Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case were two water court rulings upholding the Special Improvement District No. 1 (“Subdistrict”) of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District’s (“District”) and the State Engineer’s approval of the 2012 Annual Replacement Plan (“ARP”) developed pursuant to the Subdistrict’s decreed Plan of Water Management (“Amended Plan”). In "San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association v. Special Improvement District No. 1" (“San Antonio”), (270 P.3d 927 (Colo. 2011)), the Supreme Court affirmed the water court’s May 2010 Decree that approved the Subdistrict’s Amended Plan and imposed additional decree conditions on that Plan. The 2012 ARP under review here was the first ARP prepared pursuant to the Subdistrict’s Amended Plan. Water levels in the unconfined aquifer within the Subdistrict declined significantly due to increased groundwater consumption and sustained drought. The Amended Plan required the Subdistrict to prepare, and obtain the State Engineer’s approval of, an ARP that prevented injury to senior water rights. Objectors San Antonio, Los Pinos and Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association Save Our Senior Water Rights, LLC, Richard Ramstetter, and Costilla Ditch Company were senior surface water right holders on the Rio Grande River and its tributaries. They appealed two pretrial rulings as well as a judgment and decree upholding the 2012 ARP. Upon review of the objections, the Supreme Court concluded that the 2012 ARP complied with the Amended Plan and 2010 Decree, and protected against injury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's pretrial orders, judgment and decree pertaining to the 2012 ARP. View "San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Preservation" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act (CAA) directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants from stationary sources, such as refineries and factories, 42 U.S.C.7412; it may regulate power plants under this program only if it concludes that “regulation is appropriate and necessary” after studying hazards to public health. EPA found power-plant regulation “appropriate” because power plant emissions pose risks to public health and the environment and because controls capable of reducing these emissions were available. It found regulation “necessary” because other CAA requirements did not eliminate those risks. EPA estimated that the cost of power plant regulation would be $9.6 billion a year, but that quantifiable benefits from the reduction in hazardous-air-pollutant emissions would be $4-$6 million a year. The D. C. Circuit upheld EPA’s refusal to consider costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. EPA interpreted section 7412(n)(1)(A) unreasonably when it deemed cost irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants. “’Appropriate and necessary’ is a capacious phrase.” It is not rational, nor “appropriate,” to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits. That other CAA provisions expressly mention cost indicates that section 7412(n)(1)(A)’s broad reference to appropriateness encompasses multiple relevant factors, including cost. The possibility of considering cost at a later stage, when deciding how much to regulate power plants, does not establish its irrelevance at the earlier stage. Although the CAA makes cost irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate sources other than power plants, the point of having a separate provision for power plants was to treat power plants differently. EPA must decide how to account for cost. View "Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

McGinnes Industrial Waste Corporation dumped pulp and paper mill waste sludge into disposal pits near the San Jacinto River in Pasadena, Texas (the site). After environmental contamination was discovered at the site, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) instituted superfund cleanup proceedings under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). During the period that McGinnes was dumping waste at the Site, it was covered by standard-form commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies issued by Phoenix Insurance Company and Travelers Indemnity Company (together, the Insurers). McGinnes requested a defense in the EPA proceedings from the Insurers. The Insurers refused, determining that the proceedings were not a “suit” under the policy. McGinnes sued the insurers in federal court seeking a declaration that the policies obligated them to defend the EPA’s CERCLA proceedings. The district court granted the Insurers’ motion for partial summary judgment on the duty-to-defend issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question regarding the issue to the Texas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that “suit” in the CGL policies at issue must also include CERCLA enforcement proceedings by the EPA. View "McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp. v. Phoenix Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Zaremba Group was the owner of the 10.08-acre plot of land in question in this case. The proposed building site lies within the floodway of Lovers Lane Brook. The Project, the building of a Dollar General store, would result in a loss of flood-water storage of 1,305 cubic yards, but was designed to include a flood-mitigation cut area, which would provide additional flood-water storage of 2,544 cubic yards. The Project would narrow the Brook floodway at two points, but both of these areas are at least as wide as the Brook's narrowest section, which is just south of the Project site. The Project includes a minimum fifty-foot buffer along the Brook. Neighbors of the plot of land appealed the environmental division's decision to grant an Act 250 permit amendment to Zaremba Group to build the store on that plot. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Zaremba Group Act 250 Permit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Albert Paulek petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate, alleging defendant-respondent Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority (the Agency) erred by concluding: (1) a particular activity was not a project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA); and (2) that, if it were a project, then it was exempt from CEQA. The activity at issue involved removing a conservation designation from one parcel of land, and placing the designation on two others. The trial court found Paulek had standing and the moving of the conservation designation qualified as a "project" under CEQA. The trial court denied the writ petition because it found the project fell within a CEQA exemption. Paulek argued on appeal of that judgment that: (1) he had standing; (2) the moving of the restrictions was a CEQA project; and (3) the project did not fall within the identified CEQA exemptions. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, finding substantial evidence did not support application of the Class 7 and Class 8 exemptions relied upon in the resolution. "[i]f the Agency seeks to proceed with the criteria refinement, then the Agency must move to the next step of the analysis and conduct an initial threshold study to see if the criteria refinement will have a significant impact on the environment, in order to determine whether a negative declaration may be issued." The trial court was directed to grant Paulek’s petition for a writ of mandamus and require the Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority to: (1) vacate and set aside its February 6, 2012, passing, approval, and adoption of Resolution No. 12-002 certifying and approving the Warm Springs Criteria Refinement; and (2) rescind the February 6, 2012, Notice of Exemption concerning the MSHCP Criteria Refinement. View "Paulek v. Western Riverside Co. Regional Conserv. Auth." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari filed by appellants Judson Turner, the Director of the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and the Grady County Board of Commissioners. They appealed the Court of Appeals' decision in "Georgia River Network v. Turner," (762 SE2d 123 (2014)). In 2010, Grady County received federal approval to construct a 960-acre fishing lake. The project also entailed building a large dam and inundating wetlands and nine miles of streams to create the lake. To proceed with the project, Grady County was required to apply for a buffer variance through the EPD in order to disturb the stream waters that would be affected by the project. Non-profit appellees Georgia River Network and American Rivers challenged the variance, arguing that Grady County's application was deficient because it failed to address buffers for the wetlands that would also be affected by the project. The Director granted the variance over appellees' objections. In a separate letter, the EPD advised appellees that wetlands did not require buffers because they generally lack wrested vegetation and were not subject to a variance request. An ALJ overturned the variance, reasoning that OCGA 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) of the Erosion and Sedimentation Act required a buffer for all state waters, including wetlands. The Director and Grady County filed challenged the ALJ's decision in the superior courts of Fulton County and Grady County, respectively. On the substantive issue of the construction and interpretation of OCGA 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A), both trial courts determined that the Director's construction of the statute was correct and that the buffer requirement only applies to state waters that have wrested vegetation. Appellees then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found the ALJ had not erred and reversed the decisions of the trial courts. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in its judgment, and reversed. View "Turner v. Georgia River Network" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a request that the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission issue a declaratory ruling clarifying the application of the Commission’s groundwater protection rules to coal ash lagoons. After the Commission issued its declaratory ruling, Petitioners sought judicial review, claiming that the Commission had misconstrued the applicable regulations and erred in failing to construe the applicable regulations in the manner contended for by Petitioners in their original request for declaratory relief. The trial court determined that portions of the Commission’s decision were plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the regulations and reversed the Commission’s decision with respect to Petitioners’ second request for a declaratory ruling. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss Petitioners’ appeal from the Commission’s declaratory ruling on mootness grounds, holding that the General Assembly’s enactment of Chapter 122 of the 2014 North Carolina Session Laws supersedes the rule at issue in this appeal with respect to coal ash lagoons located at facilities with active permits. Remanded. View "Cape Fear River Watch v. N.C. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm’n" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on plaintiffs' claims under the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, and Planning Enabling Act (PEA), chapter 36.70 RCW, were properly dismissed as time barred. The trial court granted defendant-Skamania County's summary judgment motion on each of the plaintiffs' claims, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the GMA and PEA claims, reasoning that a genuine issue of fact remained as to: (1) whether Skamania County actually completed periodic review on August 2, 2005, which Skamania County argues triggered the clock for the GMA claim; and (2) the date on which the inconsistency, if any, arose between the unmapped classification and the conservancy designation, which would have triggered the clock for the PEA claim. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in part, holding that both claims were timely because: (1) inaction generally does not trigger the GMA 60-day appeal period; and (2) in this case, no actionable inconsistency existed between a 1986 ordinance and the "2007 Comprehensive Plan" (2007 Plan) until August 2012. Because further factual development was unnecessary to address the time bar issue, The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Save Our Scenic Area v. Skamania County" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged EPA’s anticipated rule restricting carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants. Petitioners argue that section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7411(d), does not grant EPA authority to limit carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants and therefore, petitioners ask the court to enjoin EPA from issuing a final rule limiting those carbon dioxide emissions. The court concluded that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), does not authorize a court to circumvent finality principles in order to review proposed agency rules; EPA's public statements about its legal authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions does not constitute final agency action subject to judicial review; and the court rejected petitioners' challenge of a 2011 settlement agreement that EPA reached with several other states and environmental groups. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review and the petition for a writ of prohibition where the court does not have authority to review proposed agency rules. View "In Re: Murray Energy Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners filed suit challenging the EPA's regional haze regulations for the State of Montana. Petitioner PPL Montana operates and partially owns the Colstrip Steam Electric Generating Station and the J.E. Corette Steam Electric Station. Petitioner NPCA are nonprofit conservation organizations. The court concluded, inter alia, that EPA’s best available retrofit technology (BART) determination for nitrogen oxide emissions at Colstrip Units 1 and 2 is arbitrary and capricious; EPA’s responses to petitioners’ more minor challenges to its cost-effectiveness analysis make clear that it is capable of the required rational explanation; because the rule offers no reasoned explanation to support its requirement of a fourth scrubber at Colstrip Units 1 and 2, the court concluded that such requirement is arbitrary and capricious; the inconsistency in EPA’s BART determinations at Colstrip Units 1 and 2 and Corette is, absent explanation, arbitrary and capricious; by requiring PPL Montana to install selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) at Colstrip Units 1 and 2 without sufficient assurance of any improvement at all, EPA has offered no reasoned explanation; and EPA’s determination that installation of additional technology to control emissions from Corette was not cost-effective suffers the same failure of explanation as its BART determinations at Colstrip. Finally, the court rejected NPCA's contention that EPA’s decision not to require any additional emission-reducing technology, let alone installation of selective catalytic reduction (SCR), at Colstrip Units 3 and 4 was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the petitions for review are granted in part, denied in part, and vacated and remanded. View "Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. EPA" on Justia Law