Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A former federal employee retired before age sixty-two and began receiving an annuity supplement under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act (FERS). Years earlier, a Colorado state court had issued a divorce decree awarding his ex-wife a pro rata share of his “gross monthly annuity” and any benefit earned from his special service, but the decree did not specifically mention the annuity supplement. For nearly thirty years, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) only divided the annuity supplement between former spouses if a court order expressly required it. In 2016, OPM changed its policy, deciding that if a court order divided the basic annuity, the annuity supplement would also be divided in the same way, even if the order was silent on the supplement. OPM applied this new interpretation retroactively, resulting in a demand that the retiree pay his ex-wife nearly $25,000.The retiree challenged OPM’s decision before the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Board’s administrative judge found that OPM could only divide the annuity supplement if a court order expressly provided for such division. The Board affirmed this decision, rejecting OPM’s new interpretation. OPM then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, under 5 U.S.C. §§ 8421(c) and 8467(a), OPM may apportion a federal retiree’s annuity supplement to a former spouse only when a court order expressly provides for such division. The court reasoned that the statutory text, structure, and history require the annuity supplement to be treated in the same way as the basic annuity, which is only divided if expressly ordered by a court. The court affirmed the Board’s decision. View "OPM v. MOULTON " on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization sought access to confidential court records from child protective and adoption proceedings involving a young girl who died after being placed in foster care and later adopted. The girl was reported missing in 2021, and her death was confirmed in 2023. The records also contained information about her siblings. The siblings, through their counsel, did not object to disclosure as long as their identities were protected through redactions. The Department of Human Services and the adoptive father opposed disclosure, arguing that the records were confidential and that redactions would not sufficiently protect privacy.The Family Court of the First Circuit denied the request, reasoning that releasing redacted records would be misleading and would not serve the public interest in understanding the response of agencies and the court to child abuse and neglect. The court concluded that the records should remain sealed, citing concerns about the completeness and potential for misunderstanding of the redacted information.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that, under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes §§ 587A-40 and 578-15, public access to confidential child protective and adoption records is permitted when a foster child is missing, has suffered a near fatality, been critically injured, or has died, provided that information about living siblings is redacted to protect their privacy. The court overruled prior precedent to the extent it limited disclosure to only those purposes that further the best interests of the child, clarifying that a “legitimate purpose” for disclosure can exist independently. The court ordered the release of the redacted records and provided guidance for future requests, affirming the family court’s authority to require agencies to prepare redacted versions for public access. View "Public First Law Center v. Viola" on Justia Law

After the birth of a child who qualified as an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) in Alaska took emergency custody due to the mother’s substance use during pregnancy. Initially, no relatives were available for placement, so the child was placed with a non-relative foster parent. Nearly two and a half years later, the mother requested that the child be placed with his great-grandmother. OCS denied this request, citing unsafe conditions in the great-grandmother’s home, including excessive clutter that posed safety risks. The great-grandmother made some improvements but did not sufficiently address the concerns. OCS also expressed doubts about her judgment and ability to protect the child, referencing past incidents involving other family members.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, held a placement review hearing after the great-grandmother requested judicial review of OCS’s denial. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that OCS did not abuse its discretion in denying the placement, determining that the great-grandmother’s home remained unsuitable and that her past actions raised concerns about her ability to prioritize the child’s needs. The court also concluded that OCS was not required to provide the great-grandmother with reasonable efforts to make her home suitable, as she was not the child’s parent or guardian.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered whether ICWA required OCS to demonstrate “active efforts” to assist the great-grandmother in overcoming obstacles to placement. The court held that ICWA’s active efforts requirement applies to preserving or reunifying the family unit with a parent or Indian custodian, not to extended family members seeking placement. Therefore, OCS was not required to provide active efforts to the great-grandmother in this context. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision upholding OCS’s denial of placement. View "Betsy F. v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the father and mother of B.W. had a contentious relationship, and the father was involved in a criminal incident where he shot and killed a man. Following this incident, the father was advised by his criminal defense attorney not to contact the mother or B.W. to avoid jeopardizing his defense. The father was later charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy but was acquitted in December 2021. In March 2022, the father sought to establish his parental rights, and the mother filed for termination of his parental rights based on abandonment.The Superior Court in Maricopa County found that the father had abandoned B.W. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship for over six months without just cause. The court rejected the father's argument that he had just cause for his inaction, noting that he did not take any legal steps to assert his parental rights. The court concluded that termination of the father's parental rights was in B.W.'s best interest. The father appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, agreeing that the father did not demonstrate just cause for his failure to maintain a relationship with B.W. The court held that the father's reliance on his criminal defense attorney's advice did not excuse his inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the meaning of "just cause" under A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The court held that "just cause" refers to a reasonable and justifiable reason for a parent's failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, based on good faith. The court reversed the juvenile court's termination order and remanded the case for reconsideration, instructing the lower court to apply the clarified definition of "just cause" in determining whether the father's actions were justified. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated. View "In re Termination Parental Rights as to B.W." on Justia Law

Marilyn Wilson and Milton Wilson were married in 1980, and Milton was employed as a police officer. They divorced in 1998, and their property settlement agreement stated that Marilyn would be the irrevocable beneficiary of Milton's survivor pension benefits. Milton later married Diane Wilson in 2007 and passed away in 2020. After his death, Marilyn sought survivor benefits from the City of Providence, which were being paid to Diane.The Family Court declined to rule on Marilyn's motion to compel the city to pay her the benefits, leading her to file a suit in the Superior Court. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Diane, ruling that she was the surviving spouse entitled to the benefits under Rhode Island General Laws § 45-21.3-1 and the Providence Code § 17-189(m)(6).The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the terms "surviving spouse" and "dependent spouse" in the statute and ordinance refer to the person lawfully married to the retiree at the time of death. The Court found that the property settlement agreement between Marilyn and Milton, which was incorporated but not merged into the final divorce judgment, could not override the statutory provisions. Therefore, Diane, as Milton's spouse at the time of his death, was entitled to the survivor benefits. View "Wilson v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

K.A. and C.P. were married and had three daughters. Their marriage ended in divorce, and the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (ACDHS) initiated actions against K.A. regarding her relationships with her children, leading to the termination of her parental rights and several contempt judgments. K.A. attempted to appeal the termination, but the Colorado Court of Appeals denied it as untimely, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined review. She also sought to appeal a contempt sentence, but it was again deemed untimely.K.A. filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against Michelle Barnes, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS), in her official capacity; ACDHS; and Michelle Dossey, Manager of the ACDHS Division of Child and Adult Protective Services, in her official capacity. The Arapahoe County Board of Commissioners was initially named but later dismissed by K.A. The district court dismissed K.A.'s claims and denied her motion to amend her complaint. K.A. filed a timely appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear K.A.'s claims due to sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and lack of standing. The court found that K.A.'s claims for damages were barred by sovereign immunity, and her requests to reverse the termination of her parental rights and order a new hearing were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Additionally, her requests for declaratory relief were either barred by sovereign immunity or lacked standing. The court also upheld the district court's denial of K.A.'s motion to amend her complaint, as she failed to explain how the amendments would cure the jurisdictional defects. View "K.A. v. Barnes" on Justia Law

In 2023, Basin Authority, a Wyoming Child Support Agency, notified Rodolfo P. Munoz that he was in arrears on his child support obligation and began garnishing his social security. Mr. Munoz filed a complaint against the State of Wyoming, the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS), and some of its employees, as well as Basin Authority and several of its employees. He alleged breach of contract and violations of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed Mr. Munoz’s complaint after a hearing.The district court of Big Horn County granted the motions to dismiss filed by the State Defendants and the Basin Authority Defendants. The court found that Mr. Munoz had not made allegations against the State Defendants and that they were not subject to suit under § 1983 because they are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute. The court also found that a breach of contract claim is not actionable under § 1983 and that the alleged agreement was void and unenforceable. Mr. Munoz’s objection and response to the State Defendants’ proposed order on the motion to dismiss and his motion for reconsideration were denied.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and summarily affirmed the district court’s decision. The court noted that Mr. Munoz failed to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure and did not present cogent arguments supported by pertinent authority. The court emphasized that even pro se litigants must adhere to procedural rules and present coherent arguments. The court concluded that summary affirmance was appropriate due to the deficiencies in Mr. Munoz’s brief and his failure to present relevant legal arguments. View "Munoz v. State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Bonnie Campbell, a federal employee, and Michael Campbell, her ex-husband, entered into a divorce property settlement agreement in which Mr. Campbell waived his rights to Ms. Campbell's Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account. Despite this agreement, Ms. Campbell did not remove Mr. Campbell as the beneficiary of her TSP account before her death. After her death, Mr. Campbell received the balance of the TSP account. The estate of Ms. Campbell (the Estate) sued Mr. Campbell for breach of contract to enforce the terms of the divorce settlement agreement.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate on its breach of contract claim, awarding money damages. The court rejected Mr. Campbell's argument that the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986 (FERSA) preempted the Estate's claim. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding that FERSA preempted the Estate's breach of contract claim.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that FERSA does not preempt the Estate’s post-distribution breach of contract action. The court found that FERSA’s purposes, which include establishing a federal employee retirement plan and ensuring it is fully funded and financially sound, do not concern plan beneficiaries. The court also noted that FERSA’s provisions elevate the requirements of a qualifying state property settlement agreement over a deceased participant’s designated beneficiary, provided notice is given before payment. The court concluded that a post-distribution suit to enforce contractual obligations in a divorce property settlement agreement does not hinder any governmental interest in administrative convenience or avoiding double payment. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed, and the Circuit Court's judgment was affirmed. View "In re Isely" on Justia Law

A Montana State Representative, William W. Mercer, requested access to certain child abuse and neglect case records from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) under a statute that allows legislators to review such records. The DPHHS provided some records but withheld others, including emails, text messages, and attorney-client privileged materials. Mercer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DPHHS to release the additional records.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the DPHHS to provide the requested records, including those claimed to be attorney-client privileged, but imposed additional confidentiality protections. The DPHHS appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted the statute and that the attorney-client privilege should exempt certain records from disclosure.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the plain language of the statute required the disclosure of the records to the legislator, subject to confidentiality protections. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, as Mercer demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities tipped in his favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court emphasized that the preliminary injunction did not resolve the ultimate merits of the case, which would be determined in further proceedings. View "Mercer v. Department of Public Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Government Oversight Committee of the 131st Maine Legislature and the Maine Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) over access to confidential records related to the deaths of four children in 2021. The DHHS refused to provide the records, citing confidentiality laws. The Committee then filed an action in the Superior Court (Kennebec County) to compel the DHHS to comply with its subpoena. The Superior Court denied the Committee’s request, and the Committee appealed.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) ruled that the Committee did not have the statutory authority to access the confidential records and denied the motion to compel. The Committee then appealed the decision to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the Committee does not have the statutory authority to access confidential records under the OPEGA statute, which limits the Committee’s access to public information and records. The Court also found that the statutory exception in 22 M.R.S. § 4008(3)(D) does not apply to the Committee, as it is not considered a “legislative official with responsibility for child protection services.” Additionally, the Court rejected the Committee’s argument that it has inherent legislative power to compel the disclosure of confidential information via subpoena, as this power is limited by the Committee’s statutorily prescribed duties and the nature of the information it may receive. View "Government Oversight Committee v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law