Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

MSHA’s jurisdiction, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Commission”) held that for the list of items in Section 802(h)(1)(C) to be considered a “mine,” the items had to be located at an extraction site, or the roads appurtenant thereto.  Because neither the trucks nor the facility associated with the citations at issue were located on land covered under subsections (A)–(B), the Commission found they failed to constitute a “mine” and vacated the citations. The Commission also found that, as an independent contractor not engaged in servicing a mine at the time of the citation, KC Transport failed to qualify as an “operator” under Section 802(d) of the Mine Act. The Secretary of Labor (“the Secretary”), acting through MSHA, appealed the Commission’s decision and asked the court to uphold the two citations as an appropriate exercise of the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Mine Act. In the Secretary’s view, subsection (C) of the “mine” definition covers KC Transport’s facility and trucks because they were “used in” mining activity.   The DC Circuit vacated and remanded the Commission’s decision, allowing the Secretary to interpret the statute’s ambiguous language. The court explained that given the Mine Act’s language, context, and the court’s binding precedent, it finds that the Commission erred in its interpretation of the “mine” and “operator” definitions. And we generally defer to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute—even when the Commission disagrees. But here, the Secretary’s position treats subsection (C) as 4 unambiguous and makes no meaningful effort to address the numerous practical concerns that would arise under such an interpretation. View "Secretary of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco (“San Francisco”) petitions for review of a final order of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) denying review of San Francisco’s federal National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit for its Oceanside combined sewer system and wastewater treatment facility (“wastewater system”). This NPDES permit, issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act of 1972 (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387, allows San Francisco to discharge from its wastewater system into the Pacific Ocean. San Francisco contends that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously.   The Ninth Circuit denied San Francisco’s petition. The panel held that the EPA had authority under the CWA to include the two general narrative prohibitions. Noting that Supreme Court precedent, this Circuit’s prior cases, and prior Environmental Appeals Board decisions support the legality and confirm the enforceability of general narrative prohibitions in permits issued under the CWA, the panel held that the two narrative provisions were consistent with the CWA and its implementing regulations. The panel further held that the EPA was not required to follow the procedures set forth in 40 C.F.R. Section 122.44(d)(1)(i)-(vii) for deriving pollutant-specific effluent limitations in imposing the general narrative provisions and that the EPA’s decision to impose the general narrative provisions was rationally connected to evidence in the record indicating that a “backstop” to the more specific provisions would be useful in protecting beneficial uses. The panel next held that the EPA had authority under its Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy to require San Francisco to update its long-term control plan for its combined sewer overflows. View "CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO V. USEPA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of the Town of Exeter in this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief challenging the Town's decision to amend its zoning ordinance, which prevented Plaintiff from developing three commercial solar-field projects in Exeter, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.On appeal, Plaintiff challenged several aspects of the superior court's judgment denying Plaintiff's request to enjoin enforcement of an emergency moratorium ordinance preventing review of Plaintiff's solar-field projects and to declare that Plaintiff's solar-field projects were vested pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 45-24-44. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under this Court's understanding of the relevant law, the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of the Town. View "Green Development, LLC v. Town of Exeter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Ohio Power Siting Board authorizing Firelands Wind, LLC to construct, operate, and maintain a wind farm in Huron and Erie Counties, holding that the nineteen nearby residents and the Black Swamp Bird Observatory that brought this appeal (collectively, Appellants) have not established that the Board's order was unlawful or unreasonable.On appeal, Appellants challenged the Board's determination that the wind farm satisfies the statutory requirements for constructing a major utility facility, asserting, among other things, that the project could kill birds and create excessive noise for residents near the wind farm and that the Board improperly failed to follow its administrative rules. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board's order was neither unlawful nor unreasonable. View "In re Application of Firelands Wind, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioners' petition objecting to a permit issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and affirmed by the Environmental Appeals Board requiring General Electric Company (GE) to clean up polychlorinated biphenyls from certain portions of the Housatonic River, holding that the EPA's challenged actions were not arbitrary or capricious.On appeal, Petitioners brought three substantive challenges and also brought procedural challenges to the permit's issuance. The First Circuit denied the petition after noting that should GE's cleanup of the river not achieve the goals set out in the permit, the permit requires further measures, holding that Petitioners were not entitled to relief on their procedural and substantive legal challenges. View "Housatonic River Initiative v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles (the City) approved a project at 1719-1731 North Whitley Avenue in Hollywood (the Project) that would replace 40 apartments subject to the City’s rent stabilization ordinance (RSO) with a hotel. The City determined the Project was exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to CEQA Guidelines relating to certain development projects. The relevant guideline addresses what is often referred to as the “infill” exemption or the “Class 32” exemption. Respondent United Neighborhoods for Los Angeles (United Neighborhoods) sought a writ of mandate in the Los Angeles Superior Court, arguing, among other things, that the in-fill exemption does not apply because the Project is not consistent with a General Plan policy concerning the preservation of affordable housing. The trial court granted the writ, effectively halting the Project until the City was to find the Project is consistent with that policy or 148-159 undertakes CEQA review. The City and real parties in interest appeal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order granting the petition for writ of mandate. The court explained that the City’s suggestion that the Project’s consistency with the Framework Element implies consistency “with the entirety of the General Plan” because of the Framework Element’s foundational role assumes, contrary to authority, the Framework Element stands in perfect harmony with the General Plan. However, the court explained that although it affirms the trial court, it does not suggest that the City was necessarily required to make formal findings that Housing Element policies are outweighed by competing policies favoring the Project. View "United Neighborhoods for L.A. v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Port Hamilton Refinery purchased an existing St. Croix petroleum refinery at a 2021 bankruptcy auction, hoping to resume operations. The Refinery had for decades served as the backbone of St. Croix’s local economy until it ceased operations in 2012. Months later, the EPA notified Port Hamilton that it would need a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit before the Refinery could resume operations.The PSD program is part of the Clean Air Act (CAA); a facility must not contribute to the violation of applicable air quality standards and must implement the “best available control technology” to limit air pollution, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a), 7479(3). PSD applies to newly constructed stationary sources of air pollution and sources that undergo emissions-altering modifications. Under EPA’s “Reactivation Policy,” an existing facility is “new” if EPA concludes that it had previously been “shut down” and restarted. If the EPA determines that the facility had only been “idled,” it need not obtain a permit.In 2018, EPA notified the Refinery’s prior owner that it need not obtain a PSD permit because the Refinery had been only “idled” since 2012. In 2022, EPA reversed course. The Third Circuit vacated the EPA decision. The Reactivation Policy, as applied to the Refinery, exceeds EPA’s statutory authority. View "Port Hamilton Refining and Transportation LLLP v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”) governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. In implementing the RCRA, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) promulgated a rule under which waste is deemed “hazardous” if it is “corrosive.” A scientist and a public interest group, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (“PEER”), unsuccessfully petitioned the EPA to expand the definition of “corrosive” wastes so that more wastes would be subject to the RCRA’s most stringent requirements. The question presented in this case is whether the EPA properly declined to revise its corrosivity regulation.The DC Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that PEER’s arguments concerning the EPA’s erroneous understanding of the ILO encyclopedia analysis and its allegedly improper protection of the commercial use of lime-treated sludge are untimely; the court wrote that, therefore it lacks jurisdiction to consider them. Moreover, the court said it was required to apply a highly deferential standard of review with respect to PEER’s remaining claims and found no basis to disturb the agency’s decisions. View "Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. EPA" on Justia Law

Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, review of orders issued by the Environmental Protection Agency after a “public hearing” lies exclusively in the courts of appeals. 7 U.S.C. Section 136n(b). For orders issued without a public hearing, review lies in the district courts. Petitioners in this case challenged EPA orders regulating the use of a pesticide named dicamba.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the 2020 Registrations unconditionally approve the dicamba products, whereas the previous orders had granted conditional registrations. And EPA needed to make additional findings to issue an unconditional registration, including that use of the products would “not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.” For those reasons, the 2020 and 2022 Registrations, unlike the actions in Costle and National Family Farm Coalition, did not follow a “public hearing” within the meaning of 7 U.S.C. Section 136n(b). View "American Soybean Association v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

Utility companies responsible for a planned electric transmission line asked the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to allow construction across the Upper Mississippi River National Wildlife and Fish Refuge alongside an existing road and railroad. Rural Utilities Service completed an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). FWS adopted the statement and issued a right-of-way permit.While litigation was pending, the utility companies sought to slightly alter the route and asked FWS to consider a land exchange. FWS discovered that it had relied on incorrect easement documents in issuing its original determination. It revoked the determination and permit but promised to consider the proposed land exchange. The district court ruled in favor of the environmental groups but declined to enjoin ongoing construction of the project on private land outside the Refuge.The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, first rejecting a mootness argument. FWS has revoked the compatibility determination but has not promised never to issue a new permit. However, FWS’s current position does not meet the criteria of finality. Whatever hardship the plaintiffs face comes not from FWS’s promise to consider a land exchange but from the Utilities’ decision to build on their own land, so the district court erred in reviewing the merits of the proposed land exchange. Plaintiffs’ request for relief against the Utilities under NEPA likewise is premature. Adopting the environmental impact statement did not “consummate” the decisionmaking process. View "Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Rural Utilities Service" on Justia Law