Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Dakota Bee appealed a criminal judgment entered on a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal a district court order denying her motion to suppress evidence. Burleigh County Social Services (BCSS) contacted the Bismarck Police Department requesting assistance in removing a child from Bee’s care. Officers accompanied BCSS social workers to Bee’s residence and informed her that they were there to remove her child. Bee refused, backing up into the home, picking up the child, and then running towards the rear of the home. Officers pursued Bee through the home and out the back door. Fleeing out the back, Bee fell while holding the child, and officers separated her from the child. After Bee had been detained outside the residence, a social worker entered the residence to obtain personal belongings for the child, and an officer followed. Once the officer was inside, the social worker pointed out a glass smoking pipe. Bee was subsequently charged with Child Neglect; Possession of Methamphetamine; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; and Refusal to Halt. The district court found that the officers entered “the residence with BCSS to retrieve personal belongings for the child” after Bee had been detained and the child was in BCSS’s custody. The court further found that the officers observed the glass smoking device on a shelf in plain view. The court concluded the officers’ actions did not violate Bee’s Fourth Amendment rights. On appeal, Bee argued the court erred in concluding that her Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the officers entered her home. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that during the first entry to the residence, the officers observed nothing that Bee sought to suppress. The second entry of the residence was justified only by a need to collect clothing and other personal items needed by the child. Because the search was concededly warrantless and no exception applies, the Court concluded Bee was entitled to claim the protection of the exclusionary rule. The district court erred by denying Bee’s motion to suppress the results of the warrantless search. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to allow Bee to withdraw her guilty plea. View "North Dakota v. Bee" on Justia Law

Upon completion of an investigation of a report of child abuse, the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (DHS) or its designated county children and youth agency (county agency) categorizes the investigated report as “indicated,” “founded,” or “unfounded.” When a report of child abuse was substantiated as either indicated or founded, or amended from indicated or founded, the named perpetrator is provided with notice of the status, including the effect of a substantiated report upon future employment opportunities involving children, and the individual’s name was added to the statewide child abuse database where it could remain indefinitely. On July 6, 2017, the county agency filed two identical indicated reports (CPS reports) identifying J.F. as a perpetrator of abuse of her fifteen-month-old twin children. While her administrative appeal of the CPS reports was pending, J.F. entered into an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) for both criminal counts of endangering the welfare of children. As a result of J.F.’s entry into ARD, the county agency changed the status of the CPS reports from “indicated” to “founded,” then filed a motion to dismiss J.F.’s administrative appeal, attaching the criminal court docket, and averring the factual circumstances of the ARD were the same as the CPS reports which authorized the county agency to change the reports’ status to founded. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine whether J.F., seeking to challenge the founded report, was entitled an administrative hearing. The Court held that in the absence of another appropriate forum to challenge DHS’s adjudication of child abuse in a recorded evidentiary hearing, a named perpetrator in a report designated as “founded” based upon the perpetrator’s voluntary entry into an accelerated rehabilitative disposition was entitled to an administrative hearing. View "J.F. v. Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Petitioner H.H. appealed a Vermont Human Services Board order upholding the Department for Children and Families’ (DCF’s) substantiation of a report that she placed her daughter at risk of harm from sexual abuse. The Board granted summary judgment to the State, concluding that the stipulated findings in a related child-in-need-of-care-or-supervision (CHINS) proceeding precluded petitioner from contesting her substantiation and resulting placement on the Child Protection Registry. Petitioner argued the Board erred in applying collateral estoppel on the basis of the CHINS adjudication. To this, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Appeal of H.H." on Justia Law

Two of L.K.’s three children were Indian children for the purposes of federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). L.K. claimed the State Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Department) removed her children without making "active efforts" to keep the family together as was required under the two laws. The Court of Appeals did not address this issue but, instead, sua sponte found that under the invited error doctrine, L.K. was precluded from raising this issue on appeal, holding that because L.K. repeatedly contended she did not need services, she could not now claim on appeal that the Department did not provide her sufficient services under ICWA and WICWA. It did not reach the issue of whether the Department provided active efforts. The Washington Supreme Court reversed appellate court's holding regarding "invited error." With respect to "active efforts," the Supreme Court found the Department did not engage in the statutorily required active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family. Accordingly, the dispositional order continuing L.R.C.K.-S. and D.B.C.K.-S.’s foster care placement was vacated. The matter was remanded for immediate return of these two children to their mother, unless the trial court finds returning the children put them in “substantial and immediate danger or threat of such danger.” The finding of dependency was unaffected. View "In re Dependency of A.L.K., L.R.C.K.-S., D.B.C.K.-S." on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent a circuit court from joining DCYF as a party to an ongoing guardianship case and from ordering the agency to provide services for the benefit of private litigants. This petition arose from a guardianship case involving an ongoing dispute between the father of a three-year-old child and the child’s guardians, who were the child’s maternal grandparents. The father alleged the child’s guardians were willfully interfering with his rights to unsupervised parenting time and notice of his child’s medical appointments as established by previous court orders. The circuit court credited the father’s allegations and expressed concern that the case “has not progressed” since the last hearing in September 2018. The trial court was ordered to provide services on a weekly basis to father, and joined DCYF as a party to the case. DCYF contended the circuit court lacked the authority to join the agency to the private case because no statute authorized the circuit court to do so. The Supreme Court agreed and, accordingly, granted DCYF’s petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that a parent and child must be living apart from each other for more than twelve months prior to the filing of a motion to terminate parental rights in order for grounds for termination to exist under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(2).Less than eight months after the child in this case was moved to a different foster home apart from Mother, the Cabarrus County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a motion to terminate Mother's parental rights. The trial court entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(2), (3), and (6). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the child was not left in foster care outside the home for more than twelve months the termination of Mother's parental rights under section 7B-1111(a)(2) cannot be sustained; and (2) the trial court made insufficient findings of fact to support its conclusions of law that grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights existed under sections 7B-1111(a)(3) and (6). View "In re K.H." on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (MDCPS) sought to terminate involuntarily the parental rights of Jack Bynum, the putative father of a child in MDCPS' custody. The chancery court determined Bynum was both indigent and entitled to counsel. The chancellor appointed Bynum counsel and ordered MDCPS to pay his attorney's fees. MDCPS appealed. The agency argued Covington County should have paid for Bynum’s representation, just as it would if Bynum were an indigent criminal defendant. But the Mississippi Supreme Court found this was not a criminal case. "And the statutory scheme that directs the initiating county in criminal prosecutions to pay for indigent representation is expressly limited. It only applies to those 'charged with a felony, misdemeanor punishable by confinement for ninety (90) days or more, or commission of an act of delinquency.'” Thus, absent a legislative directive to assess an indigent parent’s attorney’s fees to Covington County, the chancery court did not abuse its legislatively conferred discretion by ordering MDCPS to pay Bynum’s attorney’s fees. View "Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services v. Bynum" on Justia Law

In this dependency, abuse, and neglect proceeding, the Supreme Court held that Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.100(1)(b) does not entitle an indigent parent to state-funded expert assistance in dependency, neglect, and abuse (DNA) cases but that, under certain circumstances, parents are entitled to reasonably necessary expert assistance under the due process provisions of the Kentucky and United States Constitutions.The Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed DNA petitions on behalf of Parents' children based on risk of harm. The family court determined that Mother and Father were indigent, but when counsel for both parties requested funds to hire a medical expert the court denied the request. The court then found that Parents' three children were neglected or abused. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 620.100(1)(b) grants indigent parents a right to funding for reasonably necessary expert assistance. The Supreme Court reversed insofar as the court's holding relied on Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.100 but affirmed the court's reversal of the family court on constitutional grounds, holding that whether due process requires a court-appointed expert is best left to the judgment of the trial court. The Court remanded the case for new DNA proceedings with instructions for the family court to analyze the need for expert assistance prior to adjudication. View "Commonwealth, Cabinet For Health & Family Services v. K.S." on Justia Law

Parents appealed the termination of their rights in A.M. and G.M., ages five and four. Parents struggled with substance abuse and were incarcerated periodically during the underlying proceedings. In January 2018, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging the children were in need of care or supervision (CHINS) based on parental neglect, including squalid living conditions, and parental substance-abuse concerns. The children were initially placed with their maternal grandmother pursuant to a conditional custody order (CCO), and then with mother pursuant to a CCO. In April 2018, with parents’ agreement, custody of the children was transferred to DCF. Parents stipulated that the children were CHINS, and following a June 2018 disposition hearing, the parties stipulated to continued DCF custody and to DCF’s disposition case plan, which contemplated reunification by November 2018 or adoption. Parents were required to take various action steps to achieve reunification. The children did not see mother after June 2018 and they stopped seeing father before that time. As of September 2018, the children were placed together in the same foster home. Appealing the ultimate termination of the parental rights to their children, Parents challenged the trial court's treatment of voluntary guardianship petitions filed during the pendency of the juvenile proceedings. Mother also argued the court erred in terminating her rights. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed termination. View "In re A.M. & G.M." on Justia Law

C.V. (Mother) appealed an order issued under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 selecting adoption as the permanent plan for her son N.S. and terminating her parental rights. N.S.’s father was a member of the San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians (the Tribe). The Tribe was involved in this case since the juvenile court found that N.S. was an Indian child and that the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) applied. On appeal, Mother contended: (1) the Tribe’s “decree” selecting guardianship as the best permanent plan option for N.S. preempted the statutory preference for adoption under section 366.26; (2) N.S.’s counsel breached his duties under section 317 and provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to discover what Tribal benefits or membership rights were available to N.S. before the termination of parental rights; (3) the court erred in finding that the Indian child exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(vi)(I) and (II) did not apply to preclude termination of parental rights; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody in Mother’s care would be a substantial risk to N.S.; and (5) the court erred in finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) does not apply to preclude termination of parental rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law