Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) superseding order of conditions allowing the City of Boston's bridge project to proceed superseded the decision of the Conservation Commission of Quincy to deny Boston's application to build the bridge in question.Boston petitioned the Commission for permission to build a bridge to Long Island because the bridge would have an impact on wetlands in Quincy. The Commission denied the application pursuant to the State Wetlands Protection Act and Quincy's local wetlands ordinance. Boston subsequently sought a superseding order of conditions from the DEP pursuant to the Act. The DEP issued the order. The superior court concluded that the project would be governed by the DEP's superseding order of conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DEP's superseding order of conditions preempted the Commission's denial of Boston's application. View "City of Boston v. Conservation Commission of Quincy" on Justia Law

Appellants Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center, Candelas Glows/Rocky Flats Glows, Rocky Flats Right to Know, Rocky Flats Neighborhood Association, and Environmental Information Network (EIN) Inc. (collectively, “the Center”) were organizations that challenged the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s (the “Service”) 2018 decision to modify trails in the Refuge that were designated for public use. They sued the Service and others, claiming they failed to comply with various federal statutes and regulations, including the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”) and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”). The Center also moved for a preliminary injunction and for the district court to supplement the administrative record and consider evidence from outside the record. The district court denied the Center’s NEPA claims, dismissed its ESA claim for lack of standing, and denied its motions. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Rocky Mountain Peace & Justice Center, et al. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al." on Justia Law

This case was the second appeal arising out of a dispute over the operation of a commercial self-storage facility (Treelake Storage) within a planned unit development in Granite Bay (Treelake Village). Silversword Properties, LLC (Silversword) owned the property upon which K.H. Moss Company and Moss Equity (collectively, Moss) operated Treelake Storage. In a separate but related lawsuit filed in 2017, Parkford Owners for a Better Community (Parkford) challenged Placer County’s (County) issuance of a building permit for the construction of an expansion of Treelake Storage, arguing that the County failed to comply with both the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Planning and Zoning Law. The trial court concluded: (1) the County’s issuance of the building permit was ministerial rather than discretionary, and therefore CEQA did not apply; and (2) Parkford’s challenge under the Planning and Zoning Law was barred by the statute of limitations. Parkford appealed. In August 2020, a different panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that completion of the challenged expansion of Treelake Storage prior to entry of judgment rendered moot Parkford’s challenge to the County’s issuance of a building permit authorizing construction of the expansion. In June 2021, the trial court concluded that the lawsuit here, filed by Parkford in 2018 and challenged the County’s issuance of a business license for the operation of Treelake Storage, was barred by both aspects of the doctrine of res judicata--claim and issue preclusion. The Court of Appeal concluded “Parkford I” was not a final judgment “on the merits,” therefore res judicata did not operate to bar this suit. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. Windeshausen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge granting partial summary judgment and entering declarations in the two underlying cases that certain waterways regulations were an improper delegation of the Department of Environmental Protection's public trust responsibilities, holding that there was no error.Consistent with its public trust responsibilities, the Department set certain specifications for buildings within one hundred feet of protected tidelands and promulgated regulations purporting to allow the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs to override the Department's specifications by approving substitute specifications as part of a municipal harbor plan. At issue was whether the Department had the authority to delegate this override authority to the Secretary. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the delegation was ultra vires and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Armstrong v. Secretary of Energy & Environmental Affairs" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization called California River Watch claimed that the City of Vacaville, California was violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). River Watch claimed the City’s water wells were contaminated by a carcinogen called hexavalent chromium. That carcinogen, River Watch says, was in turn transported to the City’s residents through its water-distribution system. River Watch’s argument on appeal was that because the hexavalent chromium originated from the Wickes site, it was “discarded material” under RCRA, and thus the City was liable for its transportation through its water-distribution system. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the City’s motion and denied River Watch’s motion because, as it explained, River Watch hadn’t demonstrated how the City’s water-processing activities could qualify as discarding “solid waste” under RCRA. Thus, the district court explained, RCRA’s “fundamental requirement that the contaminant be ‘discarded’” was not satisfied. River Watch appealed. The Ninth Circuit was satisfied that hexavalent chromium met RCRA's definition of "solid waste." However, the Court found RCRA’s context makes clear that mere conveyance of hazardous waste cannot constitute “transportation” under the endangerment provision. Under the facts presented, the Court found the City did not move hexavalent chromium in direct connection with its waste disposal process. Under River Watch’s theory of liability, hexavalent chromium seeped through groundwater into the City’s wells and the City incidentally carried the waste through its pipes when it pumps water to its residents. The Court concluded City did not have the necessary connection to the waste disposal process to be held liable for “transportation” under § 6972(a)(1)(B) of the Act. Because the City could not be held liable under RCRA, the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the City was affirmed. View "California River Watch v. City of Vacaville" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the Clean Power Plan rule, which addressed carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants, citing Section 111 of the Clean Air Act,” 42 U.S.C. 7411(d). Although the states set the enforceable rules governing existing sources, EPA determines the emissions limit with which they have to comply by determining the “best system of emission reduction” (BSER). In the Clean Power Plan, EPA determined that the BSER for existing coal and natural gas plants included “heat rate improvements” at coal-fired plants and “generation-shifting,” i.e., a shift in electricity production from existing coal-fired to natural-gas-fired plants and from both coal and gas plants to renewables (wind and solar). An operator could reduce the regulated plant’s production of electricity, build or invest in new or existing equipment, or purchase emission allowances as part of a cap-and-trade regime. No existing coal plant could achieve the emissions performance rates without generation-shifting.The Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan in 2016. It was later repealed when EPA determined that it lacked authority “of this breadth.” EPA then promulgated the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule, mandating equipment upgrades and operating practices. The D.C. Circuit held that EPA’s repeal of the Clean Power Plan rested on a mistaken reading of the Clean Air Act and vacated the ACE rule.The Supreme Court reversed. Congress did not grant EPA the authority to devise emissions caps based on the Clean Power Plan's generation-shifting approach. Restructuring the nation’s mix of electricity generation cannot be the BSER under Section 111. Under the major questions doctrine, an agency must point to “clear congressional authorization” for such an unprecedented exercise of authority. On EPA’s view of Section 111(d), Congress implicitly tasked it alone with balancing vital considerations of national policy. Issues of electricity transmission and distribution are not within EPA’s traditional expertise. The Clean Power Plan “conveniently enabled" EPA to enact a program, cap-and-trade, that Congress rejected numerous times. View "West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Appellants brought an action contesting a Department of Agriculture rulemaking in the district court. Appellants argued that the rule violated both the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.   Appellants contested four aspects of the Final Rule: (1) that collection of a reserve surcharge violates the FACT Act; (2) that the Final Rule violates the FACT Act’s prohibition on cross-subsidization; (3) that the Final Rule violates the FACT Act and the APA by charging both a per-passenger and a per aircraft fee; and (4) that APHIS violated the APA by withholding certain information during the rulemaking process.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, reversed it insofar as the challenged rule authorizes collecting fees to fund a reserve after 2002. The court explained that Congress has directly addressed the question of whether APHIS may continue to collect fees to fund a reserve after fiscal year 2002. They may not do so. Thus, the court remanded this case to the district court for vacating insofar as the Final Rule authorizes collecting fees to maintain a reserve account.  Further, the court wrote that all of Appellants’ arguments regarding the dual application of the Commercial Aircraft User Fee and the Commercial Air Passenger Fee fail. Moreover, Appellants’ argument that fees collected from multiple user classes cannot be comingled in a fund that pays for the inspections of fee-paying user classes fails because the FACT Act does not prohibit this form of cross-subsidization. View "Air Transport Association v. AGRI" on Justia Law

The Federal Power Act (“FPA”), 16 U.S.C. Section 824d(d), ISO-NE filed tariff revisions with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “the Commission”) to compensate generators for maintaining an inventory of energy during the winter months of 2023–24 and 2024–25. The revisions implemented the Inventoried Energy Program (“IEP”), under which ISO-NE will provide additional payments to generators to maintain up to three days’ worth of fuel on-site and convert it into electricity.  The Commission issued an order accepting ISO-NE’s proposed tariff revisions. Petitioners contended that FERC’s decision to approve IEP imposes unjust and unreasonable, discriminatory, and preferential rates.   The DC Circuit upheld all but one component of the Commission’s decision to approve ISO-NE’s proposed tariff revisions implementing the Inventoried Energy Program. The court left in intact the Commission’s June 2020 order except for the portion of IEP that is arbitrary and capricious: the agency’s inclusion of nuclear, biomass, coal, hydroelectric generators. The court wrote that it believes there is no substantial doubt that FERC would have adopted IEP if it had not included these resources in the first place, and IEP can function sensibly without them. View "Belmont Municipal Light Department v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) vests the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“Commission “) with broad authority to regulate the transportation and sale of natural gas. The case at issue concerns the Commission’s application of its pipeline requirement to a liquified natural gas (“LNG “) handling facility in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The facility, constructed and operated by New Fortress Energy LLC (“NFE”) receives LNG from a floating storage unit moored at San Juan Harbor which, in turn, receives LNG from shuttle vessels that deliver LNG imports from ocean-going, bulk-carrier tankers.   While constructing the facility, New Fortress received “informal advice” from Commission staff suggesting the Commission would not assert jurisdiction. Shortly after the facility began operating, the Commission issued an order to show cause why the facility is not subject to Commission jurisdiction as an LNG terminal operating in foreign commerce. In response, NFE argued among other things that the 75-foot pipe is not a “pipeline,” but the Commission disagreed, finding the facility “connected to a pipeline” because the pipe “sends out gas” to San Juan Power Plant.   The DC Circuit denied NFE’s petition seeking review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s application of its pipeline requirement. The court explained that the physical characteristics of piping are merely a function of the volume of LNG to be imported or exported and the relative distance between the LNG terminal and the ultimate end-user. The Commission also pointed out that it “has never considered” a pipeline’s physical characteristics when determining whether a facility is an LNG import or export terminal. View "New Fortress Energy Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

TexCom sought to develop a commercial-waste-disposal facility on a 27-acre site in Montgomery County, near Conroe, that had one existing nonoperative injection well. TexCom sought to operate the existing well and construct up to three additional wells. Class I underground injection-control wells manage industrial waste by injecting it thousands of feet underground but can potentially harm drinking water and petroleum, so these injection wells undergo an extensive permitting process with the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). A permit application must be accompanied by a letter from the Railroad Commission (RRC) concluding that the proposed wells “will not endanger or injure any known oil or gas reservoir.” RRC issued such a letter for TexCom but rescinded it after six years of administrative hearings, around the same time TCEQ issued its final order granting the permit application.The Texas Supreme Court affirmed TCEQ’s order granting the permit application as supported by substantial evidence; a migration finding, combined with the injection zone’s geological suitability, is sufficient to support TCEQ’s ultimate finding that the wells would be protective of water. The rescission did not deprive TCEQ of jurisdiction, and, on these facts, TCEQ did not violate the Texas Administrative Procedure Act by declining to reopen the administrative record for further proceedings. View "Dyer v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law