Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

K.W. was removed from his long-term placement with his relative, “Grandma B.,” after she took a one-day trip and did not notify the social worker of the trip. The consequence of this removal resulted in tremendous upheaval in K.W.’s life and violated the requirements of RCW 13.34.130. Though K.W. was legally free, the placement preferences set out in the statute still applied, and the court erred in failing to apply them and failing to place K.W. with relatives. View "In re Dependency of K.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the trial court finding that the evidence presented was sufficient to support an adjudication of dependency but dismissing a claim of neglect, holding that the court of appeals' analysis showed improper deference to the trial court's conclusion of law.The Cumberland County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a juvenile petition alleging Kelly to be a neglected and dependent juvenile. The trial court adjudicated Kelly to be dependent but, without explanation, dismissed the claim of neglect. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claim of neglect. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part, holding that the court of appeals failed to conduct a proper de novo review of the issue of neglect. View "In re K.S." on Justia Law

Respondent, C.R. (ward) appealed a circuit court order appointing a guardian over her person, arguing that petitioner New Hampshire Hospital (NHH) failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was incapacitated. She also argued the trial court’s findings of incapacity exceeded the scope of the pleadings and evidence at trial, thereby depriving her of notice and an opportunity to be heard. The ward suffered from schizoaffective disorder, and, in November 2020, was involuntarily admitted to NHH for a two-year period. NHH obtained emergency treatment authorization to provide the ward with psychiatric medication without her consent, and although her condition improved, the medication caused side effects that required a reduction in dosage. The ward declined to take any medication to treat the side effects or any alternative medication that would not cause the side effects. The emergency treatment authorization expired on January 4, 2021. In the two weeks before the February 2021 guardianship proceeding, the ward started exhibiting worsening thoughts that people were trying to target her, and her mood fluctuated more, spurring concerns that the current medication was insufficient. NHH filed the guardianship petition at issue here, alleging that, the guardianship was necessary. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the trial court to have found the ward “is likely to suffer substantial harm due to an inability to provide for [her] personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, health care or safety or an inability to manage . . . her property or financial affairs.” Further, the Court found there was support in the record for the trial court's finding that guardianship was the least restrictive intervention for the ward. The Court found that the guardianship petition informed the ward the trial court could “impose additional orders as a result of the hearing,” but it did not inform her that NHH was asking the court to find her incapable of exercising her rights to marry or divorce, make a will or waive a will’s provisions, hold or obtain a motor vehicle operator’s license, initiate/defend/settle lawsuits, or make decisions concerning educational matters or training. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the ward did not receive the notice contemplated by RSA 464-A:5, I, as to those rights. Therefore, the Court vacated the guardianship order to the extent that it deprived her of those rights. The Court otherwise affirmed the order appointing a guardian over the person of the ward and remanded. View "In re Guardianship of C.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the appropriate standard of proof by which the Department would have to prove that it had made "reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely to his [or her] parent or guardian" under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 29C is proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence.The parties in this case jointly petitioned for clarification of the standard by which the Department would have to prove that it has made reasonable efforts. The Department argued that the standard of proof should be fair preponderance of the evidence, and the child at issue and its mother argued for a more demanding clear and convincing evidence standard. The Supreme Judicial Court declared that, at a reasonable efforts hearing, the Department's burden is to prove that it has made reasonable efforts by a preponderance of the evidence. View "In re Care & Protection of Rashida" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) appealed a circuit court order that dismissed a neglect petition brought against the respondent. DCYF argued the circuit court erred by: (1) relying upon criminal definitions of sexual assault and grooming; and (2) disregarding conduct that the child did not personally observe. Further, DCYF argued the evidence compelled a finding of neglect by the circuit court. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the circuit court committed legal error by basing its neglect determination, in part, upon whether the respondent’s conduct was criminal. Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded. In addition, because the issue was likely to arise on remand, the Court clarified that RSA chapter 169-C did not require that a child personally observe conduct in order for a court to consider that conduct when determining neglect. View "In re C.C." on Justia Law

M.A. (mother) and A.O. (father) appealed the termination of their parental rights to their three children. In January 2019, Children and Family Services (Agency) received a report that the home was filthy. It received a separate report that the maternal grandparents hit the children and the parents were methamphetamine addicts. Both parents had prior arrests for possession of a controlled substance. The parents and grandparents actively avoided detention warrants executed to the home. In June 2019, a police officer on an unrelated call found the family at the home and detained the children. The next month, two children were placed in foster care; the parents had a third child, L.A.-O (L) in May 2020, whom the the Agency detained and filed a dependency petition. In July 2020, at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing as to L., the juvenile court found that it had jurisdiction based on failure to protect, failure to support, and abuse of a sibling, and formally removed L. from the parents’ custody and ordered reunification services. At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found that the children were adoptable and that there was no applicable exception to termination of parental rights. It therefore terminated parental rights. The Court of Appeal addressed two novel issues raised by the parents' appeal: (1) the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Caden C., 11 Cal.5th 614 (2021) overruled lower appellate court decisions holding that a parent asserting the parental-benefit exception must show that he or she occupied a “parental role;” and (2) the juvenile court erred by “ignor[ing]” evidence in social worker’s reports filed in connection with earlier hearings and that these reports established that the parental-benefit exception applied. The trial court found that the parental-benefit exception did not apply partly because the parents “ha[d] not acted in a parental role in a long time” and partly because the prospective adoptive parents “ha[d] been acting in a parental role.” Because the trial court used this terminology, the Court of Appeal could not tell whether its ruling conformed with Caden C. Hence, judgment was remanded for reconsideration of the parental-benefit exception. With regard to the second issue, the appellate court disagreed: the reports were not introduced into evidence at the section 366.26 hearing; hence, neither the Court of Appeal nor the juvenile court could consider them. "The parents will be free to introduce them on remand." View "In re L.A.-O." on Justia Law

Mother J.B., lived with her two young children (“Y.W.-B” and “N.W.-B”) and the children’s father (“Father”) in Philadelphia. In 2019, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) allegedly received a general protective services report (“GPS report”) from an unidentified source alleging possible neglect by Mother. Although DHS referenced this GPS report several times at the evidentiary hearing and used it to refresh its sole witness’s recollection, it inexplicably never introduced it into evidence. The proceedings revealed the allegation suggested Mother was homeless and failed to feed one of her children during a single eight-hour period. DHS used this allegation as grounds to enter and inspect the family residence. The issue for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether DHS established sufficient probable cause for the trial court to issue the order permitting entry into the home without consent. To this, the Court concluded DHS did not establish probable cause, and thus reversed the order of the Superior Court holding to the contrary. View "In the Interest of: N.W.-B." on Justia Law

This matter arose from four Child in Need of Aid (CINA) cases. In each, the superior court appointed a guardian ad litem for the child through the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA), and in each case Brenda Finley, working under contract with OPA, appeared as the GAL. Pursuant to CINA Rule 11(e), Finley disclosed to the parties that she was a foster parent in another CINA case. She stated that she did not believe that her role as a foster parent “will affect her ability to be [impartial] in this specific case, or in other cases.” A parent in each case moved for an evidentiary hearing “regarding whether Ms. Finley should be disqualified as a guardian ad litem.” Arguing that Finley’s role as a foster parent might create a conflict of interest due to her relationship with the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) as both a foster parent and a GAL, the parents sought additional details to determine whether a conflict existed, suggesting a hearing would allow them to elicit information regarding Finley’s past, present, and possible future tenure as a foster parent, the status of the cases in which she served as a foster parent, her financial arrangements with OCS, and her relationship with OCS workers. Both OCS and OPA filed qualified oppositions to the parents’ request for a hearing, arguing: that categorical disqualification of foster parents from serving as GALs was overbroad; the court should provide clarity on what framework should govern the potential conflict; and that a low bar for disqualification would fail to recognize “the difficulty of keeping positions in child welfare staffed by qualified individuals, ideally with ties to the community . . . .” The Alaska Supreme Court held that the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct applied to determine whether the GAL has a disqualifying conflict of interest and that the superior court must permit limited discovery to ascertain the underlying facts for determining whether a disqualifying conflict exists. View "C.L. v. Office of Public Advocacy" on Justia Law

A minor in the custody of the Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) was brought to a hospital for mental health treatment. A hospital social worker then petitioned the superior court to have the minor involuntarily hospitalized at a psychiatric facility for a mental health evaluation. The court held a brief ex parte telephonic inquiry at which it took the social worker’s sworn testimony. The court concluded that the minor was a danger to herself and granted the petition. Under the statute governing involuntary commitments, the court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing within 72 hours if the psychiatric facility intended to continue providing treatment beyond that time. Before any hearing, however, OCS informed the court that it consented to the minor’s 30-day commitment for treatment; it contended that its consent made the 30-day commitment “voluntary” and, under the statute governing parental admissions, no hearing was required. The court eventually held an evidentiary hearing nearly 30 days after the minor’s initial hospitalization for evaluation. The court decided that the standards for a 30-day commitment were met because there was clear and convincing evidence that the minor had a mental illness, that she posed a risk of harm to herself, and that there were no less restrictive means of treatment available. The court also concluded that OCS had the statutory authority to admit a child in its care under the parental admissions statute. The first 30 days of the minor’s commitment were therefore considered voluntary, and her continued hospitalization would be considered under the involuntary commitment framework only after those 30 days expired. The court further determined that, because the 30-day limit under the parental admission statute was separate from the 30-day limit before a jury trial was required under the involuntary commitment statute, the minor could be held for an additional 30 days — 60 days total — before there was any need for a trial. The minor appealed, arguing the superior court violated her due process rights by not allowing her to be heard at the initial inquiry, when the petitioner testified under oath, and by treating her initial 30-day commitment as voluntary. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the minor’s hospitalization for evaluation complied with due process; a hearing was not required at the ex parte review stage, and a judge’s decision to hold a brief inquiry with the petitioner did not give the respondent a right to be heard. But the Supreme Court further concluded that it was error to treat the initial 30-day commitment as voluntary, because OCS was not a parent or guardian statutorily authorized to use the voluntary parental admission framework. Because the 30-day commitment should have been considered involuntary, any further hospitalization could not be ordered absent a full hearing or jury trial. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the superior court order characterizing the first 30-day commitment as voluntary and authorizing an additional 30 days of commitment. View "In the Matter of the Hospitalization of April S." on Justia Law

The superior court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her daughter after a termination trial. The mother appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that on the facts of this case, the mother preserved her evidentiary appeal point. The Court rejected the Office of Children’s Services’s (OCS) assertion that the mother waived her evidentiary objection by not repeatedly raising it to every question asked during the relevant testimony. The Court also concluded that, because the superior court did not explain its evidentiary ruling at any point during the relevant testimony or in its termination decision, it could not determine: (1) whether the court allowed some or all of the hearsay testimony for limited purposes; (2) how the court used the hearsay evidence to reach its findings; or (3) whether the court erred or abused its discretion by allowing and relying on the hearsay testimony. The case was therefore remanded to the superior court for a full explanation of its evidentiary ruling, how the ruling related to the hearsay testimony, and how the hearsay testimony related to the trial court’s findings. View "M.B. (Mother) v. Alaska, DHSS, OCS" on Justia Law