Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Reabold California LLC applied to convert a former oil well into a Class II injection well in the Brentwood Oil Field, Contra Costa County. The well, drilled in 1963, had been used to pump oil and water from an aquifer. Reabold proposed minor modifications to the well to inject produced water back into the aquifer, which had been exempted from the Safe Drinking Water Act. The project aimed to eliminate the need for trucking the produced water to a disposal site. The California Department of Conservation’s Division of Geologic Energy Management (CalGEM) approved the project, invoking a Class 1 categorical exemption under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) for minor alterations involving negligible or no expansion of use.The Contra Costa County Superior Court ruled in favor of Sunflower Alliance, which challenged CalGEM’s use of the categorical exemption. The court agreed with Sunflower that converting the well to an injection well constituted a significant change in use, thus not fitting within the Class 1 exemption. Consequently, the court issued a writ of mandate directing CalGEM to set aside its notice of exemption and project approval.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the well conversion project fell within the Class 1 exemption because the physical modifications were minor and the change in use posed negligible environmental risks. The court emphasized that the project involved injecting water into the same aquifer from which it was originally pumped, and regulatory conditions ensured the injected water would be confined within the aquifer. The court directed the lower court to deny Sunflower’s petition for writ of mandate and to order CalGEM to reinstate its project approval and notice of exemption. View "Sunflower Alliance v. Dept. of Conservation" on Justia Law

Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. applied to the Ohio Power Siting Board for approval to construct a 3.7-mile natural-gas-distribution pipeline in Maumee, Ohio. The application was submitted under an accelerated review process for pipelines less than five miles long. Yorktown Management, L.L.C., which owns property adjacent to the proposed pipeline route, raised concerns about the safety and environmental impact of the pipeline, particularly its proximity to their commercial office building.The Ohio Power Siting Board approved Columbia's application under the accelerated review process, finding that the project met the necessary criteria. Yorktown filed a motion to intervene and later a motion to suspend the review, arguing that the board had not adequately addressed their safety concerns. The board denied Yorktown's motion to suspend and subsequently denied their application for rehearing, leading Yorktown to appeal the decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the board's decision. The court found that Columbia's application did not require a 50-foot-wide permanent easement along the entire pipeline route, as Yorktown claimed. The court also determined that Yorktown had waived its right to challenge the board's rejection of testimony from a different pipeline project. Additionally, the court held that the board did not err in refusing to suspend its review of the accelerated application, as Yorktown failed to demonstrate good cause for suspension. The court concluded that the board did not improperly defer to Columbia and had appropriately conditioned the approval on compliance with relevant safety regulations. View "In re Letter of Notification Application of Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. for the Ford Street Pipeline Project" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the California Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition (Coalition) and the State Air Resources Board (Board) over the adoption of the Advanced Clean Trucks Regulation (Regulation). The Coalition, which promotes the use of natural gas as an alternative fuel, argues that the Regulation's focus on electric vehicles (ZEV) harms those who have invested in low-NOx natural gas technologies. The Coalition contends that the Board failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in promulgating the Regulation.The Superior Court of Fresno County rejected the Coalition's claims and denied their petition. The court found that the Board's rejection of the low-NOx vehicle credit as an alternative was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board had no further obligation to consider low-NOx vehicles as a mitigation measure. The court also concluded that the Board's failure to respond to certain public comments was harmless. Additionally, the court ruled that the Board had conducted a proper economic analysis under the APA and had correctly rejected the low-NOx vehicle credit in its analysis. The court did, however, allow the administrative record to be augmented with a document referenced in several comments during the regulatory proceedings.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the Board's rejection of the low-NOx vehicle credit as an alternative was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the Board had considered a reasonable range of alternatives and was not obligated to discuss the low-NOx vehicle credit as a mitigation measure. The court further concluded that the Board's failure to respond to comments was harmless and that the Board had complied with the APA in its economic analysis. The court also found that any error in augmenting the administrative record was harmless. View "California Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition v. State Air Resources Board" on Justia Law

King County Ordinance 19030 altered zoning and business licensing regulations for wineries, breweries, and distilleries (WBDs) in agricultural and rural areas. The ordinance aimed to support economic development but faced challenges regarding compliance with the Growth Management Act (GMA) and the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA). The ordinance allowed for expanded WBD operations and introduced new licensing requirements, but it also raised concerns about environmental impacts and the preservation of agricultural land.The Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board found that the County failed to comply with SEPA and the GMA, invalidating parts of the ordinance. The Board's decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Board's ruling. Friends of Sammamish Valley and Futurewise sought further review, arguing that the County did not adequately address environmental impacts and agricultural land preservation. The County contended that the ordinance was a "nonproject action" not requiring environmental review under SEPA and presumed valid under the GMA.The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the Board's order. The Court held that the County's SEPA checklist was insufficient, failing to address the full range of probable environmental impacts. The Court emphasized that the GMA requires the conservation of agricultural land and that the ordinance's changes could significantly impact the environment. The Court concluded that the County must conduct a comprehensive environmental review to comply with SEPA and the GMA. View "King County v. Friends of Sammamish Valley" on Justia Law

Coastal Environmental Rights Foundation (CERF) sued Naples Restaurant Group, LLC, and its owner over the restaurant’s annual Fourth of July fireworks show at Alamitos Bay in Los Angeles, alleging violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA) due to fireworks discharges into the water without a permit. The district court found that one firework malfunctioned and fell into the water, but this single incident was insufficient to establish a continuing violation of the CWA. Consequently, the district court dismissed CERF’s claim without prejudice.After the district court’s decision, the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board began issuing a general National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for public fireworks displays over Los Angeles waters. Naples applied for and received this permit, which authorized the discharges that CERF had challenged.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that it was constitutionally moot. The court held that the issuance of the NPDES permit made it absolutely clear that the alleged CWA violations could not reasonably be expected to recur, as Naples now had a permit authorizing the discharges. Therefore, CERF’s claims for declarative and injunctive relief were moot. The court also held that the same mootness standard applied to CERF’s claim for civil penalties, following the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. Finally, the court concluded that CERF’s claim for attorneys’ fees was also moot.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "COASTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION V. NAPLES RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Sammamish passed an ordinance to condemn property rights in George Davis Creek, which runs through the petitioners' property, for stormwater management and fish passage protection. The city aimed to address storm drainage issues, improve traffic safety, provide flood protection, and remove barriers to fish passage. The petitioners argued that the city lacked authority to condemn their property for fish passage purposes, citing the salmon recovery act (SRA) and a previous case, Cowlitz County v. Martin.The Superior Court denied the city's motion for condemnation, agreeing with the petitioners that the city had no authority to condemn private property for fish passage purposes. The city appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the city had statutory authority under RCW 8.12.030 to condemn property for stormwater management. The court distinguished this case from Cowlitz County, noting that the project in question had multiple purposes, including stormwater management, which is explicitly authorized by the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case to determine the scope of the city's statutory condemnation authority. The court held that RCW 8.12.030 grants cities the authority to condemn property for stormwater management and other public uses. The inclusion of fish passage as one of the project's purposes did not divest the city of its authority to condemn property for stormwater management. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "City of Sammamish v. Titcomb" on Justia Law

Reabold California LLC applied to convert a former oil well into a Class II injection well in the Brentwood Oil Field, Contra Costa County. The well, drilled in 1963, had been inactive for over 20 years. The conversion involved minor alterations, such as removing the well plug and installing injection equipment. The project aimed to inject produced water back into the aquifer, eliminating the need for water disposal trips. The Environmental Protection Agency had exempted the aquifer from the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1982, making it eligible for such injection projects.The California Department of Conservation’s Division of Geologic Energy Management (CalGEM) approved the project, invoking a Class 1 categorical exemption under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) for minor alterations involving negligible or no expansion of use. Sunflower Alliance challenged this exemption, arguing that converting the well to an injection well constituted a significant change in use. The Contra Costa County Superior Court agreed with Sunflower, ruling that the change in use was not negligible and directing CalGEM to set aside its approval and notice of exemption.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the conversion project fell within the Class 1 exemption because the environmental risks associated with injecting water were negligible. The court emphasized that the project involved only minor physical alterations and that the injected water would be confined within the aquifer, posing no significant environmental harm. The court directed the lower court to deny Sunflower’s petition and ordered CalGEM to reinstate its project approval and notice of exemption. View "Sunflower Alliance v. California Department of Conservation" on Justia Law

The Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) identified nitrogen pollution from wastewater treatment plants as a significant issue for Puget Sound. The Northwest Environmental Advocates (NWEA) petitioned Ecology to include nitrogen discharge limits in their regulations. Ecology denied the petition but committed to setting nutrient loading limits at current levels for all permitted dischargers in Puget Sound through the individual permitting process. Subsequently, Ecology issued permits with varying nitrogen discharge limits.The City of Tacoma and other municipalities operating wastewater treatment plants petitioned the Thurston County Superior Court for judicial review, arguing that Ecology's commitment constituted a "rule" under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and was adopted without following statutory rule-making procedures. The superior court agreed, holding that Ecology's commitment was a "rule" and invalidated it. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, finding that Ecology's actions amounted to a directive of general applicability, thus constituting a "rule" under the APA.The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed the case and concluded that Ecology's commitment in the denial letter was not a directive of general applicability. The court found that Ecology's actions allowed for staff discretion and case-by-case analysis, rather than imposing a uniform standard. Therefore, the commitment did not meet the definition of a "rule" under RCW 34.05.010(16). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the superior court for any further necessary proceedings. View "City of Tacoma v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

The case involves the U.S. Sugar Corporation and other industry petitioners challenging the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 2022 rule that classified certain industrial boilers as "new" sources of hazardous air pollutants, even though they were built before the applicable emission standards were proposed in 2020. The EPA used a 2013-era dataset to establish these standards, excluding more recent data to maintain consistency with still-valid 2013 standards. Environmental petitioners argued that this exclusion violated the Clean Air Act.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The lower court had previously remanded the EPA's 2011 rule without vacatur, allowing the invalid standards to remain while the EPA revised them. The industry petitioners argued that the EPA's classification of boilers built after June 4, 2010, as "new" sources was incorrect, as these boilers were constructed before the 2020 proposal of the new standards. The environmental petitioners contended that the EPA's decision to use outdated data was arbitrary and capricious.The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA's classification of boilers built before August 24, 2020, as "new" sources was incorrect under the Clean Air Act. The court found that the proper date to determine whether a boiler is "new" should be when each specific emission standard is first proposed, not when any standard for the category was first proposed. Therefore, the court set aside the EPA's 2022 rule to the extent that it defined sources constructed before August 24, 2020, as "new."The court also held that the EPA's decision to rely on the 2013-era dataset was neither unlawful nor arbitrary and capricious. The court found that the EPA's choice was reasonable given the limited nature of the remand and the need for consistency across standards. Thus, the court denied the environmental petitioners' petition for review. View "United States Sugar Corporation v. EPA" on Justia Law

The case involves the environmental review of commercial aquarium fishing permits in Hawai‘i. In 2017, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court ruled that the permitting process for commercial aquarium collection must undergo environmental review under the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). Following this ruling, the Environmental Court voided all existing permits and enjoined the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) from issuing new permits without completing HEPA review. The Pet Industry Joint Advisory Council (PIJAC) then prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to continue commercial aquarium fishing in the West Hawai‘i Reef Fishery Management Area (WHRFMA).The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) initially rejected the EIS, citing fourteen reasons. PIJAC revised the EIS and, after a public comment period, submitted it again. BLNR's vote on the revised EIS resulted in a 3-3 tie, leading to the EIS being "deemed accepted" by operation of law. Plaintiffs sued BLNR in the Environmental Court for the First Circuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The court ruled against the plaintiffs, finding that the EIS adequately disclosed facts for the agency to make an informed decision. Plaintiffs appealed, and the State cross-appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss.The Hawai‘i Supreme Court held that the State is a proper defendant in the case and should defend the EIS. The court also determined that the "rule of reason" should be used in conjunction with HEPA’s content requirements to evaluate an EIS. The court found that the EIS was legally sufficient as it met HEPA’s content requirements and provided enough information for BLNR to make an informed decision. Consequently, the court affirmed the Environmental Court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss and its grant of summary judgment for PIJAC. View "Kaupiko v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law