Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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In June 2019, the petitioner's 13-year-old daughter, T., disclosed to a friend, a teacher, a police officer, and a caseworker from the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) that the petitioner had struck her with an extension cord. The caseworker took photographs of T.'s injuries, and a physician confirmed that the injuries were consistent with being struck by an extension cord. ACS initiated a Family Court article 10 neglect proceeding against the petitioner and her husband. The Family Court authorized an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), and the case was dismissed in February 2020 after the petitioner complied with the court's conditions.The police officer reported the incident to the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR). In July 2019, ACS determined the report against the petitioner was indicated. The petitioner challenged this determination, but the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) upheld it after an internal review. A fair hearing was held in August 2020, and OCFS concluded that the allegations were substantiated by a fair preponderance of the evidence.The petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge OCFS's determination. The Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division, which confirmed OCFS's determination, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The Appellate Division held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR hearing and that the statutory changes to Social Services Law § 422 did not apply retroactively.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR administrative hearing. It also concluded that the statutory amendments to Social Services Law § 422 (8) (b) (ii) did not apply retroactively to OCFS determinations rendered before the effective date of the amendments. The Court further held that OCFS's determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Matter of Jeter v. Poole" on Justia Law

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An infant child, G.K., suffered grievous injuries while in the legal custody of the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and under the physical care of foster parent Samantha Gafford. Brittany Howe, G.K.'s biological mother, filed a lawsuit individually and as natural tutrix of G.K. against Gafford and DCFS. The plaintiffs alleged that DCFS had a non-delegable duty of care towards G.K. and was liable for the actions of the foster parent.The trial court granted DCFS's motion for summary judgment, agreeing with DCFS's argument that the non-delegable duty was effectively overturned by the case Kunath v. Gafford and that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Gafford's employment status with DCFS. The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that Louisiana Revised Statute 42:1441.1 prohibited DCFS from being held liable for the actions of foster parents unless the foster parent was an official, officer, or employee of the state.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that DCFS has a non-delegable duty of care and well-being owed to children in its legal custody, which cannot be abrogated by La. R.S. 42:1441.1. The court clarified that this duty is distinct from vicarious liability arising from a master-servant relationship and is an affirmative duty owed by the state. The court concluded that the statute does not apply to the duty of care DCFS owes to children in its custody. Consequently, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "HOWE VS. GAFFORD" on Justia Law

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The case involves the termination of parental rights of an incarcerated father, Anton K., to his two daughters, Allie and Melissa, who are Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed the children from their parents' home due to allegations of abuse and neglect. Anton was later incarcerated on charges of physical and sexual assault against the children's mother, Keri K., and remained in custody throughout the proceedings.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, initially found probable cause to believe the children were in need of aid and that OCS had made active efforts to avoid removing them. OCS developed case plans for both parents and facilitated some initial visitation. However, after Anton's incarceration, OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide rehabilitative services were limited, partly due to COVID-19 restrictions and miscommunications with the Department of Corrections (DOC). OCS continued to work with Keri and the children's Tribe, eventually placing the children with maternal relatives after efforts to place them with paternal relatives failed.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order terminating Anton's parental rights. The court held that OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, considering the entirety of its efforts, including those directed at Keri and the children's extended family. The court acknowledged the significant gaps in OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide services to Anton while incarcerated but concluded that the overall efforts, including those to reunify the children with Keri and place them with relatives, were sufficient under ICWA. View "Anton K. v. State" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the eligibility of a married individual, Costa Tingos, for Medicaid long-term care benefits. Costa and his wife, Mary, had been married for over 50 years, but had kept their finances largely separate due to Costa's history of gambling and financial mismanagement. When Costa moved into a nursing home, he applied for Medicaid benefits. However, Mary refused to provide information about her income and assets, which was necessary to determine Costa's eligibility. Costa argued that Mary's refusal to cooperate should not affect his eligibility.The case was initially heard by the Massachusetts Medicaid program, MassHealth, which denied Costa's application. Costa appealed to the MassHealth board of hearings, which also denied his appeal. Costa then sought judicial review in the Superior Court, which vacated the board's decision and remanded the case back to the board. After two more rounds of hearings and appeals, the Superior Court affirmed the board's decision to deny Costa's application.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. The court held that the board's interpretation of the phrase "refuses to cooperate" in the relevant regulation was reasonable. The court found that Mary's refusal to disclose her financial information did not constitute a refusal to cooperate within the meaning of the regulation, given the couple's long history of cooperation in other aspects of their marriage. The court also rejected Costa's argument that the board's decision was arbitrary and capricious. View "Freiner v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

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The case involves a mother, N.C.-F., who appealed a decision by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, regarding the placement of her children, M.F.-1, M.F.-2, and M.F.-3. The children's father had admitted to killing M.F.-3's mother, leading to an abuse and neglect case. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) placed M.F.-3 with his maternal aunt, S.M., while M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 remained in N.C.-F.'s physical custody, but their legal custody was with the DHS. The court terminated the father's parental rights and restored legal custody of M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 to N.C.-F. However, it denied N.C.-F.'s request for placement of M.F.-3 with her and his half-siblings.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County adjudicated M.F.-1, M.F.-2, and M.F.-3 as abused and neglected children based on the father's actions. The court terminated the father's parental rights and restored legal custody of M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 to N.C.-F. However, it denied N.C.-F.'s request for placement of M.F.-3 with her and his half-siblings, determining that maintaining M.F.-3’s placement with S.M. served his best interests.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the circuit court did not err in its rulings, including the decision to maintain M.F.-3’s placement with S.M. The court also found that the circuit court did not violate N.C.-F.'s constitutional due process rights by placing custody of her children with the DHS during the abuse and neglect proceedings. The court concluded that the circuit court's decision to place M.F.-3 with S.M. was in the child's best interest and that the court had properly facilitated regular visitation between M.F.-3 and his half-siblings. View "In Re M.F.-1" on Justia Law

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The case involves the paternal grandparents of a child, M.F. III, who sought to intervene in an abuse and neglect proceeding following the fatal stabbing of the child's mother by his father. The grandparents, who lived in Baltimore, Maryland, but had a second home in Charleston, West Virginia, filed three motions to intervene in the proceedings, seeking placement of the child and/or visitation rights. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied all three motions. The grandparents appealed, arguing that the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to conduct a home study to determine their suitability as adoptive parents, as required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3).The Circuit Court of Kanawha County had previously reviewed the case. The court denied the grandparents' motions to intervene in the abuse and neglect proceedings. The court also did not order the DHS to conduct a home study to assess the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents, despite the termination of the father's parental rights and the child's placement in the DHS's permanent custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision to deny the grandparents' motions to intervene, as they did not fall within the class of individuals who may seek permissive intervention under West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(h). However, the court found that the DHS had failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3) to consider the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents. The court remanded the case with directions for the DHS to comply with the statute and for the circuit court to determine the child's best interests for permanent placement following the DHS's compliance. View "In Re M.F. III" on Justia Law

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The case involves a mother, J.C. (Jan), who was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with psychotic features. The New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) became involved with Jan and her family in 2018 when she was involuntarily hospitalized for manic and paranoid behavior. The Division implemented a safety plan that mandated temporary supervision of Jan’s contact with her children. After a series of referrals and investigations, the Division filed a complaint in 2020, and the Family Part granted the Division care and supervision of the children. In 2021, the Law Guardian sought to dismiss the Title 30 action due to Jan’s lack of cooperation with the Division. The court discontinued the Division’s care and supervision of the children but dismissed the litigation with restraints, considering Jan's mental health issues.The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's decision, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification. The Appellate Division held that the family court could dismiss a Title 30 action while maintaining restraints on a parent’s conduct. The court reasoned that the family court did not enter permanent restraints but continued the restraints that existed during the litigation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the family court does not have the authority under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 to dismiss a Title 30 action and continue restraints on a parent’s conduct. If the family court finds that it is in the best interests of the child to continue the restraints on a parent’s conduct, it must keep the case open to facilitate judicial oversight of the Division’s continued involvement, while safeguarding a parent’s right to counsel. The case was remanded to the Family Part to reinstate the Title 30 action or dismiss the case without restraints. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. J.C. and K.C." on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a child, R.N., who was removed from his mother's care and placed in foster care with Ben and Charissa Wagner. The Wagners had previously adopted two of the mother's other children. The Department of Public Health and Human Services was granted temporary legal custody of R.N. and ordered the mother to complete a treatment plan. The Department later filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights due to her failure to complete the treatment plan and alleged abandonment of R.N. However, the mother began to engage with the Department and made positive changes, leading to the Department's shift from termination to reunification.The Wagners, unhappy with the Department's change of stance, filed a motion to intervene, asserting that it was appropriate under M. R. Civ. P. 24 and § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA. The District Court granted the Wagners' intervention motion, despite objections from the mother, the Department, and the guardian ad litem. The Wagners then filed a motion seeking an order for R.N. to be immediately placed in their care and for the Department to pursue termination of the mother's parental rights. The District Court did not set a hearing or issue a determination on the Wagners' motion. The Department filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the District Court granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had misinterpreted the law when it allowed the Wagners to intervene. The court also ruled that the Wagners did not have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of R.N. because the mother's rights had not been terminated. Furthermore, the court held that neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court had the authority to order or compel the Department to refile and prosecute its petition for termination. View "In re R.N." on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the custody of three children, Kelly, Amy, and Matt, who were taken into nonsecure custody by the Vance County Department of Social Services (DSS) due to their parents' issues with homelessness, mental health, and domestic violence. The children were initially placed in foster care and later with their paternal great aunt (Great Aunt). The trial court ordered an investigation into the possibility of placing the children with their maternal grandmother (Grandmother) who lived in Georgia. However, DSS did not initiate the out-of-state home study on Grandmother until November 2021, despite the court's order in February 2019.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to grant guardianship to Great Aunt, concluding that there was no obligation under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) for a home study to be completed to rule out an out-of-state relative as a placement option. The Court of Appeals also vacated the order in part and remanded for reconsideration of the mother's visitation rights.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that trial courts are not necessarily required to wait on completion of a home study to rule out the placement with an out-of-state relative if the trial court concludes that an in-state relative is willing and able to provide proper care and supervision and the placement is in the best interest of the children. However, the court noted that in some scenarios, the best-interest determination may require the completion of an ICPC home study before the trial court can make a placement. The court also clarified that the ICPC does apply to an order granting guardianship to out-of-state grandparents. View "In re: K.B., A.M.H., M.S.H" on Justia Law

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The case involves a mother, Beth, who gave birth to a child, Mia, in June 2020. Both mother and child tested positive for marijuana at the hospital. Beth was discharged from the hospital two days after delivery, but Mia remained. Beth never returned to the hospital, and the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) was unable to contact or locate her because Beth provided incorrect contact information. Mia stayed in the hospital two days longer than she would have if Beth returned to take custody of her. The Division took custody of Mia and placed her in a resource home. The Division filed an action against Beth, arguing that she abused and neglected Mia because she failed to exercise a minimum degree of care in supplying Mia with food, clothing, and shelter. The trial court concluded that the Division met its burden in proving that Beth abused and neglected Mia. The Appellate Division affirmed.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that although Beth left the hospital and did not return, she left Mia in a hospital where she was undoubtedly well taken care of and her needs were met. Nothing in the facts suggested that Beth’s actions impaired Mia or put Mia in imminent danger of being impaired while she remained in the safety of the hospital’s care. The Division therefore failed to meet its burden of establishing abuse or neglect. The court reversed the Appellate Division's decision and vacated the trial court’s finding of abuse and neglect. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. B.P." on Justia Law