Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, the EPA sets the maximum permissible atmospheric concentrations for harmful air pollutants, including ozone and classifies geographic areas as “attainment” or “nonattainment.” Each state drafts a State Implementation Plan (SIP) for each pollutant, identifying how it seeks to achieve or maintain attainment. SIPS and their revisions must be approved by EPA. If an area is in nonattainment for ozone, the SIP must include an automobile emissions testing program that meets certain performance standards. Illinois previously tested emissions of vehicles from all model years; that program was included in its SIP. Illinois exempted pre-1996 model-year vehicles that met certain standards, effective in 2007, but did not seek EPA approval until 2012. Indiana objected to the proposed change. EPA approved Illinois’s SIP revision in 2014. Indiana sought review, arguing that the change will decrease the likelihood that the “Chicago area,” which includes two Indiana counties, will achieve attainment with regard to ozone in the near future. Indiana provided analysis, indicating that Illinois’s (unauthorized) relaxation of testing procedures after 2007 caused a Chicago-area violation of the national ozone standard in 2011. The Seventh Circuit held that Indiana had standing, but that EPA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the SIP revision. View "Indiana v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

M&M Constructors, owned by James McGlinchy, submitted a permit application to the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to mine a mineral deposit for use as construction rock. DNR denied M&M’s permit application because it concluded that the mineral deposit was common variety stone. Under the Common Varieties Act, “common varieties” of stone are not subject to “location,” meaning they could not be permitted through the mining law’s location process. M&M appealed to the superior court, arguing that DNR wrongly denied its permit application and also denied it procedural due process. After the superior court affirmed, M&M appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed because M&M sought to mine for common variety stone that was "well within the ambit" of the Common Varieties Act, and it received "ample" due process in the DNR proceeding. View "McGlinchy v. Alaska Dept. of Nat. Resources" on Justia Law

Rancho Pauma Mutual Water Company filed a petition to enforce a water rights judgment against the Yuima Municipal Water District entered about 60 years earlier. The District appealed the trial court's order, contending the trial court misunderstood subsequent amendments to the judgment and improperly limited the amount of water the District could withdraw. Rancho Pauma argued the appeal should have been dismissed as the order was not appealable. Upon review, the Court of Appeal rejected Rancho Pauma's argument regarding appealability of the order. The Court also rejected the District's arguments and affirmed the order. View "Rancho Pauma Mut. Water Co. v. Yuima Mun. Water Dist." on Justia Law

Reichmann Land and Cattle, LLP managed a winter feeding facility. In 2011, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) issued an administrative order requiring Reichmann to obtain national-pollutant-discharge-elimination-system (NPDES) and state-disposal-system (SDS) permits or discontinue the winter feeding operation. Reichmann requested a contested case hearing. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Reichmann’s winter feeding fields constituted a “concentrated animal feeding operation” and were not “pastures.” Therefore, Reichmann was required to apply for an NPDES/SDS permit. The Commissioner of the MPCA adopted the findings and conclusions of the ALJ. The court of appeals affirmed the Commissioner’s conclusion that Reichmann must apply for an SDS permit but reversed the Commission’s requirement that Reichmann must apply for an NPDES permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Reichmann need not obtain an NPDES permit because its winter feeding facility is not an animal feeding operation as required by 40 C.F.R. 122.23(b)(1); and (2) Reichmann is required to obtain an SDS permit because it does not qualify for the pasture exemption. View "In re Reichmann Land & Cattle, LLP" on Justia Law

An oyster farmer closed his farm after dozens of people became sick from eating his oysters. He sued the state Department of Environmental Conservation, alleging that the agency negligently informed him that the site of his farm was suitable for shellfish farming. The superior court granted summary judgment for the agency, concluding that the farmer’s misrepresentation claim was barred by state sovereign immunity. The farmer argued on appeal that the agency’s sovereign immunity defense was inapplicable because his complaint alleged a claim of negligence, not negligent misrepresentation. After review, the Supreme Court found the allegations in the farmer’s complaint supported only a negligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the agency. View "Miller v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

An oyster farmer closed his farm after dozens of people became sick from eating his oysters. He sued the state Department of Environmental Conservation, alleging that the agency negligently informed him that the site of his farm was suitable for shellfish farming. The superior court granted summary judgment for the agency, concluding that the farmer’s misrepresentation claim was barred by state sovereign immunity. The farmer argued on appeal that the agency’s sovereign immunity defense was inapplicable because his complaint alleged a claim of negligence, not negligent misrepresentation. After review, the Supreme Court found the allegations in the farmer’s complaint supported only a negligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the agency. View "Miller v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, which owned facilities used for earth materials excavation and processing, submitted to the Department of Environmental Protection five individual applications for water diversion permits. The Department requested additional information for all five of Plaintiff’s applications. Plaintiff did not fully comply with the Department’s request. Instead of submitting the requested information, Plaintiff filed a petition for a declaratory ruling to address the scope of the Department’s authority to request information for Plaintiff’s water diversion permit applications. The Commissioner of Environmental Protection deemed all of the Department’s actions authorized under the Connecticut Water Diversion Policy Act (Act). The trial court endorsed in all material respects the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Act does not authorize the Department’s attempts to regulate Plaintiff’s excavation activities; (2) the Act does not authorize the Department to request a wetlands mitigation plan for the alteration of wetlands that had been authorized by prior municipal wetlands permit; and (3) the Department may not delay processing Plaintiff’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit application due to a pending water diversion permit application. View "Tilcon Connecticut, Inc. v. Comm’r of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Maine dairy farmer, had a business dispute with Defendant, his neighbor, and the former Commissioner of the Maine Department of Agriculture (DOA). Soon after taking office, the Commissioner recused himself from regulatory matters involving Plaintiff. The DOA eventually took four adverse regulatory actions against Plaintiff, including the action of ceasing to protect Plaintiff from the regulatory authority of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The DEP then issued several notices of violation of Plaintiff’s license conditions. As a result, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began administrative and judicial proceedings against Plaintiff that resulted in Plaintiff losing his farm. Plaintiff brought this suit for damages against Defendant, claiming that Defendant had violated his First Amendment rights through the adverse actions taken by the DOA. The district court awarded summary judgment against Plaintiff. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was correctly granted with respect tot he three adverse regulatory actions that the DOA was alleged to have taken after the Commissioner’s purported recusal; but (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Commissioner’s retaliatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in the one alleged adverse action that occurred prior to the recusal. Remanded. View "McCue v. Bradstreet" on Justia Law

Chesapeake Bay is plagued by dead zones with opaque water and algae blooms that render significant areas unable to support aquatic life. Surrounding jurisdictions recognize that the Bay absorbs far too much nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment to be a healthy ecosystem and threatens the livelihood of many. In 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency published the “total maximum daily load” (TMDL) of nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment that can be released into the Bay under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251. Opponents alleged that aspects of the TMDL that go beyond an allowable sum of pollutants (i.e., the most nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment the Bay can safely absorb) exceeded EPA’s regulatory authority, because they may intrude on states’ role in regulating land use. The district court and Third Circuit ruled in favor of EPA, stating that Bay pollution is a complex problem affecting at least 17,000,000 people. Any solution will have winners and losers, considering the interests of: environmental groups, adjoining states, tourists, fishermen, municipal waste water treatment works, urban centers, rural counties, nonpoint source polluters, and agriculture. Congress determined, with the Act, that the states and the EPA could, working together, best allocate the benefits and burdens of lowering pollution. The Bay TMDL will require sacrifice as a consequence of the tremendous effort necessary to restore the Bay’s health. View "Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Envt'l Protection Agency" on Justia Law

St. Jude’s Co. made a direct appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court a water court decision entered in favor of the Roraring Fork Club, LLC. With regard to the Club’s two applications for water rights, the water court granted appropriative rights, approved the Club’s accompanying augmentation plan, and amended the legal description of the Club’s point of diversion for an already decreed right. With regard to the separate action filed by St. Jude’s Co., the water court denied all but one of its claims for trespass, denied its claims for breach of a prior settlement agreement with the Club, denied its claims for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning its asserted entitlement to the exercise of powers of eminent domain, quieted title to disputed rights implicated in the Club’s application for an augmentation plan, and awarded attorney fees in favor of the Club, according to the terms of the settlement agreement of the parties. Upon review of St. Jude's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the Club failed to demonstrate an intent to apply the amount of water for which it sought a decree to any beneficial use. Accordingly, the Court reversed the water court with regard to appropriative rights. The Court found no other reversible errors in the water court's decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a determination of the Club's request for appellate attorney fees. View "St. Jude's Co. v. Roaring Fork Club, L.L.C." on Justia Law