Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Save the El Dorado Canal sought reversal of a judgment entered after the trial court denied its petition for writ of mandate. The petition challenged certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of a project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The challenged project, the Upper Main Ditch piping project, was approved by the El Dorado Irrigation District and the El Dorado Irrigation District Board of Directors (collectively, respondents). On appeal, appellant contended respondents’ approval of the challenged project violated CEQA because: (1) the EIR failed to provide an adequate project description because it omitted “a crucial fact about the ditch the District proposes to ‘abandon,’ ” i.e., “the Main Ditch system is the only drainage system” for the watershed; and (2) the EIR failed to adequately analyze the impacts of abandonment to hydrology, biological resources, and risks associated with wildfires. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding respondents did not abuse their discretion in approving the Blair Road alternative. The draft and final EIR’s adequately apprised respondents and the public about both the nature of the watershed and the fact that the District would no longer maintain the abandoned portion of the Upper Main Ditch. These environmental documents also adequately analyzed the Blair Road alternative’s impacts to hydrology, biological resources, and risks associated with wildfires. View "Save the El Dorado Canal v. El Dorado Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

Two appeals consolidated for review centered on Placer County’s approval of a land use specific plan and rezoning to permit residential and commercial development and preserve forest land near Truckee and Lake Tahoe. The plaintiffs-appellants contended the County’s environmental review of the project did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act on numerous grounds, and the rezoning did not comply with the California Timberland Productivity Act of 1982. The trial court rejected each of plaintiffs’ claims except one, involving analysis of the project's impact on Lake Tahoe's water quality and greenhouse case emission mitigation measures. The Court of Appeal affirmed both judgments in part, finding measure 12-2 did not comply with CEQA, and the EIR’s analysis of the project’s impact on evacuation plans was supported by substantial evidence. The Court found substantial evidence did not support the County’s finding that no additional feasible mitigation measures existed to mitigate the project’s traffic impacts on state route 267, and the EIR’s discussion of the project’s energy impacts did not comply with CEQA. View "League to Save Lake Tahoe Mountain Area v. City of Placer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that substantial evidence did not support the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's (TCEQ) decision granting an application filed by Dos Republicas Coal Partnership (DRCP) seeking renewal of a permit for wastewater discharge at a coal mine, holding that DRCP was the correct permit applicant.At the time of this dispute, TCEQ rules required both the operator and the owner of the facility to apply for a permit. DRCP owned the mine, but the dispute was whether DRCP or the contractor it hired to conduct day-to-day activities at the time was the mine's "operator." TCEQ concluded that DRCP was the mine's operator. The court of appeals disagreed, ruling that the application lacked the required applicant and should have been denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that DRCP was the entity responsible for the overall operation of the facility and was therefore the correct permit applicant. View "Texas Commission on Environment Quality v. Maverick County" on Justia Law

Enacted after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), creates a comprehensive remedial scheme that governs—and apportions liability for—oil-removal costs. OPA holds oil spillers strictly liable upfront for oil-removal expenses and allows them, if they meet certain requirements, to avail themselves of one of three liability defenses and to seek contribution from other culpable parties. The M/V SAVAGE VOYAGER was transporting oil through a Mississippi waterway when an accident at a boat lift— operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—caused a rupture in the SAVAGE VOYAGER’s hull, through which thousands of gallons of oil poured into the river.The owners of the vessel sued the United States, not under the OPA, but under the common-law admiralty regime. They cited the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), a 1920 law by which Congress generally waived sovereign immunity for most admiralty claims. The interplay between the OPA and the SAA was an issue of first impression in the federal courts. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the vessel owner’s claims for removal costs. OPA authorizes no claim against the government for oil-removal damages and OPA’s comprehensive remedial scheme displaced the SAA’s more general sovereign-immunity waiver. View "Savage Services Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

The U.S. Forest Service proposed “thinning” overcrowded areas in Cuddy Valley within Los Padres National Forest. If some trees are not removed, the forest will face increased risks of wildfires, and insects and diseases may ravage the trees, according to the Forest Service.The Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge by environmental groups. The “CE-6” exemption, 36 C.F.R. 220.6(e)(6) to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321, unambiguously allows the Forest Service to thin trees, including larger commercially viable ones, to reduce fire hazards without having to conduct an environmental impact statement or an environmental assessment. Its plain language does not limit thinning by tree age, size, or type. Nor is thinning defined to exclude commercial thinning. If the thinning project reduces fire hazards and meets certain other conditions, CE-6 greenlights the project, even if it means felling commercially viable trees. The Forest Service did not act arbitrarily in invoking the CE-6 exemption and did not violate the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1600, which sets certain aesthetic management standards. The Service did not have to explain how the project would meet such standards but did explain how the project area would retain sufficient scenic integrity. View "Mountain Communities for Fire Safety v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Tecuya Ridge, within the Los Padres National Forest, is home to densely populated forest stands that the Forest Service determined to be at risk of destruction by wildfire. The Tecuya Ridge Shaded Fuelbreak Project authorized thinning 1,626 acres of forest, including approximately 1,100 acres within the protected Antimony Inventoried Roadless Area. The Roadless Area Conservation Rule generally prohibits timber cutting, sale, or removal in areas like Antimony, with some exceptions.The Ninth Circuit vacated the approval. The Service’s conclusion that the Project was consistent with the Rule was arbitrary and capricious as was its determination that 21-inch diameter trees were “generally small timber.” The Service’s determination that the Project will “maintain or improve” Antimony’s characteristics was not arbitrary; the Service articulated a satisfactory explanation. The decision to “categorically exclude” the Project from review in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement, under the National Environmental Policy Act was not arbitrary and capricious. The court agreed that Categorical Exclusion 6 (CE-6) applied and that no extraordinary circumstances prevented CE-6's application to the Project. Consistent with 36 C.F.R. 220.6, the Service analyzed each resource condition that should be considered in determining whether there were extraordinary circumstances related to the proposed action and determined that the Project would have “no significant impact” on each. The decision to locate the Project in the “wildland zone” instead of the “threat zone” was not arbitrary. View "Los Padres ForestWatch v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law

The Army Corps of Engineers denied a permit to build student housing on the Russellville property, next to Arkansas Tech University. The land is bordered by two waterways. Downstream from the tract, the Corps maintains the Russellville Dike and Prairie Creek Pumping Station to protect Russellville from flooding by pumping water into the backwaters of the Arkansas River, away from the city. Upstream from the station is a sump, 730 acres of low-lying land that holds water that then flows toward the pumping station, The Corps purchased flowage easements giving it the right to flood the land subject to those easements to a certain elevation. Part of the tract at issue lies within the sump and is subject to an easement, "that no structures for human habitation shall be constructed." The owner proposed four apartment buildings on land subject to the easement.The Eighth Circuit upheld the denial of a permit. It is unlawful for anyone "in any manner whatever [to] impair the usefulness of any . . . work built by the United States . . . to prevent floods" unless the Corps permits it, 33 U.S.C. 408(a). The proposed construction would impair the usefulness of the Corps's pumping station. The Corps found that the structures would result in water velocities and depths that would be "a significant hazard that can deny escape," and "may threaten the lives and security of the people and property in Russellville.” View "Russellville Legends LLC v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

In two consolidated cases, petitioners seek review of the Forest Service and BLM's decisions to allow the Mountain Valley Pipeline to cross three and a half miles of the Jefferson National Forest in Virginia and West Virginia. The Fourth Circuit previously vacated the agencies' records of decision (RODs) because the Forest Service and the BLM failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Forest Management Act (the NFMA), and the Mineral Leasing Act (the MLA). Petitioners argue that the agencies' renewed RODs after remand also violate NEPA, the NFMA, and the MLA.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Forest Service and the BLM inadequately considered the actual sedimentation and erosion impacts of the Pipeline; prematurely authorized the use of the conventional bore method to construct stream crossings; and failed to comply with the Forest Service's 2012 Planning Rule. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review as to those errors; denied the petitions for review in regard to petitioners' remaining arguments about the predecisional review process, alternative routes, and increased collocation; vacated the decisions of the Forest Service and the BLM; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wild Virginia v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's administrative appeal from the decision of the Connecticut Siting Council approving the application of NTE Connecticut, LLC (NTE) seeking a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need for the construction of an electric generating facility in the town of Killingly, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, a nonprofit organization, appealed the council's decision to the trial court, arguing that the council improperly refused to consider the environmental impact of installing a gas pipeline to its proposed facility when weighing the public benefit of the facility against its probable environmental impact. The trial court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the council was not required to consider the impact of the gas pipeline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly determined that the council’s refusal to consider the potential environmental impact of the gas pipeline during the proceedings on NTE’s application for a certificate was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Not Another Power Plant v. Connecticut Siting Council" on Justia Law

In 2010, real parties in interest applied to the City of Santa Cruz to construct a 40-unit development on a parcel of land located at 1930 Ocean Street Extension. Following an initial mitigated negative declaration and years of litigation surrounding the impact of the nearby crematory at Santa Cruz Memorial Park, in 2016, the real parties in interest renewed their interest in moving forward with their project. As required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the project applicant and the City of Santa Cruz prepared and circulated the initial study, the draft environmental impact report (EIR), the partially recirculated draft EIR, and the final EIR. Following a public hearing, the city council adopted a resolution to certify the EIR and to adopt Alternative 3, a 32-unit housing project. The Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Association (OSENA) filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging the City of Santa Cruz and its city council violated CEQA and the Santa Cruz Municipal Code in approving the project. The trial court concluded the City had complied with CEQA, but it determined the City violated the municipal code, and it issued a limited writ prohibiting the City from allowing the project to proceed unless and until it followed the municipal code and the court was satisfied with its compliance. Following entry of judgment, OSENA appealed, arguing the court erred by concluding the City complied with CEQA’s requirements. OSENA contended the City violated CEQA by: (1) insufficiently addressing potentially significant biological impacts and mitigation measures in the initial study rather than in the EIR directly; (2) establishing improperly narrow and unreasonable objectives so that alternative options could not be considered meaningfully; and (3) failing to address cumulative impacts adequately. The City cross-appealed, contending the court incorrectly concluded it violated the municipal code by granting a planned development permit without also requiring the project applicant to comply with the slope modifications regulations After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City, and affirmed that portion of the trial court's order and judgment concluding it complied with CEQA. The Court reversed the portion of the order and judgment concluding the City violated its municipal code. View "Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood etc. v. City of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law