Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Rowan B., Sr.(father) and Risa F. were the divorced parents of three children: Agnes, Rowan Jr. (Junior), and Saul. After Rowan and Risa divorced, Rowan received custody of their three children as well as custody of Risa’s two older daughters, Aeryn and Reagan. In 2012 Aeryn reported to the police and the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) that she and Reagan had been physically and sexually abused by Rowan over an extended time period. Aeryn also expressed her concern that Rowan was sexually abusing Agnes. OCS filed an emergency custody petition and removed the minor children (Agnes, Junior, and Saul) in June 2012. The children were adjudicated children in need of aid based on findings that the father had sexually and physically abused his daughters. In a criminal proceeding the father was convicted on 29 counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree and one count of incest. The father sought a delay of the termination proceedings pending appeal of his criminal convictions, but the superior court denied this request. Rowan appealed the ultimate outcome: termination of his parental rights to his three biological children. He argued that the superior court abused its discretion by denying a continued. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the children’s interest in permanency weighed heavily against delaying the termination proceedings for years while the father pursues his criminal appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rowan B. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

This case centered on A.O., a minor who was 12 years old at the time of detention, and her mother, who suffered from bi-polar disorder and exhibited paranoid and aggressive tendencies. The court found jurisdiction over A.O. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) and removed her from mother’s care. At the six-month review hearing, the court found that returning A.O. to mother would be detrimental to A.O. and that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) had provided adequate reunification services. At the twelve-month review hearing, the court terminated reunification services and ordered that A.O. be placed in a Planned Permanent Living Arrangement. Mother appealed the orders from the six- and twelve-month review hearings, and, citing the court’s failure to advise her of her right to appeal after the disposition hearing, she also appealed the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed jurisdiction and disposition but reversed the court’s findings at the six- and twelve-month review hearings that DPSS had provided reasonable reunification services. View "In re A.O." on Justia Law

Six days after F.A. (F.) was born exposed to methamphetamine, she was placed with Mr. and Mrs. S., foster parents who hoped to adopt her. Unfortunately, when F. was almost seven weeks old, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) removed F. from the S.s’ care, mistakenly believing exigent circumstances required the removal, and immediately placed the baby with Mr. and Mrs. M., who were also foster parents who hoped to adopt her. When SSA realized its mistake and decided to re-place F. with the S.s, the M.s filed a grievance, which kept F. in the M.s’ home during the grievance process. The S.s and the M.s filed competing Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions. The court ordered SSA not to remove F. from the M.s’ home pending the court’s decision on the competing petitions, and granted visitation rights to the S.s. After many continuances, the court found both couples would be excellent adoptive parents, but granted the M.s’ petition and denied the S.s’ petition, finding the M.s had a “slight edge” because the M.s had an approved adoptive home study and because the baby had flourished under the M.s’ care for the last 100 days. On appeal, the S.s contended: (1) this appeal should have been treated as a writ petition; (2) SSA should have returned F. to the S.s before the M.s could file a grievance; (3) the court abused its discretion by granting so many continuances; (4) the court exceeded its authority by overriding SSA’s decision to return F. to the S.s, rather than reviewing SSA’s choice for an abuse of discretion; and (5) this case was not moot because it presented an issue of continuing public importance which is capable of repetition, yet evading review, and therefore the Court of Appeal should offer guidance to prevent future heartbreak to foster parents from whom a child is wrongly removed. After review, the Court of Appeal found no merit as to the S.s’ first four contentions, but concluded that what happened to the S.s was wrong, and potentially could have been prevented had regulations and policies been in place allowing the foster parents to promptly challenge the grounds for removal before SSA placed the child with another couple. The Court nevertheless concluded the court did not abuse its discretion under the difficult circumstances presented, and accordingly affirm the court’s orders. View "In re F.A." on Justia Law

Christine L. appealed a placement order in the juvenile dependency case of her minor children Liam L., M.L., and Angel L. The order placed the minors with their presumed father and noncustodial parent, J.L. Christine argued the evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that the minors' placement with J.L. would not be detrimental under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a). By its terms, and under the California Supreme Court's decision in "In re Zacharia D."(6 Cal.4th 435, (1993)), that statute applied only when the minor was first removed from the custodial parent, generally at the time of the disposition hearing. "Under the current statutory scheme, a noncustodial parent who requests placement or custody for the first time after disposition must file a modification petition under section 388 to make such a request. [. . .] given the underlying presumption in California's dependency scheme that a minor should be placed with a noncustodial parent, absent a finding of detriment, such a placement is inherently in the minors' best interests. A noncustodial parent under these circumstances who files a section 388 petition is therefore entitled to custody unless the party opposing placement establishes that placement with the noncustodial parent would be detrimental to the minors' safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being." The Court of Appeal concluded that J.L.'s failure to file a section 388 petition was harmless because the issue of placement with J.L. was before the court with the consent of all parties. The Court further concluded that the juvenile court's finding that the minors' placement with J.L. would not be detrimental was supported by substantial evidence. The Court therefore affirmed the juvenile court's placement order. View "In re Liam L." on Justia Law

"Adam" was born in early 2015 addicted to narcotics. Adam was eventually released to his parents, David Hunt and Carey Land. A few months later, Adam was found unconscious and unresponsive. He was transported to the hospital. The parents offered no explanation as to why Adam had been found unresponsive or unconscious. Though they were home when emergency personnel arrived, neither parent accompanied the child to the hospital. Due to the seriousness of the child's condition, he was transported to a trauma center. Medical personnel determined the child had sustained multiple trauma caused by "unexplained abusive trauma." In addition to multiple fractures, Adam's other diagnoses included chronic bilateral subdural hematomas, destruction of brain tissue, seizures, respiratory failure, malnourishment and splitting of the layers of the retina in his left eye. Emergency custody would ultimately be awarded to the Department of Family Services. This expedited proceeding was the parents' appeal of a Family Court decision granting the attorney guardian ad litem's motion to instruct Adam's medical providers to de-escalate intervention and place a do-not re-intubate order and a do-not-resuscitate order and a "comfort measures" order on Adam's medical chart. The appeal presented four issues for the Delaware Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to de-escalate medical care, a no re-intubate order and do not resuscitate order on the minor's chart; (2) whether the Family Court had authority to allow such orders when the parental rights have not been terminated; (3) whether the Family Court violated the parents' procedural due process rights by not providing the parents adequate notice and process prior to issuing the orders; and (4) were the parents' due process rights violated without receiving evidence from an independent medical expert. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Family Court's decision, and affirmed. View "Hunt v. DFS & Office of the Child Advocate" on Justia Law

This case involved "Diana" and her daughters(all "Indian children"): Natalie was born in 2008; Selah was born in 2009; Ava was born in 2010; and Drew was born in 2011. The children's father previously relinquished his parental rights. Diana has shown a pattern of drinking alcohol while pregnant, abstaining once she learns she is pregnant, and then resuming drinking after the child is born. She admitted at trial that she drank during three of her previous pregnancies. OCS has been involved with this family since 2009 because of the parents' behavior when they drank. According to family, "there [were] no two better people on this earth who could take care of those kids" when they were sober. But when they were drinking, they were not good parents. Diana became confrontational and bossy, the children went hungry, and their home was unstable. Natalie became the caregiver of her siblings; when she was four years old she made her younger sisters' bottles, changed their diapers, and dressed them. This caused Natalie to be a "worry wart," and the stress caused her "tummy issues" and exacerbated her eczema. The other children also had issues: Selah has severe separation anxiety, Ava's speech was delayed, and Drew had "the shakes." The children were adjudicated children in need of aid in March 2013. Following a trial in the summer of 2014, the trial court terminated Diana's parental rights to the children after finding them subject to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011(6), (9), and (10). Diana appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that OCS proved beyond a reasonable doubt that placing her children in her custody would likely put the children at risk of serious harm. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Diana P. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Srvcs" on Justia Law

A.M. was born in October 2011 to parents who admitted to their struggle with substance abuse. A.M. was taken into emergency DCF custody in June 2013. In its petition alleging that A.M. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS), DCF indicated that A.M. had been found in a motel room with parents in the presence of heroin and drug paraphernalia. The court issued a temporary-care order on June 4, 2013 transferring temporary legal custody of the child to DCF, and A.M. was placed with his maternal grandmother. A.M.'s Mother appealed the trial court’s disposition order continuing legal custody of the minor child A.M. with the Department for Children and Families (DCF). She argued that the court erred by failing to take evidence on whether the disposition plan should be amended to include reunification with A.M.’s maternal grandmother as a third concurrent goal. Mother contended that the court should not have taken judicial notice of a prior ruling concerning grandmother’s unsuitability to provide even temporary care for A.M. Based on these assertions, mother argued that the court’s order was unsupported by any findings. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

R.B. was born in September 2008; O.B. in December 2009; and K.C. in September 2011. In August 2012, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that the children were in need of care or supervision (CHINS) because they were without proper parental care. The court found it best to place the children with relatives if possible, and determined that the children's father's cousin Kristin and her wife Tammy Hall could take proper care of the children, at least in the short run, while work was done on a disposition plan. It was ultimately recommended that the children be placed for adoption, and the parental rights to both parents be terminated. The trial court found that Mother suffered from Munchausen’s disorder and Munchausen’s disorder by proxy. The court could not find that mother was likely to recover from these disorders at any particular time. It found no reasonable probability that mother could resume her parental duties within a reasonable period of time. Father was unwilling or unable to take over responsibility for the children’s medical care and appointments and ensure that recommendations and plans provided by DCF were implemented. As of the date of the TPR hearing, father continued to live with mother and had not developed the parenting and other skills needed to care for the children safely. It would be impossible, the court explained, for father to care for mother, protect the children, meet all of their needs, and support the family. Father was unemployed at the time of the hearing, although he was receiving some money for his work as a caretaker for mother. The parties received state benefits, which were barely sufficient to meet their financial needs. Finding no abuse of discretion in terminating the parents' rights to the three children, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination decision. View "In re R.B., O.B. and K.C." on Justia Law

The Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families (the “Department”) appealed a September 18, 2014 Family Court order finding that the Department failed to establish probable cause at a Preliminary Protective Hearing (“PPH”) to retain an infant in the Department's custody. The Department filed an emergency ex parte petition on September 12, 2014, alleging that A.F., a newborn infant, was dependent, neglected, or abused by Mother, John Tower, and Unknown Father. An investigative worker for the Department, testified that the Department received a hotline report on August 1, 2014, claiming Mother had given birth into a toilet and had appeared to the hotline reporter to be high on drugs, with glassy eyes and slurred speech. The worker contacted Mother at St. Francis Hospital, where Mother and child had been taken following the birth. A.F. was born with methadone and benzodiazepines in his system and remained in the hospital at the time of the PPH for opiate dependence treatment. After hearing all the evidence, the Family Court concluded in its September 18 order that the Department did not establish probable cause to believe that A.F. was dependent, neglected, or abused in the care of Mother and Tower. According to the Family Court, the Department failed to establish that any of the drugs Mother was taking were taken without a doctor's knowledge of her condition or in violation of her physicians' instructions. The court also credited Tower's account of the circumstances of A.F.'s birth over the report from the hotline. The court viewed the remainder of the Department's evidence as insufficient to justify removal of the child from the custody of his parents. The Department argued on appeal that the Family Court failed to apply the correct probable cause standard when it dismissed the Department's petition. The Supreme Court found no merit to the Department's argument and affirmed the Family Court. View "Dept. of Serv. Children Fam. v. Fowler" on Justia Law

D.B. was taken into protective custody in 2012 when he was seven years old. Mother N.B. appealed the juvenile court's order pertaining to the continued dependency of D.B. She argued that Welfare and Institutions Code section 364(c) required the juvenile court to terminate jurisdiction because the evidence established continued supervision was unnecessary to protect D.B. from risk of harm. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) agreed with Mother that the juvenile court should have terminated dependency jurisdiction but, unlike Mother, believed D.B.'s father, A.K., should have been granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, finding that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that the conditions justifying initial assumption of jurisdiction still existed. To the contrary, SSA took the position and proved those conditions no longer existed. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law