Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

During the Second World War, Chevron’s corporate predecessor operated oil fields in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, producing crude oil that was refined into aviation gasoline (avgas) for the United States military under federal contracts. Decades later, following the enactment of Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978, which imposed permit requirements on certain uses of the coastal zone but exempted uses lawfully commenced before 1980, Plaquemines Parish and other parishes brought suit in state court. They alleged that Chevron and other oil companies had failed to obtain required permits and that some pre-1980 activities, including those during the war, were illegally commenced and not exempt.The parish’s expert report specifically challenged Chevron’s wartime crude-oil production methods, including its use of vertical drilling, canals, and earthen pits, as harmful to the environment and not in compliance with the Act. Chevron sought removal to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1), arguing that the suit was “for or relating to” acts under color of its duties as a federal contractor refining avgas. The United States District Court granted the parish’s motion to remand to state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that although Chevron acted under a federal officer as a military contractor, the suit did not “relate to” those acts because the federal refining contract did not govern how Chevron obtained or produced crude oil.The Supreme Court of the United States held that Chevron plausibly alleged a close, not tenuous or remote, relationship between the challenged crude-oil production and its federal avgas refining duties. The Court concluded that the suit satisfied the “relating to” requirement for removal under §1442(a)(1), vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish" on Justia Law

A state environmental agency received a broad public records request from a nonprofit organization seeking documents related to a recent assessment on ethylene oxide. The agency responded the next day, asking the organization to clarify whether it wanted confidential information, which would require a formal opinion from the state attorney general and could delay production. The requester promptly confirmed it sought all responsive records, including any considered confidential but subject to disclosure under the public records law. The agency believed many documents were exempt under a deliberative-process exception and, within what it believed to be the deadline, sent a request to the attorney general for a ruling. The attorney general later determined that the agency had missed the ten-business-day deadline by two days, so the information was presumed public unless there was a compelling reason to withhold it.The agency then provided additional evidence that it was closed on July 5 due to the Independence Day holiday, that its request was timely mailed, and that it had sought clarification from the requester. Nonetheless, the Attorney General declined to reconsider. The agency filed a declaratory judgment action in district court, and the nonprofit intervened, seeking to compel disclosure. The Office of the Attorney General later conceded its original calculation was mistaken, but the district court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, ordering disclosure of over 6,000 pages. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, holding the request for a ruling was untimely and rejecting the agency’s arguments about deadlines and clarifications.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the ten-business-day deadline for the agency’s request was reset by its timely, good-faith request for narrowing or clarification, and that the agency established timely submission of its request under the mailbox rule. It reversed the judgments below and remanded for further proceedings to determine if the deliberative-process privilege protects the records. View "TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY v. PAXTON" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations, Native tribes, and individual plaintiffs sought to prevent a land exchange in Southeast Arizona’s Tonto National Forest, mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. This exchange would transfer nearly 2,500 acres of federal land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—and a large copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC. In return, the company would provide over 5,000 acres of equally appraised land to the federal government. Plaintiffs raised concerns under several statutes, including the Land Exchange Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive flaws in the exchange.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions for preliminary injunctions, finding that plaintiffs failed to show likely success or serious questions on the merits of their claims relating to appraisal, NEPA compliance, tribal consultation, and religious liberty. In a related case, Apache Stronghold v. United States, the district court’s denial of an injunction on religious liberty grounds was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and not disturbed by the Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing and that their NEPA claims were justiciable as “final agency action.” However, it concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their appraisal, NEPA, consultation, or religious liberty claims. The court further determined that existing precedent foreclosed the RFRA and Free Exercise arguments. The court did not address other injunction factors and dissolved the administrative stay. View "BROWN LOPEZ V. USA" on Justia Law

A mining company sought to expand its underground coal mine situated beneath Indian lands. To proceed, it needed approval for a revised permit, a new federal lease, and a modification of its operations plan. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement and the Bureau of Land Management jointly conducted an environmental assessment, solicited public comments, and ultimately granted the necessary authorizations for expansion.Two advocacy groups opposed the expansion, citing potential impacts on water resources and basing their challenges on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. They previously sued, raising claims under the rescinded Stream Protection Rule, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected those claims. The groups later amended their complaint to invoke different provisions of the Act, specifically Sections 1270 and 1276. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied their petition for judicial review, concluding the claims were substantially similar to those previously rejected and finding the agency had fulfilled its nondiscretionary duties.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the advocacy groups could not obtain relief under Section 1270 because they failed to provide adequate notice of the alleged violations and had advanced claims implicating discretionary, not mandatory, agency actions. The court also found that Section 1276 did not authorize judicial review for the groups because they had not participated in the permit-review process as required by the statute. The court clarified that commenting on an environmental assessment was not a substitute for objecting to the permit application itself. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for judicial review. View "Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. United States" on Justia Law

Several oil refineries with average daily crude oil throughput below 75,000 barrels in 2024 applied to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2025 for exemptions from their obligations under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program for the 2024 compliance year. The RFS program, established under the Clean Air Act, requires refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels. The Act provides for a “small refinery” exemption for facilities that do not exceed the 75,000-barrel threshold in a calendar year. The petitioning refineries did not seek exemptions for 2023 and based their applications solely on their 2024 throughput.After the refineries submitted their applications, the EPA informed them that, under its 2014 regulation, eligibility required a refinery to meet the “small refinery” definition both for "the most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension" and for "the year or years for which an exemption is sought." The EPA interpreted this to mean petitioners needed to satisfy the throughput limit in both 2023 and 2024. Since the refineries exceeded the threshold in 2023, the EPA denied the exemption requests. The refineries then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA’s interpretation of its 2014 regulation was contrary to the regulation’s plain text. The court found that, because the applications were filed in 2025 for the 2024 compliance year, both the “most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension” and “the year for which an exemption is sought” referred to 2024. Since the petitioners met the threshold in 2024, they were eligible under the regulation. The court vacated the EPA’s denial orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Florida sought approval from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assume authority for issuing permits under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which would allow parties to discharge pollutants into state waters. To streamline the process for permit applicants and reduce the burden of complying with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Florida proposed a permitting program in which the state would monitor and protect ESA-listed species primarily through a “technical assistance process,” with only advisory input from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The EPA and FWS approved Florida’s proposal after the FWS issued a programmatic Biological Opinion (BiOp) and Incidental Take Statement (ITS) that found no jeopardy to protected species and exempted permittees from further ESA liability, relying heavily on Florida’s assurances rather than detailed, up-front analysis.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the actions of the EPA and FWS after environmental groups challenged Florida’s permitting program, asserting violations of the ESA and Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court found that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS were unlawful because they failed to conduct the required analyses and deferred essential protections to a less rigorous state-run process. The court also determined the EPA’s reliance on these documents was impermissible and that the EPA had wrongly failed to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). As a remedy, the district court vacated the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program along with the BiOp and ITS.On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the environmental groups had standing and their claims were ripe. It concluded that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS did not comply with the ESA, that the EPA’s reliance on those documents was unlawful, and that the EPA erred by not consulting with the NMFS. The court required vacatur of the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program and the associated ESA documents. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

A group of local residents and environmental organizations opposed a California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) highway project in Humboldt County that would reconfigure a stretch of U.S. Highway 101 through Richardson Grove State Park, an area containing old-growth redwood trees. The opposition centered on concerns that the project would damage the trees and their root systems. Caltrans initially certified an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the project, concluding there would be no significant environmental impacts. Over the years, the challengers brought multiple legal actions, arguing that Caltrans’ environmental review failed to meet the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).After the initial EIR was invalidated on appeal for not adequately analyzing impacts on redwood tree roots (Lotus v. Department of Transportation), Caltrans prepared an Addendum with new analysis and recertified the EIR. However, a second trial court judgment found Caltrans violated CEQA by not allowing public review of the Addendum, ordering that it be circulated for comment. Caltrans complied, and both previous writs were eventually discharged. The plaintiffs did not appeal the discharge orders. The present case arose from a third petition challenging the substantive adequacy of the Addendum and Caltrans’ compliance with CEQA.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the lower court’s discharge of the initial writ (the Lotus writ) necessarily determined that Caltrans’ revised analysis complied with CEQA. Because the plaintiffs did not appeal that decision, the doctrine of res judicata barred them from relitigating the adequacy of the Addendum in this new action. The court affirmed the judgment denying the third petition, thus precluding further CEQA challenges to the Addendum’s substantive analysis of impacts on the redwoods. View "Bair v. Cal. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

The case concerns the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) designation of critical habitat in 2022 for two species of Arctic seals, following their listing as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 2012. The designated areas covered waters off Alaska’s north coast and were based on findings that those areas contained physical and biological features essential to the conservation of the seal species. Alaska opposed these designations, contending that they were too broad and provided minimal benefit, and requested that certain coastal areas be excluded due to economic impacts. NMFS excluded an area used by the Navy for training but declined to exclude others requested by Alaska and the North Slope Borough, finding no significant economic impact.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska largely agreed with Alaska, holding that the critical habitat designations were unlawful. The court vacated the rules and remanded the matter to NMFS, concluding that NMFS had not adequately explained why the entire designated area was necessary for the seals’ conservation, had failed to consider foreign conservation efforts and foreign habitat, and had abused its discretion by not considering certain exclusions. The Center for Biological Diversity intervened as a defendant and appealed the district court’s decision. The district court did, however, reject Alaska’s argument that NMFS had failed to comply with the ESA’s “prudency” requirement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction, reversed the district court’s rulings that the designations were unlawful, and affirmed the court’s ruling on the ESA’s prudency requirement. The Ninth Circuit held that NMFS’s designations complied with the ESA, that the agency was not required to consider foreign conservation efforts or habitat, and that the decision not to exclude certain coastal areas was within its discretion. The critical habitat designations were reinstated, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the Center and NMFS. View "STATE OF ALASKA V. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE" on Justia Law

Several Maryland local governments, including Baltimore City, Anne Arundel County, and the City of Annapolis, filed lawsuits in Maryland circuit courts against 26 multinational oil and gas companies. They alleged that the defendants’ extraction, production, promotion, and sale of fossil fuels—combined with deceptive marketing about their products’ climate risks—substantially contributed to global greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in severe local impacts such as sea-level rise, flooding, and heat waves. The local governments sought damages and equitable relief based on Maryland common law claims of public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, negligent failure to warn, and strict liability failure to warn.In the trial courts (the Circuit Courts for Baltimore City and Anne Arundel County), the defendants successfully moved to dismiss the complaints. The courts found that the local governments’ claims were preempted by federal law, specifically by federal common law and the Clean Air Act, and that the complaints failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted under Maryland law. The cases took a procedural detour through federal courts due to removal attempts, but were ultimately remanded to state court. The Appellate Court of Maryland consolidated the appeals, and the Supreme Court of Maryland granted review by writ of certiorari.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the dismissals. The court held that the local governments’ state law claims, though pled as torts, effectively sought to regulate interstate and international air emissions—an area governed exclusively by federal law. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, the court explained that such claims are displaced by federal common law and, in turn, by the Clean Air Act, which does not authorize broad state law claims in this context. The court further held that, even if not preempted, none of the plaintiffs stated valid claims under Maryland law for public or private nuisance, trespass, or failure to warn. View "Mayor & City Cncl. Of Balt. v. B.P. P.L.C." on Justia Law

A property owner on West Point Island sought to extend an existing dock into Barnegat Bay. The owner obtained permits from both the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the Army Corps of Engineers, and received a tidelands license from the Tidelands Resource Council (TRC). After the extension was completed, it was found to be slightly south of the permitted location, prompting the owner to seek a modified permit and license for the as-built dock. The adjacent property owner objected, arguing the extension created navigational hazards and interfered with their own dock’s use.The TRC held public hearings, considered testimony and written submissions, and ultimately approved the modified license, finding the extension complied with applicable rules and did not interfere with navigation or the rights of the objecting neighbor. The DEP approved the decision. The neighbor appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, arguing that the TRC lacked authority to set or modify pierhead lines through individual license proceedings and that such lines must be established uniformly around islands in advance under Section 19 of the Tidelands Act. The Appellate Division affirmed the TRC’s decision, finding it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and holding that the TRC was permitted to establish or modify pierhead lines in connection with individual licenses.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the Tidelands Act authorizes the TRC to set or modify pierhead lines in the context of reviewing individual tidelands license applications, rather than requiring the TRC to establish uniform pierhead lines around all islands prospectively. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment, concluding that the TRC did not exceed its statutory authority in issuing the licenses at issue. View "In the Matter of Jibsail Family Limited Partnership" on Justia Law