Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved an attorney’s fees dispute following a superior court decision upholding Lt. Governor Mead Treadwell’s certification of the “Bristol Bay Forever” ballot initiative. The initiative was approved to be placed on the November 2014 ballot. It required additional legislative approval for “a large-scale metallic sulfide mining operation located within the watershed of the Bristol Bay Fisheries Reserve.” Richard Hughes, Alaska Miners Association, and Council of Alaska Producers (Hughes plaintiffs) challenged the certification of the initiative. It was undisputed that this initiative, if passed, would impact the Pebble Project, a potential large-scale mining project in the Bristol Bay region. The initiative’s sponsors, John Holman, Mark Niver, and Christina Salmon (Holman intervenors), intervened on Alaska's side, and the State and intervenors moved for summary judgment to establish the legality of the initiative. The superior court granted the State’s and the Holman intervenors’ motions for summary judgment. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed on the merits. The Holman intervenors then moved for full reasonable attorney’s fees as constitutional claimants under AS 09.60.010. The Hughes plaintiffs opposed, arguing that they themselves were constitutional claimants and that the Holman intervenors were not constitutional claimants because they were intervenor-defendants. The superior court determined that the Holman intervenors were constitutional claimants. It also found that because Pebble Limited Partnership (Pebble) financed at least part of the litigation for the Hughes plaintiffs, Pebble was the real party in interest; the court further found that Pebble did not qualify as a constitutional claimant because it had sufficient economic incentive to bring the action. The court therefore awarded the Holman intervenors full reasonable attorney’s fees. The Hughes plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court held that because this case was fundamentally about constitutional limits on the ballot-initiative process and not whether the Pebble Project should go forward, the Hughes plaintiffs did not have sufficient economic incentive to remove them from constitutional-claimant status, and therefore reversed the award of attorney’s fees. View "Alaska Miners Association v. Holman" on Justia Law

The Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) lacked statutory authority to issue an emergency order that imposed a quarantine on land used as a whitetail deer-hunting preserve.Landowners challenged an emergency order issued by the DNR to order Landowners to quarantine land formerly used as a whitetail deer preserve for five years after the deer harvested on the property tested positive for chronic wasting disease (CWD). An administrative law judge found that the DNR lacked the statutory authority to issue the emergency order, but the Iowa Natural Resources Commission (NRC) reversed. The district court reversed the NRC, holding that, in issuing the quarantine order, the DNR was acting outside the legislature’s grant of authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DNR lacked the authority to issue the emergency order and that the emergency order did not amount to an impermissible taking under the United States or Iowa Constitutions. View "Brakke v. Iowa Department of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Grist Creek owns property in Mendocino County on which it has aggregate and asphalt processing operations. The County Air Quality Management District approved a permit to construct a “Crumb Rubber Heating and Blending Unit” for the production of rubberized asphalt, on the property. The District Hearing Board’s four members who considered an appeal split evenly on their vote; the Board stated no further action would be taken, leaving the permit in place. Oponents filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate, claiming that Grist Creek should have conducted an environmental review and that the District and Hearing Board violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA, Pub. Resources Code, 21000) and District regulations by failing to require one. The trial court dismissed the action against the Board with leave to amend, finding the tie vote was not a decision, so there was nothing to review. The court of appeals reversed. The Board’s tie vote, in this context, resulted in the denial of the administrative appeal, subject to judicial review. View "Grist Creek Aggregates, LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action under the Administrative Procedure Act seeking review of two biological opinions (BiOps) issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) evaluating requested modifications of existing licenses to operate four hydropower dams on the Kennebec River in Maine. FERC was required to obtain BiOps from the Fisheries Service on whether operating the dams under the proposed license modifications would jeopardize survival of the salmon species. The Fisheries Service issued an “incidental take statement,” finding that the proposed modifications would result in the incidental taking of individual fish among the protected population. Plaintiffs, environmental organizations participating in the licensing proceedings, challenged the statements. While the case was pending, FERC granted the license modifications. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that circumstances eliminated whatever claims of district court jurisdiction to review the BiOps Plaintiffs might have raised when this action was filed. View "Maine Council of the Atlantic Salmon Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service" on Justia Law

In 2004, the District filed this lawsuit against a number of defendants to address current and threatened groundwater contamination in the North Basin. In its operative first amended complaint (FAC), the District alleged each defendant owned or operated one or more industrial sites in northern Orange County where hazardous wastes (i.e., VOC's) had been released into the environment. The release of hazardous wastes had caused or threatened to cause contamination in groundwater within the District's geographic area. The District sought compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, costs, an order finding defendants liable for the full cost of remediation, an order declaring the contamination a nuisance and compelling defendants to abate it, and any other proper relief. Defendants cross-complained against the District for, among other things, a declaration of no liability. The trial court found in favor of defendants, and against the District, on its claims under the Orange County Water District Act (OCWD) and the Carpenter-PresleyTanner Hazardous Substances Account Act (HSAA) and for declaratory relief. The court found that each defendant was "entitled to a judicial declaration that it has no liability to the District for damages, response costs, or other costs claimed by the District, or any future costs associated with the NBGPP." The court found that the District's claims for negligence, nuisance, and trespass required the District to establish causation as to each defendant. Given the court's causation findings in its statement of decision, it found that the District could not prevail on its claims. The Court of Appeal reversed in part as to: (1) District's cause of action against Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation under the OCWD Act; and (2) the declaration finding no liability in favor of Northrop. The Court of Appeal remanded for the trial court to reexamine the relevant evidence, receive such additional evidence as the court deemed necessary and appropriate, make new findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the issues subject to reversal, and enter judgment accordingly. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Orange County Water Dist. v. Alcoa Global Fasteners" on Justia Law

In 2004, the District filed this lawsuit against MAG and several other defendants to address current and threatened groundwater contamination in northern Orange County. In its operative first amended complaint (FAC), the District alleged that MAG owned and operated an industrial site at 1300 East Valencia Drive in Fullerton, California (the Valencia site). The District alleged that MAG and other owners and operators at the Valencia site released hazardous wastes there, including the volatile organic compound PCE (tetrachloroethylene or perchloroethylene). The release of hazardous waste had caused or threatened to cause contamination to groundwater within the District's geographic area. The District alleged injury in the form of investigation and remediation costs to address this contamination and threatened contamination, as well as the ongoing threat to public health, natural resources, and the environment posed by the hazardous waste releases. In appealing the grant of summary judgment in favor of MAG, the District argued: (1) the trial court erred during the bench trial by granting MAG's motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 on the District's HSAA claim; (2) the trial court erred under Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (b) by scheduling a bench trial on the District's equitable claims before a jury trial on the District's legal claims, thereby depriving the District of its right to trial by jury; (3) the trial court erred by granting declaratory relief in favor of MAG in the absence of a request by MAG; and (4) the trial court erred by applying Evidence Code section 412 to discount the conclusions of the District's expert witness. Finding no reason to disturb the trial court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Orange County Water Dist. v. MAG Aerospace Industries" on Justia Law

This case concerned residual pollutant discharges from public fireworks displays over the waters of the United States within the jurisdiction of the California Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Diego Region (the Regional Board), which included a large portion of San Diego County, portions of south Orange County, and the southwestern portion of Riverside County (San Diego Region). The Regional Board approved a general permit for public displays of fireworks over the region's surface waters. Coastal Environmental Rights Foundation (CERF) appealed the trial court's denial of its petition for writ of mandamus challenging the approval of the Fireworks Permit. CERF contended: (1) the trial court applied the wrong standard of review in denying its petition, (2) the Fireworks Permit violates federal law regarding water quality monitoring, and (3) the Fireworks Permit violated prohibitions in the State Water Resources Control Board's 2009 California Ocean Plan concerning discharges in areas of special biological significance (ASBS). After review, the Court of Appeal rejected CERF's arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Coastal Environ. Rights v. Cal. Reg. Wat. Quality Control Bd." on Justia Law

When ARB's adoption of low carbon fuel standards (LCFS) regulations in 2009 violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the Court of Appeal directed the issuance of a writ of mandate compelling ARB to take corrective action. At issue in this appeal was whether ARB's actions satisfied the writ and corrected one of its CEQA violations. The court concluded that the writ should not have been discharged and the CEQA violation continues uncorrected. Pursuant to the court's discretionary authority to fashion appellate relief, the court reversed the order discharging the writ and remanded for further proceedings under a modified writ. The modifications direct ARB to address NOx emissions from biodiesel in a manner that complies with CEQA, including the use of a proper baseline. View "Poet, LLC v. State Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the EPA's conditional registration of the pesticide NSPW-L30SS, an antimicrobial materials preservative that uses nanosilver as its active ingredient. The Ninth Circuit held that the EPA failed to support the public-interest finding with substantial evidence under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. 136a(c)(7)(C). The panel explained that the EPA's finding that current users of conventional-silver pesticides will switch to NSPW and/or that NSPW will not be incorporated into new products relied on unsubstantiated assumptions. Accordingly, the panel vacated the EPA's conditional registration of NSPW. View "NRDC V. USEPA" on Justia Law

Environmental groups requested records from the EPA that the agency had previously obtained from power plants under Section 308 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1318(a), (b). The records requested are exempt from disclosure under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4), but seemingly must be disclosed under Section 308. At issue was what statute prevailed. The DC Circuit held that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 559, directly addressed the issue. Section 559 provides that FOIA exemptions apply unless a later statute expressly supersedes or modifies those exemptions. In this case, section 308 is the later statute. Because section 308 does not expressly supersede Exemption 4, EPA impermissibly invoked Exemption 4 to deny the FOIA requests. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA" on Justia Law