Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An interlocutory appeal came before the Supreme Court, involving an issue of the “stream-of-commerce” doctrine of personal jurisdiction. Defendant Total Petrochemicals & Refining USA, Inc. (TPRI) challenged a superior court decision denying its motion to dismiss, for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff State of Vermont’s complaint. The State alleged that TPRI, along with twenty-eight other defendants, contaminated the waters of the state by introducing into those waters a gas additive called methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Atlantic Richfield Company" on Justia Law

The County petitioned for review of the Board's ruling reversing the ALJ's findings and conclusions in a proceeding under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1367. The parties agreed that the Board incorrectly applied a de novo rather than substantial-evidence standard to the ALJ's findings. The court denied the petition for review, concluding that reviewing for substantial evidence would not have changed the result because the Board reversed the ALJ on matters of law, not fact. View "DeKalb Cnty. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.3705(1) allows the State Engineer to subject newly approved water applications to an incremental use process. The statute was enacted in 2007. In 1989, Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) filed various water permit applications with the State Engineer. Many entities, including the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (CPB), opposed SNWA’s applications. Ultimately, in 2012, the State Engineer denied some of SNWA’s applications and granted others. The State Engineer subjected SNWA’s approved applications to three stages of incremental development and monitoring. CPB and others petitioned the district court for review. The district court rejected CPB’s argument that the State Engineer gave section 533.3705(1) an improper retroactive effect but reversed and remanded the State Engineer’s ruling on other grounds. CPB subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ barring the State Engineer from applying section 533.3705(1) to SNWA’s applications. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the State Engineer applied section 533.3705(1) prospectively to applications approved in 2012, and therefore, the State Engineer did not apply section 533.3705(1) retroactively in this case. View "Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Seventh Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In consolidated California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) actions, several plaintiffs, including Highland Springs Conference and Training Center (Highland Springs) and Banning Bench Community of Interest Association (Banning Bench) successfully challenged the certification by defendant-respondent, City of Banning of an environmental impact report (EIR) for a 1,500-acre real estate development project known as the Black Bench project. In their writ petitions, filed in November 2006, Highland Springs and Banning Bench named “SCC/Black Bench, LLC, dba SunCal Companies” (SCC/BB), as the only real party in interest. SCC/BB appealed the April 2008 judgments entered in favor of plaintiffs on their writ petitions, but its appeal was dismissed in September 2008 after it failed to deposit the costs of preparing the record on appeal. By that time, SCC/BB was in default on two purchase money loans for the Black Bench property, and by the end of 2008 SCC/BB lost the property in foreclosure. In August 2008, Highland Springs and Banning Bench, along with two other plaintiffs, jointly moved to recover their attorney fees and costs incurred in the CEQA litigation from SCC/BB. In October 2008, the trial court awarded the moving plaintiffs over $1 million in attorney fees and costs. SCC/BB did not oppose the motion. In October 2012, the four plaintiffs, including Highland Springs and Banning Bench, jointly moved to amend the judgments to add SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (SCCA) as an additional judgment debtor, and make SCCA liable for paying the attorney fees and costs awards. The plaintiffs claimed that SCCA was the alter ego of SCC/BB, it would be unjust not to hold SCCA liable for paying the attorney fees and costs awards, and plaintiffs did not discover until 2012 that SCC/BB had been dissolved in 2010. Following initial and supplemental briefing, three hearings, and several rounds of evidentiary submissions, the trial court denied the motion to amend the judgments on the sole basis that plaintiffs failed to act with due diligence in bringing the motion. The court reasoned plaintiffs knew, or reasonably should have known, of SCCA’s alleged alter ego relationship to SCC/BB long before plaintiffs moved to amend the judgments in October 2012. Still, the court indicated the equities favored granting the motion and the court “likely” would have granted it had it been filed earlier. In this appeal, Highland Springs and Banning Bench claimed the motion to amend their judgments was erroneously denied. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the motion to amend was erroneously denied based solely on plaintiffs’ delay in filing the motion, because SCCA made an insufficient evidentiary showing that it was prejudiced by the delay. SCCA did not meet its burden of proving the motion was barred by laches. The Court therefore reversed the order denying the motion and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court must determine whether the judgments in favor of Highland Springs and Banning Bench should be amended to add SCCA as an additional judgment debtor. View "Highland Springs Conference etc. v. City of Banning" on Justia Law

Two separate groups brought pre-enforcement challenges to the MSHA's final rule, entitled Lowering Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust, Including Continuous Personal Dust Monitors (New Dust Rule). On the first challenge, the court concluded that, consistent with the plain language of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and with the earlier precedent of this court, the statute as amended clearly evinces a congressional intent that, although it must consider the advice of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), MSHA has the sole responsibility to issue regulations covering the subjects addressed by this rule. On the second challenge, the court concluded that MSHA’s decades-long effort, culminating in the publication of this rule, adequately took into account the scientific evidence of record and arrived at conclusions which, given MSHA’s expertise, are worthy of deference. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "National Mining Ass'n v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

In an inverse condemnation action, the issue facing the Court of Appeal was a unique situation, where a state agency assumed control of a local flood control process, and it determined to provide less flood protection than historically provided by a local agency in order to protect environmental resources. Plaintiffs, whose properties suffered flooding damage when the lagoon level rose above eight feet msl, filed this action in 2007 for inverse condemnation. They alleged they suffered a physical taking from the Department’s actions, and a regulatory taking by the Commission retaining land use jurisdiction over the subdivision throughout this time instead of transferring it to the County. Plaintiffs also sought precondemnation damages and statutory attorney fees. The trial court found the Department and the Commission (collectively, the State) liable for a physical taking and awarded damages, but it concluded plaintiffs’ claim for a regulatory taking was barred. It rejected the State’s arguments that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ complaint. It awarded plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount they incurred under a contingency agreement, but it denied plaintiffs any precondemnation damages. Both the State and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment finding the state agency liable in inverse condemnation for a physical taking of plaintiffs’ properties, and not liable for a regulatory taking. The Court reversed the judgment to the extent the court found another state permitting agency liable in inverse condemnation. View "Pacific Shores v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife" on Justia Law

Mach Mining petitioned for review of the Commission's final order concluding that two of Mach's regulatory violations under the Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA), 30 U.S.C. 801, were the result of “high negligence” and one violation was also “significant and substantial.” Mach operates a longwall coal mine that releases more than 1 million cubic feet of methane daily. An inspector issued a citation to Mach based on coal that had accumulated around two conveyor belts and the inspector concluded that the accumulations violation was the result of high negligence and was "significant and substantial." Mach also received a violation for locating battery charging stations in primary escapeways. The inspector investigating the charging station concluded that the violation was a result of Mach's high negligence. The court rejected Mach's arguments based on mitigating circumstances and denied the petition for review, concluding that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings for the "high negligence" and the "significant and substantial" determinations. View "Mach Mining, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Montana Environmental Information Center (MEIC) filed suit challenging the decision of the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to approve the expansion of Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc.’s (GSM) gold mine to include a nearby pit. DEQ and GSM (together, Appellees) asserted that MEIC should be collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of whether the Montana Constitution and the Montana Metal Mine Reclamation Act (MMRA) require lands disturbed by a mining operation to be fully reclaimed because this precise issue had already been litigated, with MEIC receiving an adverse ruling from the district court. The district court agreed and entered judgment in favor of Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly found that collateral estoppel precluded MEIC from relitigating whether the Montana Constitution or the MMRA requires land disturbed by the taking of natural resources to be fully reclaimed to its previous condition; and (2) the district court did not err by upholding the DEQ’s decision. View "Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality" on Justia Law

Askins filed a citizen suit alleging that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Ohio EPA, and the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) violated the Clean Water Act’s permitting procedures with respect to controlling water pollution caused by certain animal feeding operations, 33 U.S.C. 1251. They alleged that the Ohio EPA failed to inform the EPA that it transferred authority over part of the state’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination (NPDES) permit program to ODA until five years after it had done so; that ODA administered part of the state-NPDES Program without approval from the EPA; that the EPA permitted Ohio EPA to transfer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval; and that the EPA allowed ODA to administer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Clean Water Act does not permit suits against regulators for regulatory functions. View "Askins v. Ohio Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two membership organizations, filed suit alleging that federal agencies unlawfully neglected to manage stocks of river herring and shad in the Atlantic Ocean from New York to North Carolina. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no basis for judicial review of the Fishery Council’s decision. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs' claims are not subject to judicial review under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C. 1801(b)(3), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker" on Justia Law