Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

S.W.S. appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to T.R.C. S.W.S. is the father and C.M.C. is the mother of T.R.C., who was born in 2011. The child was taken into custody of Traill County Social Services in late 2012, based on abandonment by C.M.C. A reunification plan was developed for each parent for reunification with the child. Close to a year later, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of S.W.S. and C.M.C. C.M.C. appeared at an initial hearing and advised the court that she wished to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to the child. A termination hearing was held and various witnesses testified, including the father, the father's wife, and the child's social worker. There was evidence presented about conditions in the father's home, the father's employment, and the father's chemical dependency. After the hearing, the juvenile court ordered termination of both parents' parental rights. The court found the child was deprived and the deprivation was likely to continue. The court also found it was contrary to T.R.C.'s welfare to continue to live with his parents, reasonable efforts were made to prevent the need for removing the child and to make reunification possible, and termination was in T.R.C.'s best interests. After review of S.W.S's argument on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the trial court's findings did not adequately explain the basis for its decision.View "Interest of T.R.C." on Justia Law

The superior court adjudicated Candace as a child in need of aid because she had been sexually abused by her adoptive brother. The superior court nonetheless ordered that Candace be returned to her parents' home, holding that the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS), had failed to present "qualified expert testimony" as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to support a finding that she would likely suffer serious physical or emotional harm in her parents' custody. After review of the case, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the superior court's failure to accept OCS's proposed expert witnesses as qualified was error, and therefore vacated the order placing Candace with her parents. View "In the Matter of Candance A." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee William Sloan, a citizen of the United States, and plaintiff-appellant Elaine Murphy, a citizen of Ireland, were married in California in 2000. They lived together in Mill Valley, California, and had a daughter, E.S., in 2005. In October 2009, the couple separated, with Sloan moving to a different bedroom in their house. In 2010, Murphy and Sloan enrolled E.S. in a private California preschool for the next fall. But plans changed in the spring after Murphy proposed moving to Ireland so that she (Murphy) could go back to school. Murphy and Sloan discussed the move to Ireland as a "trial period," and Sloan wrote to both the private preschool and the public school district to inform them of E.S.'s move and the temporary nature of the plan. Visitation between the parents worked for several years until Murphy took E.S. with her on a trip to visit Murphy's boyfriend in Asia. Sloan lost contact with Murphy during that time. On a regularly scheduled visit to E.S. in Ireland, Sloan grew concerned about E.S.'s absences from school when Murphy announced she would again be going to Asia with Murphy's boyfriend. Sloan took E.S. with him to the United States when he left Ireland. Murphy and Sloan agreed that Sloan told Murphy that he did not intend to return E.S. to Ireland, to which Murphy responded that if E.S. was going to live in the United States, Murphy would return to Mill Valley. Murphy took no action to compel E.S.'s return to Ireland for nearly three months, until September 2013, when she filed the action that led to this appeal. E.S. began third grade in Mill Valley in August 2013. In October 2013, the Superior Court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage, but left pending the state court action for purposes of issuing further orders regarding child custody, child support and spousal support. Murphy brought suit under the Hague Convention to compel E.S.'s return to Ireland, contending that Ireland was E.S.'s "habitual residence." The district court denied Murphy's petition after considering Murphy and Sloan's sworn declarations, testimony and documents presented at an evidentiary hearing and depositions of Murphy's boyfriend and an expert witness. It determined that the spring of 2010 was the last time that Sloan and Murphy had a shared, settled intent, which was that E.S. reside in California. The court concluded that "E.S. was, at the time of the alleged wrongful retention, and now remains, a habitual resident of the United States." The issue this case presented for the Ninth Circuit's review explored the significance of a "trial period" of residence on a child's "habitual residence" under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Murphy sought the return of E.S. to Ireland. After review, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court that E.S. was a habitual resident of the United States; "E.S.'s attachments to Ireland 'did not shift the locus of [E.S.'s] development[,] and . . . any acclimatization did not overcome the absence of a shared settled intention by the parents to abandon the United States as a habitual residence.'" View "Murphy v. Sloan" on Justia Law

A.S. (mother) and P.B. (father) appealed orders asserting dependency jurisdiction over their children, N.S. and J.S., and removing the children from their custody. In a partially published opinion, the Court of Appeal held that there was sufficient evidence to support the removal of the children from both parents based on domestic violence. Furthermore, the Court held that, even though the father’s 1997 Kentucky conviction for second degree sexual abuse was a misdemeanor under Kentucky law, it constituted a "violent felony" for purposes of the denial of reunification services under California law. The Court modified the jurisdictional findings, and affirmed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the trial court. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

After his father left Jayden with his paternal grandmother with an eye infection and no provision for support, the Department of Health and Human Services petitioned the juvenile court alleging that Jayden comes within the jurisdiction of the court because of the father’s untreated substance abuse problem and history of domestic violence, and the mother’s prostitution and substance abuse. The court sustained the petition and placed Jayden with his paternal aunt and uncle. Reunification services were offered to both parents, but father failed to use the offered services, and mother only partially engaged in services. After several months of services both parents expressed a desire to waive reunification services. Their reunification services were terminated at the six-month review hearing based on the Department’s recommendation. Neither parent appealed this decision. When Jayden was placed with his paternal aunt and uncle, they expressed an interest in adopting Jayden. Several months later, based on an assessment that the paternal aunt and uncle were meeting Jayden’s needs and aiding him in his speech and motor skills development, a permanency plan suggested that Jayden remain with them to be adopted. However, on the day of the scheduled selection and implementation hearing, Jayden’s counsel requested ex parte that the court change its order requiring a noticed petition to move Jayden from his placement with his paternal aunt and uncle because the Department had developed concerns about the caregivers and no longer believed the placement was in Jayden’s best interest. The court continued the selection and implementation hearing to investigate other potential relative placements to ensure that the Department could locate a suitable home for Jayden. At the continued selection and implementation hearing, counsel for the Department said Jayden was going to be placed in an adoptive home that same day. Jayden’s counsel was supportive of terminating parental rights and of removing him from his aunt and uncle’s home. Father’s counsel entered “general objections,” and specifically objected to the finding that the child was likely to be adopted and the recommendation that father’s parental rights be terminated. Mother’s counsel objected to the termination of mother’s parental rights and to the court’s finding of Jayden’s adoptability. On appeal, the parents contended: (1) the Department and the juvenile court erroneously removed Jayden from his prospective adoptive parents without complying with the statutory procedures; (2) there was insufficient evidence Jayden was adoptable; and (3) the juvenile court violated parents’ rights to effective assistance of counsel and a fair hearing and abrogated its duty to make an independent decision when it denied mother’s request for a continuance of the hearing in light of the Department’s failure to provide an updated assessment of potential adoptive placements to the court. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the parents' allegations and affirmed the juvenile court’s orders. View "In re Jayden M." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Virginia Code sections 20-45.2 and 20-45.3; the Marshall/Newman Amendment, Va. Const. art. I, 15-A; and any other Virginia law that bars same sex-marriage or prohibits the State's recognition of otherwise-lawful same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions (collectively, the Virginia Marriage Laws). Plaintiffs argued that these laws violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and enjoined Virginia from enforcing the laws. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that each of the plaintiffs had standing as to at least one defendant, and the court declined to view Baker v. Nelson as binding precedent. The court concluded that strict scrutiny analysis applied in this case where the Virginia Marriage Laws impede the right to marry by preventing same-sex couples from marrying and nullifying the legal import of their out-of-state marriages. Proponents contend that five interests support the laws: federalism-based interests, history and tradition, protecting the institution of marriage, encouraging responsible procreation, and promoting the optimal childrearing environment. The court concluded, however, that these interests are not compelling interests that justify the Virginia Marriage Laws. Therefore, all of the proponents' justifications for the laws fail and the laws cannot survive strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Virginia Marriage Laws violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that they prevent same-sex couples from marrying and prohibit Virginia from recognizing same-sex couples' lawful out-of-state marriages. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bostic v. Schaefer" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the family court’s adjudication of her daughter B.A. as a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). She argued that the court erred in combining the merits of the CHINS proceeding with the disposition of a concurrent delinquency proceeding. Mother contended that the court lacked statutory authority to combine the hearings and that striking the CHINS adjudication is necessary to cure the error. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.A." on Justia Law

The Minto Tribal Court terminated the parental rights of Edward Parks and Bessie Stearman to their daughter S.P. At the termination hearing, the attorney for Parks and Stearman was not permitted to present oral argument to the tribal court. Parks did not file an appeal with the Minto Court of Appeals and instead brought suit against S.P.'s foster parents, the Simmondses, in the state superior court in an attempt to regain custody of S.P. The Simmondses moved to dismiss Parks's state lawsuit on the basis that the tribal court judgment terminating parental rights was entitled to full faith and credit under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that full faith and credit should not be afforded because the tribal court had denied Parks minimum due process by prohibiting his attorney from presenting oral argument on his objections to tribal court jurisdiction based on his status as a non-tribal member. Although the superior court recognized that oral argument is not a per se requirement of minimum due process, the superior court concluded that the denial of oral argument in this case deprived Parks of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Parks did not receive sufficient notice that his attorney would not be allowed to present oral argument to the tribal court. The Simmondses appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court for further findings. On remand, the superior court reiterated its prior conclusion of a violation of minimum due process and further concluded that the due process error was not harmless because Parks's objections to the Minto Tribal Court's jurisdiction might have had merit. The Simmondses appealed again to the Supreme Court. Because Parks failed to exhaust his remedies in the Minto Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that his state court suit should have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded for dismissal of Parks's suit. View "Simmonds v. Parks" on Justia Law

The superior court terminated a mother's parental rights based on evidence of her chronic delusions and the danger these delusions posed to her child. On appeal, the mother argued that several aspects of the court's decision were not adequately supported. Namely, she argues that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) should have required an assessment of her psychiatric condition and monitored the course of her psychological therapy. The Supreme Court's review of the record revealed that the mother did receive a psychiatric evaluation at OCS's direction and that it would likely have been harmful to disrupt the positive relationship she had with her counselor. Therefore, the Court concluded that the record supported the superior court's conclusion that OCS fulfilled its duty to make active efforts to provide this mother with services designed to prevent the breakup of her family. View "Grace L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a juvenile court can delegate discretion to the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) to return a dependent child to his or her parents without first determining that return is in the child’s best interests. The juvenile court concluded that ADES has the discretion to determine when it serves a dependent child’s best interests to be returned to the child’s parent or guardian. The Supreme Court vacated the juvenile court’s order, holding (1) a juvenile court must specifically determine that return of a dependent child to his or her parents is in the child’s best interests before ordering the return; and (2) the juvenile court in this case erred by granting discretion to ADES to place dependent children with their parents without a prior judicial determination that reunification was in the children’s best interests. View "Alexander M. v. Hon. Lisa Abrams" on Justia Law