Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Mother appealed the family court’s order adjudicating her children A.S. and K.S. as children in need of care or supervision (CHINS). On appeal, mother argued that the court erred in looking exclusively at the facts that existed at the time the CHINS petition was filed and ignoring evidence of the changed circumstances at the time of the evidentiary hearing. Finding no reversible error after review of this matter, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re A.S. and K.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jackie Watkins ("Watkins"), in her capacity as guardian of her adult daughter, Jane Doe, sought damages against defendants, Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital ("Griffin"), Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services ("ODMHSAS") and Dr. Asma Mudassir, in her official capacity as a resident physician and individually. Plaintiff's allegations against defendants all sounded in tort. Doe was admitted to Griffin at 4:00 a.m. on March 19, 2011, for treatment of suicidal thoughts. At the time of admission, she was nineteen years old, five months pregnant and lived at home with her mother. Later that day, Doe told Nicholas Schiavo, R.N. she was having abdominal pain and was concerned she was having contractions. Schiavo took Doe into an exam room with no other witness present to check her for bleeding. He remained present in the room and watched while Doe removed her clothing from the waist down. Schiavo did not provide Ms. Doe with a sheet, drape or a gown. He then put on a glove, and conducted a pelvic exam while she was undressed on the exam table. No female staff was present. They were alone in the exam room for nine minutes. Sometime later, Schiavo asked Doe if she was still involved in a relationship with the father or interested in dating other people. He also offered to perform another pelvic exam when she felt better. Doe filed a complaint with Griffin prior to her March 21, 2011, discharge, claiming she felt violated by Schiavo conducting a "pelvic exam with no doctor or female present then joked and asked if [Doe] wasn't with the father was [she] looking to see other people and touched [her] shoulder". It was undisputed that Watkins knew about the specific concerns raised in the complaint submitted to Griffin. Watkins followed up with Griffin about the status of this complaint. She was told a formal investigation of the incident was being conducted. Unsatisfied with the results of the investigation, Watkins filed suit. Griffin and ODMHSAS were state institutions and argued claims against these defendants were subject to the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act ("GTCA"). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter to address two issues: (1) whether the limitations period in the GTCA tolled when state employees allegedly withheld facts critical to the analysis of potential negligence claims; and (2) whether the record contained disputed facts material to this analysis? The Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative, holding that the resolution of these issues contained questions for the trier of fact, making summary adjudication improper. View "Watkins v. Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

U.S., the presumed father of five-year-old Robert S. and three-year-old Miguel S., and J.V., Robert’s biological father, each appealed the termination of their respective parental rights to the children. U.S. and J.V. argued insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply in this case, and further argued the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to comply with its obligations under ICWA. U.S. and J.V. also argued the juvenile court erred by finding the children adoptable and terminating parental rights while a child abuse report investigation was pending. The Court of Appeal granted SSA’s unopposed motion to take additional evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 909, which shows the juvenile court concluded the child abuse report was unfounded and the home study for Miguel and Robert’s prospective adoptive parents was completed and approved by SSA. That evidence mooted U.S.’s and J.V.’s challenges to the order terminating parental rights based on the pendency of the child abuse report investigation at the time of the permanency hearing. As for U.S.’s and J.V.’s ICWA challenges, although SSA was informed the children were both eligible to enroll in two different Chippewa tribes, the record did not show that any further efforts on the part of SSA or the juvenile court were made before SSA proposed that the court find that ICWA did not apply and the juvenile court made that finding. The Court of Appeal therefore reversed the order terminating parental rights for the limited purpose of allowing SSA to make active efforts necessary to secure tribal membership for the children, in compliance with rules 5.482(c) and 5.484(c)(2) of the California Rules of Court. View "In re Miguel S." on Justia Law

This case arose in early July 2012, when the State filed a CHINS (child in need of care and supervision) petition and request for an emergency care order based on concerns about mother’s ability to care for the minor I.B. The parents had a history with Department for Children and Families (DCF); several older children had been previously adjudicated CHINS based on mother’s continuing use of opiates, and their parental rights to the children were ultimately terminated. Father appealed a family court post-disposition order transferring custody of the minor I.B. to the Department for Children and Families (DCF). He argued the court violated his due process rights by: (1) transferring custody without making an express finding of changed circumstances; and (2) applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof. The Court of Appeal took these arguments into consideration, as well as whether the order at issue is a final appealable order. The Court concluded that it was, and affirmed. View "In re I.B." on Justia Law

A superior court ordered the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) to audit the child support and spousal support accounts of a divorced couple. The audits revealed that the agency had collected too much child support from the ex-wife and that the ex-husband owed her the overpayment as well as arrearages in spousal support. The ex-wife’s attorney filed an attorney’s lien on money in the ex-husband’s possession that the attorney claimed was owed to his client, then filed a separate action to enforce the lien. The ex-husband paid the money to CSSD, which turned it over to the ex-wife.The superior court granted summary judgment to the ex-husband on the attorney’s lien claim, concluding that the lien was invalid because the ex-husband was required to pay the money for the overpayment and the spousal support arrearages directly to CSSD. The attorney appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the attorney’s lien satisfied the requirements of the governing statute, AS 34.35.430(a)(3). Therefore the Court reversed the superior court’s summary judgment order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Law Offices of Steven D. Smith, P.C. v. Ceccarelli" on Justia Law

Jasmine was born in February 2009 to Clementine and Jermaine. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of the child after receiving reports that her mother’s conduct had placed her at risk of harm. OCS then investigated the child’s father, who lived out of state, and determined that the child would be safe in his care. At the temporary custody hearing, the superior court granted Jermaine's motion to dismiss the case and ordered the child released from OCS custody. Clementine appealed, arguing that the court should have granted her request for a continuance and held an evidentiary hearing on the father’s conduct and that the court erred by dismissing the petition without first making findings on the allegations it contained. The Supreme Court concluded that the mother had no right to an evidentiary hearing on the father’s conduct and that the superior court did not err by dismissing the petition when OCS declined to pursue it. View "Clementine F. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

E.G. was born in 2015 while his then 22-year-old mother, K.K. (mother), and 34-year-old father, R.G., were incarcerated. After his birth, mother arranged to have an unrelated female take E.G. home from the hospital. About two months later, Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) received a welfare report concerning the state of this woman’s home. SSA substantiated the report, and SSA took E.G. into protective custody. SSA placed E.G. with his maternal grandmother in June 2015, and he seemed to be doing well. Grandmother facilitated weekly supervised visits between E.G. and mother during her incarceration. Mother was happy about E.G.’s placement and expressed the desire to continue regular visitation. She took a parenting class, worked through a parenting handbook, and passed her GED while incarcerated. SSA challenged the juvenile court’s order granting reunification services to the mother. SSA argued the court should have bypassed reunification, citing Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). In rejecting SSA’s argument, the court decided drug treatment ordered as the result of a deferred entry of judgment was not "prior court-ordered treatment" for purposes of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). The Court of Appeal found "no principled difference between drug treatment ordered pursuant to Penal Code section 1000 (PC1000) and any other drug treatment ordered by a court during unrelated criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the Court reversed reversed the judgment and remanded the case for the juvenile court to reconsider its ruling in light of PC1000 as “court-ordered treatment” as contemplated by section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

Mother Jessica O. and Father Scott O. were the parents of D.O. Mother had three older children (Je.O., Y.O, and Jo.O., collectively, Siblings) by another father. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a petition after D.O.'s mentally ill father committed several acts of domestic violence and the mother failed to take protective action or otherwise cooperate with the Agency. After the Agency filed the petitions, the mother absconded with D.O. and Y.O. At the time of the detention hearing, their whereabouts were unknown, and neither parent attended the hearing. The court made a prima facie finding on the petition and ordered D.O. detained out of the parents' custody. One week later, police located D.O. with the father in a grocery store parking lot when the mother was caught shoplifting. D.O. and Y.O. were detained together in one foster home; their brothers were detained together in another. A recommendation was made, and the juvenile court terminated parental rights as to D.O. and ordered adoption as her permanent plan. On appeal, the mother and the Siblings contended the juvenile court erred when determining whether there would be substantial interference with D.O.'s sibling relationships by improperly considering the caregivers' assurances that sibling visits would continue, instead of by considering the factors specifically enumerated by statute. The Court of Appeal found the juvenile court cited five evidentiary bases supporting its conclusion. "Notably, the court did not rely solely on unsupported assurances from the caregivers that they would allow future visits; rather, the court cited the caregivers' proven track record of facilitating visits, and the paternal grandmother's commitment to the mother's new baby (who is related to D.O. but may not be related to the paternal grandmother). … And although the minor clearly enjoyed the time she spent with her half siblings, there was no evidence that the detriment she might suffer if visits ceased presented a sufficiently compelling reason to forgo the stability and permanence of adoption by caretakers to whom she was closely bonded." The Court of Appeal affirmed the termination of parental rights. View "In re D.O." on Justia Law

Timothy G. alleged he was abused by his stepfather repeatedly between 1997 and 2006. In 2006, Timothy reported the abuse to his mother. She took Timothy and his four siblings to a shelter, sought a protective order against the stepfather, and instituted divorce proceedings. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) then substantiated the report of harm, removed the children from their mother’s care, and placed them in foster care. In 2012, Timothy filed a complaint naming OCS and his stepfather as defendants. He sought compensatory damages from OCS, claiming that “[a]s a direct and proximate consequence of [OCS’s] breach of [its] dut[y] of care, [he] suffered physical injury, psychological and emotional injury and distress, psychological torment, torture and sexual abuse, pain and suffering, and resultant loss of earning capacity.” Timothy alleged that OCS had investigated at least ten reports of harm involving him and his siblings, but had taken no action. In response to OCS' motion to dismiss, Timothy G. asserted that the statute of limitations had been tolled on his claim because he was mentally incompetent following those years of abuse. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on this issue and concluded that Timothy had failed to prove that he was incompetent. On appeal, Timothy argued that the superior court should have ruled in his favor if he produced more than a scintilla of evidence to support his assertion. But the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court applied the proper burden of proof and the proper test for competency, and that the court did not clearly err in finding that Timothy did not prove his incompetence. View "Timothy G. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

In consolidated juvenile dependency cases, father appealed judgments changing the permanent plans for one of his children from reunification with a parent to guardianship and for another child from reunification to another planned permanent living arrangement. Father argued that his trial counsel was inadequate for failing to appear on his behalf at the hearing in which the juvenile court decided to change the permanent plans. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a parent could raise a claim of inadequate assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal from judgments changing the permanent plans for his children from reunification with a parent to permanent plans of guardianship and APPLA. After review, the Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative. The Court concluded: (1) the unchallenged rationale of "Oregon ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist" (796 P2d 1193 (1990)), was applicable to a direct appeal from judgments that make such changes in the permanent plans for children who were wards of the court in dependency cases; and (2) the legislature’s enactment, following the Supreme Court's decision in "Geist," of a statute that provided a juvenile court procedure for modifying or setting aside a dependency judgment while an appeal from the judgment was pending, did not obviate the need for a direct appeal remedy for father’s claim of inadequate assistance of counsel. View "Dept. of Human Services v. T. L." on Justia Law