Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for B.B. (Father) and appointed H.B.'s (the minor) maternal aunt as legal guardian. In 2016, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a new petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and sought to terminate the guardianship. Father petitioned for extraordinary relief for review of the juvenile court's order terminating the guardianship and setting a section 366.26 hearing to determine a new permanent plan for H.B. He contended the Agency erred when it filed a new section 300 petition instead of a petition under section 388 to terminate the guardianship. He argued this error was prejudicial because it denied him the opportunity to seek reunification services at a 60-day review hearing following termination of the guardianship. The Court of Appeal concluded any error was harmless and denied Father's writ petition. View "B.B. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Respondent, mother of a minor child, appealed a circuit court order terminating her parental rights over the child. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the petition brought by the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), to terminate her parental rights while the direct appeal of her underlying criminal conviction was pending; and (2) finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the consequences of interpreting the termination statute to permit termination of the parent-child relationship while an appeal of the underlying judgment of conviction was pending was “troubling.” The lack of finality of a conviction that was being appealed raised the question whether DCYF satisfied the heightened requirement of proving the grounds for termination beyond a reasonable doubt. “Taking into consideration the interests of both parents and children that are at stake in termination proceedings, and the heightened standards we apply to such proceedings, we concluded that the legislature intended the terms ‘convicted’ and ‘conviction’ as used in RSA 169-C:24-a, I, and RSA 170-C:5, VI and VII, to mean an affirmance of guilt following a direct appeal as of right to [the Supreme Court] that raises an issue of innocence or guilt.” Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it terminated the mother’s parental rights while her direct appeal of the conviction that formed the statutory ground for the termination was pending. View "In re S.T." on Justia Law

All parties to this matter appealed a district court’s judgment. Orange County Social Services Department (SSA) sought to remove Z.G. and I.L. from their parents’ custody, C.G. (Mother) and H.L. (Father), after Children’s sibling, H.L., Jr. (Junior), died. The juvenile court found Parents’ “neglect” was a cause of Junior’s death. Despite the Parents essentially doing nothing to move the family towards reunification, the court found reunification was in the “best interest” of Children. The Parents appealed the jurisdiction and disposition orders and argued there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding their neglect was a cause of Junior’s death. Thus, they contend the court erred by concluding Children were subject to jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (f), and that Parents were subject to the reunification services bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4). The Children appealed the disposition order and contended there was insufficient evidence to support the finding reunification with Parents is in the best interest of Children. Hence, they argued, the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents under section 361.5, subdivision (c). SSA joined the Children’s argument. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding Parents’ neglect was a cause of Junior’s death, but there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding reunification with Parents was in Children’s best interest. Therefore the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents. Consequently, the Court reversed that portion of the disposition order, but affirmed the jurisdiction and disposition orders in all other respects. View "In re Z.G." on Justia Law

Seven entities under contract to provide residential services to youth in the state (collectively, Petitioners) filed a petition for writ of mandamus requiring the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services (DHHR), its Cabinet Secretary, the West Virginia Bureau for Medical Services (BMS), its Acting Commissioner, the Bureau for Children and Families (BCF), and its Commissioner (collectively, Respondents) to promulgate new or amended legislative rules prior to implementing changes to existing residential child care services policies. The Supreme Court granted a writ as moulded, finding it most appropriate to order this matter to be docketed in this circuit court as if it were an original proceeding in mandamus in that court. Remanded for further proceedings. View "State ex rel. Pressley Ridge v. W. Va. Department of Health & Human Resources" on Justia Law

This case concerned a Mother’s parental rights to her two children, M.S. and I.P. Jane Doe I and John Doe I (Respondents) were the paternal great-grandparents of M.S. and I.P. Respondents started caring for M.S. and I.P. in late 2010. At that time, Respondents witnessed Mother unable to hold steady employment and a permanent residence, which forced Mother to “leav[e] [M.S. and I.P.] with people all the time.” Additionally, Father (Respondents’ grandson) had recently moved out-of-state and largely severed contact with M.S. and I.P. Respondents became concerned about the well-being of M.S and I.P. Consequently, Respondents began hosting M.S. and I.P at their home, offered to let Mother move in with them, and regularly gave Mother money to buy groceries. For reasons unclear, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) took M.S. and I.P. from Mother in January 2011 and placed M.S. and I.P. with Respondents. Respondents were awarded guardianship in April 2011 and have since cared full-time for M.S. and I.P. Mother was awarded supervised visitation in 2012, but after missing approximately 14 visits, Mother’s supervised visitation rights were terminated in 2014. A year later, her parental rights to the children were terminated. She appealed the termination, contending that the magistrate court erred in concluding she: (1) abandoned M.S. and I.P. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship; and (2) neglected M.S. and I.P. by failing to provide proper parental care. Finding the decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Re: Termination of Parental Rights" on Justia Law

In 2011, when the minor "T.M." was seven years old, his mother died and he began living with father. In 2015, an unknown reporter told social services the minor was afraid of his father, who had been punching him. The minor reported to the social worker father had been punching him “for the last five years,” including “whoopings” when the minor got into trouble and “for no reason.” The minor was aware father hits his stepmother. Father was convicted of a 2012 misdemeanor domestic violence incident against stepmother. He failed to complete the batterer’s treatment program that was part of his sentence. T.M. was ultimately placed with an uncle, and indicated he did not want to return home. At a contested jurisdiction hearing, father testified the minor was lying about being afraid or having been beaten. Apparently referencing father’s disruptive behavior during the hearing, the court noted he was unable “to control himself in any setting, let alone should the child be subject to his behaviors.” The court set review hearing dates and reiterated therapeutic visitation and conjoint counseling could begin after both father and the minor had an opportunity for individual counseling. Father appealed the juvenile court's order denying him visitation with T.M., arguing the trial court applied the wrong standard in finding that visits would be detrimental to T.M. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "In re T.M." on Justia Law

John Doe and Mother were the natural parents of J.M, an eight-year-old boy. John Doe and Mother had what was described as a sporadic and volatile relationship for approximately ten years. During that time, both Doe and Mother used methamphetamine and other controlled substances and committed acts of domestic violence upon each other. Mother had three children; however, this appeal dealt only with the termination of Doe’s parental rights to J.M. Doe was J.M.'s biological son. Doe appealed the magistrate court’s judgment terminating his parental rights to J.M. The magistrate court determined that it was in J.M.’s best interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights under Idaho Code sections 16-2005(1)(b) and (d) because there was clear and convincing evidence that Doe had neglected J.M pursuant to Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b), and/or Doe would be unable to discharge his parental responsibilities for a prolonged indeterminate period of time, which would be injurious to J.M’s health, morals, or well-being. After review of the record, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the decision to terminate parental rights and affirmed. View "Re: Termination of Parental Rights (father)" on Justia Law

A mother and her eight children were routinely severely abused by the father of the younger children while living in another state. The mother fled to Alaska with four of her daughters in 2013. After the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) obtained temporary custody of the children, the mother resisted OCS’s efforts to reunify the family and refused to participate in supervised visits with her daughters. She left Alaska in October 2014, maintaining only sporadic contact with her daughters, and she had not returned. The superior court terminated the mother’s and father’s parental rights with respect to two of the younger daughters, finding that: the children were in need of aid due to abandonment and other statutory factors; that the parents had not remedied the conduct that made the children in need of aid; that OCS had made reasonable efforts toward reunification; and that termination was in the daughters’ best interests. The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights but did not appeal the superior court’s finding that her children were initially in need of aid. Finding that the superior court's judgment was amply supported by the record, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Joy B. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

Mother and Father were the biological parents of D.M. D.M. was removed from Mother and Father and placed in the custody of the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (the DHHR). After a dispositional hearing, the circuit court entered a final order finding D.M. to be an abused and neglected child and terminating the parental rights of both Mother and Father. The court denied Mother’s and Father’s motions for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and ordered that custody of D.M. will remain with the DHHR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in determining that D.M. was an abused and neglected child and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse could be substantially corrected in the near future; and (2) properly determined that neither Mother nor Father established a likelihood of full participation in a post-adjudicatory improvement period. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law

Jane Doe (“Mother”) appealed a magistrate court’s judgment terminating her parental rights as to her children, D.M., A.M., J.S., A.L., and R.L. She argued that the State failed to produce clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that she could parent her children. Specifically, Mother argued that: (1) the last eight months of her participation in the case plan contravene a finding of neglect; and (2) the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“IDHW”) failed to help reunify the family. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "H&W v. Jane Doe (2016-11)" on Justia Law