Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Under Ind. Code 31-14-7-1(1), a husband is presumed to be a child’s biological father; both spouses are listed as parents on the birth certificate and the child is deemed to be born in wedlock. There is no similar presumption with respect to a same-sex couple. The district court issued an injunction requiring Indiana to treat children born into female-female marriages as having two female parents, who must be listed on the birth certificate. Because Indiana lists only two parents on a birth certificate, this prevents the state from treating as a parent the man who provided the sperm but requires that one spouse, who provided neither sperm nor egg, be identified as a parent. The court reasoned that Indiana lists a husband as a biological parent (when a child is born during marriage) even if he did not provide sperm, and must treat a wife as a parent even if she did not provide an egg. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the Supreme Court’s 2017 holding, Pavan v. Smith, that same-sex and opposite-sex couples must have the same rights with respect to the identification of children’s parentage on birth certificates. Indiana’s statutory presumption violates the Constitution. The court rejected the state’s arguments that the statutory presumption is rebuttable. View "Henderson v. Box" on Justia Law

Parents appeal the termination of their parental rights to son C.L.S. C.L.S. was born in February 2018. During mother’s last trimester of pregnancy, hospital staff reported to the Department for Children and Families (DCF) that mother had repeatedly tested positive for illicit unprescribed substances. She missed numerous prenatal and medication-assisted-treatment appointments during her pregnancy. She declined inpatient treatment or a referral to a substance-abuse clinic. Parents were unmarried but lived together prior to C.L.S.’s birth. At birth, C.L.S. weighed less than five pounds, had an underdeveloped esophagus, and was in withdrawal from having illegal drugs in his system. He initially required a feeding tube. Mother tested positive for numerous unprescribed illegal drugs. DCF took C.L.S into custody on an emergency basis on the day he was born and filed a petition alleging that C.L.S. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). A temporary care hearing began the following day. The parents denied that C.L.S. was CHINS, sought a conditional order giving custody to father, and requested a contested temporary care hearing. The court continued custody with DCF but permitted parents to have unsupervised contact with C.L.S. while he remained in the hospital. C.L.S. was subsequently discharged to a foster home and father filed a motion requesting parent-child contact and unsupervised visitation. In September 2018, after a contested hearing, the court issued a disposition order continuing DCF custody and adopted a case plan calling for concurrent goals of reunification with either parent or adoption. Neither party appealed the disposition order. In January 2019, the State filed petitions to terminate mother’s and father’s parental rights. On appeal, neither parent challenged the court’s findings or conclusions in the termination order. Rather, they asserted the court committed various errors at the temporary care hearings that required reversal of the merits determination and subsequent disposition orders. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed termination. View "In re C.L.S." on Justia Law

Mother Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court’s termination of her parental rights to her minor son, A.V. The magistrate court concluded that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother and John Doe (“Father”) neglected A.V. and that termination was in A.V.’s best interests (Father’s termination was the subject of a separate appeal (Dkt. No. 47200)). A.V. went into foster care in November 2017, when he was approximately two-and-a-half years old. The child was malnourished; health care providers testified the child was four to six months developmentally delayed. November 2017 was his second trip to foster care; social workers found A.V. weighed less than he had in his first trip a year before, "the size and weight of a twelve-month-old." In response to a question about why she thought A.V. was losing weight in the time period before he was placed into care in November of 2017, Mother testified that she was dealing with a very big loss—the death of her mother by suicide—and unfortunately she let it get in the way of her life and the lives of her children. She did not ask for help because she did not want people feeling sorry for her. However, after A.V. was placed in foster care, she realized that all of this could have been avoided if she had just reached out for help. A Department social worker developed a case plan for Mother and Father. Both parents were present at the case plan meeting in which the case plans were designed. The magistrate court determined, however, by clear and convincing evidence the Department had established statutory grounds for termination under Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b), neglect through failure to complete a case plan, and under section 16-1602(31), neglect through conduct or omission of the parents. The magistrate court also determined that termination was in A.V.’s best interests. A final judgment and a decree were entered, terminating both Mother’s and Father’s parental relationship with A.V. Mother’s main argument on appeal was that the magistrate court erred in terminating her parental rights because her disabilities prevented her from completing her case plan. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court’s decree terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "DHW v. Jane Doe" on Justia Law

Father John Doe appealed a magistrate court's judgment granting the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s (“the Department”) petition to terminate his parental rights to his son, A.V. The magistrate court concluded the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Father and Jane Doe (“Mother”) neglected A.V. and that termination was in A.V.’s best interests (Mother’s termination was the subject of a separate appeal (Dkt. No. 47190)). Father’s main argument on appeal was that the magistrate court erred in terminating his parental rights because it was not in A.V.’s best interests to be separated from his siblings. A.V., the child at issue in this case, went into foster care in November 2017, when he was approximately two-and-a-half years old. The child was malnourished; health care providers testified the child was four to six months developmentally delayed. November 2017 was his second trip to foster care; social workers found A.V. weighed less than he had in his first trip a year before, "the size and weight of a twelve-month-old." Father testified that he was aware that A.V. was malnourished and not developing as he should have been while he was in Father’s care, and that he did not obtain services to help A.V. with walking and talking. However, Father did not realize that A.V. had lost weight when he came back into their care. One Department social worker testified that Father feels that it is his responsibility to work and provide financially for the family, and it is Mother’s responsibility to ensure the children are getting their medical and emotional needs met and to feed and care for them during the day. She further testified that she had talked with Father about his observing A.V. being underweight or not gaining weight, and Father said that he told Mother she needed to take care of it. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the magistrate court did not err in concluding termination was in A.V.'s best interests, even though termination would result in A.V. being separated from his siblings. The Court determined it was not error for the magistrate court finding Father was also responsible for A.V.'s neglect. Accordingly, the magistrate court was affirmed. View "DHW v. John Doe" on Justia Law

Father John Doe appealed a magistrate court's termination of his parental rights to his minor children “B.L.S.” and “A.C.S.” On Christmas Eve, 2017, the Department received a referral when A.C.S. was born prematurely. Mother’s amniotic fluid had ruptured prematurely due to drug use. Tests confirmed that A.C.S. was prenatally exposed to methamphetamine. Shortly after her birth, A.C.S. was life-flighted to Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane, Washington for treatment. Mother explained that she and Father had been in an on-and-off relationship for the past 20 years. At the time of the meeting, Mother and Father lived together in a camper on his family’s farm near Kendrick, Idaho. Mother disclosed that she actively used methamphetamine and had used methamphetamine while pregnant with A.C.S. She also explained that she and Father used methamphetamine together in their camper, sometimes with their children present. Mother described frequent incidents of domestic violence that occurred in the home: when the couple fought, it could become violent, where they would yell and throw appliances and other objects at each other. After an adjudicatory hearing where Father and Mother again stipulated to jurisdiction and custody, the Department worked with the parents to develop a case plan. At a review hearing in October 2018, the Department requested an early permanency hearing on the grounds that both parents had made little progress on their case plans. Agreeing that the parents had made very little progress up to that point, the magistrate court moved the permanency hearing up from December 2018, to November 26, 2018. At the permanency hearing, the magistrate court approved a permanency plan that sought termination of parental rights and relative adoption with the foster parents as the primary goal for each child. The Idaho Supreme Court determined Father failed to preserve his argument that Idaho Code section 16-1622(2)(g)(i) caused the magistrate court to violate his right to due process by moving the date of the permanency hearing from December to November. Further, the Supreme Court determined the magistrate court's decision to termination Father's parental rights was supported by substantial, competent evidence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to B.L.S. and A.C.S. View "DHW v. John Doe" on Justia Law

Mother Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court’s termination of her parental rights to her minor children “B.L.S.”, “X.V.S.”, and “A.C.S.” Mother’s amniotic fluid had ruptured prematurely due to drug use. Tests confirmed that A.C.S. was prenatally exposed to methamphetamine. Shortly after her birth, A.C.S. was life-flighted to Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane, Washington for treatment. Mother explained that she and Father had been in an on-and-off relationship for the past 20 years. At the time of the meeting, Mother and Father lived together in a camper on his family’s farm near Kendrick, Idaho. Mother disclosed that she actively used methamphetamine and had used methamphetamine while pregnant with A.C.S. She also explained that she and Father used methamphetamine together in their camper, sometimes with their children present. Mother described frequent incidents of domestic violence that occurred in the home: when the couple fought, it could become violent, where they would yell and throw appliances and other objects at each other. After an adjudicatory hearing where Father and Mother again stipulated to jurisdiction and custody, the Department worked with the parents to develop a case plan. At a review hearing in October 2018, the Department requested an early permanency hearing on the grounds that both parents had made little progress on their case plans. Agreeing that the parents had made very little progress up to that point, the magistrate court moved the permanency hearing up from December 2018, to November 26, 2018. At the permanency hearing, the magistrate court approved a permanency plan that sought termination of parental rights and relative adoption with the foster parents as the primary goal for each child. Mother argued on appeal that the magistrate court abused its discretion by holding the permanency hearing 11 months after the children were placed in the Department's custody, and that the decision to terminate was not supported by substantial, competent evidence. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed termination of parental rights. View "DHW v. Jane Doe" on Justia Law

Raymond Dapo was born in 1990. OCS took custody of him ten years later and, in April 2000, placed him in Taun Lucas’s foster home. Lucas and her husband David legally adopted Dapo in May 2002. According to Dapo, Lucas began sexually abusing him shortly thereafter; Lucas, however, alleged that she was sexually abused by Dapo, and Dapo, then 11 years old, was arrested and charged with two counts of first-degree sexual assault. The charges were eventually dropped, and Dapo was returned to the custody of the State as a dependent child. When he was 24 years old (in 2015), Dapo filed a complaint against Lucas, alleging that she had sexually abused him while he was a minor. In September 2015, Lucas filed a third-party claim against OCS for apportionment of fault, contending that OCS “had a duty to protect” Dapo and “negligently failed to protect” him. The superior court granted OCS’s motion to dismiss the apportionment claim, holding that it was barred by the ten-year statute of repose, AS 09.10.055(a). Dapo appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court held that the statute of repose applied to the apportionment claim and was not unconstitutional as applied. However, the Court determined there were issues of fact regarding the applicability of two exceptions to the statute of repose: claims for gross negligence and claims for breaches of fiduciary duty. Therefore the superior court’s order was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Dapo v. Alaska, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

After falling into arrears on his court-ordered child support obligation, the North Dakota suspended Joshua Rose's drivers license. In November 2018, Rose entered into a child support payment plan with the State which lifted his drivers license suspension. The payment plan required Rose to make a $1,000 down payment and pay $836 per month for his current child support obligation and $167.20 per month for his arrears. Rose stopped paying his child support obligation after December 31, 2018. Following Rose’s failure to comply with the payment plan, the State resuspended his drivers license. Rose requested a hearing in the district court and asked to appear telephonically to contest the license suspension. The court denied the motion on May 17, 2019, reasoning Rose “has failed to show any statutory, or procedural, basis for granting his requests.” The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court erred, reversed and remanded for a hearing as required by N.D.C.C. 50-09-08.6. View "North Dakota v. Rose" on Justia Law

Mother of the minor, J.R., appealed a juvenile court’s September 11, 2018, order selecting guardianship as the permanent plan and terminating dependency jurisdiction. She also appealed the court’s January 13, 2017, visitation order. The minor first came to the attention of the Department in 2016, when it was reported that mother had relapsed into the use of alcohol and was driving under the influence of alcohol with the 12-year-old minor in the car. The maternal grandmother and maternal step-grandfather reported the minor had been living with them for the previous two weeks, at mother’s request, due to mother’s relapse. The Department filed a dependency petition pursuant to Family Code section 300(b), alleging mother’s failure to protect the minor due to her ongoing and untreated substance abuse problem. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the dependency petition, adjudged the minor a dependent, and removed him from mother’s care. Mother was reportedly noncompliant with her substance abuse services. According to the report, the minor felt safe living with the maternal grandparents and wished to continue living with them despite mother’s desire for him to be returned to her custody. The visitation schedule called for twice weekly observed visits. Mother and the minor visited three times in January 2017. Subsequent visits were changed to supervised status due to mother’s agitation and argumentative behavior toward the visitation supervisor and her attempts to separate herself and the minor from the visitation supervisor during visits. She was ultimately dismissed from drug dependency court after failing to attend three compliance hearings. Finding no reversible error with respect to the two orders subject to this appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed them. View "In re J.R." on Justia Law

San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) removed K.T. (K. or child) from his mother when he was about nine months old. At that time, a nurse noticed that he had an enlarged head. He was placed with distant relatives, Mr. and Ms. B., who were already caring for his older half-brother. Further testing showed that K. had a subdural hematoma. Meanwhile, the B.’s began refusing to communicate with K.’s social worker or her “friends” in the same office, claiming that she had discriminated against them and insulted them. CFS detained K., placed him in a special health care needs foster home, and filed a petition to remove K from the B.'s custody. The B.'s in turn, filed a "changed circumstances" petition for return of the child. The trial court denied the B.'s petition, finding they had not show they were qualified as a special health care needs foster home. It then granted CFS' petition, finding that communication between the B.'s and CFS has broken down. The B.'s appealed; CFS contended the B.’s lacked standing to appeal the trial court's orders, citing In re Miguel E., 120 Cal.App.4th 521 (2004). The Court of Appeal agreed with Miguel E. that, in general, a person from whom a child has been removed under Welfare & Institutions Code section 387 lacked standing to challenge the removal. However, when that person is a relative, the Court disagreed with Miguel E., because under Welfare & Institutions Code section 361.3, a relative has standing to appeal from a refusal to place a child with him or her (an argument that Miguel E. did not consider). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal rejected the B.'s contentions of error and affirmed the trial court's orders. View "In re K.T." on Justia Law