Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) in Rhode Island, which was held in contempt by the Family Court for failing to place a minor, N.B., in a specific facility, St. Mary’s Home for Children, as ordered by the court. N.B., who has behavioral issues and Type I juvenile diabetes, was initially placed in Hasbro Children’s Hospital after her mother refused to take her home due to safety concerns. The Family Court ordered DCYF to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, but the facility refused to admit her due to her medical needs and behavioral issues. Despite DCYF's efforts to secure a placement for N.B., including contacting multiple potential placements and attempting to hire nurses to monitor N.B.'s diabetic care needs, no suitable placement was available.The Family Court found DCYF in contempt for failing to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, rejecting DCYF's argument that it was impossible to comply with the placement order. The court ordered DCYF to pay a daily sanction until it complied with the order. DCYF appealed the contempt order, arguing that the Family Court abused its discretion by finding that DCYF had not exercised reasonable efforts to place N.B. and that it was impossible to comply with the placement order.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the Family Court’s contempt order. The Supreme Court found that DCYF had made substantial efforts to place N.B. at St. Mary’s and other appropriate facilities, but compliance with the placement order was outside the department’s control due to circumstances such as the refusal of facilities to accept N.B. and ongoing nursing shortages related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court had abused its discretion in finding that DCYF had not used reasonable efforts to place N.B. and in holding DCYF in contempt. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law

The case involves the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) in Rhode Island, which was held in contempt by the Family Court for failing to place a minor, N.D., in a residential facility appropriate for her level of need. N.D., a teenager with severe mental health issues, was under the temporary custody of DCYF. Despite the court's order, DCYF was unable to find an appropriate in-state or out-of-state placement for N.D. due to her high level of need and the lack of available facilities. The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) filed a motion to adjudge DCYF in contempt for this failure.The Family Court found DCYF in contempt, rejecting DCYF's defense that it was unable to comply with the court's order. The court imposed a contempt sanction of $1,000 per day until N.D. was placed in an appropriate facility, with the sanction to be placed in a trust for N.D.'s benefit. DCYF appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the order of the Family Court. The Supreme Court found that while DCYF was in technical violation of the Family Court's order, it had demonstrated that it was literally unable to comply because an appropriate placement for N.D. was not presently within its power. The court noted the lack of appropriate facilities for girls with N.D.'s level of need in Rhode Island, staffing issues, and an increase in mental health problems among adolescents. The case was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings. View "In re N.D." on Justia Law

The case involves T.S. (Mother) and A.A. (Father) who appealed the termination of their parental rights to their minor children (D.A., L.A., and F.A.) by the Montana Second Judicial District Court. The Child and Family Services Division of the Montana Department of Health and Human Services (Department) became involved with the family in August 2019 when two of the children were found wandering the streets unsupervised. The Department had previously been involved with the family due to allegations of child abuse or neglect. In August 2019, the Department removed the children from the parents' care and placed them in a protective kinship placement. The parents were given treatment plans to follow for potential reunification with their children.Despite multiple extensions to complete their treatment plans, neither parent had successfully completed all requirements by January 2022. As a result, the Department transitioned to court-ordered guardianships as the new permanency plan for the children. In March 2022, the Department petitioned for termination of parental rights due to the parents' failure to complete their treatment plans and their inability to provide adequate parental care. The District Court issued judgments terminating the parents' respective parental rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the District Court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and that the parents had failed to demonstrate that any material District Court finding of fact was clearly erroneous. The court also held that the District Court did not terminate the parents' respective parental rights without clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable family preservation and reunification efforts. The court concluded that the District Court correctly terminated the parents' respective parental rights under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA. View "In re F.A." on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny absolute and qualified immunity to two social workers, Gloria Vazquez and Mirta Johnson, in a case brought against them by Sydney Rieman and her child, K.B. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) failing to provide them with notice of a juvenile detention hearing where the County’s Child and Family Services sought custody of K.B., and (2) providing false information to the Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing.The court rejected the defendants' claim that they were entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their quasi-prosecutorial role as social workers. The court determined that the failure to provide notice of the hearing and the provision of false information to the Juvenile Court were not similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute. Therefore, absolute immunity did not apply.The court also held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for failing to provide notice of the hearing and for providing false information to the Juvenile Court. The court affirmed that Ms. Rieman had a due process right to such notice and that this right was clearly established. It was also clear that providing false information to the court constituted judicial deception. The court concluded that a reasonable social worker in the defendants' position would have understood that their actions were violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. View "RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ" on Justia Law

Christine M. Nordgren's parental rights were terminated in a Minnesota state court. Instead of appealing this decision, she filed a federal lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Hennepin County, and various other parties involved in her case, alleging a range of constitutional, federal, and state claims. She sought multiple forms of damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The district court dismissed all federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. Nordgren then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court interpreted as a request to reconsider and amend her pleadings, and denied it. Nordgren appealed this decision.The Hennepin County defendants moved to dismiss Nordgren's appeal as untimely, arguing that she did not appeal the judgment in a timely manner and that the district court's order denying her motion for reconsideration was not separately appealable and did not extend the appeal period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the defendants, determining that Nordgren's motion did not qualify as an appealable motion under Rule 59(e), which is designed to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. As such, the appeal period began on the date the judgment was entered, and Nordgren's notice of appeal, filed beyond the 30-day appeal period, was untimely.Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed Nordgren's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Nordgren v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

This case involves a minor plaintiff, identified as S.W., who suffered severe injuries inflicted by her father's girlfriend. The State of Montana's Department of Public Health and Human Services was sued based on claims that it negligently failed to remove S.W. from her father's home prior to the injuries. The District Court ruled that the state's child abuse investigation was negligent and had led to S.W.'s injuries. A jury awarded S.W. over $16 million in damages.Several issues were raised on appeal, including whether the District Court was correct in deciding that the state's immunity provision did not cover the State, but only individual persons, whether the state was negligent as a matter of law, and whether the assault on S.W. was foreseeable.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court was correct in its interpretation that the state's immunity provision did not extend to the State. However, the Supreme Court found that the District Court erred in its summary judgment that the State was negligent as a matter of law and that the assault on S.W. was foreseeable as a matter of law. The Court ruled that these issues contained material factual disputes that should be left to a jury. The Supreme Court also held that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing a disproportionate sanction on the State for spoliation of evidence. The judgment was reversed, the jury’s verdict was vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "S. W. v. State" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed a case involving the question of whether the federal Title X program preempts a Texas law that gives parents the right to consent to their teenagers’ obtaining contraceptives. Alexander Deanda, a father raising his children according to Christian beliefs, challenged the Secretary of Health and Human Services' administration of Title X, which funds clinics providing contraceptives to minors without parental notification or consent. Deanda contested this on the grounds that it nullifies his right to consent to his children's medical care, infringing on his state-created right. The court held that Title X does not preempt Texas's law. The statute does not preempt Deanda's parental right to consent to his children's obtaining contraceptives because Title X's goal (encouraging family participation in teens’ receiving family planning services) is not undermined by Texas's goal (empowering parents to consent to their teen’s receiving contraceptives). Instead, the two laws reinforce each other. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment to the extent it declared that Title X does not preempt Texas's parental consent law. However, the court reversed the partial vacatur of a regulation which forbids Title X grantees from notifying parents or obtaining their consent, as the regulation was not challenged by Deanda under the Administrative Procedure Act or otherwise. View "Deanda v. Becerra" on Justia Law

In a suit involving the West Virginia Department of Human Services (the Department), the plaintiff, A.R., alleged that her injuries stemmed from the Department's negligence, specifically its failure to follow proper procedures, policies, and protocols mandated by the Child Welfare Act. The Department moved to dismiss the claims on the basis of qualified immunity, asserting that the claims were based on discretionary, governmental functions and thus it was immune from claims of negligence. However, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied the Department’s motion.In its decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision in part, ruling that the Department was indeed entitled to qualified immunity from A.R.'s negligence claims. The Court found that the hiring, training, and supervision of employees were discretionary governmental functions, and A.R.'s broad allegations that the Department violated the Child Welfare Act and the Child Protective Services Policy were insufficient to defeat the Department's claim of qualified immunity. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, consistent with its opinion. View "West Virginia Department of Human Resources v. A.R." on Justia Law

In a case involving the Department of Child and Family Services of the County of Los Angeles and individual social workers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a mixed ruling. The case arose from the removal of two minor children from their parents' custody following an anonymous report that the parents were using medical marijuana to treat one child's severe autism. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment.The Circuit Court reversed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants on the parents' claim of judicial deception. The court concluded that the application submitted by the defendants in support of the warrant for removal contained misrepresentations and omissions and a reasonable trier of fact could find these misrepresentations material.The Circuit Court also reversed the district court's summary judgment for defendants on the parents' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and their Monell claim, which argued that the county had an unofficial policy of encouraging social workers to omit exculpatory information from warrant applications.However, the Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim concerning the social worker's interview of one child at her school, finding that the social worker was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found no error in the district court's handling of a jury question during trial.The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the claims of judicial deception, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Monell claim.The case was remanded for further proceedings on these issues. View "SCANLON V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

This case concerned the Office of Children’s Services' (OCS) decision to take emergency custody of a baby who tested positive for drugs at birth, and the subsequent legal proceedings that ensued. Both parents initially expressed interest in voluntarily relinquishing their parental rights, but the court found that the relinquishments were not valid because the forms were not dated or signed by an OCS witness. The foster parents opposed OCS's plan to move the baby from their home to her maternal aunt’s home and were granted permission to intervene for a placement review hearing. After the hearing, the court concluded that OCS had abused its discretion in deciding to move the child and granted the mother's motion to withdraw her putative relinquishment. The foster parents then filed a motion to reconsider the order allowing the mother to withdraw her relinquishment. The court granted the foster parents’ motion and reversed its order withdrawing the relinquishment. The court then terminated the parental rights of both parents without holding an evidentiary hearing. OCS and both parents appealed the superior court’s decisions. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that it was error to allow the foster parents’ continued intervention, to reinstate the relinquishments, and to terminate parental rights. The court vacated all the orders relating to those errors and remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings. The court clarified that it was an abuse of discretion to permit the foster parents to continue to intervene regarding the validity of the parents’ relinquishments, to revisit the validity of the relinquishments, and to issue termination orders without providing the parties with notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as a legal error to issue a termination order without making a best interests finding. View "Tara R. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law