Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent and real party in interest Al-Nur Islamic Center was a nonprofit religious organization which intended to erect an Islamic community center and mosque in a residential neighborhood in an unincorporated area of San Bernardino County. Plaintiff-appellant Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment (SOURCE) was an organization of individuals who opposed Al-Nur’s plans based on the negative environmental impact the opponents believed the project would have on the neighborhood. Following a study of the environmental impact of the proposed project, the San Bernardino County Planning Commission adopted a mitigated negative declaration (MND) and issued a conditional use permit (CUP) for the project. SOURCE appealed to the San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors. After hearing testimony, the board of supervisors denied the appeal. SOURCE then filed a combined petition for writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive relief. The court granted the petition and overturned the approval of the MND and CUP on grounds of the county’s failure to properly analyze the project’s impacts on the environment in the area of wastewater disposal. It ordered the county to prepare an analysis in compliance with CEQA of the project’s impacts in that respect. SOURCE then filed a motion for attorney fees. Al-Nur opposed the motion on the grounds that because of SOURCE’s limited success, the petition failed to convey a public benefit justifying an award of attorney fees, that SOURCE had failed to demonstrate it was entitled to fees based on the current rates in Los Angeles rather than in San Bernardino County, that SOURCE had failed to demonstrate the number of hours it expended was reasonable and necessary, that it sought excessive fees for some of the work performed, and that a portion of the hours claimed were for activities related to the administrative proceedings and not to the litigation. The trial court granted the motion, finding that SOURCE conferred a public benefit sufficient to warrant an award of attorney fees. However, at the hearing on the motion, the court stated that the amount requested was "outrageous." SOURCE appealed the eventual award of fees it received, arguing the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded $19,176, despite SOURCE’s request for $231,098. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that SOURCE did not meet its burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, and affirmed the award. View "Save Our Uniquely Rural v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

Hawkes wishes to mine peat from wetland property owned by affiliated companies in northwestern Minnesota. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (JD) that the property constitutes “waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, requiring a permit to discharge dredged or fill materials into the “navigable waters,” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), 1362(7). The district court dismissed a challenge, holding that an approved JD, though the consummation of the Corps’ jurisdictional decision-making process, was not a “final agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. While the appeal was pending, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that both courts misapplied the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Sackett v. EPA. A “properly pragmatic analysis of ripeness and final agency action principles compels the conclusion that an Approved JD is subject to immediate judicial review. The Corps’s assertion that the Revised JD is merely advisory and has no more effect than an environmental consultant’s opinion ignores reality.” View "Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Congress passed the Clean Water Act "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." The Act bans "the discharge of any pollutant by any person," unless affirmatively allowed by law. This case began when a group of environmental organizations petitioned the EPA to "use its powers [pursuant to section 1313(c)(4)(B)] to control nitrogen and phosphorous pollution" within the Mississippi River Basin and the Northern Gulf of Mexico. The EPA declined to do so. While the agency agreed that nitrogen and phosphorous pollution "is a significant water quality problem," it did "not believe that the comprehensive use of federal rulemaking authority is the most effective or practical means of addressing these concerns at this time." The petitioners filed suit, arguing the EPA had violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the CWA by declining to make a necessity determination. The EPA moved to dismiss the case on subject matter jurisdiction grounds, arguing that the decision whether to make a necessity determination was a discretionary act that the court lacked authority to review. The parties also cross-moved for summary judgment on the merits. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in "Massachusetts v. EPA" the district court held that the "EPA could not simply decline to make a necessity determination in response to . . . [the] petition for rulemaking." It remanded the case to the agency with orders to conduct a necessity determination. In doing so, the district court declined to issue specific guidance on "the types of factors that EPA can or cannot consider when actually making the necessity determination." This appeal followed. The Fifth Circuit surmised this case posed two questions: (1) whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to review the EPA's decision not to make a necessity determination; and (2) was the EPA required to make such a determination. The Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, and that the EPA was not required to make such a determination. View "Gulf Restoration Network v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB), after a notice and comment period and a hearing, voted to appropriate an instream flow right (ISF) on the San Miguel River, and to file a water application for water rights with the water court. Farmers Water Development Company opposed the proposed San Miguel ISF during the notice and comment period, but did not attend the hearing. Farmers also opposed the application at the water court. On cross-motions for a determination of a question of law, the water court was asked to determine whether the CWCB's decision to appropriate an ISF was a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial decision. Farmers argued that the decision was quasi-judicial, and that the procedures CWCB followed did not meet the dictates of procedural due process. The water court disagreed, concluding the CWCB was acting in a quasi-legislative capacity when it decided to appropriate the San Miguel ISF because, among other things, it was not adjudicating individual rights. The Supreme Court agreed: the CWCB's ISF appropriation was quasi-legislative because it was a policy decision "to preserve the natural environment" on behalf of the people of Colorado, as opposed to an adjudication of the rights of any specific party. View "Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Farmers Water Development Co." on Justia Law

The “Swampbuster” provisions of the Food Security Act deny certain farm-program benefits to persons who convert a wetland for agricultural purposes, 16 U.S.C. 3821. Smith challenged the USDA’s determination that Smith had converted 2.24 acres of wetland and was, therefore totally ineligible for benefits. Smith claimed that the Department erred in failing to: analyze whether his purported conversion would have only a minimal effect on surrounding wetlands, a finding that would exempt him from ineligibility; consider factors that would reduce his penalties; and exempt Smith’s parcel because it was originally converted and farmed before the enactment. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that, while this case only involves 2.24 acres, it has ramifications for thousands of corn and soybean farmers. The USDA had signed a mediation agreement with Smith, permitting him to plant the parcel in the spring and cut down trees so long as Smith did not remove stumps; USDA never argued that Smith intentionally violated this agreement, but permanently deprived him of benefits, in disregard of its own regulations. That Smith’s stance on mitigation may have “colored” the agency’s relationship with him does not mean that USDA is entitled to ignore minimal-effect evidence and a penalty-reduction request. View "Maple Drive Farms Ltd. P'ship v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

The Alaska Board of Game has established two different systems of subsistence hunting for moose and caribou in Alaska’s Copper Basin region: (1) community hunts for groups following a hunting pattern similar to the one traditionally practiced by members of the Ahtna Tene Nene’ community; and (2) individual hunts. A private outdoors group, the Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund, argued that this regulatory framework violated the equal access and equal protection clauses of the Alaska Constitution by establishing a preference for a certain user group. The Fund also argued that the regulations were not authorized by the governing statutes, that they conflicted with other regulations, and that notice of important regulatory changes was not properly given to the public. The Supreme Court concluded that the Board’s factual findings supported a constitutionally valid distinction between patterns of subsistence use, and because the Board’s regulations do not otherwise violate the law, the Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to the State, upholding the statute and the Board regulations against the Fund’s legal challenge. View "Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. Alaska" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff-appellant Leona Kuhn's improper disposal of debris from her house in the Napoleon city dump in late June 2013, after her house had been severely damaged by fire. The City of Napoleon maintains an "inert waste landfill" for its residents, located about two miles southeast of the city. The landfill was subject to the North Dakota Department of Health's rules and regulations, which permits only certain types of garbage in the landfill sorted into separate piles, some of which is burned or buried under the regulations. Kuhn appealed a district court judgment entered after an appeal from a municipal court conviction finding her guilty of violating a City ordinance for improperly disposing of refuse, and a subsequent court order denying her request for a written restitution order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, concluding sufficient evidence supported Kuhn's conviction, but reversed Kuhn's sentence and remanded for clarification. View "City of Napoleon v. Kuhn" on Justia Law

The Tussing Road Water Reclamation Facility in Fairfield County is required to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act from the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (Ohio EPA). The Fairfield County Board of Commissioners challenged the validity of new phosphorus limitations added on to the Tussing Road plant’s renewed NPDES permit, alleging that Ohio EPA ignored the administrative rulemaking procedures required by the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act (the Act) and imposed the new limits solely on a federally approved total maximum daily load (TMDL) report previously issued for the watershed in question. Specifically, the County contended that it should have had a full and fair opportunity to be heard and the right to review and challenge the TMDL before it was submitted to United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). The Court of Appeals vacated the NPDES phosphorus limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a TMDL established by Ohio EPA is a rule that is subject to the requirements of the Act, and therefore, Ohio EPA must follow the rulemaking procedure in the Act before submitting a TMDL to U.S. EPA for its approval and before the TMDL may be implemented in an NPDES permit. View "Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Nally" on Justia Law

St. Marys makes portland cement at a plant in Charlevoix. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment deemed the plant’s pollution controls sufficient and excused St. Marys from the retrofitting requirement under the Clean Air Act’s Regional Haze Rule, 40 C.F.R. 51.308–.309, which requires the states to determine which facilities within their borders create visibility-impairing pollutants that may “be emitted and transported downwind” to a federal park or wilderness area. States then must decide which of those sources are eligible for “Best Available Retrofit Technology.” The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency disagreed with the state and required the plant to add more stringent pollution controls. The Second Circuit upheld the EPA decision, rejecting challenges to EPA’s scientific and technological assertions concerning the plant’s nitrous oxide emissions, and a claim that St. Marys was exempt from the retrofitting requirement. View "St. Marys Cement Inc. v. Envtl. Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Black Warrior Riverkeeper and Defenders of Wildlife appealed a district court’s grant of final summary judgment to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as well as to the Alabama Coal Association and several other intervenor mining companies. Riverkeeper challenges the 2012 version of Nationwide Permit 21 (“NWP 21”), a general permit that allowed surface coal mining operations to discharge dredged or fill materials into navigable waters. Riverkeeper argued that the Corps arbitrarily and capriciously found that NWP 21 would have no more than minimal environmental effects, in violation of both the Clean Water Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. After deciding Riverkeeper has standing to sue, the district court held that Riverkeeper’s lawsuit was, nonetheless, barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. After thorough review, however, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the intervenors have shown neither inexcusable delay on the part of Riverkeeper nor prejudice resulting from Riverkeeper’s alleged delay. To the extent that Riverkeeper lagged in filing suit, its delay was slight and excused by its need to adequately investigate and prepare its claims in this complex case. Moreover, the Intervenors’ modest showing of harm, stated only at the highest order of abstraction, does not outweigh the potential environmental benefits of allowing Riverkeeper to proceed. As for the merits of Riverkeeper’s environmental claims, the district court concluded, after thorough deliberation, that the Corps’ determinations that NWP 21 would have only “minimal cumulative adverse effect” on the environment, pursuant to the Clean Water Act, and “no significant impact” on the environment, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, were neither arbitrary nor capricious. However, literally on the eve of oral argument before the Eleventh Circuit, the Corps admitted that it had underestimated the acreage of waters that would be affected by the projects authorized under the permit. In the face of this change in facts, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the implications of the Corps’ error. The Corps then conceded that the district court’s decision must be reversed and the matter remanded to the Corps for further consideration based on a more accurate assessment of the potential impacts of NWP 21. The Eleventh Circuit agreed. View "Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, et al" on Justia Law