Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Jasmine was born in February 2009 to Clementine and Jermaine. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of the child after receiving reports that her mother’s conduct had placed her at risk of harm. OCS then investigated the child’s father, who lived out of state, and determined that the child would be safe in his care. At the temporary custody hearing, the superior court granted Jermaine's motion to dismiss the case and ordered the child released from OCS custody. Clementine appealed, arguing that the court should have granted her request for a continuance and held an evidentiary hearing on the father’s conduct and that the court erred by dismissing the petition without first making findings on the allegations it contained. The Supreme Court concluded that the mother had no right to an evidentiary hearing on the father’s conduct and that the superior court did not err by dismissing the petition when OCS declined to pursue it. View "Clementine F. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

E.G. was born in 2015 while his then 22-year-old mother, K.K. (mother), and 34-year-old father, R.G., were incarcerated. After his birth, mother arranged to have an unrelated female take E.G. home from the hospital. About two months later, Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) received a welfare report concerning the state of this woman’s home. SSA substantiated the report, and SSA took E.G. into protective custody. SSA placed E.G. with his maternal grandmother in June 2015, and he seemed to be doing well. Grandmother facilitated weekly supervised visits between E.G. and mother during her incarceration. Mother was happy about E.G.’s placement and expressed the desire to continue regular visitation. She took a parenting class, worked through a parenting handbook, and passed her GED while incarcerated. SSA challenged the juvenile court’s order granting reunification services to the mother. SSA argued the court should have bypassed reunification, citing Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). In rejecting SSA’s argument, the court decided drug treatment ordered as the result of a deferred entry of judgment was not "prior court-ordered treatment" for purposes of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). The Court of Appeal found "no principled difference between drug treatment ordered pursuant to Penal Code section 1000 (PC1000) and any other drug treatment ordered by a court during unrelated criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the Court reversed reversed the judgment and remanded the case for the juvenile court to reconsider its ruling in light of PC1000 as “court-ordered treatment” as contemplated by section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

Mother Jessica O. and Father Scott O. were the parents of D.O. Mother had three older children (Je.O., Y.O, and Jo.O., collectively, Siblings) by another father. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a petition after D.O.'s mentally ill father committed several acts of domestic violence and the mother failed to take protective action or otherwise cooperate with the Agency. After the Agency filed the petitions, the mother absconded with D.O. and Y.O. At the time of the detention hearing, their whereabouts were unknown, and neither parent attended the hearing. The court made a prima facie finding on the petition and ordered D.O. detained out of the parents' custody. One week later, police located D.O. with the father in a grocery store parking lot when the mother was caught shoplifting. D.O. and Y.O. were detained together in one foster home; their brothers were detained together in another. A recommendation was made, and the juvenile court terminated parental rights as to D.O. and ordered adoption as her permanent plan. On appeal, the mother and the Siblings contended the juvenile court erred when determining whether there would be substantial interference with D.O.'s sibling relationships by improperly considering the caregivers' assurances that sibling visits would continue, instead of by considering the factors specifically enumerated by statute. The Court of Appeal found the juvenile court cited five evidentiary bases supporting its conclusion. "Notably, the court did not rely solely on unsupported assurances from the caregivers that they would allow future visits; rather, the court cited the caregivers' proven track record of facilitating visits, and the paternal grandmother's commitment to the mother's new baby (who is related to D.O. but may not be related to the paternal grandmother). … And although the minor clearly enjoyed the time she spent with her half siblings, there was no evidence that the detriment she might suffer if visits ceased presented a sufficiently compelling reason to forgo the stability and permanence of adoption by caretakers to whom she was closely bonded." The Court of Appeal affirmed the termination of parental rights. View "In re D.O." on Justia Law

Timothy G. alleged he was abused by his stepfather repeatedly between 1997 and 2006. In 2006, Timothy reported the abuse to his mother. She took Timothy and his four siblings to a shelter, sought a protective order against the stepfather, and instituted divorce proceedings. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) then substantiated the report of harm, removed the children from their mother’s care, and placed them in foster care. In 2012, Timothy filed a complaint naming OCS and his stepfather as defendants. He sought compensatory damages from OCS, claiming that “[a]s a direct and proximate consequence of [OCS’s] breach of [its] dut[y] of care, [he] suffered physical injury, psychological and emotional injury and distress, psychological torment, torture and sexual abuse, pain and suffering, and resultant loss of earning capacity.” Timothy alleged that OCS had investigated at least ten reports of harm involving him and his siblings, but had taken no action. In response to OCS' motion to dismiss, Timothy G. asserted that the statute of limitations had been tolled on his claim because he was mentally incompetent following those years of abuse. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on this issue and concluded that Timothy had failed to prove that he was incompetent. On appeal, Timothy argued that the superior court should have ruled in his favor if he produced more than a scintilla of evidence to support his assertion. But the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court applied the proper burden of proof and the proper test for competency, and that the court did not clearly err in finding that Timothy did not prove his incompetence. View "Timothy G. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

In consolidated juvenile dependency cases, father appealed judgments changing the permanent plans for one of his children from reunification with a parent to guardianship and for another child from reunification to another planned permanent living arrangement. Father argued that his trial counsel was inadequate for failing to appear on his behalf at the hearing in which the juvenile court decided to change the permanent plans. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a parent could raise a claim of inadequate assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal from judgments changing the permanent plans for his children from reunification with a parent to permanent plans of guardianship and APPLA. After review, the Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative. The Court concluded: (1) the unchallenged rationale of "Oregon ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist" (796 P2d 1193 (1990)), was applicable to a direct appeal from judgments that make such changes in the permanent plans for children who were wards of the court in dependency cases; and (2) the legislature’s enactment, following the Supreme Court's decision in "Geist," of a statute that provided a juvenile court procedure for modifying or setting aside a dependency judgment while an appeal from the judgment was pending, did not obviate the need for a direct appeal remedy for father’s claim of inadequate assistance of counsel. View "Dept. of Human Services v. T. L." on Justia Law

Pro se defendant Justin Gonyo appealed a family court order adjudicating nonparentage. The child at the center of this matter was born in 2011. Shortly thereafter, the child’s mother and defendant filed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Parentage (VAP) form with the Department of Health, Agency of Human Services. Both parties signed the form, which stated that they “voluntarily and without coercion, and of our own free will, hereby acknowledge that we are the biological parents of the child” and understand and accept “the legal rights and responsibilities that come with being a parent,” including rights to custody, visitation, and notice before the child may be adopted. The child’s birth certificate identified mother and defendant as the child’s parents. Mother and defendant separated in 2012. About a year later, in October 2013, the Office of Child Support (OCS) filed a Complaint for Support and Recovery of Debt, together with a “Motion for Genetic Testing Despite Parentage Presumption.” The motion alleged that, despite the presumption of parentage arising from the VAP, there were grounds to believe that defendant was not the biological father based on mother’s affidavit naming another individual as the biological father, and stating that she was already fourteen weeks pregnant when she and defendant got together. The following month, defendant filed a pro se pleading in which he opposed the motion for genetic testing and asked the court “to grant [him] a parentage order of the child.” Defendant acknowledged that he was not the child’s biological father and was aware of this when he signed the VAP, but claimed that there was “nothing wrong” with doing so, and that the time for rescinding it had expired. Defendant followed with a more formal motion to establish parentage in December 2013. In the meantime, the family court granted the motion for genetic testing, which took place in early January 2014. The test excluded defendant as the child’s biological father. Mother later filed a pro se motion to dismiss defendant’s parentage action, and OCS moved to set aside the VAP and to set the matter for a hearing. In February 2014, the family court issued a summary “order of non-parentage” based on the genetic test, dismissed defendant’s parentage action, and ordered the case closed. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that undisputed facts supported a motion to set aside the acknowledgment of paternity as a fraud on the court, and affirmed the judgment of nonparentage as to defendant on that basis. View "McGee v. Gonyo" on Justia Law

Mother Kimberly L. appealed a trial court's orders terminating her parental rights to Albert A. (A.A.) and Veronica A. (V.A.). Mother argued: (1) the juvenile court’s jurisdictional orders finding the children were dependents within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), were not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing; (3) the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying mother’s request to continue the permanency hearing to allow her time to file a petition under section 388 requesting additional reunification services; (4) the juvenile court’s orders finding the children were likely to be adopted were not supported by substantial evidence; and (5) the juvenile court erred by concluding legally sufficient notice was provided to relevant Indian tribes pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded mother waived her claim of error regarding the jurisdictional orders by not appealing the dispositions. Mother was absent from the continued jurisdictional hearing and was not entitled to notice of her right to appeal under California Rules of Court, rule 5.590(a). Because the Court concluded the juvenile court did not provide mother with timely and adequate notice of her right to challenge the orders setting a permanency hearing, as mandated by rule 5.590(b), mother did not waive her claim of error respecting the termination of reunification services. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by terminating reunification services or by denying a request to continue the permanency hearing because mother did not comply with her case plan and did not visit with the children. However, the Court agreed with mother that the juvenile court erred by not considering legal impediments to the children being adopted by their paternal grandmother when it found the children were likely to be adopted, and we agree with mother and CFS that the ICWA notice was inadequate. Therefore, the orders terminating parental rights was reversed and the case remanded for the juvenile court to consider legal impediments to the children being adopted, for CFS to provide new ICWA notice, and for the juvenile court to determine whether that notice was sufficient. View "In re Albert A." on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to two of her daughters. The superior court granted the petition. The mother appealed the superior court’s finding that OCS made active efforts to reunify the family, as required by state and federal law, as well as a few of the factual findings underlying this conclusion. Because the superior court did not clearly err in finding that OCS made active efforts by providing services geared toward reunification the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the termination decision. View "Denny M. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a married couple, filed an application with the Department of Children and Families for a license that would enable them to become foster and preadoptive parents. The Department denied the application because of Plaintiffs’ use of corporal punishment as a form of discipline in their home. A hearing officer affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed, alleging that the Department’s decision was inconsistent with its regulations, was arbitrary and capricious, and was not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiffs also argued that the Department’s decision impermissibly infringed on their right to the free exercise of their religion under the Federal and State Constitutions because physical discipline is an integral aspect of their Christian faith. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department’s decision to deny Plaintiffs’ application was supported by substantial evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious, and was based on a reasonable interpretation of its enabling legislation; and (2) the substantial burden that the Department’s decision imposed on Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religions beliefs was outweighed by the Department’s compelling interest in protecting the welfare of foster children. View "Magazu v. Dep’t of Children and Families" on Justia Law

Dustin R., who was born in 1992, has lived in a foster home since 1995. Guardianship was granted to the Department of Social Services. Dustin is medically fragile and has special needs. In 2010, Dustin began to seek the provision of services for himself after age twenty-one. In 2013, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) consented to co-commitment. The parties, however, continued to debate Dustin’s request that services continue after his twenty-first birthday after the guardianship terminates. The juvenile court ordered DHMH to continue to provide services to Dustin after the age of twenty-one. DHMH appealed. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the juvenile court’s order was not a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court’s order is appealable as an interlocutory order granting an injunction; (2) the juvenile court had jurisdiction and statutory authority to order DHMH to enter into a plan to obtain “life-sustaining services” for Dustin to continue after he reached age twenty-one; and (3) the juvenile court did not violate the separation of powers in the instant case. View "In re Adoption/Guardianship of Dustin R." on Justia Law