Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Steve Shehyn, owns a 20-acre avocado orchard in Moorpark, California. He alleged that sediment from the Ventura County Public Works Agency and Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1's (collectively, the District) water delivery system permanently damaged his irrigation pipes and orchard. The plaintiff claimed that the sediment was a direct result of the District's water supply facilities' plan, design, maintenance, and operation.The trial court sustained the District's demurrer to the plaintiff's first amended complaint, which included causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and inverse condemnation. The court allowed the plaintiff to amend the breach of contract and negligence claims but sustained the demurrer without leave to amend for the inverse condemnation claim, citing that the plaintiff "invited" the District's water onto his property. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, maintaining the inverse condemnation claim unchanged and indicating his intent to seek a writ of mandamus. The trial court entered judgment for the District after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his contract and negligence claims without prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claim for inverse condemnation. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations that the District's water delivery system delivered a disproportionate amount of sediment to his property, causing damage, supported a claim for inverse condemnation. The court disagreed with the trial court's reliance on Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., stating that the issue of whether the plaintiff "invited" the water goes to the merits of the claim, not its viability at the pleading stage. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. View "Shehyn v. Ventura County Public Works Agency" on Justia Law

The case involves Protect the Gallatin River (PTGR) appealing a decision by the Gallatin County Floodplain Administrator to issue a floodplain permit for the Riverbend Glamping Getaway project proposed by Jeff and Jirina Pfeil. The project includes developing a campground with non-permanent structures on an island in the Gallatin River. PTGR argued that the public's right to participate was violated and that the Floodplain Administrator's decision was erroneous.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court of Gallatin County reviewed the case and issued an order on November 13, 2023, resolving competing summary judgment motions. The court denied PTGR's motions for partial summary judgment, granted summary judgment in favor of Gallatin County and the Pfeils regarding PTGR's complaint, and addressed other related claims. PTGR then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Floodplain Administrator did not violate PTGR's right to participate, as the public was given a reasonable opportunity to comment, and the decision not to re-open public comment was not arbitrary or capricious. The court also found that the Floodplain Administrator's participation in the appeal process before the Commission was appropriate and lawful, as it did not involve post hoc rationalizations. Finally, the court held that the Floodplain Administrator's decision complied with the Gallatin County Floodplain Regulations and was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's summary judgment orders. View "Protect the Gallatin v. Gallatin Co." on Justia Law

A resident of Alaska filed a lawsuit challenging amendments to the State’s predator control program. The resident claimed that after the changes were implemented, she observed a noticeable decrease in the brown bear population at Katmai National Park, where she frequently visited to view bears. She argued that the Board of Game violated its constitutional and statutory duties by not providing adequate notice and opportunities for public input before adopting the changes, which expanded the program to target bears.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, dismissed the complaint, concluding that the resident lacked standing and was not entitled to a declaratory judgment on the validity of the regulatory change. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the Board of Game and the Commissioner of the Department of Fish & Game.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and held that the resident had standing because she demonstrated an injury to her interest in viewing bears at Katmai National Park, which was sufficient to show standing. The court also concluded that she was entitled to a declaratory judgment on the validity of the regulation. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of her complaint, vacated the associated award of attorney’s fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bittner v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

The case involves the interpretation of the phrase “has proven to be operational” in the definition of “best available control technology” (BACT) under Texas law. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) is responsible for issuing permits for facilities like power plants, ensuring they use BACT, which must be technically practicable and economically reasonable. The dispute centers on whether BACT requires a pollution control method to be currently operating under a TCEQ permit or if it can refer to methods deemed capable of operating in the future.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of Texas. The underlying litigation about the permitting of a power plant is not pending in the Texas Supreme Court, but the court has jurisdiction to answer the certified question under the Texas Constitution.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the phrase “has proven to be operational” requires that the pollution control method must have already been demonstrated to be operational through experience and research. It does not require the method to be currently operating under a TCEQ permit, nor does it allow for methods that are only deemed capable of operating in the future. The court emphasized that the statutory requirement for BACT includes considerations of technical practicability and economic reasonableness, and the administrative rule must be interpreted based on its plain text. The court rejected the notion that previously issued permits determine BACT for other facilities, stating that each facility’s proposal must be evaluated on its own merits based on real-world experience and research. View "PORT ARTHUR COMMUNITY ACTION NETWORK v. TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY" on Justia Law

The California Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted a regulation in August 2020 to limit emissions from ocean-going vessels while docked at California ports. The Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA) challenged this regulation, arguing that CARB acted arbitrarily and capriciously by setting unfeasible compliance deadlines for emissions control measures. WSPA also claimed that CARB violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by not timely disclosing a commissioned report on tanker emissions and failed to adequately analyze safety hazards and cumulative environmental impacts under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied WSPA’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding that CARB had the authority to set emissions standards requiring future technology and that WSPA did not prove the necessary technology would not be developed in time. The court also found that CARB substantially complied with the APA’s notice provisions and did not violate CEQA in its environmental analysis.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that CARB’s determination that compliance with the regulation was feasible did not lack evidentiary support. CARB relied on assurances from technology providers that capture and control systems could be adapted for tankers by the compliance deadlines. The court also found that CARB substantially complied with the APA by making the emissions report available before the end of the comment period, allowing WSPA to provide feedback. Finally, the court held that CARB’s environmental analysis under CEQA was adequate, as it provided a general discussion of potential impacts and appropriately deferred more specific analysis to future site-specific reviews. View "Western States Petroleum Ass'n. v. Cal. Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian, challenged the U.S. Air Force's decision to engage in hazardous waste disposal at Tarague Beach, Guam, without conducting a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review. The Air Force planned to dispose of unexploded ordnance through Open Burning/Open Detonation (OB/OD) operations. The nonprofit argued that the Air Force failed to take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts and did not engage the public as required by NEPA.The District Court of Guam dismissed the case, holding that Prutehi Litekyan lacked standing because its injury was not fairly traceable to the Air Force's actions. The court also found that there was no final agency action, making the case unripe for judicial review. Additionally, the court ruled that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permitting process made NEPA review redundant, thus Prutehi Litekyan failed to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Prutehi Litekyan had standing because the Air Force's failure to conduct NEPA review could have influenced its decision on waste disposal methods, making the injury fairly traceable to the Air Force's actions. The court also determined that the Air Force's decision to apply for a RCRA permit and its detailed plans for OB/OD operations constituted final agency action, making the case ripe for judicial review.Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that NEPA applied to the Air Force's decision to conduct OB/OD operations at Tarague Beach. The court found that RCRA's permitting process did not displace NEPA's requirements, as the two statutes serve different purposes and are not redundant. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "LITEKYAN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE" on Justia Law

Environmental groups challenged the issuance of a permit by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the development of the Cainhoy Plantation in South Carolina. The plaintiffs argued that the permit violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). They claimed the permit improperly used a habitat surrogate to set the level of anticipated take of an endangered species and was issued after an Environmental Assessment (EA) rather than a more comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they did not have a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court concluded that the Corps' decision to issue the permit based on an EA was reasonable and that the use of a habitat surrogate was justified under the circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the Corps had taken the required "hard look" at the environmental consequences of the project as mandated by NEPA and that the use of a habitat surrogate was appropriate given the impracticality of monitoring the take of individual bats. The court found that the Corps' decision to rely on an EA instead of preparing an EIS was entitled to deference and that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court also noted that the surrogate used by the Service was enforceable and set a clear standard for determining when the level of anticipated take had been exceeded. View "South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The case involves the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association, Inc. (MALA) challenging a final rule issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) that seasonally bans vertical buoy lines used in lobster and Jonah crab trap fishing in certain federal waters off Massachusetts from February 1 to April 30 each year. The NMFS issued this rule to protect the endangered North Atlantic right whales from entanglement in these buoy lines during their foraging period.Previously, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of MALA, holding that the final rule conflicted with a temporary statutory authorization for lobster and Jonah crab fishing contained in a rider to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. The district court found that the final rule did not fall within the exception provided in the rider, which allowed for actions to extend or make final an emergency rule that was in place on the date of the rider's enactment, December 29, 2022. The court concluded that the 2022 emergency rule was not "in place" on that date because it was not actively preventing fishing in the Wedge area at that time.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the 2022 emergency rule was indeed "in place" on December 29, 2022, for the purposes of the rider's exception. The court reasoned that the emergency rule's findings and authority were still relevant and could serve as a basis for future regulatory actions, such as the final rule. Therefore, the final rule was lawful and enforceable under the exception provided in the rider. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Mass. Lobstermen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv." on Justia Law

The Unkechaug Indian Nation and its Chief, Harry B. Wallace, challenged the enforcement of New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations prohibiting the harvesting of American glass eels. They argued that the Andros Order, a 1676 agreement between the Royal Governor of New York and the Nation, allowed them to fish freely and preempted the DEC’s regulations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the DEC from enforcing these regulations against the Nation’s members in their customary fishing waters.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Andros Order is not federal law preempting New York’s fishing regulations. The court also found that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Commissioner Basil Seggos in his official capacity under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims against Commissioner Seggos under the Ex parte Young exception. The court also found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to resolve Daubert motions or privilege disputes before ruling on the summary judgment motions. Finally, the court held that the Andros Order is not federal law binding on the United States because it was entered before the Confederal period, on behalf of the British Crown, and has not been ratified by the United States. Therefore, the Andros Order does not preempt New York’s fishing regulations, and the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Unkechaug Indian Nation v. Seggos" on Justia Law

A group of individuals and West Rockhill Township challenged the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding its approval of a compressor station project by Adelphia Gateway, LLC. The DEP's approval was part of the federal Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act (APCA) enforcement. The challengers sought review from the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board (EHB), which dismissed the appeals, citing the Third Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) for such federal law-related decisions.The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed the EHB's dismissal, holding that the EHB had jurisdiction to review the DEP's decision. The court reasoned that an appeal to the EHB is not a "civil action" under the NGA, which grants the Third Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions challenging state agency decisions under federal law. The court distinguished administrative proceedings from civil actions, noting that EHB appeals are administrative in nature and not subject to the NGA's jurisdictional provision.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision. The court held that the EHB has jurisdiction to review the DEP's permitting decisions under the CAA and APCA. It concluded that EHB appeals are not "civil actions" as defined by the NGA, and thus, the Third Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction does not preempt EHB's review. The court also emphasized that the DEP's decisions are not final until the opportunity for EHB review has passed, aligning with Pennsylvania's statutory framework and the federal Clean Air Act's delegation of authority to state agencies. The case was remanded to the EHB for substantive review of the challengers' appeals. View "Cole v. DEP" on Justia Law