Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Magellan Pipeline Company, LP appealed a sales tax assessment levied by the state Department of Revenue and Regulation on its additive injection and equipment calibration services. The Hearing Examiner, Department Secretary and trial court all found Magellan's services were non-exempt from tax. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under the plain language of the applicable statute, Magellan's services were exempt from sales tax. View "Magellan Pipeline Co v. Dept. of Revenue & Regulation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Farrell-Cooper Mining Company and Defendant-Appellant Oklahoma Department of Mines appealed a district court's dismissal of their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department of Interior; the Secretary of the Interior; the Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement; and the Director of OSMRE. A dispute arose over reclamation requirements contained in surface coal mine permits for Farrell-Cooper's Liberty Mine #5 and Liberty Mine #6. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as unripe. View "Farrell-Cooper Mining Company v. US Department of the Interior, et al" on Justia Law

North Central Electric Cooperative appealed a district court judgment affirming a Public Service Commission order that dismissed its complaint against Otter Tail Power Company. The Commission decided it did not have regulatory authority over Otter Tail's extension of electric service to a facility owned by the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians on tribal trust land within the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. North Central argued on appeal: (1) the Commission has jurisdiction under North Dakota law; and (2) the Commission's findings were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and did not sufficiently address North Central's evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Commission did not err in deciding it lacked authority to regulate the Tribe's decision to have Otter Tail provide electric service to a tribal-owned facility on tribal-owned land within the reservation. View "North Central Electric Coop., Inc. v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Alaskan Crude Corporation applied to the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to have a suspended the "Burglin 33-1" well reopened to explore for oil and gas. Arguing that it was highly unlikely that oil from the well would rise to the surface unassisted, Alaskan Crude requested to be exempted from oil discharge response requirements or, in the alternative, to have the requirements reduced. The Commission made successive reductions to the technical flow-rate assessments and the response planning standards that it recommended to the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation for use in setting Alaskan Crude’s discharge response requirements. The Commission declined, however, to classify the Burglin 33-1 well as a gas facility, which would have exempted Alaskan Crude entirely from such requirements. Alaskan Crude appealed to the superior court, challenging the Commission’s recommended response planning standards and its well classification. The superior court affirmed. Alaskan Crude appealed from the superior court’s decision. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alaskan Crude Corporation v. Alaska" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the siting of a wind powered energy facility under the energy facilities site locations act (EFSLA). The State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC), after reducing the scope of the project applied for, recommended that the governor approve the project, which she did. Opponents of the project then sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The superior court certified the issue directly to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found no basis to reverse the EFSEC's recommendation or the governor's approval of the project. View "Friends of Columbia Gorge, Inc. v. State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council" on Justia Law

Appellants, the New Mexico Attorney General and New Mexico Industrial Energy Consumers, asked the Supreme Court to vacate and annul the final order in PRC Case No. 11-00308-UT (Case 308 Final Order) because it permitted Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) to earn returns on the operating expenses incurred from energy efficiency programs. Appellants argue that such returns are inconsistent with New Mexico law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Case 308 Final Order was consistent with the PRC’s ratemaking authority under the New Mexico Public Utility Act, the New Mexico Efficient Use of Energy Act, and with the Court's holding in "Attorney General v. New Mexico Public Regulation Commission" (258 P.3d 453). Furthermore, the Court held that Case 308 Final Order was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Case 308 Final Order. View "NMAG v. NMPRC" on Justia Law

In the 1960s Penelec and NYSEG built the Homer City coal-burning power plant in Indiana County, Pennsylvania. The Clean Air Act of 1970 subsequently charged the EPA with setting national maximum permissible levels of common pollutants, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)–(b). In 1990 the CAA was amended by Title V, the Operating Permit Program, which requires all major sources of air pollution to obtain operating permits. The Plant’s “grandfathered” status ended in the 1990s, when Penelec and NYSEG made changes to boilers that increased emissions of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. Penelec and NYSEG believed the changes were “routine maintenance” and did not apply for a permit. In 1995, Penelec and NYSEG applied for a Title V operating permit; they subsequently sold the Plant to EME, which then sold to OLs, which simultaneously leased it back to EME. By 2004, the Plant had become “one of the largest air pollution sources in the nation,” and was a target of the EPA’s new enforcement initiative. In 2008 the EPA filed suit, alleging that the former owners had modified the Plant without a permit and without installing required emissions controls. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. The relief sought would require distortion of plain statutory text to shore up what the EPA views as an incomplete remedial scheme. View "United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the EPA's permit allowing Shell to construct, operate, and conduct "pollutant emitting activities" associated with a drill vessel (the "Kulluk") in the Beaufort Sea off Alaska's North Slope. The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the Environmental Appeals Board's (EAB) Decision was not entitled to Chevron deference; Section 7661c(e) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7661c(e), was ambiguous, and the EPA's interpretation was reasonable under the applicable statutes' plain language; the court owed Chevron deference to the EAB Decision not to require a preconstruction increment analysis for the "Kulluk;" and the EPA permissibly granted a 500-meter exemption to the "Kulluk" from "ambient air" standards. View "Alaska Wilderness League v. EPA" on Justia Law

REX was unsuccessful in privately obtaining easements from defendants to install an interstate natural-gas pipeline authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under a coal mine in Ohio and had to condemn the easement, 15 U.S.C. 717f. REX built the pipeline and gas began flowing in 2009. Defendants believed that safety concerns regarding the pipeline would delay its mining permits and accelerated its mining, resulting in unanticipated costs associated with inefficient mining techniques. In valuing the easement, the district court determined that the defendants suffered no compensable damages to its coalmining operations as a result of the pipeline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that FERC found as a matter of fact that the pipeline would not compromise mining and that the two operations could co-exist. View "Rockies Express Pipeline, LLC v. 4.895 Acres of Land, More or Less" on Justia Law

In assessing the value of electric power plants for purposes of property taxation, assessors may not include the value of intangible assets and rights in the value of taxable property. An electric company purchased "emission reduction credits" (ERCs), which the company had to purchase to obtain authorization to construct an electric power plant and to operate it at certain air-pollutant emission levels. These ERCs constituted intangible rights for property taxation purposes. In assessing the value of the power plant using the replacement cost method, the State Board of Equalization (Board) estimated the cost of replacing the ERCs. In also using an income approach in assessing the plant, the Board failed to attribute a portion or the plant's income stream to the ERCs and to deduct that value from the plant's projected income stream prior to taxation. In analyzing the Board's valuation of the power plant, the Supreme Court held (1) the Board improperly taxed the power company's ERCs when it added their replacement cost to the power plant's taxable value; and (2) the Board was not required to deduct a value attributable to the ERCs under an income approach. Remanded. View "Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law