Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) prepared and certified a programmatic environmental impact report (EIR) for a seven-year program to eradicate an invasive pest, the light brown apple moth (LBAM), but “at the last minute” approved instead a seven-year program to control LBAMs based on new information that eradication was no longer attainable. The EIR did not evaluate control as a reasonable alternative to eradication, and there was no supplemental environmental review in connection with the last-minute change. In two appeals, consolidated for the Court of Appeal's review, challenged trial court decisions that denied petitions for writ of administrative mandamus that asserted California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) violations and challenging the program approved by the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) and its former Secretary A.G. Kawamura. Appellants contended the EIR violated CEQA by making assumptions unsupported by substantial evidence and by inadequately addressing environmental impacts, a reasonable range of alternatives, and cumulative impacts. Appellants also contended the CDFA’s “last-minute” approval of a control program instead of the eradication program rendered the environmental review deficient in failing to provide an accurate and stable project description, inadequately discussing alternatives, and improperly “segmenting” the project by reviewing a seven-year program but approving a seven-year program that will have to continue beyond seven years. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that, even before the new information came to light that eradication was no longer attainable, the EIR violated CEQA by giving the project’s “objective” an artificially narrow definition (“eradication of LBAMs”) and thereby omitting analysis of pest control as a reasonable alternative to the eradication program. The EIR acknowledged the project’s “purposes” included protecting California native plants and agricultural crops from damage. "The EIR’s omissions leave the record devoid of evidence to prove CDFA’s claim that the last-minute change was legally acceptable because the adopted control program was narrower than the EIR’s eradication program." The trial court judgments were reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings. View "North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Kawamura" on Justia Law

The Lieutenant Governor declined to certify a proposed ballot initiative that would ban commercial set net fishing in nonsubsistence areas, reasoning that the initiative was a constitutionally prohibited appropriation of public assets. The superior court approved the initiative, concluding that set netters were not a distinct commercial user group and that the legislature and Board of Fisheries would retain discretion to allocate the salmon stock to other commercial fisheries. After the Supreme Court's review of the matter, it concluded that set netters were a distinct commercial user group that deserved recognition in the context of the constitutional prohibition on appropriations. The Court therefore reverse the superior court’s judgment because this proposed ballot initiative would have completely appropriated salmon away from set netters and prohibited the legislature from allocating any salmon to that user group. View "Lieutenant Governor of the State of Alaska v. Alaska Fisheries Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned individual objectors to the Crow Water Compact, an agreement to distribute and manage water rights among the United States, the Crow Tribe, and the State of Montana. The Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court’s order, holding (1) the Water Court applied the proper legal standard of review in approving the Compact in the final order; (2) the Objectors failed to meet their burden of showing that the Compact was unreasonable and materially injured their interest; and (3) the Compact negotiation process did not violate the Objectors’ due process rights. View "In re Crow Tribe Water Compact" on Justia Law

Through Pennsylvania’s Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act, ("Act 2"), the General Assembly created a scheme for establishing “cleanup standards” applicable to voluntary efforts to remediate environmental contamination for which a person or entity may bear legal responsibility. Appellant EQT Production Company (“EPC”), owned and operated natural gas wells in the Commonwealth. In May 2012, the company notified Appellee, the Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department” or “DEP”), that it had discovered leaks in one of its subsurface impoundments containing water that had been contaminated during hydraulic fracturing operations. Subsequently, EPC cleared the site of impaired water and sludge and commenced a formal cleanup process pursuant to Act 2. In May 2014, the agency tendered to EPC a proposed “Consent Assessment of Civil Penalty,” seeking to settle the penalty question via a payment demand of $1,270,871, subsuming approximately $900,000 attending asserted ongoing violations. EPC disputed the Department’s assessment, maintaining that: penalties could not exceed those accruing during the time period in which contaminants actually were discharged from the company’s impoundment; all such actual discharges ended in June 2012; and the Act 2 regime controlled the extent of the essential remediation efforts. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether ECT had the right to immediately seek a judicial declaration that the DEP's interpretation of the Act was erroneous. The Court held that the impact of the Department’s threat of multi-million dollar assessments against EPC was sufficiently direct, immediate, and substantial to create a case or controversy justifying pre-enforcement judicial review via a declaratory judgment proceeding, and that exhaustion of administrative remedies relative to the issues of statutory interpretation that the company has presented was unnecessary. View "EQT Production Co. v. DEP" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Bar Area Air Quality Management District passed a resolution adopting new thresholds of significance for air pollutants and published new California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) air quality guidelines. The California Building Industry Association (CBIA) filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging these thresholds. The superior court entered judgment in favor of CBIA, concluding that the District’s promulgation of the 2010 thresholds was a “project” subject to CEQA review, and the District was bound to evaluate the thresholds’ potential impact on the environment. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the promulgation of the 2010 thresholds was not a project subject to CEQA review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) CEQA does not generally require an agency to consider the effects of existing environmental conditions on a proposed project’s future users or residents except in specific instances; and (2) because the Court of Appeal’s analysis of CBIA’s petition for writ relief did not address potentially important arguments for and against such relief in light of CEQA’s requirements as interpreted in this opinion, this case is remanded so the court may have an opportunity to address those issues. View "Cal. Building Ind. Ass’n v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist." on Justia Law

In 1982, Teton Co-Operative Canal Company (Teton Canal) filed a statement of claim for existing water rights for the Eureka Reservoir. Teton Cooperative Reservoir Company (Teton Reservoir) objected to Teton Canal’s claims. The Water Master held a hearing in 2012 and, in 2015, adjudicated Teton Canal’s claims. Teton Reservoir appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the Water Court’s order regarding Teton Canal’s water right claims to the Eureka Reservoir, holding that the Water Court erred in determining that off-stream water storage in the Eureka Reservoir was included as part of Teton Canal’s April 18, 1890 Notice of Appropriation. Remanded to the Water Court to assign a new priority date to Teton Canal’s rights to the Eureka Reservoir and for further proceedings. View "Teton Co-op Canal Co. v. Teton Coop Reservoir Co." on Justia Law

The Bowers Wind Project proposed to place sixteen wind turbines within the boundary of an expedited permitting area, making them visible from multiple scenic resources of state or national significance. Champlain Wind, LLC filed an application with the Department of Environmental Protection seeking permits to construct the Project. The Department denied Champlain’s application, concluding that the Project did not satisfy the statutory scenic standard. The Board of Environmental Protection affirmed the Department’s denial of Champlain’s permit application, concluding that the Project would “unreasonably adversely affect scenic character and existing uses related to scenic character.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not act unlawfully or arbitrarily in its determination that the visual impact of the Project would have an unreasonable adverse effect on the existing scenic character or existing uses related to scenic character of nine affected great ponds. View "Champlain Wind, LLC v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

The Board of Trustees of the California State University appealed a writ of mandate directing it to vacate its certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared with respect to plans for the expansion of the California State University East Bay campus. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs-respondents City of Hayward and two local community groups, Hayward Area Planning Association and Old Highlands Homeowners Association, that the EIR failed to adequately analyze impacts on fire protection and public safety, traffic and parking, air quality, and parklands. In the Court of Appeal's initial opinion, it concluded that the EIR was adequate in all respects except that its analysis of potential environmental impacts to parkland was not supported by substantial evidence. The California Supreme Court granted review, and subsequently transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of "City of San Diego v. Board of Trustees of California State University' (61 Cal.4th 945 (2015)). After review of the parties’ supplemental briefing, the Court of Appeal reissued its opinion, and modified section 3(c) of the Discussion to reflect the holding of the Supreme Court in City of San Diego. View "City of Hayward v. Board Cal. State Univ." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the adequacy of an environment impact report certified by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW) for a land development in northwest Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs challenged DFW’s actions by a petition for writ of mandate, raising several claims under the California Environmental Quality Act. The superior court granted the petition. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the environmental impact report did not validly determine that the development would not significantly impact the environment by its discharge of greenhouse gases; (2) the report’s mitigation measures adopted for protection of a freshwater fish, a fully protected species under the Fish and Game Code, constituted a prohibited taking of the fish under the Code; and (3) Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies regarding certain claims of deficiency. Remanded. View "Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed petitions with the EPA seeking to withdraw Alabama's authorization to administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), as part of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. On appeal, petitioners challenged the EPA's findings on some of the 22 alleged deficiencies that did not warrant the initiation of program withdrawal proceedings. The court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, concluding that it does not have jurisdiction to review the interim report with which petitioners disagreed because EPA has not made a "determination" within the meaning of section 1396(b)(1)(D). View "Cahaba Riverkeeper v. EPA" on Justia Law