERC gave the virtual marketers reasonable notice that their refunds were under reconsideration, but that FERC's orders were arbitrary and capricious because they were insufficiently justified. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review of the Surplus Orders and granted the petition for review of the Recoupment Orders, remanding for further proceedings. View "Black Oak Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Until 2007, petroleum refinery property was assessed by separately assessing the value of land and improvements separately from the value of fixtures, including machinery and equipment. In light of evidence that petroleum refinery property, including land, improvements, and fixtures, was generally sold as a unit, the Board of Equalization enacted Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18, 474 (Rule 474), which provides that, for purposes of determining Proposition 8 declines in the value of petroleum refinery property, petroleum refinery property is rebuttably presumed to constitute a single appraisal unit - unlike most industrial property. The Western States Petroleum Association sought to invalidate the regulation. The trial court and court of appeal held that Rule 474 was both substantively and procedurally invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeal erred in finding that Rule 474 was substantively invalid, as the board was not statutorily or constitutionally prohibited from appraising refinery land and fixtures as a single unit; but (2) because the Board failed to provide an adequate assessment of the rule's economic impact, the rule was procedurally deficient under the Administrative Procedures Act. View "W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

South Alabama Gas District (SAG) appealed a circuit court order enjoining it from selling liquified petroleum ("LP") gas and related appliances outside its member cities. Four individual taxpayers and Fletcher Smith Butane Co., Inc., sued SAG seeking both an injunction and damages for SAG's alleged violation of 11-50-266, as made applicable to gas districts by 11-50-399. The trial court bifurcated the claim for injunctive relief and the damages claim, and held a bench trial on the claim for injunctive relief. SAG argued that the notice and buy-out provisions did not apply to it because LP gas is not a "manufactured gas" within the terms of the statute. The trial court found otherwise and enjoined SAG from selling LP gas if it did not comply with 11-50-266. The circuit court found that the taxpayers lacked standing to challenge SAG's appliance sales. With regard to Fletcher Smith, SAG argued (among other things), that Fletcher Smith lacked standing because it sold its assets and was no longer engaging in the LP gas business. As proof, SAG cited Fletcher Smith's to "Requests for Admissions of Fact." After review of the circuit court record and the admissions cited by SAG in its appeal brief, the Supreme Court found that Fletcher Smith's claims for prospective relief became moot. "Because mootness goes to justiciability, this Court will not consider the merits of a claim that is moot." View "South Alabama Gas District v. Knight" on Justia Law

Atmos Energy Corporation, a local distributing company, contracted with independent gas marketing companies to purchase natural gas then delivered gas to customers through local pipelines. Following an audit, Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) staff indicated that Atmos had failed to comply with affiliate transaction rules by failing to document properly the fair market value and fully distributed cost of its transactions with its affiliate, Atmos Energy Marketing LLC (AEM). The staff then proposed a disallowance regarding Atmos' transactions with AEM. After an evidentiary hearing, the PSC found compliance with the affiliate transaction rules and rejected the proposed disallowances. The Office of Public Counsel (OPC) appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC erred in relying upon a presumption of prudence in rejecting staff and OPC's proposed disallowance regarding Atmos's transactions with AEM. Remanded. View "Office of Pub. Counsel v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law