Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court declaring section 11.800 of House Bill No. 2011 (HB2011) invalid, holding that there was a direct conflict between the language of Mo. Rev. Stat. 208.153.2 and 208.152.1(6), (12) requiring the MO HealthNet Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services to pay its authorized providers for covered physicians' services and family planning provided to Medicaid-eligible individuals and the language of section 11.800 prohibiting MO HealthNet from doing so.Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region and Reproductive Health Services of Planned Parenthood (Planned Parenthood) was an authorized provider of physicians' services and family planning because it had an agreement with MO HealthNet to do so. MO HealthNet informed Planned Parenthood that it could not reimburse Planned Parenthood for those services during the fiscal year 2019 due to section 11.800, which stated that "No funds shall be expended to any abortion facility...." The circuit court concluded that section 11.800 of HB2011 violated Mo. Const. Art. III, 23 because it amended substantive law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 11.800 was invalid because article III, section 23 prohibits using an appropriation bill to amend a substantive statute; and (2) the circuit court properly severed that provision from the remainder of HB2011. View "Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region v. Department of Social Services, Division of Medical Services" on Justia Law

D.R. (Father) and J.R. (Mother) (collectively, Parents) resided in Greene County, Pennsylvania with their five children, ranging in age from six to sixteen years old. Father was an attorney who, as part of his private practice, represented parents under investigation by Greene County Children and Youth Services (CYS). On October 29, 2018, Greene County CYS received a report that on October 12, 2018, Father was observed to be impaired or under the influence while in the presence of one of his children. Because Father was a practicing attorney in Greene County, and to avoid a conflict of interest, the matter was referred to Fayette County CYS (the Agency). The Agency received three reports regarding Father, one of which was an allegation of abuse towards Mother (criminal charges were dropped because she refused to testify). The Agency thereafter moved to compel Parents' cooperation with a General Protective Services Assessment. Following a hearing, orders directing Parents to permit the Agency into their home to assess the living conditions of the children, and directing Parents to cooperate with the Agency were issued. The court also ordered Father to submit observed urine samples for purposes of drug and alcohol assessments. The orders further noted that Parents’ failure to comply would subject them to sanctions. Parents appealed, and a superior court reversed, finding no link between the alleged abuse and conditions in the home. Further, though there were reports of Father's intoxication, there was no specificity as to the type of impairment or whether such impairment caused the children to be abused or neglected. The Agency argued on appeal that the Superior Court erred in holding that it was without authorization to require urine samples as part of its duty to investigate reports of suspected child abuse. Finding no reversible error in the superior court judgment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Interest of: D.R." on Justia Law

The Orange County Department of Child Support Services (Department) has withdrawn money from Daniel Lak’s (Father) Social Security Disability Insurance benefits (SSDI) to pay for child/spousal support arrears since 2015. Father disputed the Department's authority to withdraw money, and at a hearing, sought reimbursement for overpayments and maintained the Department violated Family Code section 5246 (d)(3) by collecting more than five percent from his SSDI. The court denied Father’s requests and determined the Department could continue withdrawing money from SSDI for support arrears. On appeal, Father maintaned the court misinterpreted the law and failed to properly consider his motion for sanctions. Finding his contentions lack merit, the Court of Appeal affirmed the court’s order the Department did not overdraw money for arrears, Father failed to demonstrate he qualified for section 5246(d)(3)’s five percent rule, and sanctions were not warranted. View "Lak v. Lak" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of a state agency ruling several noncitizen applicants ineligible for all public benefits of the Bridge to Independence program (B2I), holding that the district court did not err in determining that applicants were not eligible for B2I.The applicants in this case were Guatemalan citizens who fled to Nebraska as minors. Each applicant was adjudicated pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) and placed in foster care. The applicants, who had already received special immigration juvenile status, applied to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for B2I. DHHS denied the applications because each applicant failed to meet the citizenship and lawful presence requirements. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the applicants were not eligible for B2I because the applicants were not "lawfully present" and the legislature did not "affirmatively provide[]" for unlawful applicants to be eligible under the Young Adult Bridge to Independence Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-4501 to 43-4514. View "E.M. v. Nebraska Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The issue case raised centered whether the Washington Department of Social and Health Services (Department) fulfilled its statutory obligation under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) to provide a mother necessary services before terminating her parental rights. B.B., the mother of D.H., S.T., L.L., and T.L., had her parental rights terminated after a nearly three-year long dependency. B.B. contended that the Department failed to provide her timely dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) and neuropsychological services and that the parenting education services she received were not properly tailored to her mental health needs. A Court of Appeals commissioner affirmed the termination, finding that the Department provided and properly tailored all necessary services to B.B. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, finding substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that all necessary and ordered services were offered or provided. View "In re Parental Rights to D.H." on Justia Law

This appeal involved the investigation into a claim that a mother, S.C., abused her seven-year-old son by corporal punishment. The New Jersey Department of Children and Families (Department) concluded, after its investigation, that the claim of abuse was “not established.” Because the abuse allegation was deemed “not established” rather than “unfounded,” it was not eligible to be expunged. S.C. appealed the Department’s action, claiming: (1) a deprivation of her due process rights because she was not afforded a hearing; and (2) that the Department’s “not established” finding was arbitrary and capricious because the record was insufficient to support a finding that her son was harmed. S.C. did not raise a direct challenge to the validity of having a “not established” finding category in the Department’s regulations, although amici urged that the category be declared illegitimate and eliminated. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded: (1) for the Department to provide improved notice of the basis on which its investigation has found credible evidence to support the allegation of harm; and (2) for S.C. to have an informal opportunity before the Department to rebut and/or supplement the record before the Department finalizes its finding. The Supreme Court rejected that due process considerations required the Department to conduct an adjudicative contested case proceeding either internally or at the Office of Administrative Law for a “not established” finding. That said, on the basis of the present record, the Supreme Court could not assess whether the “not established” finding in this instance was arbitrary or capricious. "It would be well worth the effort of the Department to revisit its regulatory language concerning the standard for making a 'not established' finding as well as its processes related to such findings. Our review of this matter brings to light shortcomings in fairness for parents and guardians involved in investigations that lead to such findings and which may require appellate review." View "S.C. v. New Jersey Department of Children and Families" on Justia Law

Daughter A.W. was born in October 2013 and son A.W. was born in June 2017. In February 2019, father was charged with domestic assault for attempting to strangle daughter, who was five years old at the time. As a result, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed petitions alleging that daughter and son were children in need of care or supervision (CHINS). DCF had accepted five previous reports asserting both physical abuse of daughter and mother by father and concerns that son was not gaining weight or receiving medical care. The court granted emergency- and temporary-care orders transferring custody to DCF. Children were placed with their paternal grandparents. In March 2019, both parents stipulated that daughter and son were CHINS due to father’s physical abuse of daughter and statements indicating a risk of harm to son. In May 2019, the court entered a disposition order and adopted a case plan calling for reunification with one or both parents by November 2019. The Children appealed the ultimate decision to terminate their parents rights to them following voluntary relinquishments. The Children argued the family division court lacked the power to modify the disposition order terminating the parental rights because they did not consent to the termination, and the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether termination was in their best interests. To this, the Vermont Supreme Court concurred, reversed, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re A.W. & A.W." on Justia Law

Appellant S.O. was subject to dual status supervision as both a dependent and a ward of the court; San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) was designated as the lead agency.In 2019, the juvenile court dismissed the dependency proceedings, effectively modifying dual status jurisdiction to single status jurisdiction. S.O. appealed, contending the court abused its discretion in modifying jurisdiction by failing to obtain a “section 241.1 dual status report addressing the advisability of a modification to single jurisdiction under” Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and, thus, failing to make “a reasoned determination” of his best interests. CFS argued “dismissal was warranted under section 241.1(d) and (e),” “dual status was no longer authorized,” and implicit findings supported dismissal of the section 300 dependency petition. After review, the Court of Appeal concurred with CFS, rejected S.O.’s contentions and affirmed. View "In re S.O." on Justia Law

In early December 2018, Jan K. gave birth to Ada K. in Anchorage. Within a few days the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of Ada and filed an emergency petition to adjudicate her as a child in need of aid. OCS identified Ralph W. As Ada's father. Jan had reported that Ralph was the "biological father" and that he "had intended to be at the hospital for the birth." Jan and Ralph did not live together, but both lived in Wasilla. According to OCS, Ralph said he had known Jan for “approximately one year”; Ralph “was aware of the pregnancy and was certain that he was the father and wanted the child to be placed with him.” OCS also asserted that Ralph said he had been present at all of Jan’s prenatal appointments and they planned to marry. According to OCS, Ralph explained he had not been present at the birth because Jan had been unable to call him, and no one else had called him. OCS noted that Ralph took a paternity test that day. While the parties concurred Ada should have been placed with Ralph, OCS declined until paternity test results were received. At the time of the hearing, the results were not in. The parties nonetheless stipulated, subject to the pending paternity test results, that Ada be placed with Ralph and that “if it turns out that [Ralph] is not the father, [OCS] will have the authority to immediately remove [Ada].” The Office of Public Advocacy petitioned for the Alaska Supreme Court's review of the trial court's appointment order. Within a week, the paternity test results excluded Ralph as Ada's father, and an order disestablishing paternity was entered. Despite the issue being moot, the Supreme Court granted OPA's petition for review to clarify the appointment of counsel in this context. The primary issue for review reduced to whether a putative father’s parentage could be judicially established by “sufficient evidence” presented to the superior court — or must be established by scientific, genetic testing — to allow appointment of public agency counsel to the putative father in a CINA proceeding. The Court concluded that a judicial determination of paternity did not necessarily need underlying scientific, genetic testing in this context, and affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Office of Public Advocacy v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Daniel Tewksbury and Bobbie Young were previously married and were the parents of two minor children, Lane and Emma. They divorced in May 2006, and Daniel was ordered to pay child support. Daniel stopped making child-support payments in 2008. Bobbie later married Gerald Young, Jr. Gerald filed a petition to adopt Lane and Emma. In the adoption, Daniel’s parental rights were terminated. As of the termination of his parental rights, Daniel owed Bobbie $34,759 for child support. On April 5, 2015, Daniel died in an automobile accident. The accident occurred while Daniel was in the course and scope of his employment with Air Masters Mechanical, Inc. Bobbie then filed a petition with the Workers’ Compensation Commission on behalf of Lane and Emma, claiming that the children were entitled to Daniel’s workers’ compensation death-benefit proceeds and sought the payment of the $34,759 in outstanding child support. The Workers’ Compensation Commission Administrative Judge (AJ) determined that the child-support lien of $34,759 was valid and payable under Section 71-3-129. Air Masters and Associated General Contractors filed a petition for review with the Commission. The Commission concluded that Lane and Emma were not entitled to Daniel’s death benefits because they were not his statutory dependents under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-25 (Supp. 2019). The Commission reversed the AJ’s order and dismissed Bobbie’s petition. On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed the Commission’s decision, concluding the child-support lien was valid. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, finding Section 71-3-129 did not authorize a lien on death benefits payable directly to the deceased employee’s statutory dependents. Accordingly, the child-support lien did not apply to Daniel’s death benefits. Further, because Daniel had no statutory dependents, there were simply no benefits to which the lien can attach in this case. As a result, the Commission properly dismissed the claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission was reinstated and affirmed. View "Young v. Air Masters Mechanical Inc." on Justia Law