Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This matter comprised two joined cases, both involving claims to water diverted from the South Fork of Dupuyer Creek in Two Medicine River Basin, into Gansman Coulee, for irrigation in the Teton River Basin. Two sets of claimants (“Duncan” and “Skelton”) filed statements of claim for existing rights. A canal and reservoir company (“Pondera”) appeared in the adjudication of Duncan’s and Skelton’s claims. The Montana Water Court amended the Water Master’s Report and adopted it as amended. Duncan and Skelton appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Chief Water Judge properly admitted historical documents prepared by Pondera in anticipation of litigation under the ancient document exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the Chief Water Judge correctly rejected the Master’s findings regarding certain variables used to determine the historical capacity of a flume on the Thomas ditch; (3) the Chief Water Judge correctly determined that portions of the claimants’ water rights had been abandoned or never perfected; and (4) the Chief Water Judge correctly adopted the Master’s conclusion that the claimants did not acquire any water rights by adverse possession. View "Skelton Ranch, Inc. v. Pondera County Canal & Reservoir Co." on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Wyoming Public Records Act, Plaintiff requested from the Office of the Governor and the Wyoming Game & Fish Department (together, the State) documents related to the status of grizzly bears under the Endangered Species Act. The State provided some documents and withheld others on grounds of the deliberative process privilege and the attorney-client communication privilege. The district court held (1) the Act incorporates the deliberative process privilege as a ground to exempt documents from disclosure under the Act, and the documents withheld under the deliberative process privilege were properly withheld by the State; and (2) two of the three documents withheld under the attorney-client privilege were properly withheld. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s ruling with respect to the documents withheld under the attorney-client privilege; (2) affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Act incorporates the deliberate process privilege; but (3) concluded that some of the documents withheld pursuant to the deliberative process privilege were not properly withheld because they were outside the scope of the privilege’s protection. View "Aland v. Mead" on Justia Law

US Oil Sands, Inc. applied for a discharge permit from the Utah Board of Water Quality (BWQ) for its tar sands bitumen-extraction project. In 2008, the BWQ issued the discharge permit. The 2008 decision was reaffirmed by the Executive Secretary in 2011. Living Rivers, an environmental advocacy organization, intervened and sought administrative review of the Secretary’s decision. The BWQ affirmed the issuance of the 2008 permit on its merits. Living Rivers petitioned for review of the BWQ’s decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because was no timely challenge to the 2008 decision, the original permit was final and not subject to further challenge on the merits. View "Living Rivers v. Utah Div. of Water Quality" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act requires permits for stationary sources, such as factories and powerplants. The Act’s “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD) provisions make it unlawful to construct or modify a “major emitting facility” in “any area to which [PSD program] applies” without a permit, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C). A “major emitting facility” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” (or 100 tons per year for certain sources). Facilities seeking a PSD permit must comply with emissions limitations that reflect the “best available control technology” (BACT) for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act and it is unlawful to operate any “major source,” wherever located, without a permit. A “major source” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air pollutant,” under Title V of the Act. In response to the Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA promulgated greenhouse-gas (GHG) emission standards for new vehicles, and made stationary sources subject to the PSD program and Title V, based on potential GHG emissions. Recognizing that requiring permits for all sources with GHG emissions above statutory thresholds would render the programs unmanageable, EPA purported to “tailor” the programs to accommodate GHGs by providing that sources would not become newly subject to PSD or Title V permitting on the basis of their potential to emit GHGs in amounts less than 100,000 tons per year. The D.C. Circuit dismissed some challenges to the tailoring rule for lack of jurisdiction and denied the rest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the Act does not permit an interpretation requiring a source to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of potential GHG emissions. The Massachusetts decision held that the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” includes GHGs, but with respect to PSD and Title V permitting provisions, EPA has employed a narrower, context-appropriate meaning. Massachusetts did not invalidate the long-standing constructions. “The Act-wide definition is not a command to regulate, but a description of the universe of substances EPA may consider regulating.” The presumption of consistent usage yields to context and distinct statutory objects call for different implementation strategies. EPA has repeatedly acknowledged that applying PSD and Title V permitting requirements to GHGs would be inconsistent with the Act’s structure and design, which concern “a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.” EPA lacked authority to “tailor” the Act’s unambiguous numerical thresholds to accommodate its GHG-inclusive interpretation. EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require sources that would need permits based on emission of conventional pollutants to comply with BACT for GHGs. BACT, which has traditionally been about end-of-stack controls, may be fundamentally unsuited to GHG regulation, but applying BACT to GHGs is not "disastrously unworkable," and need not result in a dramatic expansion of agency authority. View "Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Various Community Groups and the Detroit International Bridge Company sued the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), challenging the Record of Decision (ROD) issued in 2009, selecting the Delray neighborhood of Detroit as the preferred location alternative for a new international bridge crossing between the U.S. and Canada. The Bridge Company owns and operates the existing Ambassador Bridge, about two miles from the proposed new crossing. The Bridge Company also owns property in the Delray neighborhood. The complaint alleged that selecting the Delray neighborhood as the preferred alternative violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act; Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA); and “applicable legal authorities” on environmental justice, essentially because the decision was arbitrary and capricious.” The district court held that the Bridge Company had prudential standing to challenge the ROD and affirmed the ROD. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting extensive study of the project. View "Latin Ams. for Social & Econ. Dev. v. Adm'r of Fed. Highway Admin." on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's issuance of a memorandum entitled, "Next Steps for Pending Redesignation Requests and State Implementation Plan Actions Affected by the Recent Court Decision Vacating the 2011 Cross-State Air Pollution Rule." The court dismissed the petition for review because petitioners failed to show that they suffered injury that is imminent or certain as a result of the Memorandum. Accordingly, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners' challenges. View "Sierra Club, et al. v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

The Village of Kings Point adopted a proposal to build a facility in Kings Point Park. Plaintiffs filed an action against the Village, its Mayor and its Board of Trustees seeking to enjoin the Village’s proposed project and its current use of a portion of the Park for storage as unlawful uses of parkland in violation of the public trust doctrine. The State then filed an action against the Village seeking relief with respect to the Village’s proposed project. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the State and Plaintiffs, permanently enjoining Defendants from proceeding with the project and from obstructing existing access to the Park and directing the Village to remove the materials being stored in the Park. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the causes of action challenging the proposed project were not barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) the continuing wrong doctrine applied to toll the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the ongoing use of parkland alleged to violate the public trust doctrine. View "Capruso v. Village of Kings Point" on Justia Law

In 1998, the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) and John, Alfred, and Anna Tillinghast (Defendants) executed a consent agreement regarding the actions Defendants would take to remedy alleged violations of the Freshwater Wetlands Act from the establishment of five campsites in the Bowdish Lake Camping Area. When Defendants purportedly failed to comply with the consent agreement, the superior court appointed a master to resolve the issues in dispute. The master issued a report, and Defendants filed a motion asking the trial justice to approve the master’s report. After a hearing, the trial justice adopted the report and ordered that the master’s findings be implemented. Plaintiff, named in her official capacity as the director of the DEM, appealed. The Supreme Court denied and dismissed the appeal, holding that because the order confirming the master’s report was not final, the appeal was interlocutory and thus not properly before the Court. View "Coit v. Tillinghast" on Justia Law

Appellants Energize Vermont, Inc. and several individuals challenged the Vermont Public Service Board (PSB)’s affirmance of a permit issued by the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR), approving an operational-phase stormwater management plan for appellee Green Mountain Power (GMP), with respect to the Kingdom Community Wind Project (Wind Project) on Lowell Mountain. Appellants raised a variety of challenges to the operational-phase permit, as well as other permits. On the appeal of the PSB order, the only issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether ANR complied with certain requirements of its own Vermont Stormwater Management Manual in granting the operational-phase permit. "Given the deferential standard of review, this straightforward plain meaning analysis needs little elaboration. Appellants have not met their burden." The Supreme Court found no clear and convincing error in ANR’s interpretation of the VSMM to allow an operational stormwater permit for the Wind Project’s level spreaders.View "In re ANR Permits in Lowell Mountain Wind Project" on Justia Law

The South Florida Water Management District alleged that RLI, Live Oak, LLC, a land developer and owner of property that purportedly contained wetlands, participated in unauthorized dredging, construction activity, and filling of wetlands without first obtaining the District’s approval. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the District and awarded the District $81,900 in civil penalties. The district court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in basing its findings on a preponderance of the evidence standard and not the clear and convincing evidence standard. On motion for rehearing or certification, the district court certified a question for a determination by the Supreme Court of the proper burden of proof. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the Legislature statutorily authorizes a state governmental agency to recover a “civil penalty” in a “court of competent jurisdiction” but does not specify the agency’s burden of proof, the agency is not required to prove the alleged violation by clear and convincing evidence but, rather, by a preponderance of the evidence. View "S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC" on Justia Law