Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

TCI Pacific Communications, LLC (“TCI”) appealed a district court’s judgment holding it liable to Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. (“Cyprus”) for contribution under 42 U.S.C. sections 9601(9)(B), 9607(a), and 9613(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). This case involved claims brought by Cyprus to determine whether TCI could be held liable for environmental cleanup costs relating to zinc smelting operations near Collinsville, Oklahoma. The Bartlesville Zinc Company, a former subsidiary of Cyprus’s predecessor, operated the Bartlesville Zinc Smelter (the “BZ Smelter”) from 1911 to 1918, near Collinsville, Oklahoma. TFMC owned and operated another zinc smelter (the “TFM Smelter”) from 1911 to 1926. This case does not concern cleanup work at either smelter, but rather is an action by Cyprus seeking cost recovery and contribution for its remediation in the broader Collinsville area, within the Collinsville Soil Program (“CSP”) Study Area. Cyprus sought to hold TCI liable as a former owner or operator of the TFM Smelter whose waste was located throughout the CSP Study Area. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Cyprus and pierced the corporate veil to hold TCI’s corporate predecessor, the New Jersey Zinc Company (“NJZ”), liable as the alter ego of the Tulsa Fuel & Manufacturing Co. (“TFMC”). The district court then interpreted CERCLA and held that TCI was liable as a former owner/operator of a CERCLA “facility.” Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Cyprus Amax Minerals Company v. TCI Pacific Communications" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Service in an action challenging the Service's "barred owl removal experiment," which was designed to protect the northern spotted owl, a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The panel held that this experiment will produce a "net conservation benefit" under the plain language of the ESA’s implementing regulations because it allows the agency to obtain critical information to craft a policy to protect threatened or endangered species. The panel also held that the Service did not have to conduct a supplemental environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) because it had adequately contemplated this experiment in its earlier analysis. Accordingly, the Service complied with both the ESA and NEPA in issuing the permits and safe harbor agreements. View "Friends of Animals v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the authority of the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) to issue revocable permits is subject to the environmental review requirements of the Hawai'i Environmental Policy Act (HEPA), Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 343.At issue was the water rights for 33,000 acres of land in the Ko'olau Forest Reserve and Hanawi Natural Area Reserve. In 2000, the BLNR approved the issuance of four revocable water permits to Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. (A&B) and East Maui Irrigation Co., Ltd. (EMI). The BLNR subsequently continued the permits. Petitioners brought this action alleging that the renewal of the revocable permits required the preparation of an environmental assessment pursuant to the HEPA. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Petitioners, concluding that the continuation decision was not a HEPA action but that the revocable permits were invalid because they exceeded the BLNR's authority under Haw. Rev. Stat. 171-55. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the revocable permits were not authorized under section 171-55; and (2) the circuit court erred in holding that there was no "action" within the meaning of Haw. Rev. Stat. 343-5(a) and that HEPA's environmental review process was thus inapplicable. View "Carmichael v. Board of Land & Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code 30000) requires a coastal development permit (CDP) for any “development” resulting in a change in the intensity of use of, or access to, land or water in a coastal zone. In December 2018, Los Angeles adopted the Home-Sharing Ordinance, imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals, with mechanisms to enforce those restrictions. Objectors sought to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the city obtains a CDP, claiming the Ordinance constituted a “development” requiring a CDP.The trial court denied relief, finding the petition time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, and that the Ordinance does not create a change in intensity of use and, therefore, is not a “development” requiring a CDP. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the 90-day statute of limitations applies, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The court did not address whether the Ordinance constitutes a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act. View "Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal was whether a watermaster appointed by the trial court to implement and administer a water rights decree had the right to appeal the trial court’s orders interpreting the decree on the grounds the watermaster disagrees with the trial court’s interpretation and the orders would increase the watermaster’s administrative burdens and costs. The Court of Appeal concluded the watermaster did not have the right to appeal because the watermaster was not aggrieved by the trial court’s interpretation of the water users’ rights under the decree. View "Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Company" on Justia Law

Appellant Save the El Dorado Canal sought reversal of a judgment entered after the trial court denied its petition for writ of mandate. The petition challenged certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of a project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The challenged project, the Upper Main Ditch piping project, was approved by the El Dorado Irrigation District and the El Dorado Irrigation District Board of Directors (collectively, respondents). On appeal, appellant contended respondents’ approval of the challenged project violated CEQA because: (1) the EIR failed to provide an adequate project description because it omitted “a crucial fact about the ditch the District proposes to ‘abandon,’ ” i.e., “the Main Ditch system is the only drainage system” for the watershed; and (2) the EIR failed to adequately analyze the impacts of abandonment to hydrology, biological resources, and risks associated with wildfires. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding respondents did not abuse their discretion in approving the Blair Road alternative. The draft and final EIR’s adequately apprised respondents and the public about both the nature of the watershed and the fact that the District would no longer maintain the abandoned portion of the Upper Main Ditch. These environmental documents also adequately analyzed the Blair Road alternative’s impacts to hydrology, biological resources, and risks associated with wildfires. View "Save the El Dorado Canal v. El Dorado Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

Two appeals consolidated for review centered on Placer County’s approval of a land use specific plan and rezoning to permit residential and commercial development and preserve forest land near Truckee and Lake Tahoe. The plaintiffs-appellants contended the County’s environmental review of the project did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act on numerous grounds, and the rezoning did not comply with the California Timberland Productivity Act of 1982. The trial court rejected each of plaintiffs’ claims except one, involving analysis of the project's impact on Lake Tahoe's water quality and greenhouse case emission mitigation measures. The Court of Appeal affirmed both judgments in part, finding measure 12-2 did not comply with CEQA, and the EIR’s analysis of the project’s impact on evacuation plans was supported by substantial evidence. The Court found substantial evidence did not support the County’s finding that no additional feasible mitigation measures existed to mitigate the project’s traffic impacts on state route 267, and the EIR’s discussion of the project’s energy impacts did not comply with CEQA. View "League to Save Lake Tahoe Mountain Area v. City of Placer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that substantial evidence did not support the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's (TCEQ) decision granting an application filed by Dos Republicas Coal Partnership (DRCP) seeking renewal of a permit for wastewater discharge at a coal mine, holding that DRCP was the correct permit applicant.At the time of this dispute, TCEQ rules required both the operator and the owner of the facility to apply for a permit. DRCP owned the mine, but the dispute was whether DRCP or the contractor it hired to conduct day-to-day activities at the time was the mine's "operator." TCEQ concluded that DRCP was the mine's operator. The court of appeals disagreed, ruling that the application lacked the required applicant and should have been denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that DRCP was the entity responsible for the overall operation of the facility and was therefore the correct permit applicant. View "Texas Commission on Environment Quality v. Maverick County" on Justia Law

Enacted after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), creates a comprehensive remedial scheme that governs—and apportions liability for—oil-removal costs. OPA holds oil spillers strictly liable upfront for oil-removal expenses and allows them, if they meet certain requirements, to avail themselves of one of three liability defenses and to seek contribution from other culpable parties. The M/V SAVAGE VOYAGER was transporting oil through a Mississippi waterway when an accident at a boat lift— operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—caused a rupture in the SAVAGE VOYAGER’s hull, through which thousands of gallons of oil poured into the river.The owners of the vessel sued the United States, not under the OPA, but under the common-law admiralty regime. They cited the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), a 1920 law by which Congress generally waived sovereign immunity for most admiralty claims. The interplay between the OPA and the SAA was an issue of first impression in the federal courts. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the vessel owner’s claims for removal costs. OPA authorizes no claim against the government for oil-removal damages and OPA’s comprehensive remedial scheme displaced the SAA’s more general sovereign-immunity waiver. View "Savage Services Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

The U.S. Forest Service proposed “thinning” overcrowded areas in Cuddy Valley within Los Padres National Forest. If some trees are not removed, the forest will face increased risks of wildfires, and insects and diseases may ravage the trees, according to the Forest Service.The Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge by environmental groups. The “CE-6” exemption, 36 C.F.R. 220.6(e)(6) to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321, unambiguously allows the Forest Service to thin trees, including larger commercially viable ones, to reduce fire hazards without having to conduct an environmental impact statement or an environmental assessment. Its plain language does not limit thinning by tree age, size, or type. Nor is thinning defined to exclude commercial thinning. If the thinning project reduces fire hazards and meets certain other conditions, CE-6 greenlights the project, even if it means felling commercially viable trees. The Forest Service did not act arbitrarily in invoking the CE-6 exemption and did not violate the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1600, which sets certain aesthetic management standards. The Service did not have to explain how the project would meet such standards but did explain how the project area would retain sufficient scenic integrity. View "Mountain Communities for Fire Safety v. Elliott" on Justia Law