Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced new and revised air traffic procedures in the Southern California Metroplex as part of its Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) initiative in 2016, affecting airports including Los Angeles International Airport. These procedures, specifically the HUULL, IRNMN, and RYDRR routes, relied on satellite navigation and were subject to an environmental review, which concluded there would be no significant noise impacts. In 2018, the FAA amended these procedures, making minor changes to altitude and speed restrictions at certain waypoints, with no changes to flight paths, number of flights, or aircraft types. Only one amended waypoint affected Malibu, and none affected Culver City.Previously, Culver City and other parties challenged the FAA’s 2016 approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which upheld the FAA’s decision. After the 2018 amendments, the City of Los Angeles and Culver City (as intervenor) challenged the FAA’s actions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found violations of environmental statutes but remanded for further review without vacating the procedures. The FAA then conducted additional environmental consultations and issued a Record of Decision, concluding the amendments qualified for a categorical exclusion from further environmental review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the petitions from Malibu and Culver City regarding the FAA’s 2018 amendments. The court held that only challenges to the 2018 amendments were timely, dismissing any challenge to the original 2016 procedures as untimely. The court determined that neither city demonstrated standing to challenge the 2018 amendments: Malibu’s evidence addressed only the 2016 procedures, and Culver City failed to provide evidence of injury. The petitions were dismissed for lack of standing. View "City of Culver City v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

Egger Enterprises, LLC acquired a ranch in Humboldt County, Nevada, which had previously shifted from flood to center pivot irrigation systems. This conversion left portions of water rights unused, and Egger sought to use the leftover water by acquiring adjacent public land through federal Desert Land Entry applications. Administrative delays between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Nevada’s Division of Water Resources (NDWR) prolonged this process. Meanwhile, a nonparty challenged Egger’s applications, asserting that Egger had not used portions of its water rights for over 16 years, and thus, those rights were forfeited.The State Engineer found, by clear and convincing evidence, that certain water rights had not been put to beneficial use for five or more consecutive years and declared them forfeited. Egger petitioned for judicial review in the Sixth Judicial District Court, which initially reversed and remanded for lack of proper notice. Once proper notice was sent and Egger requested extensions of time, the State Engineer granted one extension but denied a subsequent request, ultimately issuing a declaration of forfeiture. Egger again sought judicial review, but the district court denied relief, finding the State Engineer’s decision supported by substantial evidence and holding that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of Egger’s petition. The court held that the State Engineer is not required to make findings on every statutory factor when considering an extension request under NRS 534.090(3)—only those relevant to the case. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the forfeiture decision and that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief, as there was no beneficial use of the water within the statutory period, nor any estoppel or error by the State Engineer. View "EGGER ENTER., LLC VS. STATE ENGINEER" on Justia Law

A group of cities in Idaho, each holding junior ground water rights within the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer, became subject to curtailment proceedings initiated by senior surface water users represented by the Surface Water Coalition. The Coalition argued that pumping by junior ground water rights holders diminished water available to senior rights holders drawing from the Snake River. In response, the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources has periodically updated the methodology used to determine whether material injury to the senior rights has occurred, issuing a series of orders—the most recent being a Sixth Methodology Order.Following the issuance of a Fifth Methodology Order and an associated Post-Hearing Order, the cities challenged those orders in the Snake River Basin Adjudication district court, raising several concerns about the Director’s factual determinations and legal standards. During the administrative process, the Director simultaneously issued a Sixth Methodology Order that expressly superseded all prior methodology orders. The cities, however, did not include a direct challenge to the Sixth Methodology Order in their petition for judicial review. The district court affirmed the Director’s Post-Hearing Order, supporting the agency’s methodology and factual findings.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the cities failed to petition for review of the operative Sixth Methodology Order in the district court, as required under Idaho administrative law. As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and declined to address the substantive claims raised by the cities. The court also denied requests for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-117(1), finding the statute inapplicable, but awarded costs to the prevailing parties. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued four ten-year plans authorizing the gathering and removal of wild horses from public lands in specific areas to achieve and maintain population levels within approved management ranges. Friends of Animals challenged these plans, arguing that they allowed indefinite removals without specific findings of overpopulation, failed to rely on current information, and did not include proper consultation, contrary to requirements under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. The BLM responded that the Act permitted multiple removal operations over a period of years within a single plan.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. The court held that the ten-year plans were unlawful to the extent they permitted additional gathers after achieving the approved management levels, and vacated those portions of the plans. The court also held that future removal operations must be based on current information and proper consultation, and must be conducted promptly, as required by the Act. The court remanded the matter to BLM to revise the plans and clarify which future gathers would require further process before proceeding. Notably, the court did not resolve the parties’ principal disputes, leaving them to be addressed on remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal brought by Friends of Animals. The appellate court determined that the District Court’s remand order was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it left the core dispute unresolved for further proceedings. As a result, the appellate court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the case and dismissed the appeal. The disposition was a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management" on Justia Law

Texas LNG, a company seeking to construct a liquid natural gas terminal in Brownsville, Texas, received a permit from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to build its facility. The company faced delays due to litigation and the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in three successive extensions of its construction deadline granted by TCEQ’s executive director. The South Texas Environmental Justice Network (STEJN), an environmental advocacy group, moved to overturn the third extension, arguing that Texas LNG did not meet the requirements under Texas law to receive it and that the executive director lacked authority to grant the extension.Prior to the current appeal, both federal and state agencies reviewed Texas LNG’s permit. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and TCEQ initially granted the necessary permits, but subsequent legal challenges led to a remand by the D.C. Circuit to FERC (which ultimately reaffirmed the permit) and a dismissal by the Third Court of Appeals in Austin for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction regarding the TCEQ permit. TCEQ’s Office of Public Interest recommended granting the motion to overturn on the basis of updated air quality standards, but TCEQ did not issue a decision, resulting in a denial of STEJN’s motion by operation of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed STEJN’s direct petition for review of TCEQ’s denial. Applying de novo review under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act, the Fifth Circuit held that STEJN had standing but found that TCEQ’s executive director had the authority under section 116.120 of the Texas Administrative Code to grant the third extension. The court determined that Texas LNG met the regulatory requirements for a third extension, and substantial evidence supported TCEQ’s decision. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit denied STEJN’s petition for review. View "S Texas Environmental Justice v. Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The case centers on the United States Bureau of Land Management’s decision to approve a contract with JS Livestock for a new off-range corral on private land near Winnemucca, Nevada, intended to house and care for up to 4,000 wild horses and burros removed from public lands. Friends of Animals, an advocacy group, challenged this decision, arguing that the Bureau’s actions violated both the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. The group raised concerns about the adequacy of animal welfare protections and environmental impacts, including the facility’s design, animal density, disease management, and mitigation of adverse effects on soil and groundwater.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found no statutory violations, holding that the Bureau had complied with both the Wild Horses Act and NEPA. Specifically, the court determined that the Bureau’s reliance on its established animal welfare standards and contract requirements was reasonable and that the environmental assessment sufficiently considered the project’s impacts as required by law. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau and denied Friends of Animals’ motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that Friends of Animals had representational standing to bring the case. The court found that the Bureau did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law: it properly ensured humane treatment of the animals, took a “hard look” at environmental impacts as required by NEPA, reasonably relied on compliance with state permits, considered appropriate project alternatives, and adequately explained why the facility’s impacts would not be significant. The summary judgment for the Bureau was affirmed. View "FRIENDS OF ANIMALS V. BURGUM" on Justia Law

A group of cities holding junior ground water rights in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer sought judicial review of a final order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources. This order updated the methodology used to assess whether pumping by junior ground water users caused material injury to senior surface water rights holders who divert water from the Snake River. The Director’s Fifth Amended Final Order revised technical aspects of the model and data, and after a hearing on objections by the cities, the Director affirmed the methodology with modifications and issued a Sixth Methodology Order, which expressly superseded all prior methodology orders.The cities filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication district court, challenging the Director’s Post-Hearing Order regarding the Fifth Methodology Order. The district court affirmed the Director’s findings and conclusions, upholding the methodology and the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard, and found that the Director did not prejudice the cities’ substantial rights. The district court’s judgment specifically affirmed the Post-Hearing Order but did not address the operative Sixth Methodology Order.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the cities had properly invoked its jurisdiction. The Court held that the cities failed to challenge the currently operative Sixth Methodology Order in district court, and therefore, under Idaho law, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal or award the requested relief. As a result, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court awarded attorney fees and costs to the Idaho Department of Water Resources but denied attorney fees to the intervening Surface Water Coalition, granting them costs only. View "City of Idaho Falls v. IDWR" on Justia Law

The case concerns a property owner in Sonoma County who, after a fire, conducted timber operations under an emergency waiver of waste discharge requirements. Following observations of waste discharge violations and failure to comply with cleanup orders, the regional water quality control board issued notices of violation and ultimately imposed administrative civil liability, assessing a penalty of $276,000. The property owner did not file a petition with the State Water Resources Control Board within the statutory 30-day period to seek review of the regional board’s order.Subsequently, the property owner filed a writ petition in Sonoma County Superior Court to challenge the civil liability order, and later requested the State Board to review the order on its own motion under Water Code section 13320. The State Board declined to exercise its discretionary review. The property owner amended his writ petition to add the State Board as a party, alleging abuse of discretion in its refusal to review. The State Board and the regional board demurred, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the State Board’s discretionary decision was not subject to judicial review. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for the respondents.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the State Board’s decision not to exercise its discretionary authority to review a regional board order under Water Code section 13320 is not subject to judicial review. The court rejected arguments that this interpretation violated the separation of powers doctrine, concluding that the State Board’s action was not quasi-judicial and did not adjudicate the parties’ rights. The court confirmed that only regional board orders, not the State Board’s discretionary refusals, are eligible for judicial review under the statutory scheme. View "Bareilles v. State Water Resource Control Board" on Justia Law

The case concerns two decisions made by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding air quality standards in the Detroit area under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Michigan sought to redesignate the Detroit area from nonattainment to attainment for the 2015 ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), relying on air quality data from 2019–2021. However, in June 2022, the area recorded exceedances attributed to wildfire smoke from Canada. Michigan requested the EPA to exclude these exceptional-event data points. Meanwhile, Detroit missed its attainment deadline and was reclassified from Marginal to Moderate nonattainment, triggering additional requirements for Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT) implementation.After Detroit missed its attainment deadline, the EPA finalized its determination of nonattainment and reclassified the area as Moderate nonattainment, setting deadlines for Michigan to submit RACT revisions. Michigan submitted its redesignation request before these RACT requirements became effective. The EPA later approved Michigan’s exceptional-events request and redesignated Detroit to attainment, despite Michigan not having implemented the newly required RACT measures for Moderate nonattainment areas. Sierra Club challenged both the EPA’s approval of the exceptional-event exclusion and the subsequent redesignation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed both EPA actions. The court held that the EPA’s approval of Michigan’s exceptional-event request was not arbitrary or capricious, finding that the agency had adequately explained its reasoning and considered the relevant data linking wildfire smoke to the ozone exceedances. However, the court vacated the EPA’s redesignation of Detroit to attainment, holding that the CAA requires a state to satisfy all requirements applicable at the time of redesignation, not merely those in effect when the redesignation request was submitted. Because Michigan had not met the RACT requirements by the time of redesignation, the EPA’s action was contrary to law. Thus, the approval of the exceptional-event request was affirmed, and the redesignation was vacated. View "Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

A company sought approval to construct a 500 kW solar-energy project in Randolph, Vermont. The proposed project required a certificate of public good (CPG) from the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC). A portion of the project's infrastructure, such as its access road and interconnection line, would be located on land with slopes exceeding 25%. Local and regional planning commissions, as well as the Town of Randolph Selectboard, initially supported the project and jointly requested the site be designated as a “preferred site.” After neighbors raised concerns that some panels would be located on steep slopes in conflict with the Town Plan, the applicant agreed to revise the project so that no panels would be built on slopes over 25%. The Town conditioned its continued support on this revision and on receiving the final site plan.The PUC’s hearing officer initially recommended denying the CPG due to uncertainty about whether the Town’s conditions regarding slope measurement had been met. The PUC rejected this recommendation, refocusing on whether the Town itself was satisfied with the conditions. The applicant subsequently provided a letter from the Town confirming its support and satisfaction with the conditions. The PUC found the project's compliance with soil-erosion control measures sufficient, particularly in light of a stormwater permit issued by the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR), and ruled that the project would not unduly interfere with the region’s orderly development. The PUC granted the CPG; the neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, giving deference to the PUC’s expertise and factual findings. The Court affirmed the PUC’s grant of the CPG, holding that the PUC correctly applied the legal standards under 30 V.S.A. § 248, properly considered the Town Plan’s land-conservation measures, reasonably relied on the Town’s assurances and ANR’s permit, and did not misapply its own rules regarding “preferred site” status. View "In re Petition of Randolph Davis Solar LLC" on Justia Law