Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Bailey was convicted of federal prostitution charges in 2004. Minneapolis police officers took trial exhibits to a locked police storage facility, including $2,036 in cash, a wallet, and a cell phone. Years later Bailey moved for return of the property, but the government could not locate it. Bailey sought damages. The government agreed to pay Bailey $2,500 "by a check . . . made payable to Robert Bailey" to be mailed to the address of his lawyer. The Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services notified Bailey that he owed past due support of $45,956.48 and announced the state's "intent to collect this amount through the federal administrative offset process and by withholding . . . [tax refunds] or other federal or state payment(s)." The notice cited 31 U.S.C. 3716, indicating that "certain federal payments which might otherwise be paid to you will be intercepted for payment of current and past due support." It advised Bailey of his rights, such as having the debt redetermined. Bailey unsuccessfully moved to vacate his settlement agreement. He was advised that the $2,500 had been administratively offset against his child support obligation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed; the government did not breach Bailey's settlement agreement View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

At a routine doctor appointment for a hand injury, Y.N. ("Yvonne") learned that she was four months pregnant. During that four-month period, Yvonne had been taking Percocet for injuries caused in a car accident and became dependent on that medication. Hospital personnel advised her that she could not stop taking Percocet abruptly without endangering her pregnancy and recommended that she enter a methadone maintenance treatment program. Yvonne entered such a program four months later, a month before she gave birth. Her baby, P.A.C. ("Paul"), suffered methadone withdrawal symptoms at birth and remained hospitalized for about seven weeks. The Division of Youth and Family Services filed an abuse and neglect complaint against Yvonne based on her long-term drug use before and during her pregnancy, the harm caused to Paul from methadone withdrawal, and her failure to address acts of domestic violence committed against her. After a hearing, the family court entered a finding of abuse and neglect. The Appellate Division affirmed on the basis that Yvonne caused her child to suffer withdrawal symptoms from the methadone she took as part of a prescribed, bona fide medical treatment plan. The panel held her strictly liable for the harm suffered by Paul and gave no consideration to whether Yvonne acted unreasonably or failed to provide a minimum level of care for her newborn. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Division's reasoning and reversed: absent exceptional circumstances, a finding of abuse or neglect cannot be sustained based solely on a newborn's enduring methadone withdrawal following a mother's timely participation in a bona fide treatment program prescribed by a licensed healthcare professional to whom she has made full disclosure. The Appellate Division did not consider all of the requisite statutory elements in its analysis. The case was remanded for a determination of whether the finding of abuse or neglect could be sustained on any other ground articulated by the family court. View "New Jersey Div. of Child Protection & Perm. v. Y.N." on Justia Law

Mother and Father (“Parents”) were the parents of twin girls. Mother was a member of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (“Tribe”), Father was not a member of any tribe, and the children were either members of, or eligible to be members of, the Tribe. The Dinwiddie Department of Social Services (DDSS) filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (“J&DR court”) denied the petitions. The DDSS appealed. The Tribe and Parents sought to transfer the case to tribal court. The trial court held that good cause existed not to transfer the proceeding to tribal court and denied the motion to transfer. The court then terminated Parents’ parental rights. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the motion to transfer, vacated the award terminating Parents' parental rights, and remanded. In so doing, the court rejected the traditional “best interests of the child” test in favor of a more limited test involving a substantial risk of harm to a child arising from the transfer to a tribal court. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded in light of the standards articulated by the court of appeals in Thompson v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Family Servs.View "Dinwiddie Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Nunnally" on Justia Law

M.U. is the mother of D.H., born in 1998, and J.A.H., born in 2001. On September 6, 2013, M.U. sought assistance from Burleigh County Social Services due to concerns she was being stalked. Later the same day, a juvenile court officer issued a temporary custody order granting Morton County Social Services temporary custody of the children. At a shelter care hearing, a judicial referee found continued shelter care was necessary, as there was probable cause for deprivation. The State petitioned to obtain custody of the children, alleging the children were deprived. M.U., the mother, appealed the juvenile court order removing her children and placing them in the custody of Morton County Social Services. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court remanded this case with instructions that, within sixty days from the filing of this opinion, the juvenile court make expedited findings of fact to determine whether D.H. and J.A.H. were deprived.View "Interest of J.A.H." on Justia Law

John Doe was the biological father of T.C. Doe was a juvenile when T.C. was born. Doe paid Mother a total of $52.00 in child support, despite a court order requiring him to pay Mother child support of $253.00 per month. Doe owed approximately eight thousand dollars in unpaid child support. Doe never provided T.C. or Mother with any alternate form of support such as clothing, diapers, or food. During T.C.’s life, Doe was regularly incarcerated and had no contact with T.C. for months at a time; including a substantial period of time that the child protection proceedings were ongoing. Doe has been unable to maintain employment or a home and typically resides in the homes of various girlfriends. Doe was addicted to methamphetamine and, when not in custody, he used methamphetamine. Doe had an extensive criminal record and has been a defendant in more than forty criminal matters. A petition was filed under the Child Protective Act (CPA) asking a magistrate court to place T.C under the supervision of the Department. The same day, the magistrate court ordered the removal of T.C. on the basis that continuation in the home would be contrary to T.C.’s welfare. The magistrate court placed T.C. in the care of the Department of Child Services. Doe learned of the Department’s petition when his aunt informed him of the proceedings. His parental rights to T.C. were ultimately terminated on grounds that the trial court found Doe neglected T.C., and that it was in the child's best interests to have Doe's parental rights terminated. Doe appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order.View "Health & Welfare v. John Doe (13-29)" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to his daughter based on Father’s abandonment of the child. After a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to his daughter, finding clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the child and that termination was in the child’s best interests. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Father intentionally abandoned the child due to Father’s lack of absolute certainty concerning paternity and his incarceration while awaiting trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) clear and convincing evidence supported the finding of abandonment because Father was initially involved in his daughter’s life but later demonstrated no interest in her or in exercising parental responsibilities; and (2) the evidence clearly and convincingly established that termination of Father’s parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests.View "In re Interest of Gabriella H." on Justia Law

Jamie and Anna They stopped using drugs when they realized Anna was pregnant with their son Ian, but after the birth they went back to abusing drugs and alcohol, with periods of sobriety. Although Ian lived with his parents during his early years, by the time he was four, he and his two non-party siblings were living with Ian’s grandmother in Oklahoma while his parents lived elsewhere. According to Jamie, Ian was exposed to domestic violence by Jamie’s brother during that time. Jamie, Anna, and Ian moved to Alaska in 2004. Once in Alaska, Jamie and Anna had three more children. The couple’s relationship was chaotic and physically abusive, and apparently they were separated at the time of trial. All four children have special needs.The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) sought termination of Jamie’s, but not Anna’s, parental rights to Ian. In closing argument, Jamie asserted that termination of his parental rights was not in Ian’s best interests because OCS had not identified any permanent placement. But the superior court did not specifically address this issue in its findings when it ordered the termination of Jamie’s parental rights. Jamie appealed, arguing that the termination should be vacated because the decision does not clearly state that termination of Jamie’s parental rights was for purposes of freeing Ian for adoption or other permanent placement. The Supreme Court concluded that given the facts and circumstances of this case, the superior court did not err when it found that termination was in Ian’s best interests.View "Jamie H. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Respondents, Larry M. and Sonia M. appealed a Circuit Court order terminating their parental rights over their children, A.M. and C.M. On appeal, Larry argued that the trial court erred by: (1) proceeding with the termination case based on an underlying neglect case in which he was improperly denied counsel; and (2) finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Sonia argues that the court erred because: (3) the trial judge did not recuse himself despite the fact that he presided over the underlying neglect case in the circuit court. Both respondents argue that the court erred by: (4) failing to afford them twelve months from the superior court's de novo finding of neglect within which to correct the conditions which led to the finding of neglect; and (5) finding that the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), made reasonable efforts to assist them in correcting the conditions that led to the neglect finding. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re C.M." on Justia Law

After the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) learned that JM, a minor, had several unexcused absences from school, a deputy count attorney filed a petition alleging that JM was a neglected child because Mother had failed to provide adequate education for JM’s well being. Following a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order of neglect. Mother appealed, claiming that the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition because the district court was required to give her notice and counseling before the petition was filed, and she did not receive such notice or counseling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compulsory attendance statutes upon which Mother relied, which require school districts to give parents notice or counseling based on students’ unexcused absences, do not apply when a juvenile petition is filed by a prosecuting attorney under the Child Protection Act on the basis of a complaint from DFS alleging neglect.View "In re JM" on Justia Law

This case began in July 2008 when the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) assumed custody of four-month-old "Dawn" from her parents. Dawn was found to be a child in need of aid (CINA). Dawn's parents were Native Alaskans and thus the protections and requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied. Native Village of Tununak (the Tribe) intervened in Dawn's CINA case and submitted a list of potential placement options for Dawn, including Dawn's maternal grandmother, Elise, who lived in the village. Throughout much of the case, the parents and Tribe agreed there was good cause not to place Dawn with an ICWA preferred placement, and Dawn was eventually placed with the Smiths, non-Native foster parents who live in Anchorage. The superior court terminated Dawn's parents' parental rights at a September 2011 trial, making Dawn eligible for adoption. The Tribe asserted that, given the termination of parental rights, there was no longer good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and objected to Dawn's continued placement in Anchorage. In November the Smiths filed a petition to adopt Dawn. At no point in the case did Elise file an adoption petition in the superior court. The superior court conducted a placement hearing following the Tribe's objection to placement with the Smiths. Following testimony by a number of witnesses, including Elise, the court found that there was continued good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences and again approved Dawn's placement with the Smiths. The court then granted the Smiths' adoption petition in March 2012. Dawn was almost four years old, and had lived with the Smiths for almost two and a half years. In separate appeals, the Tribe appealed both the superior court's order finding that there was good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and the adoption order. The Supreme Court then issued an order staying the adoption appeal while it considered the adoptive placement appeal. In 2013, the Court issued a decision in the first appeal that examined Dawn's adoptive placement with the Smiths. The Court reversed the superior court's finding of good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences. Four days after the Alaska Court issued its opinion in the adoptive placement appeal ("Tununak I"), the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl" (Baby Girl). There, the Supreme Court held that ICWA "section 1915(a)'s [placement] preferences are inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. This is because there simply is no 'preference' to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under section 1915(a) has come forward." The Alaska Court concluded that the decision in "Baby Girl" applied directly to the adoptive placement case on remand and to this adoption appeal. "We discern no material factual differences between the Baby Girl case and this case, so we are unable to distinguish the holding in Baby Girl. Because the Supreme Court's holding in Baby Girl is clear and not qualified in any material way, and because it is undisputed that Elise did not 'formally [seek] to adopt' Dawn in the superior court, we conclude that, as in Baby Girl, 'there simply is no 'preference' to apply[,] [as] no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward[,]' and therefore ICWA . . .preferences are inapplicable." The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's order granting the Smiths' petition to adopt Dawn and vacated its remand order in "Tununak I" requiring the superior court to conduct further adoptive placement proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law