Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A group of farmers in Marion County, Oregon, formed an irrigation district to secure water for agricultural use by constructing a reservoir on Drift Creek. In 2013, the district applied to the Oregon Water Resources Department for a permit to store water by building a dam, which would inundate land owned by local farmers and impact an existing in-stream water right held in trust for fish habitat. The proposed project faced opposition from affected landowners and an environmental organization, who argued that the reservoir would harm both their property and the ecological purpose of the in-stream water right.The Oregon Water Resources Department initially recommended approval of the application, finding that the project would not injure existing water rights, as the prior appropriation system would ensure senior rights were satisfied first. After a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge also recommended approval. However, the Oregon Water Resources Commission, upon review of exceptions filed by the protestants, reversed the Department’s decision and denied the application. The Commission concluded that the proposed reservoir would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream water right—namely, supporting fish habitat—even if the required water quantity was maintained at the measurement point. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s order.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the public interest protected by Oregon water law includes not only the quantity of water guaranteed to a senior right holder but also the beneficial use for which the right was granted. The Commission was correct to consider whether the proposed use would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream right. However, the Court further held that, after finding the presumption of public interest was overcome, the Commission was required to consider all statutory public interest factors before making its final determination. Because the Commission failed to do so, the Supreme Court reversed its order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved a 1,000-foot natural-gas pipeline crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. The Sierra Club and Public Citizen challenged this approval, arguing that FERC should have exercised jurisdiction over a longer 157-mile pipeline extending into Texas, considered the environmental impact of the entire pipeline, and evaluated alternatives to the border-crossing segment. They also claimed that FERC's approval of the border-crossing pipeline was arbitrary and capricious.The lower court, FERC, concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the 157-mile Connector Pipeline because it did not cross state lines or carry interstate gas upon entering service. FERC conducted an Environmental Assessment for the 1,000-foot Border Facility, found minimal environmental impact, and deemed it in the public interest. After FERC reaffirmed its conclusions on rehearing, the petitioners sought judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC reasonably declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Connector Pipeline under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, respecting state regulatory authority. The court also found substantial evidence supporting FERC's conclusion that the Connector Pipeline would not transport interstate gas initially, thus not subjecting it to Section 7 jurisdiction. The court rejected the petitioners' claims that FERC's approval of the Border Facility was arbitrary and capricious, noting the presumption favoring authorization under the Natural Gas Act.Regarding the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the court found that FERC reasonably defined the project's purpose and need, appropriately limited its environmental review to the Border Facility, and did not need to consider the upstream Connector Pipeline's impacts. The court denied the petition, affirming FERC's decisions. View "Sierra Club v. FERC" on Justia Law

The American Burying Beetle, the largest carrion beetle in North America, was listed as an endangered species by the Fish and Wildlife Service in 1989. In 2015, the Service began reevaluating the Beetle's status, prompted by a petition from private entities. The Service's Species Status Assessment Report revealed that the Beetle's current range is larger than initially thought, with several large, resilient populations across the United States. The Service concluded that the Beetle faces a relatively low near-term risk of extinction but is likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future due to future land-use changes and climate change. Consequently, in 2020, the Service downlisted the Beetle from "endangered" to "threatened" and established a Section 4(d) Rule for its conservation.The Center for Biological Diversity challenged the downlisting and the sufficiency of the protections for the Beetle as a threatened species. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the Service, concluding that the Downlisting Rule did not violate the Endangered Species Act, was supported by the administrative record, and was reasonably explained. The court also found that the Center failed to establish standing for its challenges to the Section 4(d) Rule.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the Service's conclusion that the Beetle was not endangered at the time of the decision in 2020 was reasonable and consistent with the record evidence. The court also found that the Center lacked standing to challenge the Section 4(d) Rule on appeal. The Service's decision to downlist the Beetle to threatened status was based on the best available scientific and commercial data, and the Service's predictions about the Beetle's future viability were adequately explained and supported by the record. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. FWS" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implementing a cap-and-trade program to reduce hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) as mandated by the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act of 2020. The AIM Act requires an 85% reduction in HFC production and consumption by 2036. The EPA issued a rule in 2021 to allocate allowances for 2022 and 2023 based on historical market share data from 2011 to 2019. In 2023, the EPA issued a new rule for 2024-2028, again using the same historical data.The petitioners, RMS of Georgia, LLC (Choice) and IGas Holdings, Inc. (IGas), challenged the 2024 Rule. Choice argued that the AIM Act violated the nondelegation doctrine by giving the EPA too much discretion in allocating allowances. IGas contended that the EPA's exclusion of 2020 data from its market-share calculations was arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed Choice's argument, holding that the AIM Act did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power because it provided sufficient guidance to the EPA, modeled on previous cap-and-trade programs under the Clean Air Act. The court found that Congress intended for the EPA to allocate allowances based on historical market share, providing an intelligible principle to guide the agency's discretion.Regarding IGas's challenge, the court found that the EPA's decision to exclude 2020 data was reasonable. The EPA determined that 2020 data was unrepresentative due to the COVID-19 pandemic and supply chain disruptions and that including it could disrupt the market. The court held that the EPA's methodology was not arbitrary and capricious, as the agency provided a rational explanation for its decision.The court denied both petitions for review, upholding the EPA's 2024 Rule. View "IGas Holdings, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

GreenPower Motor Company Inc. (GreenPower) and San Joaquin Valley Equipment Leasing, Inc. (San Joaquin Leasing) were involved in the California Hybrid and Zero-Emissions Truck and Bus Voucher Incentive Project (HVIP), which subsidizes the price of qualifying electric vehicles (EVs). GreenPower's participation in the HVIP program was suspended following an investigation by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) into their compliance with HVIP requirements. Subsequently, the Attorney General's Office began investigating potential violations of the HVIP program and issued subpoenas to GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing for documents related to their compliance with HVIP.GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing filed a petition for writ of mandate in Sacramento County Superior Court to compel CARB to issue vouchers for their EVs. Meanwhile, the Attorney General issued subpoenas as part of a separate investigation. When GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing did not comply, the Attorney General filed a petition in the City and County of San Francisco Superior Court to enforce the subpoenas. The trial court ordered GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing to show cause for their non-compliance and eventually required them to produce the requested documents.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas and that the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction did not apply because the issues in the Sacramento action and the present proceeding were factually and legally distinct. The court also found that the subpoenas were valid, specific, and relevant to the Attorney General's investigation into potential violations of the HVIP program and the California False Claims Act. The order requiring compliance with the subpoenas was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Bonta v. Greenpower Motor Co." on Justia Law

Janet Cote owns a property that was previously a gas station site. After discovering significant petroleum contamination in the soil, she applied for and received reimbursement from the Petroleum Cleanup Fund (PCF). The Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) later denied further reimbursement for costs associated with a licensed engineer and additional items on Cote’s property. The Environmental Division affirmed the ANR’s decision in part and reversed in part. Cote appealed the denied reimbursements.The Environmental Division held a two-day hearing and concluded that the ANR must reimburse Cote for electrical work, concrete work, and wastewater work, as these were pre-approved and the ANR’s subsequent denial was unreasonable. However, the court upheld the ANR’s denial of costs for a licensed engineer and other punch list items, finding the ANR’s decision reasonable and consistent with the law.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ANR’s denial of reimbursement for the licensed engineer and punch list items was reasonable. The court found the Environmental Division’s analysis lacking, as it did not adequately explain why the ANR’s denial was reasonable or provide sufficient findings of fact. The court noted that the Environmental Division merely restated the ANR’s conclusory arguments without proper analysis.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, instructing the Environmental Division to make adequate factual findings and any additional conclusions necessary on the disputed reimbursement claims. The court emphasized the need for clear reasoning and analysis to support the decision. View "In re Cote/Maquam Shore Market" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages wild horse herds in southern Wyoming under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. This Act mandates the protection and management of wild horses on public lands. The land in question is a checkerboard pattern of alternating public and private ownership. Since 1979, BLM managed these herds with the consent of private landowners. However, in 2010, private landowners revoked their consent, making it difficult for BLM to maintain the herds. In 2022, BLM amended its Regional Management Plan (RMP) to change two Herd Management Areas (HMAs) to Herd Areas (HAs), reducing the wild horse population goal to zero in two areas and significantly reducing it in another.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming reviewed the case and ruled in favor of BLM, finding that the agency had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in amending the RMP. The court held that any challenge to BLM’s decision to remove horses was unripe and that BLM had complied with the relevant statutes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found that BLM failed to consider whether its decision would achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance, as required by the Wild Horse Act. The court held that BLM’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not base its decision on this statutory requirement. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case to determine the appropriate remedy, considering the practical consequences of vacatur and the potential for BLM to substantiate its decision on remand. View "American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby" on Justia Law

Marjorie Johnson, the owner of farmland, was denied a permit by the Village of Polk to drill a new well for irrigating her farmland. She sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance requiring a permit for new wells in the village’s wellhead protection area was invalid, arguing it was preempted by the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and violated state law by interfering with her existing farming operations.The district court for Polk County denied her request for declaratory judgment and her petition in error. The court found that the ordinance was not preempted by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature intended for both local natural resources districts (NRDs) and municipalities to have control over water sources. The court also found that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the land was previously irrigated through an agreement with a neighbor, and it was the dispute with the neighbor, not the ordinance, that resulted in the land being dryland.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was enacted under the necessary statutory grant of power to the municipality, as the Wellhead Protection Area Act and other statutes granted villages the authority to adopt controls to protect public water supplies. The court also found no field or conflict preemption by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature did not intend to deprive municipalities of their statutory authority to require permits for wells within wellhead protection areas. Finally, the court agreed that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the existing farming at the time of the permit request was dryland farming, and it was the neighbor’s actions, not the ordinance, that prevented irrigation. View "Johnson v. Village of Polk" on Justia Law

Upper Missouri Waterkeeper and seven Broadwater County residents challenged the approval of a subdivision by 71 Ranch, LP, arguing it did not meet the "exempt well" exception for a water rights permit. They sought attorney fees under the Montana Water Use Act, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), and the Private Attorney General Doctrine. The District Court denied their request for fees under all three claims.The First Judicial District Court found that the subdivision's environmental assessment was inadequate and that the County abused its discretion in approving the subdivision. The court ruled in favor of Upper Missouri on most claims but denied their request for attorney fees. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of fees.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the Water Use Act did not authorize fees. However, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of fees under the UDJA, finding that the District Court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court held that the equities supported an award of attorney fees and that the declaratory relief sought by Upper Missouri was necessary to change the status quo. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine a reasonable amount of fees and their apportionment. The Supreme Court did not address the private attorney general claim. View "Upper Missouri v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of a dairy farm and residences adjacent to Burlington International Airport, sued the City of Burlington for soil and water contamination caused by runoff from the airport. The contamination was due to the use of aqueous film-forming foam containing PFAS by the Vermont Air National Guard, which leased part of the airport. Plaintiffs alleged negligence, trespass, private nuisance, de facto taking, violation of the Vermont Groundwater Protection Act, increased water surface drainage, and direct negligence.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the complaint for failure to join the United States and the Guard as necessary and indispensable parties, and on the basis of municipal immunity. The court found that the United States and the Guard were necessary parties because their actions were central to the claims and their absence could lead to inconsistent obligations for the City. The court also held that municipal immunity applied to the claims related to firefighting services.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claim (Count 1) because it was based on the Guard’s firefighting activities, making the United States and the Guard necessary parties. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the other claims (Counts 2-5 and 7), which were based on the City’s failure to contain contaminated water on its property. The court found that these claims did not require the presence of the United States or the Guard as necessary parties.The court also remanded the case for further consideration of whether municipal immunity applied to the City’s maintenance and operation activities alleged in the surviving counts. The court noted that municipal airport operations are generally considered proprietary functions, which are not protected by municipal immunity. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Belter v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law