Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners and intervenors petitioned for review of FERC's orders (1) approving PJM's method of disbursing a monetary surplus that resulted from the way it operated its markets, and (2) requiring PJM to recoup money refunded to the virtual marketers in connection with the administrative dispute over the surplus. The court held that FERC gave the virtual marketers reasonable notice that their refunds were under reconsideration, but that FERC's orders were arbitrary and capricious because they were insufficiently justified. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review of the Surplus Orders and granted the petition for review of the Recoupment Orders, remanding for further proceedings. View "Black Oak Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Until 2007, petroleum refinery property was assessed by separately assessing the value of land and improvements separately from the value of fixtures, including machinery and equipment. In light of evidence that petroleum refinery property, including land, improvements, and fixtures, was generally sold as a unit, the Board of Equalization enacted Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18, 474 (Rule 474), which provides that, for purposes of determining Proposition 8 declines in the value of petroleum refinery property, petroleum refinery property is rebuttably presumed to constitute a single appraisal unit - unlike most industrial property. The Western States Petroleum Association sought to invalidate the regulation. The trial court and court of appeal held that Rule 474 was both substantively and procedurally invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeal erred in finding that Rule 474 was substantively invalid, as the board was not statutorily or constitutionally prohibited from appraising refinery land and fixtures as a single unit; but (2) because the Board failed to provide an adequate assessment of the rule's economic impact, the rule was procedurally deficient under the Administrative Procedures Act. View "W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

South Alabama Gas District (SAG) appealed a circuit court order enjoining it from selling liquified petroleum ("LP") gas and related appliances outside its member cities. Four individual taxpayers and Fletcher Smith Butane Co., Inc., sued SAG seeking both an injunction and damages for SAG's alleged violation of 11-50-266, as made applicable to gas districts by 11-50-399. The trial court bifurcated the claim for injunctive relief and the damages claim, and held a bench trial on the claim for injunctive relief. SAG argued that the notice and buy-out provisions did not apply to it because LP gas is not a "manufactured gas" within the terms of the statute. The trial court found otherwise and enjoined SAG from selling LP gas if it did not comply with 11-50-266. The circuit court found that the taxpayers lacked standing to challenge SAG's appliance sales. With regard to Fletcher Smith, SAG argued (among other things), that Fletcher Smith lacked standing because it sold its assets and was no longer engaging in the LP gas business. As proof, SAG cited Fletcher Smith's to "Requests for Admissions of Fact." After review of the circuit court record and the admissions cited by SAG in its appeal brief, the Supreme Court found that Fletcher Smith's claims for prospective relief became moot. "Because mootness goes to justiciability, this Court will not consider the merits of a claim that is moot." View "South Alabama Gas District v. Knight" on Justia Law

Atmos Energy Corporation, a local distributing company, contracted with independent gas marketing companies to purchase natural gas then delivered gas to customers through local pipelines. Following an audit, Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) staff indicated that Atmos had failed to comply with affiliate transaction rules by failing to document properly the fair market value and fully distributed cost of its transactions with its affiliate, Atmos Energy Marketing LLC (AEM). The staff then proposed a disallowance regarding Atmos' transactions with AEM. After an evidentiary hearing, the PSC found compliance with the affiliate transaction rules and rejected the proposed disallowances. The Office of Public Counsel (OPC) appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC erred in relying upon a presumption of prudence in rejecting staff and OPC's proposed disallowance regarding Atmos's transactions with AEM. Remanded. View "Office of Pub. Counsel v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case involved long-running multidistrict litigation concerning contamination of groundwater by the organic compound MTBE, which was used as a gasoline additive by Exxon and others. The court concluded that the state law tort verdict against Exxon was not preempted by the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401; the jury's finding that the MTBE levels in Station Six Wells will peak at 10ppb in 2033 was not inconsistent with a conclusion that the City had been injured; the City's suit was ripe because the City demonstrated a present injury and the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations; the jury's verdict finding Exxon liable under state tort law theories was not precluded by the jury's concurrent conclusion that the City had not carried its burden, in the design-defect context, of demonstrating a feasible, cost-reasonable alternative to MTBE available to satisfy the standards of the now-repealed Reformulated Gasoline Program; Exxon's demand for a retrial because of an incident of juror misconduct was unavailing; the jury properly offset the gross damages award by amounts it reasonably attributed to cleanup of contaminants other than MTBE; and the City was not entitled to a jury determination of Exxon's liability for punitive damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "In re: MTBE Products Liability Litig." on Justia Law

Petitioner WildEarth Guardians challenged an Environmental Protection Agency order that denied in part its petition for an objection to a Title V operating permit issued by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) to Intervenor Public Service Company of Colorado (d/b/a Xcel Energy), for a coal-fired power station in Morgan County, Colorado. Petitioner argued that the permit should have included a plan to bring the station into compliance with the Clean Air Act. The EPA denied Petitioner's petition for an objection despite the EPA's issuing a citation to Public Service for violating the act in 2002. The EPA concluded that Petitioner's evidence failed to demonstrate a violation, and that the state agency adequately responded to Petitioner's comments before it issued the permit. Petitioner petitioned the Tenth Circuit on appeal. The Court saw no error in the EPA's persuasive interpretation of the demonstration requirement. Furthermore, the Court concluded the agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate noncompliance with the Act. Therefore the Court affirmed the EPA's order denying in part the petition to object. View "WildEarth v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an energy trader, challenged FERC's order to pay a $50,000 civil penalty because petitioner had made false statements and material omissions in forms he filed with the Commission and a market operator the Commission regulates. The court agreed with FERC that petitioner's admissions supported summary disposition without a hearing; because petitioner's actions were worse than careless, FERC reasonably concluded that he violated Market Behavior Rule 3; petitioner's arguments under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., were without merit; and petitioner failed to show that FERC increased his penalty to promote general deterrence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Kourouma v. FERC" on Justia Law

Seeking to construct a natural gas compressor station in Maryland, Dominion applied for and received a certificate of public convenience and necessity from FERC. The Department subsequently twice refused to process Dominion's application for an air quality permit and Dominion sought expedited review from the court. The court granted Dominion's petition and remanded for further action because the Department's failure to act to grant, condition, or deny Dominion's air quality permit was inconsistent with federal law. View "Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, et al." on Justia Law

The Authority was formed under Ga. Code 46-4-82(a) to provide member municipalities with natural gas. It operates as a non-profit, distributing profits and losses to member municipalities: 64 in Georgia, two in Tennessee, 12 in other states. It pays its own operating expenses and judgments; it is exempt from state laws on financing and investment for state entities and has discretion over accumulation, investment, and management of its funds. It sets its governance rules; members elect leaders from among member municipalities. Smyrna, Tennessee has obtained gas from the Authority since 2000, using a pipeline that does not run through Georgia. The Authority entered a multi-year “hedge” contract for gas acquisition, setting price and volume through 2014, and passed the costs on. The market price of natural gas then fell due to increased hydraulic fracturing (fracking), but Smyrna was still paying the higher price. Smyrna sued for breach of contract, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. The district court denied the Authority’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity under Georgia law and the Eleventh Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Authority’s claim that any entity referred to as a state “instrumentality” in a Georgia statute is entitled to state-law sovereign immunity “requires quite a stretch of the imagination.” View "Town of Smyrna, TN v. Mun. Gas Auth. of GA" on Justia Law

A severe rainstorm in 2006 caused two wastewater storage tanks at CITGO's Lake Charles Louisiana refinery to fail and over two million gallons of oil flooded into the surrounding waterways. The United States filed suit against CITGO under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1321, seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief. The district court imposed a $6 million penalty against CITGO and ordered injunctive relief. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that the motion to dismiss was properly denied where there was no diligent prosecution by the State and no jurisdictional issue to resolve; the district court needed to have made a finding on the amount of economic benefit and that such a finding was central to the ability of the district court to assess the statutory factors and for an appellate court to review that assessment; the court vacated the civil penalty award and remanded for re-evaluation; at that time, the district court should reconsider its findings with respect to CITGO's conduct, giving special attention to what CITGO knew prior to the oil spill and its delays in addressing recognized deficiencies; and the court rejected the government's argument that the district court erred with respect to its findings on the amount of oil spilled. View "United States, et al. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law