Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Department of Fish and Wildlife appealed a judgment in favor of the Siskiyou County Farm Bureau (Farm Bureau), interpreting a Fish and Game Code section 1602 requiring notification when an entity plans to "substantially divert" water from a river or stream. "The trial court appears to have been led astray by a questionable and aborted enforcement policy" issued by a single Department employee, as well as the deluge of extrinsic material proffered by the Farm Bureau in its effort to demonstrate a latent ambiguity in the statute. Although extrinsic evidence may reveal a latent ambiguity in a statute, "such ambiguity must reside in the statutory language itself. It cannot exist in the abstract, or by ignoring the statutory language." Here, the Court of Appeal found extrinsic evidence revealed no ambiguity in the statute: the term "divert" had a long-established meaning in the context of water law before enactment of the statute. Regardless of an entity’s legal right to take water, such as for agricultural purposes, and regardless of whether the taking alters the streambed itself, section 1602 unambiguously required notification to the Department if an entity plans to "substantially divert" water. After notification, a statutory mechanism--arbitration followed by court review--exists to resolve disputes about diversions. This notification requirement neither encroaches on any entity’s water rights, nor impairs the powers and duties of the State Water Resources Control Board. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed because the trial court incorrectly found the statute, section 1602, to be ambiguous, and then resolved the perceived ambiguity in a manner inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. View "Siskiyou Co. Farm Bureau v. Dept. Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

Billings, Golden Valley, McKenzie, and Slope Counties in North Dakota, and the state, sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a, seeking to quiet title to alleged rights-of-way along section lines that run through lands owned by the federal government in the Dakota Prairie Grasslands and managed by the U.S. Forest Service. They alleged that in North Dakota, with a few exceptions, a public easement provides a right-of-way for public travel within 33 feet on either side of the section lines. The federal government does not recognize these rights-of-way. Nonprofit environmental organizations sought to intervene as defendants as of right under FRCP 24(a) or permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They alleged that they possess important aesthetic, recreational, and environmental interests in preserving the Grasslands. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right, finding that they failed to show injury in-fact or a recognized interest in the suit’s subject matter and that the United States adequately represented any legally protectable interest. The court also denied the alternative request for permissive intervention. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the groups did not overcome the presumption of adequate representation and noting that permissive intervention is “wholly discretionary.” View "North Dakota v. Badlands Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

This case involves the authority of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to issue nationwide permits under section 404(e) of the Clean Water Act. These permits authorized activities involving discharge of dredged or fill material in U.S. waters and wetlands. TransCanada Corporation proposed to rely on the nationwide permit to build an oil pipeline, the Gulf Coast Pipeline, running approximately 485 miles and cross over 2,000 waterways. The Corps issued letters verifying that Nationwide Permit 12 would cover the proposed construction. Shortly thereafter, TransCanada began constructing the pipeline, which was completed. Three environmental groups (Sierra Club, Inc.; Clean Energy Future Oklahoma; and East Texas Sub Regional Planning Commission) challenged the validity of the nationwide permit and verification letters. The district court rejected these challenges and entered judgment for the defendants. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the entry of judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Sierra Club v. Bostick" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were land and water use permits allowing intensive mineral exploration on State land. Specifically, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had to give public notice before issuing the permits. Because the Alaska Constitution required public notice when interests in land were transferred, the answer to this question depended on whether the permits conveyed an interest in land. After a trial, the superior court held that notice was not required because the permits were nominally and functionally revocable and therefore did not transfer an interest in land. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the land use permits were not functionally revocable, conveyed an interest in land and consequently should have been preceded by public notice. As such, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Aulukestai v. Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Banning Ranch was a 400-acre parcel of largely undeveloped coastal property with active oilfield facilities and operations. Project proponents sought to develop one-fourth of Banning Ranch for residential and commercial purposes, and to preserve the remaining acreage as open space and parks, removing and remediating much of the oil production equipment and facilities. The City of Newport Beach and its City Council (collectively the City) approved the Project. Banning Ranch Conservancy filed a mandamus action against the City. The trial court agreed with the Conservancy’s claim that the City violated the Planning and Zoning Law and its own general plan by its alleged failure to adequately coordinate with the California Coastal Commission before its approval of the Project. The court rejected the Conservancy’s claim that the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act by failing to identify in the environmental impact report (EIR) the “environmentally sensitive habitat areas” (ESHAs). All interested parties appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s CEQA ruling but concluded the court erred by finding the City violated its general plan. Therefore the Court reversed the judgment to the extent it provided mandamus relief to the Conservancy. View "Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

In this eminent domain proceeding, plaintiff Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency (SAFCA) acquired a fee simple interest in, a roadway easement over, and a temporary construction easement over a portion of defendant Ranjit Dhaliwal’s roughly 131-acre property in the Natomas Basin for use in connection with the Natomas Levee Improvement Program. The jury awarded Dhaliwal $178,703 for the property taken and $29,100 in severance damages. Brinderjit Dhaliwal and Gurdeep Dhaliwal, as co-executors of Dhaliwal’s estate, appealed the compensation award, arguing mainly that the trial court prejudicially erred in allowing SAFCA to introduce evidence concerning “future access” to the property. He claimed that such evidence was speculative because “[a]fter this case is concluded, the County and SAFCA would be able to deny Dhaliwal access to the property,” leaving him landlocked. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence because such evidence had the potential to affect the property’s market value, and was not conjectural, speculative, or remote, and did not contradict the scope of the taking as defined by the resolution of necessity. Dhaliwal also argued that the trial court erred in allowing SAFCA’s appraiser to critique his appraiser’s valuation of the property, and that SAFCA’s counsel committed misconduct during closing argument by commenting on Dhaliwal’s absence and referring to SAFCA’s inability to pay more than fair market value for the property. The Court of Appeal concluded that neither of these contentions had merit, and affirmed the trial court's ruling on those. View "Sacramento Area Flood Agency v. Dhaliwal" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) approved Fox Islands Wind’s (Fox Island) application for certification to build and operate a small-scale wind energy development project and issued a certification with a condition requiring Fox Island to implement a noise-reduction operation plan. After some neighbors, organized as Fox Island Wind Neighbors (FIWN), complained about the noise from the turbines, DEP demanded that Fox Island submit a revised operation protocol for approval. DEP subsequently issued a condition compliance order (CCO) accepting the revised protocol. FIWN filed a Rule 80C petition challenging the CCO, complaining that DEP’s action did not go far enough. The superior court reversed the CCO and remanded to DEP but denied FIWN’s constitutional claims. DEP and Fox Island appealed, and FIWN cross-appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the CCO was a judicially reviewable enforcement action; (2) the issuance of the CCO was supported by substantial record evidence and was within the discretion of the DEP; and (3) FIWN's First Amendment retaliation claim failed because there was no adverse action taken by DEP against FIWN that would deter FIWN from further exercising its constitutional rights. View "Fox Islands Wind Neighbors v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection" on Justia Law

The 2010 General Permit requires municipal storm sewer systems to develop and implement a Stormwater Management Program in compliance with specifications developed by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) to limit the introduction of pollutants into stormwater. After the 2010 General Permit took effect, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) and other environmental advocacy groups (collectively, NRDC) brought this hybrid N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding/declaratory judgment action against DEC challenging certain aspects of the 2010 General Permit. The Appellate Division rejected NRDC’s federal and state law challenges to the 2010 General Permit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that NRDC’s challenges to the lawfulness of the 2010 General Permit were without merit. View "Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation" on Justia Law

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service conveyed to a strip of land to a consortium of local governments a strip of land for the construction of a parkway. The decision was challenged on various environmental grounds by several parties, including appellants WildEarth Guardians, Rocky Mountain Wild, the Town of Superior, and the City of Golden. The district court affirmed the Service’s actions, and Appellants appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Appellants asserted that the Service violated the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered Species Act. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

The State Corporation Commission issued to Virginia Electric and Power Company certificates of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction of electric transmission facilities. BASF Corporation appealed, challenging the approval of the transmission line’s route across an environmental remediation site on its property along the James River. James City County, Save the James Alliance Trust, and James River Association (collectively, JCC) also appealed, challenging the approval of an overhead transmission line that will cross the James River and a switching station that will be located in James City County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its construction or application of Va. Code 56-46.1’s requirements that the power company reasonably minimize adverse environmental impacts on the area concerned, and the Commission’s findings were not contrary to the evidence or without evidentiary support; and (2) the Commission erred in concluding that the switching station was a “transmission line” under Va. Code 56-46.1(F) and therefore not subject to local zoning ordinances. Remanded as to the JCC appellants. View "BASF Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n" on Justia Law