Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from Washington Gas' request to expand a natural gas substation (County Zoning Plans). On appeal, Washington Gas challenged the district court's order dismissing Washington Gas' mandatory referral claim and the district court's subsequent order granting summary judgment on Washington Gas' federal preemption claims. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the mandatory referral claim pursuant to Burford v. Sun Oil; the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act (PSA), 49 U.S.C. 60102, 60104, did not preempt the County Zoning Plans because the PSA only preempted safety regulations and the County Zoning Plans were not safety regulations; and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717, did not preempt the County Zoning Plans because Washington Gas was a local distributor of natural gas and, therefore, was not subject to the NGA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Washington Gas Light Co. v. Prince George's County Council" on Justia Law

To facilitate the transition to a competitive market for the supply of electricity, the Legislature provided that consumers would receive certain credits over the period of a year to mitigate a large projected increase in Baltimore Gas & Electric Company's (BGE) rates for the supply of electricity. The overall scheme involving credits, charges, and bond financing was known as the rate stabilization plan. Following passage of the rate stabilization law, BGE took the position that the legislation had the effect of deferring part of its franchise tax liability during the period that credits were applied to customers' bills. The Department of Assessments rejected BGE's position. BGE filed a refund claim, which was rejected. The tax court upheld the Department's denial. The circuit court concluded that the deferral credit affected BGE's distribution revenues for purposes of computing its franchise tax liability, that the tax court decision would subject BGE to double taxation, and that BGE was entitled to the claimed refund. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, in establishing the rate stabilization plan, the legislature neither intentionally nor inadvertently provided for the credits and charges to affect BGE's franchise tax liability. Remanded. View "Dep't of Assessments v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission approved Cimarex Energy Company's plan to reinject waste carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide into a producing natural gas formation in southwest Wyoming over the objection of Exxon Mobil Corporation. Exxon appealed. The district court affirmed the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the Commission properly denied Exxon's petition for a rehearing; but (2) the Commission failed to provide sufficient findings of fact as to whether Cimarex's plan to reinject carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide would result in waste of natural gas and improperly interfere with Exxon's correlative rights. Remanded to the Commission to make appropriate findings of both basic and ultimate facts. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n" on Justia Law

FERC fined petitioner $30 million for manipulating natural gas futures contracts. Petitioner, an employee of the hedge fund Amaranth, claimed that FERC lacked authority to fine him because the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over all transactions involving commodity futures contracts. The court granted the petition for review because manipulation of natural gas futures contracts fell within the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction and because nothing in the Energy Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. 717c-1, clearly and manifestly repealed the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. View "Hunter v. FERC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA), as amended by the Reform Act of 1987, required the Secretary of the Interior to issue leases for parcels of land to the highest bidding energy company within sixty days of payment to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Appellants (collectively, "Energy Companies") sued to compel the Secretary to issue pending leases on which they were the high bidders and more than sixty days had passed since they had paid the BLM in full. The district court construed the MLA to impose a mandate on the Secretary to decide whether to issue the leases, and ordered BLM to make such decisions regarding the still pending leases of Energy Companies within thirty days. Energy Companies appealed the district court's order and asserted that the MLA required the Secretary to issue the pending leases within sixty days rather than merely make a decision on whether the leases will be issued. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s order was not a "final decision," and as such, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Energy Companies' appeal. View "Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Three main issues were raised on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case: (1) whether a school district is liable for oil and gas severance taxes on its royalty interests derived from oil and gas production on sixteenth-section land (the chancellor ruled that it is not); (2) whether the statute of limitations restricts the time period in which a school district can seek a refund of severance taxes that it had paid erroneously (the chancellor ruled that a three-year statute of limitations applied to any refund claims); and (3) whether a school district is liable for administrative expense taxes on its royalty interests derived from oil and gas production on sixteenth-section land (the chancellor ruled that it is). Upon review of the applicable code and in consideration of the arguments of the parties to this case, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor's judgment should be affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) school districts are not liable for oil and gas severance taxes on sixteenth-section royalty interests: school districts, as political subdivisions of the state, are not included within the definition of "persons" made subject to these taxes; (2) pursuant to the Mississippi Constitution, statutes of limitation in civil causes do not run against the state or its subdivisions; and (3) school districts are liable for administrative expense taxes on sixteenth-section royalty interests: "[t]hese assessments are 'fees,' not 'taxes'; the Legislature has expressly made the state and its subdivisions subject to these fees; and no constitutional provision or other law is violated by requiring school districts to pay them." View "Jones County School District v. Mississippi Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant Catherine Lakey and twelve other homeowners owned property that bordered a parcel owned by Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (PSE) on which there was an electrical substation. The homeowners sued PSE and the City of Kirkland after PSE constructed a new substation on PSE property. The homeowners sought review of the trial court's decision to exclude testimony of their expert under the "Frye" rule, and the court's ultimate decision to grant summary judgment on behalf of PSE. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court improperly excluded the expert's testimony under the "Frye" rule but properly excluded it under the Rules of Evidence ER702. Furthermore, the Court reversed the trial court's decision with respect to their Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) claims, finding that LUPA did not apply to the homeowners' inverse condemnation claim. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection approved an application of Saddleback Ridge Wind, LLC for a permit to construct the Saddleback Ridge Wind Project, a wind energy development. The Board of Environmental Protection affirmed. Friends of Maine's Mountains, Friends of Saddleback Mountain, and several individuals appealed, arguing, among other things, that the Board abused its discretion when determining which nighttime sound level limit to apply to the applications. The Supreme Court vacated the Board's order related to nighttime sound requirements and remanded, holding that the Board failed to meet its statutory obligation to protect the health and welfare of the Project's neighbors and thus abused its discretion in approving Saddleback's permit applications. View "Friends of Maine's Mountains. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Massachusetts submitted an environmental impact statement (EIS) with its relicensing application in 2006. Before relicensing occurred, an earthquake and tsunami occurred off the coast of Japan, which hit the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Less than three months later, Massachusetts moved to admit a contention and to reopen the Pilgrim record, arguing that Fukushima revealed new and significant information that the environmental impact analysis needed to address. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board denied Massachusetts's motion. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) denied the Commonwealth's petition for review, rejecting the Commonwealth's claims that the EIS was inadequate in light of the damage to Fukushima. The Commonwealth also petitioned for review from the NRC's vote to renew the license of the Pilgrim station. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition for review, holding that the NRC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by (1) failing to require supplementation of the EIS in light of Fukushima; and (2) declining to hear Massachusetts' rulemaking petition and to complete all the post-Fukushima review before granting the license. View "Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the interaction between the NRC's regular decommissioning process of a licensed nuclear facility and a statutory provision (section 2021 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2021) authorizing the NRC to transfer regulatory authority over classes of nuclear materials located within a state to the government of that state. In regards to the basic standards for decommissioning, the court's inability to understand the key regulatory materials purportedly guiding the agency exercise of control over decommissioning required a remand. The court found no legal error in the remainder of the Commission's Order. View "Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., et al" on Justia Law