Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The court addressed a procedural question that related to Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utilities & others (No. 1). At issue was whether the department committed error in denying the third motion filed by the Alliance to reopen the administrative record in the proceeding that the court reviewed in Alliance III. The court applied the more deferential standard of review that generally applied to procedural decisions by agencies on whether to reopen an administrative record and held that the department did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen a closed record in a completed proceeding in order to accept more information on the same points. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court where the decision of the department denying the motion to reopen the record was to be affirmed.

PSEG challenged orders of the FERC accepting the results of an auction for electric generation capacity conducted by ISO New England. In those orders, FERC approved ISO New England's determination that PSEG's resources in Connecticut could not reduce their capacity supply obligation because doing so would endanger the system's reliability. FERC also held that ISO New England could reduce the per unit price paid to PSEG for that capacity. The court held that because the latter holding was based on tariff provisions that the FERC thought were clear but now conceded were ambiguous, and because in the course of construing those provisions it failed to respond to PSEG's facially legitimate objections, the petition was granted and the orders were remanded for further consideration.

This case stemmed from FERC's statutory mandate set out in the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824-824w, to ensure that all rates and charges made, demanded, or received by power wholesalers were just and reasonable. Petitioners subsequently sought review of FERC's final order (Order 697), contending that the order violated FERC's governing statutes. In Order 697, FERC codified the existing limited market-based policy, along with multiple enhancements, in a final rule. At issue was whether the market-based regulatory policy established by FERC's order was permissible under the law. Taking into account Chevron deference, the law of the circuit, other relevant precedent, and the direction of the Supreme Court as to how the court should approach such administrative law issues concerning federal agencies, the court concluded that Order 697 did not per se violate the FPA.

Appellant Alaskan Crude Corporation operates an oil and gas unit known as the "Arctic Fortitude Unit." Alaskan Crudeâs unit agreement with the Department of Natural Resources set work obligation deadlines that Alaskan Crude was required to meet to continue operating the Unit. In July 2008 the Commissioner found that Alaskan Crude had failed to meet its work obligations, gave notice that Alaskan Crude was in default under its unit agreement, and specified that the Unit would be terminated if Alaskan Crude did not cure the default by a new set of deadlines. Alaskan Crude appealed the Commissionerâs decision to the superior court, arguing that a pending judicial decision in a separate appeal qualified as a force majeure under the unit agreement, preventing Alaskan Crude from meeting its work obligations. It also argued that the Commissionerâs proposed default cure was an improper unilateral amendment of Alaskan Crudeâs unit agreement. The superior court affirmed the Commissionerâs findings and decision and Alaskan Crude appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the pending judicial decision in Alaskan Crudeâs separate appeal did not trigger the force majeure clause of the unit agreement; and (2) the Commissionerâs proposed default cure was not a unilateral amendment of Alaskan Crudeâs unit agreement. Thus the Court affirmed the decision of the superior court upholding the decision of the Commissioner.

Plaintiff, which owned a nuclear power plant, entered into the standard U.S. Department of Energy contract, under which DOE agreed to collect spent nuclear fuel (SNF) no later than 1998. DOE never began collecting SNF and has breached contracts nationwide. Massachusetts restructured the electric utility industry and, in 1999, the plant sold for $80 million; buyer agreed to accept decommissioning responsibilities for $428 million. The district court awarded $40 million for the portion of the decommissioning fund corresponding to projected post-decommissioning SNF-related costs attributable to DOEâs continuing breach. The court awarded the buyer $4 million in mitigation damages, including direct and overhead costs for new spent fuel racks and fees paid to the NRC. The Federal Circuit reversed in part and remanded. Plaintiff cannot recover damages under a diminution-of-value theory in a partial breach setting. The sale of assets does not alter the principle that when the breaching party has not repudiated and is still expected to perform, anticipated damages are not recoverable until incurred. A non-breaching party may recover from the government indirect overhead costs associated with mitigation and the costs of financing those activities.

The issue on this appeal centers on who should bear responsibility for the cost of cleaning up petroleum contamination caused by releases from a gas station's underground storage tanks. The controversy in this appeal was between the State of Vermont, which runs the Vermont Petroleum Cleanup Fund (VPCF) and Stonington Insurance Co. (Stonington), which insured Bradford Oil, the owner of the underground storage tanks, for approximately a three-and-a-half-year period. The State appealed the trial court's judgment limiting Stonington's liability to a 4/27 share of past and future cleanup costs and awarded the State $45,172.05. On appeal, the State argued: (1) the Supreme Court's application of time-on-the-risk allocation in "Towns v. Northern Security Insurance Co." did not preclude joint and several liability under all standard occurrence-based policy language; (2) the circumstances here, including the reasonable expectations of the insured and the equity and policy considerations, support imposing joint and several liability on Stonington for all of the State's VPCF expenditures; and (3) even if time-on-the-risk allocation would otherwise be appropriate, Stonington was not entitled to such allocation because it failed to show sufficient facts to apply this allocation method in this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Towns" was the controlling case law here, and the Court was unconvinced by the State's reasonable expectations, equity, and policy arguments to distinguish the "Towns" decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

This case consolidated appeals that challenged the Public Regulation Commission's (PRC) effort to comply with the Efficient Use of Energy Act (EUEA).  The EUEA was amended by the Legislature, requiring the PRC to identify and remove regulatory disincentives to a public utility's implementation of energy efficiency programs.  To comply with this legislative mandate, the PRC issued a Final Order amending its Energy Efficiency Rules.  The Attorney General (AG) and the New Mexico Industrial Energy Consumers (NMIEC) separately appealed the PRC's Final Order, challenging the Final Order on several grounds.  The Supreme Court consolidated both appeals, and after reviewing the record, annulled and vacated the PRC's Final Order.

Five companies entered into special contracts with the Toledo Edison Company for the sale of electricity. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) established February 2008 as the termination date for the contracts, basing its finding on the language of the special contracts and its orders in earlier electric-deregulation cases. Appellants challenged the decision, contending (1) Toledo Edison agreed in 2001 that the contracts would not terminate until Toledo Edison stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges from its customers, and (2) December 31, 2008 was the date when Toledo Edison stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PUCO ignored the plain language of the 2001 amendments to Appellants' special contracts, and accordingly, the PUCO unlawfully and unreasonably allowed Toledo Edison to terminate the special contracts in February 2008.

Defendant Alabama Power Company filed a petition for the writ of mandamus to ask the Supreme Court to direct the trial court to dismiss Plaintiff Capitol Container, Inc.'s claims against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Alabama Power argued the Alabama Public Service Commission (APSC) had exclusive jurisdiction over those claims Capitol filed, and Capitol failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its action. Upon review of the record below, the Supreme Court found that Capitol indeed failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its suit against the power company. The Court issued the writ.

This case stemmed from a challenge by environmental groups to a proposed incremental drawdown of water from Lake Roosevelt in eastern Washington. At issue was whether the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) took a "hard look" and genuinely scrutinized the environmental consequence of its proposed action. The court held that, under its precedents and the circumstances presented, Reclamation's actions did not violate the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court also held that its review revealed no other deficiencies in the substance of the Environmental Assessment (EA), and although Reclamation took several steps toward implementing the drawdown project before drafting the EA, it scrupulously adhered to NEPA's timing requirements. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.