Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The State filed a petition alleging that Mother had neglected her two children. Mother admitted to the allegations of the neglect petition and agreed to complete a Department of Family Services (DFS) case plan. The State eventually filed a petition to revoke the consent decree. The juvenile court found the children to be neglected children and ordered that DFS would have legal and physical custody of the children. This appeal concerned the juvenile court’s order changing the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court did not commit plain error when it did not make a determination prior to the hearing regarding the children’s attendance at the permanency hearing; (2) Mother was not denied due process of law when the permanency hearing was held without the children; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s decision to change the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. View "ST v. State" on Justia Law

Melissa was the biological mother of Santiago, the minor child at issue in this case. Santiago was in the care of Maria from his birth until he was three years old. At that time, the Commissioner of Children and Families filed a motion for an order of temporary custody of Santiago on the basis of neglect. The trial court adjudicated Santiago neglected on the basis of abandonment by his biological parents and ordered him committed to the custody of the Commissioner. Thereafter, the Department of Children and Families filed a motion to terminate Melissa’s parental rights. Maria filed an amended motion to intervene as of right and permissively. The trial court denied the motion to intervene. Maria appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that Maria failed to plead a colorable claim of intervention as of right, and therefore, the trial court’s denial of her motion to intervene as of right was not a final judgment for purposes of this appeal. View "In re Santiago G." on Justia Law

Jane Doe (Mother) appeals the Bonneville County magistrate court’s termination of her parental rights to her two minor children, K.J.M. and K.M.M. (Children). The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) became involved in this case in November 2012, when it learned Mother and her boyfriend, who was also K.J.M.’s father, were blowing marijuana smoke in K.R.C.’s and K.J.M.’s faces. IDHW visited Mother’s home and noted it was "filthy with pills and drug paraphernalia scattered throughout the home[.]" Further investigation revealed that Mother’s boyfriend was physically abusing Mother. Mother’s boyfriend was arrested for felony strangulation of Mother. Apparently, Mother dropped the charges "due to him being the sole caretaker of the children and needing his help . . . ." In addition, Mother’s boyfriend was physically abusing K.R.C. and K.J.M. Mother reported she had witnessed her boyfriend "shake 4 month old [K.J.M.] . . . and hit[] 1 year old [K.R.C.], leaving bruises on her legs and bottom." Even so, Mother routinely placed them in the care of her boyfriend while she went to work, not "fully comprehend[ing] the danger she [was] placing her children in . . . ." IDHW petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to the children in late 2015. After an eight-day trial where over forty witnesses testified and close to 200 exhibits were admitted, the magistrate found termination appropriate on several bases, and entered a judgment of termination. Mother appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2016-32)" on Justia Law

In 2004, KGS was born to Father and Mother. In 2013, a neglect petition was filed against Mother and, after a hearing, KGS was placed in the legal custody of the Department of Family Services. The Department later filed a petition seeking termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. After a hearing, the district court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department presented sufficient evidence to support termination of Father’s parental rights; and (2) Father failed to show that he was denied due process in this case. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights to KGS" on Justia Law

Mother appealed a superior court decision denying her motion to set aside a previous order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, P.K. Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights in the same proceeding in which she entered into a postadoption-contact agreement with P.K.’s paternal grandmother, with whom the child had been placed by the Department for Children and Families (DCF). After DCF removed P.K. from the paternal grandmother’s home and placed her with another pre-adoptive foster family, mother moved to set aside the termination order. The trial court found that mother agreed, at the termination hearing, that "all parties agreed that it was in P.K.’s best interest that custody be transferred to DCF, without limitation as to adoption." Mother argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court erred by not employing available legal remedies to safeguard her ongoing relationship with P.K., which the court necessarily found to be in P.K.'s best interest in approving the postadoption-contact agreement. She contended that relief was available based on changed circumstances, in this case, the changed circumstances of the paternal grandmother's removal as a preadoptive parent. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s denial of mother’s motion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re P.K." on Justia Law

In 2013, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for B.B. (Father) and appointed H.B.'s (the minor) maternal aunt as legal guardian. In 2016, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a new petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and sought to terminate the guardianship. Father petitioned for extraordinary relief for review of the juvenile court's order terminating the guardianship and setting a section 366.26 hearing to determine a new permanent plan for H.B. He contended the Agency erred when it filed a new section 300 petition instead of a petition under section 388 to terminate the guardianship. He argued this error was prejudicial because it denied him the opportunity to seek reunification services at a 60-day review hearing following termination of the guardianship. The Court of Appeal concluded any error was harmless and denied Father's writ petition. View "B.B. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Respondent, mother of a minor child, appealed a circuit court order terminating her parental rights over the child. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the petition brought by the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), to terminate her parental rights while the direct appeal of her underlying criminal conviction was pending; and (2) finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the consequences of interpreting the termination statute to permit termination of the parent-child relationship while an appeal of the underlying judgment of conviction was pending was “troubling.” The lack of finality of a conviction that was being appealed raised the question whether DCYF satisfied the heightened requirement of proving the grounds for termination beyond a reasonable doubt. “Taking into consideration the interests of both parents and children that are at stake in termination proceedings, and the heightened standards we apply to such proceedings, we concluded that the legislature intended the terms ‘convicted’ and ‘conviction’ as used in RSA 169-C:24-a, I, and RSA 170-C:5, VI and VII, to mean an affirmance of guilt following a direct appeal as of right to [the Supreme Court] that raises an issue of innocence or guilt.” Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it terminated the mother’s parental rights while her direct appeal of the conviction that formed the statutory ground for the termination was pending. View "In re S.T." on Justia Law

All parties to this matter appealed a district court’s judgment. Orange County Social Services Department (SSA) sought to remove Z.G. and I.L. from their parents’ custody, C.G. (Mother) and H.L. (Father), after Children’s sibling, H.L., Jr. (Junior), died. The juvenile court found Parents’ “neglect” was a cause of Junior’s death. Despite the Parents essentially doing nothing to move the family towards reunification, the court found reunification was in the “best interest” of Children. The Parents appealed the jurisdiction and disposition orders and argued there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding their neglect was a cause of Junior’s death. Thus, they contend the court erred by concluding Children were subject to jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (f), and that Parents were subject to the reunification services bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4). The Children appealed the disposition order and contended there was insufficient evidence to support the finding reunification with Parents is in the best interest of Children. Hence, they argued, the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents under section 361.5, subdivision (c). SSA joined the Children’s argument. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding Parents’ neglect was a cause of Junior’s death, but there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding reunification with Parents was in Children’s best interest. Therefore the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents. Consequently, the Court reversed that portion of the disposition order, but affirmed the jurisdiction and disposition orders in all other respects. View "In re Z.G." on Justia Law

Seven entities under contract to provide residential services to youth in the state (collectively, Petitioners) filed a petition for writ of mandamus requiring the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services (DHHR), its Cabinet Secretary, the West Virginia Bureau for Medical Services (BMS), its Acting Commissioner, the Bureau for Children and Families (BCF), and its Commissioner (collectively, Respondents) to promulgate new or amended legislative rules prior to implementing changes to existing residential child care services policies. The Supreme Court granted a writ as moulded, finding it most appropriate to order this matter to be docketed in this circuit court as if it were an original proceeding in mandamus in that court. Remanded for further proceedings. View "State ex rel. Pressley Ridge v. W. Va. Department of Health & Human Resources" on Justia Law

This case concerned a Mother’s parental rights to her two children, M.S. and I.P. Jane Doe I and John Doe I (Respondents) were the paternal great-grandparents of M.S. and I.P. Respondents started caring for M.S. and I.P. in late 2010. At that time, Respondents witnessed Mother unable to hold steady employment and a permanent residence, which forced Mother to “leav[e] [M.S. and I.P.] with people all the time.” Additionally, Father (Respondents’ grandson) had recently moved out-of-state and largely severed contact with M.S. and I.P. Respondents became concerned about the well-being of M.S and I.P. Consequently, Respondents began hosting M.S. and I.P at their home, offered to let Mother move in with them, and regularly gave Mother money to buy groceries. For reasons unclear, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) took M.S. and I.P. from Mother in January 2011 and placed M.S. and I.P. with Respondents. Respondents were awarded guardianship in April 2011 and have since cared full-time for M.S. and I.P. Mother was awarded supervised visitation in 2012, but after missing approximately 14 visits, Mother’s supervised visitation rights were terminated in 2014. A year later, her parental rights to the children were terminated. She appealed the termination, contending that the magistrate court erred in concluding she: (1) abandoned M.S. and I.P. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship; and (2) neglected M.S. and I.P. by failing to provide proper parental care. Finding the decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Re: Termination of Parental Rights" on Justia Law