Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Section 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a), N.D.C.C., does not require both treating and non-treating physicians to testify at a medication hearing addressing a request to involuntarily treat with medication. M.G. appealed a district court's order authorizing involuntary treatment with prescribed medication. F.M.G. argued the district court erred in granting the request to treat her with prescribed medications, because the proper medical providers did not testify at the hearing under N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a), and the mandatory certification requirements under N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a)(2) were not met. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a) did not require both treating and non-treating physicians to testify at the hearing, and F.M.G. did not adequately raise the issue of whether the form used to request involuntary treatment with medication met the certification requirements under N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a)(2) before the district court. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Interest of F.M.G." on Justia Law

A party petitioning for termination of a guardianship must make a prima facie showing that the ward is no longer incapacitated, and if a prima facie case is established, the guardian has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the ward remains an incapacitated person. M.E. appealed a trial court order denying her petition to be restored to capacity, arguing the district court erred by denying her petition because no evidence showed she lacked the ability to care for herself and the court failed to order the least restrictive form of intervention. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding M.E. failed to establish a prima facie case for termination of the guardianship or for a less restrictive form of intervention. View "Guardianship & Conservatorship of M.E." on Justia Law

Yolanda Terry, a social worker employed by the Macon County Department of Human Resources ("DHR"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its order denying her motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity and to enter a summary judgment in her favor based on that defense. DHR assigned the case of Mildred Collins to Terry. Collins was living with her daughter Cherri Forrester (her legal guardian). Collins' grandson Ronald Person, suspected Forrester was abusing Collins. After an investigative visit, Terry concluded Collins was not in imminent danger, and no indication that legal intervention was needed to have Collins removed from Forrester's home. Collins died two days after the visit. The death certificate indicated the cause of death as "blunt force abdominal injuries with hematoma." The personal representative of Collins' estate sued Terry for failing to follow DHR policy that allowed Collins to remain in Forrester's custody. After review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the estate failed to meet its burden of presenting substantial evidence that Terry acted beyond her authority by failing to discharge her duties, i.e., investigating the report that Collins was being abused, pursuant to DHR policy and procedures, because Terry complied with DHR policy and procedures concerning unannounced investigative visits, the need for involving law enforcement, private interviews of clients, inspections of the affected areas of a client's body, and inspections of the entire home. The Court found Terry was entitled to State-agent immunity, and granted her writ application. View "Ex parte Terry" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-parents Gabrielle A. and Nicholas G., and John A. and Gregory A. (the children) appealed a judgment following the trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment by the County of Orange (the County) and several social workers. Plaintiffs’ claims related to the detention of the children for six months. Gabrielle went into early labor, and gave birth at Hoag Hospital to Gregory at 31 weeks. Three days later, Gabrielle was released, and she returned to her mother Barbara’s home. Gregory remained in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU). A few days later, Hoag employees filed a referral for an immediate response from the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA). Hoag staff reported to Villa that Gabrielle had appeared at Hoag with John and Barbara, wearing a trench coat with nothing on underneath, displaying “irrational and aggressive behavior,” including removing the trench coat and walking around unclothed. She had previously asked for Gregory to be placed back inside of her, and she asked a nurse to cut her ankles for blood letting. According to staff, she attempted to wheel Gregory’s isolette out of the NICU and became violent with them. Hospital employees informed Villa that Gabrielle had expressed thoughts of hurting her children and demonstrated paranoia. Gabrielle disputed this version of events, but did not dispute that she was placed on a hospital hold pending evaluation. The trial court found that exigent circumstances existed to detain the children without a warrant at Hoag, and that Nicholas’s arrival at Hoag after the children were detained did not alter matters; there was no evidence to show conduct by the social workers to establish a claim for deliberate indifference, or behavior that shocks the conscience; the social workers were entitled to immunity because there was no evidence of material false statements; numerous claims by the plaintiffs were barred by the parents’ pleas of no contest in dependency court. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the parents’ knowing and voluntary pleas of no contest to the jurisdictional allegations during dependency proceedings defeated their claims, and the social workers were entitled to immunity. “[E]ven if we were to disregard the no contest pleas and the relevant immunity doctrines, defendants correctly argue they met their burden to establish they were entitled to summary judgment on each cause of action, and plaintiffs failed to raise triable issues of material fact. Accordingly, we affirm.” View "Gabrielle A. v. Co. of Orange" on Justia Law

K.B. appealed a judgment terminating her parental rights to her two children, Jc.L. and Ja.L. K.B. contended the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because the court failed to comply with "the inquiry/notice requirements" of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). After review of the trial court record, the Court of appeals concluded the trial court properly determined that the Agency did not violate ICWA's inquiry and notice provisions. View "In re J.L." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition alleging that Mother had neglected her two children. Mother admitted to the allegations of the neglect petition and agreed to complete a Department of Family Services (DFS) case plan. The State eventually filed a petition to revoke the consent decree. The juvenile court found the children to be neglected children and ordered that DFS would have legal and physical custody of the children. This appeal concerned the juvenile court’s order changing the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court did not commit plain error when it did not make a determination prior to the hearing regarding the children’s attendance at the permanency hearing; (2) Mother was not denied due process of law when the permanency hearing was held without the children; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s decision to change the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. View "ST v. State" on Justia Law

Melissa was the biological mother of Santiago, the minor child at issue in this case. Santiago was in the care of Maria from his birth until he was three years old. At that time, the Commissioner of Children and Families filed a motion for an order of temporary custody of Santiago on the basis of neglect. The trial court adjudicated Santiago neglected on the basis of abandonment by his biological parents and ordered him committed to the custody of the Commissioner. Thereafter, the Department of Children and Families filed a motion to terminate Melissa’s parental rights. Maria filed an amended motion to intervene as of right and permissively. The trial court denied the motion to intervene. Maria appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that Maria failed to plead a colorable claim of intervention as of right, and therefore, the trial court’s denial of her motion to intervene as of right was not a final judgment for purposes of this appeal. View "In re Santiago G." on Justia Law

Jane Doe (Mother) appeals the Bonneville County magistrate court’s termination of her parental rights to her two minor children, K.J.M. and K.M.M. (Children). The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) became involved in this case in November 2012, when it learned Mother and her boyfriend, who was also K.J.M.’s father, were blowing marijuana smoke in K.R.C.’s and K.J.M.’s faces. IDHW visited Mother’s home and noted it was "filthy with pills and drug paraphernalia scattered throughout the home[.]" Further investigation revealed that Mother’s boyfriend was physically abusing Mother. Mother’s boyfriend was arrested for felony strangulation of Mother. Apparently, Mother dropped the charges "due to him being the sole caretaker of the children and needing his help . . . ." In addition, Mother’s boyfriend was physically abusing K.R.C. and K.J.M. Mother reported she had witnessed her boyfriend "shake 4 month old [K.J.M.] . . . and hit[] 1 year old [K.R.C.], leaving bruises on her legs and bottom." Even so, Mother routinely placed them in the care of her boyfriend while she went to work, not "fully comprehend[ing] the danger she [was] placing her children in . . . ." IDHW petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to the children in late 2015. After an eight-day trial where over forty witnesses testified and close to 200 exhibits were admitted, the magistrate found termination appropriate on several bases, and entered a judgment of termination. Mother appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2016-32)" on Justia Law

In 2004, KGS was born to Father and Mother. In 2013, a neglect petition was filed against Mother and, after a hearing, KGS was placed in the legal custody of the Department of Family Services. The Department later filed a petition seeking termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. After a hearing, the district court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department presented sufficient evidence to support termination of Father’s parental rights; and (2) Father failed to show that he was denied due process in this case. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights to KGS" on Justia Law

Mother appealed a superior court decision denying her motion to set aside a previous order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, P.K. Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights in the same proceeding in which she entered into a postadoption-contact agreement with P.K.’s paternal grandmother, with whom the child had been placed by the Department for Children and Families (DCF). After DCF removed P.K. from the paternal grandmother’s home and placed her with another pre-adoptive foster family, mother moved to set aside the termination order. The trial court found that mother agreed, at the termination hearing, that "all parties agreed that it was in P.K.’s best interest that custody be transferred to DCF, without limitation as to adoption." Mother argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court erred by not employing available legal remedies to safeguard her ongoing relationship with P.K., which the court necessarily found to be in P.K.'s best interest in approving the postadoption-contact agreement. She contended that relief was available based on changed circumstances, in this case, the changed circumstances of the paternal grandmother's removal as a preadoptive parent. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s denial of mother’s motion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re P.K." on Justia Law