Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Marjorie Johnson, the owner of farmland, was denied a permit by the Village of Polk to drill a new well for irrigating her farmland. She sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance requiring a permit for new wells in the village’s wellhead protection area was invalid, arguing it was preempted by the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and violated state law by interfering with her existing farming operations.The district court for Polk County denied her request for declaratory judgment and her petition in error. The court found that the ordinance was not preempted by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature intended for both local natural resources districts (NRDs) and municipalities to have control over water sources. The court also found that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the land was previously irrigated through an agreement with a neighbor, and it was the dispute with the neighbor, not the ordinance, that resulted in the land being dryland.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was enacted under the necessary statutory grant of power to the municipality, as the Wellhead Protection Area Act and other statutes granted villages the authority to adopt controls to protect public water supplies. The court also found no field or conflict preemption by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature did not intend to deprive municipalities of their statutory authority to require permits for wells within wellhead protection areas. Finally, the court agreed that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the existing farming at the time of the permit request was dryland farming, and it was the neighbor’s actions, not the ordinance, that prevented irrigation. View "Johnson v. Village of Polk" on Justia Law

Upper Missouri Waterkeeper and seven Broadwater County residents challenged the approval of a subdivision by 71 Ranch, LP, arguing it did not meet the "exempt well" exception for a water rights permit. They sought attorney fees under the Montana Water Use Act, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), and the Private Attorney General Doctrine. The District Court denied their request for fees under all three claims.The First Judicial District Court found that the subdivision's environmental assessment was inadequate and that the County abused its discretion in approving the subdivision. The court ruled in favor of Upper Missouri on most claims but denied their request for attorney fees. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of fees.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the Water Use Act did not authorize fees. However, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of fees under the UDJA, finding that the District Court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court held that the equities supported an award of attorney fees and that the declaratory relief sought by Upper Missouri was necessary to change the status quo. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine a reasonable amount of fees and their apportionment. The Supreme Court did not address the private attorney general claim. View "Upper Missouri v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of a dairy farm and residences adjacent to Burlington International Airport, sued the City of Burlington for soil and water contamination caused by runoff from the airport. The contamination was due to the use of aqueous film-forming foam containing PFAS by the Vermont Air National Guard, which leased part of the airport. Plaintiffs alleged negligence, trespass, private nuisance, de facto taking, violation of the Vermont Groundwater Protection Act, increased water surface drainage, and direct negligence.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the complaint for failure to join the United States and the Guard as necessary and indispensable parties, and on the basis of municipal immunity. The court found that the United States and the Guard were necessary parties because their actions were central to the claims and their absence could lead to inconsistent obligations for the City. The court also held that municipal immunity applied to the claims related to firefighting services.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claim (Count 1) because it was based on the Guard’s firefighting activities, making the United States and the Guard necessary parties. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the other claims (Counts 2-5 and 7), which were based on the City’s failure to contain contaminated water on its property. The court found that these claims did not require the presence of the United States or the Guard as necessary parties.The court also remanded the case for further consideration of whether municipal immunity applied to the City’s maintenance and operation activities alleged in the surviving counts. The court noted that municipal airport operations are generally considered proprietary functions, which are not protected by municipal immunity. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Belter v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), a federal agency responsible for marketing power generated at federal hydroelectric facilities in the Columbia River Basin, holds financial reserves to maintain stable rates. When these reserves exceed a certain threshold, BPA is required to spend the excess. In fiscal years 2022 and 2023, BPA decided to allocate only about 10 percent of its excess reserves to fish and wildlife mitigation efforts, prompting environmental groups led by the Idaho Conservation League (ICL) to challenge this decision.The environmental groups argued that BPA's decision violated its obligations under section 4(h)(11)(A) of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (NWPA), which requires BPA to provide equitable treatment for fish and wildlife and to consider the Council's environmental mitigation program to the fullest extent practicable. BPA contended that section 4(h)(11)(A) did not apply to its financial decisions regarding the allocation of excess reserves.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the petitions for review were timely filed within 90 days of BPA's final allocation decisions. The court also determined that the cases were not moot, as the issues raised were capable of repetition while evading review.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit concluded that BPA's allocation of its excess financial reserves was not subject to the requirements of section 4(h)(11)(A) of the NWPA. Instead, the court found that section 4(h)(10)(A) specifically addresses BPA's use of the excess financial reserve fund for fish and wildlife and does not require the same level of prioritization as section 4(h)(11)(A). Consequently, the court denied the petitions for review. View "IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION" on Justia Law

The case involves the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and its application of the Spills Law, which mandates that parties responsible for hazardous substance discharges must notify the DNR and take necessary actions to mitigate environmental harm. The central issue is whether the DNR must promulgate rules identifying specific substances, including PFAS, as hazardous before enforcing the Spills Law.The Waukesha County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. (WMC) and Leather Rich, Inc., holding that the DNR's policies on emerging contaminants like PFAS were invalid unpromulgated rules. The court of appeals affirmed this decision.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the DNR's statements regarding PFAS and other emerging contaminants as hazardous substances were guidance documents, not rules, and thus did not require rulemaking. The Court also determined that the DNR's interim decision to offer only partial liability exemptions in the Voluntary Party Remediation and Exemption from Liability program was a guidance document. Additionally, the Court found that the DNR's communications did not impose a reporting threshold for PFAS discharges.The Supreme Court concluded that the DNR has broad but explicit authority under the Spills Law to enforce reporting thresholds for hazardous substances without promulgating specific rules. Therefore, the DNR's actions were within its statutory authority, and the decision of the court of appeals was reversed, with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the DNR. View "Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved California regulations under the Clean Air Act that require automakers to produce more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles to reduce emissions. Several fuel producers, including those of gasoline and ethanol, sued the EPA, arguing that the EPA lacked the authority to approve these regulations as they target global climate change rather than local air quality issues. The fuel producers claimed that the regulations would significantly reduce the demand for liquid fuels, causing them monetary injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the fuel producers lacked Article III standing. The court found that the fuel producers failed to demonstrate that automakers would likely respond to the invalidation of the regulations by producing fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles, thus failing to establish redressability.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge the EPA’s approval of the California regulations. The Court found that the fuel producers demonstrated injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The Court reasoned that the regulations likely cause monetary injury to the fuel producers by reducing the demand for gasoline and other liquid fuels. The Court also found that invalidating the regulations would likely redress the injury by increasing the sales of gasoline-powered vehicles and, consequently, the demand for liquid fuels. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The case involves the Center for Biological Diversity and other petitioners challenging the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) Program for the years 2023, 2024, and 2025. The petitioners include environmental organizations, refiners, a renewable fuel producer, and a biofuel trade association. They argue that the EPA's rule, known as the Set Rule, fails to adequately address the environmental impacts, particularly greenhouse gas emissions and effects on endangered species.The lower court, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reviewed the EPA's RFS Program standards for 2020-2022 in a previous case, Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co. LLC v. EPA. In that case, the court upheld the EPA's standards. In the current case, the petitioners argue that the EPA did not adequately explain its reliance on outdated data for greenhouse gas emissions and failed to properly consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) regarding the impact on endangered species.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the EPA's use of outdated data for greenhouse gas emissions was arbitrary and capricious. The court also found that the FWS's concurrence with the EPA's determination that the Set Rule would have "no effect" on endangered species was not adequately explained. The court remanded the Set Rule to the EPA and FWS for further consideration and explanation without vacating the rule. The court denied the petitions of Neste and the Refiner Petitioners and dismissed SABR's petition for untimeliness and lack of standing. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Environmental organizations challenged the EPA's decision not to revise technology-based pollution limits, guidelines, and standards (ELGs) for seven specific industrial categories under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The petitioners argued that the ELGs for these categories were outdated and did not reflect advances in pollution control technology.The EPA's decision was based on its Effluent Guidelines Program Plan 15, which used a Category Ranking Analysis to prioritize ELGs for revision. This analysis ranked industries based on the concentration and total load of pollutants discharged, using data from discharge monitoring reports (DMR data) from direct dischargers. The EPA did not consider data from indirect dischargers or unregulated pollutants in this analysis. The EPA concluded that revising the ELGs for the seven categories was not a priority based on this analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the EPA's refusal to revise the ELGs constituted final agency action and was reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court found that the EPA's reliance on the Category Ranking Analysis was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider advances in pollution control technology, pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers, and unregulated pollutants. The court also found that the EPA's decision regarding the plastics molding and forming category was arbitrary and capricious due to inadequate explanation.The court granted the petition for review in part, remanding the case to the EPA to reconsider its decision or provide a fuller explanation. The court emphasized that the EPA must offer a reasoned justification for its decisions consistent with the CWA and APA. View "Waterkeeper Alliance v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Interim Storage Partners (ISP) applied for a license to build a facility in West Texas to store spent nuclear fuel. During the licensing process, a Texas government agency and Fasken Land and Minerals, a private business, submitted comments on the draft environmental impact statement prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Fasken also sought to intervene in the licensing proceeding but was denied by the NRC. Fasken challenged this denial before the full Commission and the D.C. Circuit but was unsuccessful.In September 2021, the NRC granted ISP a license to build and operate the storage facility. Texas and Fasken sought review of the NRC's licensing decision in the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit vacated ISP's license, allowing Texas and Fasken to challenge the NRC's decision despite not being parties to the licensing proceeding.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Texas and Fasken were not entitled to judicial review of the NRC's licensing decision because they were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding. The Court emphasized that under the Hobbs Act, only a "party aggrieved" by a licensing order of the Commission may seek judicial review. To qualify as a party, one must be the license applicant or have successfully intervened in the proceeding. Since Texas and Fasken did not meet these criteria, they could not obtain judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded the case with instructions to deny or dismiss the petitions for review. View "Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its denial of small refinery exemption petitions under the Clean Air Act's (CAA) renewable fuel program. The CAA requires most domestic refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels, with a phased exemption scheme for small refineries. Following a Supreme Court decision in HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn., the EPA reconsidered and ultimately denied 105 exemption petitions in 2022, based on its interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" and an economic theory that Renewable Identification Number (RIN) costs are passed through to consumers.The small refineries challenged these denials in multiple regional Circuits. Most Circuits either dismissed the challenges for improper venue or transferred them to the D.C. Circuit. However, the Fifth Circuit retained jurisdiction, ruling that the EPA's actions were locally applicable and not based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect, as the EPA still examined refinery-specific facts before issuing denials.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit. The Court concluded that the EPA's interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" and its RIN passthrough theory were determinations of nationwide scope or effect that formed the core basis for the denials. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit erred in retaining jurisdiction, and the case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Environmental Protection Agency v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C." on Justia Law