Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, DHS removed R.M, C.M., and E.M., then eight (8) years and six (6) months, six (6) years and ten (10) months, and four (4) years and ten (10) months old respectively, from Mother's custody. The questions this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review were whether: (1) the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) provided reasonable efforts to reunite Mother with Children; (2) the State presented clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of parental rights; and (3) Mother's trial counsel provided effective assistance. The Court answered all questions in the affirmative, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "In the Matter of C.M." on Justia Law

Mother appealed a superior court order that adjudicated her son, B.C., a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). She challenged: (1) the court’s admission of evidence of father’s out-of-court statements; (2) the court’s reliance on findings from a prior CHINS determination; and (3) the sufficiency of the evidence, especially given that B.C. was in the custody of the Department for Children and Families (DCF) when the State filed the petition. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the family division erred by admitting evidence of father’s out-of-court statements, and that without that testimony, and in light of the court’s findings with respect to other evidence, the remaining evidence would be insufficient to support a CHINS determination. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order. View "In re B.C." on Justia Law

The superior court terminated a father’s parental rights to his son, finding that the child was in need of aid because of abandonment, neglect, and the father’s incarceration and that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) had satisfied its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify parent and child. The father appealed, arguing these findings were unsupported by the evidence. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the father: the record showed he initiated efforts to visit the child, who was already in OCS custody, as soon as he learned of his possible paternity; that during the father’s subsequent incarceration he had visitation as often as OCS was able to provide it; and that OCS never created a case plan to direct the father’s efforts toward reunification. The Supreme Court concluded it was clear error to find that the child was in need of aid and that OCS made reasonable efforts toward reunification, and reversed the termination decision. View "Duke S. v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Willis S. Sheldon, individually as the father of Dezirae Sheldon, and as administrator of the Estate of Dezirae Sheldon, appealed the grant of summary judgment to defendant Nicholas Ruggiero, an administrative reviewer with the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF). Plaintiffs argued that defendant negligently failed to report an allegation that Dezirae’s stepfather Dennis Duby abused Dezirae, eventually leading to Dezirae’s murder at Duby’s hands. Plaintiffs presented alternative theories for defendant’s liability under: (1) Vermont’s mandated-reporter statute, which they argued created a private right of action; (2) common-law negligence; or (3) negligent undertaking. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that even if the mandated-reporter statute creates a private right of action, or alternatively, even if defendant had a common-law duty to report suspected abuse, plaintiffs’ negligent-undertaking claim failed because defendant acted reasonably and prudently in his role as a DCF administrative reviewer. In addition, the Court concluded that defendant never undertook DCF’s statutory obligation to investigate all potential sources of Dezirae’s injuries. View "Sheldon v. Ruggiero" on Justia Law

Former foster children brought a case against the Department of Social and Health Service (DSHS) alleging negligence in failing to protect them from the tortious or criminal acts of their foster (and later, adoptive) parents. At the close of evidence, the trial court granted the Department's CR 50 motion and dismissed the children's claims of negligence concerning the preadoption-foster care period. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding DSHS owed them a common law duty to protect dependent foster children from foreseeable harm based on the special relationship between DSHS and such children. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning, and remanded for trial on the children's preadoption claims. View "H.B.H. v. Washington" on Justia Law

The parents of O.D., B.D., and G.D. appealed a circuit court order terminating their parental rights over their children, on the ground that they failed to correct the conditions leading to a finding of neglect. They argued the circuit court violated their due process rights by terminating their parental rights without requiring the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) to file new abuse or neglect petitions against them after the court issued an ex parte order removing the children from their home during ongoing neglect proceedings and by failing to appoint counsel for them during the neglect proceedings. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re O.D." on Justia Law

A certified class of minor children in the Permanent Managing Conservatorship (PMC) of DFPS filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking injunctive relief and alleging that Texas' maintenance of its foster care system exposes them to a serious risk of abuse, neglect, and harm to their physical and psychological well-being. The district court granted plaintiffs a permanent injunction requiring sweeping changes to the state's foster care system.The Fifth Circuit held that facts in the record adequately supported the finding that a policy or practice of maintaining overburdened caseworkers directly causes all PMC children to be exposed to a serious risk of physical and psychological harm; the district court correctly found that the State was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the Licensed Foster Care (LFC) subclass as a result of its insufficient monitoring and oversight, and that these deficiencies were a direct cause of the constitutional harm; the district court erred in concluding that inadequate placement array causes constitutionally cognizable harm to the LFC subclass and that the State was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm; and to the extent that the lack of awake-night supervision may have sustained a constitutional claim under the circumstances, the remaining policies and their effects did not cause foster group homes (FGH) children an amplified risk of harm sufficient to overcome the threshold hurdle.The court also held that Rule 23-specific arguments were waived. While the district court entered an expansive injunction mandating dozens of specific remedial measures and it was entitled to grant plaintiffs injunctive relief, the court held that the injunction was significantly overbroad. Accordingly, the court vacated the injunction and remanded with instructions to remove the remedial provisions related to placement array and FGHs, and to strike provisions that were not necessary to achieve constitutional compliance. View "M.D. v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant, C.T. (Mother), appealed the dependency court’s dispositional judgment granting Mother reunification services in her absence, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5. Mother claimed that her whereabouts were unknown on the date of the dispositional hearing for purposes of subdivision (b)(1) of section 361.5, thus entitling her to set a six-month hearing rather than a selection and implementation hearing. If the court denied reunification services under section 361.5(b)(1) and if the whereabouts of the parent become known within the first six months, the court may then order reunification services. As a result, a parent could potentially gain six more months to reunify with the child up to the maximum 12-month period of reunification services from the date of entry into the dependency system. Relevant here, 361.5(b)(1) was found not applicable and reunification services were ordered in Mother's absence. Mother contended the dependency court abused its discretion by commencing reunification services rather than withholding services. The Court of Appeal reduced Mother's argument to one in which she sought to use this bypass provision (361.5 (b)(1)) as a sword by arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by granting her reunification services instead of denying them under section 361.5 (b)(1). Plaintiff-respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), argued Mother’s contention lacked merit. Finding that the dependency court did not misconstrue 361.5(b)(1) or act contrary to its intent, the Court of Appeal affirmed its judgment. View "In re Molly T." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant, S.A. (Mother), appealed the termination of her parental rights to N.G., a boy born in 2005. She argued the juvenile court erroneously failed to ensure that plaintiff-respondent, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), fully investigated N.G.’s paternal lineal ancestry and gave adequate notices of the proceedings to all federally recognized Cherokee tribes and to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed Mother’s claim had merit and conditionally reversed the judgment. The Court also concluded that DPSS had to be ordered to further investigate N.G.’s paternal lineal ancestry, and include any newly discovered information concerning N.G.’s paternal lineal ancestry in the ICWA notices to all federally recognized Cherokee tribes, the BIA, and all previously noticed tribes. DPSS was also ordered to inquire whether N.G. may have maternal lineal ancestry and, if so, send additional ICWA notices, as appropriate. View "In re N.G." on Justia Law

Nineteen-year-old M.W. was a nonminor dependent of the court until it terminated dependency jurisdiction over him in August 2017. One of the acceptable living arrangements for nonminor dependents was a “‘[s]upervised independent living placement’” (SILP). The court terminated dependency jurisdiction over M.W. because he had moved in with a former foster mother, and the court believed a former caregiver’s home could not qualify as a SILP. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred: "Nothing in the law disqualifies a former caregiver’s home as a SILP. Even the document on which plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), relied for its argument—a form developed by the California Department of Social Services—does not disqualify a former caregiver’s home." The Court determined the error was prejudicial to M.W. and therefore reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider whether to retain or terminate dependency jurisdiction. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law