Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Army Corps of Engineers partnered with the City of Dallas on the Dallas Floodway Extension (DFE) project, which began in 1999. Plaintiffs Timpy Ondrusek and Barbara Ann Ondrusek Wolfe own property that Dallas attempted to condemn for the DFE. They sued the Corps and the City in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming the Corps failed to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) to account for new information, violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the claims, determining the case was not justiciable. The court found the plaintiffs had not shown Article III standing and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, but the district court again concluded the case was not justiciable, noting the levee design phase was only 35 percent complete, and dismissed the case as unripe without prejudice, denying leave to amend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found the claims against the Army Corps of Engineers were ripe for decision, as the Corps' failure to comply with NEPA presented a present controversy. The court determined the plaintiffs had standing, as they alleged a concrete and particularized risk of environmental harm to their property due to the Corps' failure to prepare an SEIS. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the suit with respect to the Army Corps of Engineers, affirmed the dismissal with respect to the City of Dallas, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ondrusek v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) changing its air-quality standard for ozone under the Clean Air Act, which required states to amend their state plans. The EPA issued guidance memoranda to assist states, suggesting specific modeling and a minimum threshold for interstate emissions. Kentucky proposed a plan based on this guidance, but the EPA delayed action on the plan for two years and then disapproved it using different modeling and a lower threshold than initially recommended. Kentucky petitioned the court to vacate the EPA's disapproval.The EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was challenged in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The EPA sought to transfer the case to the D.C. Circuit, arguing that the disapproval was a nationally applicable final action. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion, stating that the EPA's disapproval was not nationally applicable and was based on Kentucky's unique facts. The court also found that the EPA's action violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by acting arbitrarily and inconsistently with its prior guidance.The Sixth Circuit held that the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA failed to adequately explain its departure from prior guidance and did not consider Kentucky's reliance on the initial recommendations. The court vacated the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized the importance of consistency and the need for the EPA to justify its actions when changing its approach. View "Kentucky v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The case involves the approval process for a large-scale commercial offshore wind energy facility located on the Outer Continental Shelf, fourteen miles south of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket. The plaintiffs, consisting of commercial fishing entities and a nonprofit organization, challenged the federal government's approval of the project, citing violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, which included various federal departments and agencies, as well as the business entity responsible for the wind project. The court found that the plaintiffs' ESA claims were non-justiciable due to lack of standing and mootness, as the initial biological opinion had been superseded by a new one. The court also ruled that the plaintiffs were outside the zone of interests protected by the NEPA and the MMPA, and that the Alliance had failed to show that the Corps' issuance of the CWA Section 404 permit was arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's rulings de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgments, agreeing that the plaintiffs lacked standing for their ESA claims and that the claims were moot. The court also upheld the district court's zone-of-interests rulings regarding the NEPA and MMPA claims. Additionally, the court found that the Corps' decision to issue the CWA permit was not arbitrary or capricious and that the BOEM's approval of the project under the OCSLA was lawful. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs' arguments did not demonstrate that the BOEM had acted arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the project. View "Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Best Development Group, LLC proposed to develop a Grocery Outlet store in King City. The King City Planning Commission approved the project, determining it was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) under the class 32 categorical exemption for infill development. Efrain Aguilera appealed this decision to the King City Council, which denied the appeal and upheld the exemption. Aguilera and Working Families of Monterey County then filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the class 32 exemption did not apply because the project was not in an urbanized area and the environmental assessment was inadequate.The Monterey County Superior Court denied the petition, ruling that the class 32 exemption did not require the project to be in an urbanized area as defined by CEQA and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the project met the exemption criteria. The court also found that the City was not required to conduct a formal environmental review.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the terms “infill development” and “substantially surrounded by urban uses” in CEQA Guidelines section 15332 should not be interpreted using the statutory definitions of “infill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses” from other sections of CEQA. The court found that the regulatory intent was to reduce sprawl by exempting development in already developed areas, typically but not exclusively in urban areas. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that the project site was substantially surrounded by urban uses, based on the environmental assessment and aerial photographs.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, upholding the application of the class 32 exemption and ruling that no further CEQA compliance was required. View "Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Com." on Justia Law

A group of organizations and a resident challenged a plan by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Park Service (NPS) regulating tourist flights over four national parks near San Francisco. The agencies determined that no environmental analysis was needed under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) because the plan would cause minimal additional environmental impact compared to existing conditions.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the agencies had previously announced their intent to prepare an environmental assessment but later terminated that process. The agencies then decided to use the existing number of flights as the baseline for their environmental analysis, concluding that the plan would have no significant environmental impact.The court held that the agencies acted arbitrarily by using the existing flights under interim operating authority as the baseline for their NEPA analysis. This approach effectively enshrined the status quo without evaluating the environmental impacts of the existing flights. The court found that the agencies' reliance on interim operating authority as the baseline was unreasonable and contrary to their duties under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act and NEPA.The court vacated the FAA's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the agencies to conduct a proper NEPA analysis. The court also noted that the agencies could move for a stay of the mandate if they wished to keep the current plan in place while conducting the new analysis. View "Marin Audubon Society v. FAA" on Justia Law

Jim Walsh, a member of the Washington State House of Representatives, along with other appellants, submitted six initiatives to the legislature. Three of these initiatives were enacted, while the remaining three—repealing the Washington Climate Commitment Act, repealing the state’s capital gains tax, and making participation in the state’s long-term care insurance program optional—were set to appear on the November 2024 ballot. The appellants sought to prevent public investment impact disclosures from appearing on the ballot, arguing that these disclosures were not warranted.The Thurston County Superior Court denied the appellants' request for writs of mandamus and prohibition, dismissing their complaint. The court found that the capital gains tax was not impliedly repealed by another initiative and that the other two initiatives did indeed modify a "tax or fee," thus requiring public investment impact disclosures. The appellants then appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the writs of prohibition and mandamus were not appropriate in this case. The attorney general and the secretary of state were acting within their jurisdiction and statutory obligations. The court also noted that the appellants had not demonstrated the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of legal proceedings. Therefore, the trial court's denial of relief and dismissal of the case were upheld. View "Walsh v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a taxpayers' association and a water district over the imposition of groundwater replenishment charges. The taxpayers' association alleged that the water district's charges violated constitutional provisions and unfairly benefited large agricultural businesses. The association sought a writ of mandate to stop the collection of these charges and to vacate the resolutions imposing them. They also claimed conversion, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) against the water district's board members, general manager, and consulting firms.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike several causes of action on the grounds that they arose from protected activities. The court found that the public interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute applied. Additionally, the court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the first amended petition and complaint, finding the claims time-barred under the validation statutes. The court also awarded over $180,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, deeming the anti-SLAPP motion frivolous.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the public interest exemption did not apply because the relief sought could only be provided by the water district, not the individual defendants. The court found that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted for most causes of action, except for conversion and the writ of mandate against the general manager. Consequently, the fee award was reversed. The court also affirmed the demurrer ruling, as the claims against the individual defendants were not legally sufficient. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell" on Justia Law

Reabold California LLC applied to convert a former oil well into a Class II injection well in the Brentwood Oil Field, Contra Costa County. The well, drilled in 1963, had been used to pump oil and water from an aquifer. Reabold proposed minor modifications to the well to inject produced water back into the aquifer, which had been exempted from the Safe Drinking Water Act. The project aimed to eliminate the need for trucking the produced water to a disposal site. The California Department of Conservation’s Division of Geologic Energy Management (CalGEM) approved the project, invoking a Class 1 categorical exemption under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) for minor alterations involving negligible or no expansion of use.The Contra Costa County Superior Court ruled in favor of Sunflower Alliance, which challenged CalGEM’s use of the categorical exemption. The court agreed with Sunflower that converting the well to an injection well constituted a significant change in use, thus not fitting within the Class 1 exemption. Consequently, the court issued a writ of mandate directing CalGEM to set aside its notice of exemption and project approval.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the well conversion project fell within the Class 1 exemption because the physical modifications were minor and the change in use posed negligible environmental risks. The court emphasized that the project involved injecting water into the same aquifer from which it was originally pumped, and regulatory conditions ensured the injected water would be confined within the aquifer. The court directed the lower court to deny Sunflower’s petition for writ of mandate and to order CalGEM to reinstate its project approval and notice of exemption. View "Sunflower Alliance v. Dept. of Conservation" on Justia Law

Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. applied to the Ohio Power Siting Board for approval to construct a 3.7-mile natural-gas-distribution pipeline in Maumee, Ohio. The application was submitted under an accelerated review process for pipelines less than five miles long. Yorktown Management, L.L.C., which owns property adjacent to the proposed pipeline route, raised concerns about the safety and environmental impact of the pipeline, particularly its proximity to their commercial office building.The Ohio Power Siting Board approved Columbia's application under the accelerated review process, finding that the project met the necessary criteria. Yorktown filed a motion to intervene and later a motion to suspend the review, arguing that the board had not adequately addressed their safety concerns. The board denied Yorktown's motion to suspend and subsequently denied their application for rehearing, leading Yorktown to appeal the decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the board's decision. The court found that Columbia's application did not require a 50-foot-wide permanent easement along the entire pipeline route, as Yorktown claimed. The court also determined that Yorktown had waived its right to challenge the board's rejection of testimony from a different pipeline project. Additionally, the court held that the board did not err in refusing to suspend its review of the accelerated application, as Yorktown failed to demonstrate good cause for suspension. The court concluded that the board did not improperly defer to Columbia and had appropriately conditioned the approval on compliance with relevant safety regulations. View "In re Letter of Notification Application of Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. for the Ford Street Pipeline Project" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the California Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition (Coalition) and the State Air Resources Board (Board) over the adoption of the Advanced Clean Trucks Regulation (Regulation). The Coalition, which promotes the use of natural gas as an alternative fuel, argues that the Regulation's focus on electric vehicles (ZEV) harms those who have invested in low-NOx natural gas technologies. The Coalition contends that the Board failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in promulgating the Regulation.The Superior Court of Fresno County rejected the Coalition's claims and denied their petition. The court found that the Board's rejection of the low-NOx vehicle credit as an alternative was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board had no further obligation to consider low-NOx vehicles as a mitigation measure. The court also concluded that the Board's failure to respond to certain public comments was harmless. Additionally, the court ruled that the Board had conducted a proper economic analysis under the APA and had correctly rejected the low-NOx vehicle credit in its analysis. The court did, however, allow the administrative record to be augmented with a document referenced in several comments during the regulatory proceedings.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the Board's rejection of the low-NOx vehicle credit as an alternative was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the Board had considered a reasonable range of alternatives and was not obligated to discuss the low-NOx vehicle credit as a mitigation measure. The court further concluded that the Board's failure to respond to comments was harmless and that the Board had complied with the APA in its economic analysis. The court also found that any error in augmenting the administrative record was harmless. View "California Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition v. State Air Resources Board" on Justia Law