Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the magistrate court in an expedited appeal regarding the termination of John Doe (2017-32)'s parental rights. John Doe is the father of minor children KB and AB (the “Children”). The Children entered the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s (“IDHW”) custody in December 2014 after the Twin Falls Police declared them to be in imminent danger. The Children were in their mother’s (“Mother”) care when the police arrested her for possession of a controlled substance. Law enforcement described the condition of Mother’s home at this time as “filthy, cluttered, and containing numerous safety hazards, including raw sewage being present in the basement.” An Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) case plan, filed January 2015, included number of enumerated tasks for both Doe and Mother to complete in order for them to reunite with the Children. The case plan sought to provide Doe and Mother a framework to address “stable housing, sanitary living conditions, the need to obtain controlled substance abuse treatment, to remain clean/sober, and [to] stay out of jail.” Mother relapsed within weeks of a December 2016 order and was arrested for felony possession, kicked out of Drug Court, and went to prison. IDHW sought to terminate Doe and Mother’s parental rights. Doe had not completed his required drug treatment regimen by a first trial, he became more actively involved in his treatment plan by the time of a second trial. Doe showed other encouraging signs between the first and second trial as well, including significant progress on his case plan. However, the magistrate court noted that, despite progress, Doe still had not completed his case plan nor reunified with his children in the intervening period between the first and second trial. The court issued a Memorandum Decision granting termination of Doe and Mother’s parental rights on October 2, 2017, and entered a corresponding judgment ten days later on October 12, 2017. Mother did not appeal, but Doe timely filed his notice of appeal. The Supreme Court found the magistrate court’s December 2016 order stating that termination was not in the Children’s best interest was irreconcilable with IDHW’s first official recommendation following that order that termination “remains” in the Children’s best interest. The magistrate court’s October 2017 decision following the second trial highlighted Doe’s failure to reunify with the Children as a substantial factor in his ultimate decision to terminate. The magistrate court’s procedural error in not entering judgment for Doe and dismissing the petition upon finding that termination was not in the Children’s best interest affected Doe’s fundamental rights in this case. View "Dept. of Health & Welfare v. John Doe (2017-32)" on Justia Law

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S.K. was born with methamphetamine in his system and, after defendant-appellant, R.B. (mother), absconded with him, he was hospitalized with toxic levels of oxycodone in his system. The juvenile court removed S.K. from mother based on her untreated substance abuse. On appeal, mother challenged the court’s finding that the social worker exercised due diligence in conducting an investigation “to identify, locate, and notify” S.K.’s relatives of his removal. In April 2017, DPSS filed a petition alleging that (1) S.K. tested positive for methamphetamine and opiates at birth, and approximately a month later, he suffered a seizure and had high levels of oxycodone in his system, (2) mother had an extensive and untreated history of abusing controlled substances, (3) father’s whereabouts were unknown and he had failed to provide for S.K., and (4) mother failed to cooperate with preplacement preventative services. Department of Public Social Services attempted to locate all persons identified by mother, and the trial court found "based upon the limited information we have gathered from the mother thus far, will make a finding that [DPSS] is actively working towards relative assessments if there are any available. The duty is ongoing. It does not end simply because we had a hearing denying services to one side or offering services or other [sic]. [DPSS] must continue to do so.” Mother argued the trial court abused its discretion in finding DPSS exercised due diligence in trying to locate relatives for placement of S.K. The Court of Appeal disagreed: "Mother’s own conduct held back the investigation." Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the child's removal. View "In re S.K." on Justia Law

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S.K. was born with methamphetamine in his system and, after defendant-appellant, R.B. (mother), absconded with him, he was hospitalized with toxic levels of oxycodone in his system. The juvenile court removed S.K. from mother based on her untreated substance abuse. On appeal, mother challenged the court’s finding that the social worker exercised due diligence in conducting an investigation “to identify, locate, and notify” S.K.’s relatives of his removal. In April 2017, DPSS filed a petition alleging that (1) S.K. tested positive for methamphetamine and opiates at birth, and approximately a month later, he suffered a seizure and had high levels of oxycodone in his system, (2) mother had an extensive and untreated history of abusing controlled substances, (3) father’s whereabouts were unknown and he had failed to provide for S.K., and (4) mother failed to cooperate with preplacement preventative services. Department of Public Social Services attempted to locate all persons identified by mother, and the trial court found "based upon the limited information we have gathered from the mother thus far, will make a finding that [DPSS] is actively working towards relative assessments if there are any available. The duty is ongoing. It does not end simply because we had a hearing denying services to one side or offering services or other [sic]. [DPSS] must continue to do so.” Mother argued the trial court abused its discretion in finding DPSS exercised due diligence in trying to locate relatives for placement of S.K. The Court of Appeal disagreed: "Mother’s own conduct held back the investigation." Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the child's removal. View "In re S.K." on Justia Law

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At issue for the Vermont Supreme Court’s review was a determination of whether the evidence and findings supported the trial court’s conclusion that a child with significant mental-health issues was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) because she was “without or beyond the control of . . . her parent, guardian, or custodian,” or “CHINS-C.” After review, the Court concluded that a child with significant mental illness who cannot be safely cared for by a parent in the home is not CHINS-C if the parent has effectively exercised parental authority to ensure that the child’s care is properly managed in another setting. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s merits determination that M.L. was a child in need of supervision. View "In re M.L." on Justia Law

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At issue for the Vermont Supreme Court’s review was a determination of whether the evidence and findings supported the trial court’s conclusion that a child with significant mental-health issues was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) because she was “without or beyond the control of . . . her parent, guardian, or custodian,” or “CHINS-C.” After review, the Court concluded that a child with significant mental illness who cannot be safely cared for by a parent in the home is not CHINS-C if the parent has effectively exercised parental authority to ensure that the child’s care is properly managed in another setting. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s merits determination that M.L. was a child in need of supervision. View "In re M.L." on Justia Law

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The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) sought to challenge a circuit court order closing a child protection case. In November 2014, DCYF filed a petition for neglect under RSA chapter 169-C against the respondent-mother alleging that she neglected her child by engaging in drug use and exposing the child to domestic violence in the home. The child was found to be neglected; in January 2015, the trial court held a dispositional hearing and issued orders requiring, among other things, that the mother: attend and meaningfully participate in substance abuse and/or mental health counseling; attend and meaningfully participate in visits with the child; follow the terms of her release from incarceration and remain free from incarceration; and obtain and maintain a home free from untreated substance abuse, mental health issues, and/or domestic violence. At a three-month review hearing in April, the mother was found to be in “partial compliance.” At a six-month review hearing in August, the mother failed to appear and was found to be “not in compliance.” At a permanency hearing in December, the mother was again found to be “not in compliance,” at which time DCYF recommended and the court ordered a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and that DCYF file a termination of parental rights petition under RSA chapter 170-C to enable adoption to occur. In October 2016, a hearing was held on DCYF’s petition for termination of parental rights, but the court denied it, finding DCYF did not present evidence of the mother’s failure to correct the conditions that led to the finding of neglect despite DCYF’s provision of reasonable efforts. In February, however, the court, sua sponte, issued an order concluding that “the New Hampshire legislature has determined that guardianship should be awarded for a child, pursuant to RSA 170-C:11, IV, when a termination proceeding fails, but the Court nonetheless believes that the child’s parental care requires substitution or supplementation.” The court found the language of the statute mandatory, and that “[n]o discretion is provided in this context, assuming that the Court finds a need for substitution or supplementation.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court held the circuit court erred as a matter of law in ruling that RSA 170-C:11, IV mandated closure of the child’s RSA chapter 169-C child protection case and guardianship with DHHS as the child’s permanency plan. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth & Families" on Justia Law

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The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) sought to challenge a circuit court order closing a child protection case. In November 2014, DCYF filed a petition for neglect under RSA chapter 169-C against the respondent-mother alleging that she neglected her child by engaging in drug use and exposing the child to domestic violence in the home. The child was found to be neglected; in January 2015, the trial court held a dispositional hearing and issued orders requiring, among other things, that the mother: attend and meaningfully participate in substance abuse and/or mental health counseling; attend and meaningfully participate in visits with the child; follow the terms of her release from incarceration and remain free from incarceration; and obtain and maintain a home free from untreated substance abuse, mental health issues, and/or domestic violence. At a three-month review hearing in April, the mother was found to be in “partial compliance.” At a six-month review hearing in August, the mother failed to appear and was found to be “not in compliance.” At a permanency hearing in December, the mother was again found to be “not in compliance,” at which time DCYF recommended and the court ordered a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and that DCYF file a termination of parental rights petition under RSA chapter 170-C to enable adoption to occur. In October 2016, a hearing was held on DCYF’s petition for termination of parental rights, but the court denied it, finding DCYF did not present evidence of the mother’s failure to correct the conditions that led to the finding of neglect despite DCYF’s provision of reasonable efforts. In February, however, the court, sua sponte, issued an order concluding that “the New Hampshire legislature has determined that guardianship should be awarded for a child, pursuant to RSA 170-C:11, IV, when a termination proceeding fails, but the Court nonetheless believes that the child’s parental care requires substitution or supplementation.” The court found the language of the statute mandatory, and that “[n]o discretion is provided in this context, assuming that the Court finds a need for substitution or supplementation.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court held the circuit court erred as a matter of law in ruling that RSA 170-C:11, IV mandated closure of the child’s RSA chapter 169-C child protection case and guardianship with DHHS as the child’s permanency plan. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth & Families" on Justia Law

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John Doe (2017-27) (“the father”) and Jane Doe (2017-27) (“the mother”) appealed magistrate court judgments terminating their parental rights to their daughters (“Z.W.” and “N.W.”). The magistrate court terminated the mother and father’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect, abuse, inability to discharge parental responsibilities, and chronic abuse and/or neglect, and also found termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother only challenged the termination of her parental rights as to N.W., while the father challenged the termination of his parental rights as to both of the children. The sole issue the father argued on appeal was that the magistrate court did not have substantial and competent evidence to find terminating his parental rights was in the best interest of both children. Finding no abuse of discretion in judgments against either parent, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court. View "Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. John & Jane Doe" on Justia Law

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Parents appealed a superior court’s order that found the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) had satisfied the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) requirements authorizing the removal of their daughter, an Indian child, from their custody. OCS took emergency custody of “Mary” and her older brother Claude in March 2014. It acted following a December 2013 report that Claude had been medivaced out of the family’s village due to alcohol poisoning and that his parents had been too intoxicated to accompany him, and a March 2014 report that Diego and Catharine were intoxicated and fighting in their home. OCS alleged in its emergency petition that the court should make child in need of aid (CINA) findings. At the custody hearing Diego and Catharine stipulated to probable cause that their children were in need of aid under AS 47.10.011, without admitting any of the facts alleged in the petition, and to temporary OCS custody pending an adjudication hearing. The superior court held a disposition hearing over two days in December and January. OCS argued for an order authorizing it to remove the children from their parents’ home; the parents urged the court to grant OCS only the authority to supervise the family. Because the Alaska Supreme Court found the trial court relied on information that was not in evidence to make the required ICWA removal findings, it vacated the order authorizing removal. View "Diego K. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

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The superior court dismissed a Child in Need of Aid (CINA) petition because it believed it no longer had jurisdiction over the case after the disposition order granting the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) custody of the child had expired. Before dismissing the CINA petition, the superior court entered removal findings based only on a motion filed by OCS. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded this was error because the removal order was not supported by sufficient evidence and did not comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Court determined jurisdiction over a CINA case was distinct from the grant of custody or supervision to OCS in a disposition order and that it derives from the child’s status as a child in need of aid. The Court reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services v. Michelle P" on Justia Law