Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, FERC reviewed rates resulting from an auction process and concluded that though the rates were not contract rates, they warranted the Mobile-Sierra doctrine presumption anyway. The NEPGA and State Petitioners petitioned for review. Because the NEPGA lacked standing, the court dismissed its petition for review. The court rejected the merits of the State Petitioners' arguments where FERC did not exceed the bounds of its considerable discretion by adopting the public interest standard for deciding whether a given Forward Capacity Auction rate was just and reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the State Petitioners' petition for review. View "New England Power Generators Assoc., Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, HPBA and NPGA, sought review of two recently promulgated rules that they believed expanded the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C. 6201 et seq., to include decorative fireplaces. The court agreed with the HPBA that the DOE's interpretation of decorative fireplaces as "Direct heating equipment," a specifically enumerated class of covered products under the Act, contravened the EPCA's statutory scheme and, in turn, clear congressional intent. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Assoc. v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs the State and the Vermilion Parish School Board filed a "Petition for Damages to School Lands" in 2004 seeking damages and remediation of a sixteenth section of property in Vermilion Parish owned by the State and managed by the School Board. The property was allegedly polluted by oil and gas exploration and production performed pursuant to an oil, gas and mineral lease originally granted on the property in 1935 and a surface lease entered into in 1994. The plaintiffs claimed damage to the land’s soil, surface waters and ground waters. Plaintiffs raised various causes of action including negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, trespass, breach of contract and violations of both the Mineral Code and the Civil Code. Several defendants were named in the original petition and in supplemental and amending petitions as companies which conducted, directed, controlled or participated in various oil and gas exploration and production activities as operators and/or working interest owners, and/or joint venturers in the mineral interest. At the time of this appeal, the remaining defendants were Union Oil Company of California; Union Exploration Partners; Carrollton Resources, L.L.C.; Chevron USA Inc.; and Chevron Midcontinent, L.P. In a motion for summary judgment, Chevron USA Inc. sought dismissal from suit, which was denied. Upon review of Chevron's argument that it should have been dismissed from the suit, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal’s conclusion that there seemed to be a genuine issue of material fact as to Chevron USA Inc.’s successor status to Union Oil Company of California, and as such, should not have been dismissed from the case. Consequently, the Court affirmed the court of appeal’s opinion in this regard. View "Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Company" on Justia Law

After a portion of an oil and gas lease's interest was assigned to Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, the Ohio Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (Division) issued a permit to Chesapeake to drill an oil and gas well on the lease property. Summitcrest, Inc., who originally entered into the lease with the assignor, appealed to the Oil and Gas Commission (Commission). The Division filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the issuance of permits to drill oil and gas wells did not constitute an appealable order. Chesapeake joined in the Division's motion to dismiss. The Commission denied the motion to dismiss. Chesapeake filed this action for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Commission from exercising further jurisdiction in the appeal and to vacate the Commission's actions in the appeal. The Commission subsequently heard the appeal and affirmed the issuance of the drilling permit. Thereafter, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the prohibition case based on mootness, which the Supreme Court denied. The Supreme Court then granted the writ, holding that the Commission patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the appeal from the Division's issuance of the permit. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Oil & Gas Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Congress's amendment of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o), to establish a renewable fuel standard (RFS) program. API objected to the EPA's 2012 projection for cellulosic biofuel and to its refusal to reduce the applicable advanced biofuels volume for 2012. The court rejected API's argument that the EPA failed to justify its determination not to reduce the applicable advanced biofuels volume for 2012. However, because the EPA's methodology for making its cellulosic biofuel projection did not take neutral aim at accuracy, the court held that it was an unreasonable exercise of agency discretion. Accordingly, the court vacated the 2012 RFS rule and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Petroleum Institute v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 1961, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued a right-of-way grant to the Alaska Department of Public Works conveying a "road building material site" along the Denali Highway with no expiration date and no rental fee. After the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) was enacted in 1971, the United States conveyed the surface and subsurface estates encompassing the State's material site to Ahtna, Inc., an Alaska Regional Native Corporation. The conveyance was "subject to" the "[r]ights-of-way for Federal Aid material sites." ANCSA allowed the federal government to waive administration of the rights-of-way, which BLM did in 1984. The BLM waiver stated that the State was the grantee of the right-of-way at issue, and instead of providing an expiration date the waiver described the term of duration of the right-of-way as "[p]erpetual." The waiver entitled Ahtna to "any and all interests previously held by the United States as grantor," but the waiver explicitly stated there were no rental or other revenues associated with the right-of-way. The State removed material from the site until 1988, but the State did not use material from the site for the next 20 years. The State began using the site again in 2008. Ahtna demanded compensation for the removal of gravel from the material site and directed the State to cease and desist further entry onto Ahtna lands. The State responded that its right to remove the gravel pre-existed Ahtna's title interest. The State filed suit against Ahtna, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State, concluding that the State had a valid interest in the material site right-of-way under the Federal-Aid Highway Act, and that Ahtna could not cancel the right-of-way for nonuse or abandonment so long as the State operated and maintained the Denali Highway. Ahtna appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under the assumption that BLM's waiver transferred administrative authority to Ahtna, that authority did not include the right to cancel the State's interest in the material site for nonuse or abandonment without consent from the State. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the State. View "Ahtna, Inc. v. Alaska Dept. of Trans. & Public Facilities" on Justia Law

Several environmental groups challenged decisions made by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) regarding the legality of thirty-nine oil and gas leases in Southern Utah, owned by Kirkwood Oil and Gas, LLC and William C. Kirkwood. In the 1980s, Kirkwood applied to have its oil and gas leases converted to combined hydrocarbon leases, which would allow Kirkwood to extract oil from tar sands. At the time, BLM never accepted or rejected Kirkwood's applications. Between 2006 and 2008, BLM and IBLA issued several decisions declaring that the underlying oil and gas leases were "suspended" pending review of the conversion applications. The groups alleged that the BLM and IBLA violated the Mineral Leasing Act and other federal laws by retroactively deeming the leases to be suspended, avoiding expiration of the leases according to their terms. The district court held the groups did not have standing to bring its claims and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the district court misapplied the law in important respects with regard to standing, the Tenth Circuit ultimately held that this case was not ripe for review. View "S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Palma" on Justia Law

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, which operated a nuclear power plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire, applied to renew its operating license. NextEra submitted a required environmental report that concluded that offshore wind electric generation was not a reasonable alternative to the extended licensing of Seabrook. Several environmental groups (collectively, Petitioners) questioned and sought a hearing on NextEra's environmental report. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board admitted the contention, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) denied the admission of the contention, which resulted in Petitioners not being entitled to have a hearing on the merits about their contention that generation of electricity from offshore wind was a reasonable alternative source of baseload energy to the relicensing of Seabrook. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding (1) the NRC did not misapply case law interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act in formulating its contention-admissibility standard; and (2) NRC's conclusion that the contention was inadmissible was not arbitrary or capricious, and there was no basis in law to set it aside. View "Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Black Beauty petitioned for review of an order of the Federal MSHRC adopting the findings of the ALJ. The court held that the ALJ's conclusion that Black Beauty violated 30 C.F.R. 75.400 was supported by substantial evidence; Black Beauty's violation of section 75.400 constituted an unwarrantable failure; and the ALJ's high negligence finding was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Black Beauty Coal Co. v. MSHR, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of California generators, including Calpine, petitioned for review of FERC's orders under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824. On appeal, the court considered FERC's authority to regulate public-utility charges to independent generators for the latter's use of "station power" - the electricity necessary to operate a generator's requirements for light, heat, air conditioning, etc. The court concluded that FERC's jurisdictional determination was not arbitrary or capricious. The generators were on notice that they could be assessed retail charges for station power depending on the outcome of this litigation. The generators have alternative means of alleviating any potential grievances stemming from retroactive charges. Accordingly, Calpine's petition for review was denied and FERC's orders on remand were affirmed. View "Calpine Corp., et al v. FERC" on Justia Law