Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Tim DeChristopher entered a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) oil and gas lease auction in Salt Lake City, Utah, by representing he was a bidder. His purpose was to disrupt the auction and call attention to the potential environmental harms of drilling on the leases. He proceeded to drive up the auction prices and ultimately won almost $1.8 million in bids, for which he was unable to pay. A jury convicted Defendant of interfering with the provisions of Chapter 3A of the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act, and making a false statement or representation. He appealed, raising eight separate issues related to his conviction. Upon review of each, the Tenth Circuit determined they had no merit and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. DeChristopher" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over the proper calculation of royalty payments on state oil and gas leases. Over the years, the Legislature has enacted several versions of the statutory oil and gas lease, and Lessees have entered into “hundreds” of oil and gas leases with the State. Specifically, the New Mexico Legislature enacted statutory oil and gas leases in 1919, 1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1945, 1947 and 1984. This appeal concerned the royalty clauses contained in the 1931 and the 1947 statutory lease forms. Both the 1931 lease and 1947 lease specified that the payment of royalty was to be calculated as a percentage of the “net proceeds” resulting from the sale of gas. During 2005 and 2006 Commissioner audited ConocoPhillips Company and Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Company’s royalty payments. Following the Audit, Commissioner notified Lessees that they had been underpaying their royalty obligations and issued them assessments for the underpayment. The Commissioner claimed that pursuant to the terms of the statutory lease forms Lessees could not deduct the post-production costs necessary to prepare the gas for the commercial market when calculating their royalty payments. Commissioner claimed that the improper deductions for post-production costs resulted in ConocoPhillips underpaying royalties by approximately $18.9 million and Burlington underpaying by approximately $5.6 million. In response to Commissioner’s audit and assessments, Lessees filed a complaint in the district court seeking a declaration that Commissioner’s assessment of additional royalty constituted a deprivation of due process, an unconstitutional impairment of contract, and breach of contract. In addition, Lessees claimed that Commissioner had exceeded his constitutional and statutory powers by issuing the assessments and had effectively usurped legislative power by seeking royalty payments under calculation methods not approved by the Legislature. In response, Commissioner alleged a host of counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of the implied covenant to market. This appeal pertained to three orders granting summary judgment on behalf of Lessees and a fourth order denying Commissioner’s motion for reconsideration of the district court’s previous dismissal of his counterclaim for breach of the implied covenant to market. In the first order, the district court granted Lessees’ motion for summary judgment. Upon review of the several orders and claims before the Supreme Court on appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "ConocoPhillips Co. v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The Council of the City of New Orleans and the Louisiana Public Service Commission petitioned for review of an order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) allowing two companies to withdraw from a regional energy system agreement without paying exit fees. FERC concluded that there was nothing in the agreement that compelled payments prior to withdrawal. FERC found that, under the terms of the agreement, (1) withdrawing companies were not obligated to pay exit fees, and (2) once companies left the agreement, they no longer needed to continue to make rough equalization payments. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petitions for review, holding that FERC's findings were reasonable. View "Council of City of New Orleans v. FERC" on Justia Law

Underlying this appeal was the case of Center for Biological Diversity v. Interior, in which the Court vacated a five-year program for expanding leases for oil and gas development in the coast of Alaska. The U.S. Department of Interior, which approved the program, then issued a new five-year program. Here, the Native Village of Point Hope, Alaska, petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for reimbursement of attorneys' fees and costs it incurred in this matter. The D.C. Circuit allowed reimbursement in the amount of $192,293 in fees and $8,493 in costs, for a total reimbursement of $200,786.

Plaintiff-Appellant WildEarth Guardians sued Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo) pursuant to the Clean Air Act's citizen-suit provisions seeking civil penalties and an injunction to halt construction for a new coal-fired power plant in Pueblo, Colorado. WildEarth's principal argument was that PSCo failed to obtain a valid construction permit. Although the project initially complied with all applicable federal and state laws when construction commenced in 2005, the regulatory landscape changed in 2008. A decision of the D.C. Circuit required regulators to impose additional Clean Air Act requirements upon new power plant construction. While litigation was pending, PSCo finished constructing the plant and came into compliance with the new regulatory regime. The district court dismissed the suit, reasoning that to find a Clean Air violation under the circumstances would be to give unwarranted retroactive effect to the decision of the D.C. Circuit. The question before the Tenth Circuit was whether WildEarth's allegations that PSCo violated the Act became moot. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "under the unusual circumstances of this case . . . PSCo's violations could nto reasonably be expected to recur, and thus no deterrent effect could be achieved." Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as moot.

The United States petitioned the district court for an order enforcing a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) subpoena served on Golden Valley Electric Association (Golden Valley) for power consumption records concerning three customer residences. The court granted the petition and ordered compliance. Golden Valley complied with the subpoena but appealed the order. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Golden Valley's compliance with the district court's enforcement order did not moot the appeal; (2) the DEA's subpoena sought information relevant to a drug investigation, was procedurally proper, and was not overly broad; and (3) the subpoena complied with the Fourth Amendment.

US Magnesium sought review of a recent final rule from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In its rule, the EPA called for Utah to revise its State Implementation Plan (SIP) for the federal Clean Air Act (CAA). Under the CAA, the EPA may call for a state to revise its SIP (a SIP Call) if the EPA finds the state’s current SIP substantially inadequate. Here, the EPA determined that Utah’s SIP was substantially inadequate because it contained an Unavoidable Breakdown Rule (UBR), which permits operators of CAA-regulated facilities to avoid enforcement actions when they suffer an unexpected and unavoidable equipment malfunction. In this SIP Call, published as a final rule in April 2011, the EPA requested that Utah promulgate a new UBR—one that conforms with the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA. US Magnesium maintained that the SIP Call was arbitrary and capricious and asked the Tenth Circuit to vacate it. Upon review, the Court did not find the EPA's decision arbitrary and capricious, and denied US Magnesium's petition for review.

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation petitioned the Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board to determine the propriety of costs that Kelly Oil Company was attempting to charge to Anadarko as a nonconsenting owner in a force-integrated drilling unit. The Board determined that all costs Kelly Oil was attempting to charge were properly chargeable. The chancery court affirmed the Board's order, and Anadarko appealed. Because the Board's order contained insufficient reasoning and findings of fact for the Supreme Court to conduct an adequate review, the Court vacated the Board's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Relators filed two qui tam suits against Shell, alleging that Shell had defrauded the U.S. Department of the Interior. At the time their suits were filed, Relators were federal employees who discovered wrongdoing in the scope of their official duties. The district court granted summary judgment to Shell on the ground that two False Claims Act (Act) provisions prohibited the suit: 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(1), describing who may bring suit; and 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(A),(B), which contained a public disclosure bar. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding (1) a federal employee, even one whose job it is to investigate fraud, a "person" under the Act such that he may maintain a qui tam action; and (2) the district court used an overly broad conception of the Act's public disclosure bar.

Pattison Sand Company operated a sandstone mine in Iowa. After part of the mine roof collapsed near where a miner was working, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) issued an order under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act prohibiting any activity in much of the mine. Pattison challenged the order before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. An ALJ determined that the order was valid and that the Commission lacked authority to modify it. Pattison moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing MSHA from enforcing parts of the order. The federal district court denied relief. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted in part and denied in part Pattison's petition for review and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination that the roof fall was an accident within the meaning of the Act; (2) the ALJ's determination that he lacked the authority to modify the order was in error; and (3) the district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the company's request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was not in error.