Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A person identified as O.R. appealed the decision of the Los Angeles County Superior Court to place his child, N.R., under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) based on allegations of substance abuse. The Supreme Court of California reviewed two issues concerning the interpretation of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D), which allows for jurisdiction over a child in cases where the parent’s substance abuse results in an inability to provide regular care for the child and causes or could cause the child serious physical harm or illness.First, the court clarified the term “substance abuse” as used in the statute. It rejected O.R.’s argument that “substance abuse” must be shown through a medical diagnosis or by meeting the criteria for a substance use disorder as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The court held that “substance abuse” in this context should be given its ordinary meaning, which refers to the excessive use of drugs or alcohol. The court cautioned that to establish dependency jurisdiction, the abuse must render the parent unable to provide regular care for the child and either cause the child serious physical harm or illness, or place the child at substantial risk of such harm or illness.Second, the court rejected the so-called “tender years presumption,” which holds that substance abuse by a parent is prima facie evidence of an inability to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical harm when the child is very young. The court held that this presumption is not supported by the language of the statute or the legislative intent, and improperly simplifies the analysis required under section 300(b)(1)(D). Instead, the court held that the government must establish each element of the statute separately, without shifting the burden to the parent to rebut a presumption created by a finding of substance abuse.The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re N.R." on Justia Law

The Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of a child within days of her birth. OCS then filed an emergency child in need of aid (CINA) petition seeking an order confirming probable cause to believe the child was in need of aid and granting OCS temporary custody of the child pending further proceedings. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that OCS had not shown probable cause to believe the child was a child in need of aid, and dismissed the CINA case. The superior court later denied OCS’s reconsideration motion, and OCS then appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision in a short summary order (with an opinion to follow), remanding to reopen the CINA case and conduct further proceedings in the normal course. The Court explained its order in this opinion. View "Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services v. Karlie T." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the dispositional orders of the circuit court terminating Father's parental rights to his four children, holding that the circuit court erroneously failed to follow the process established by the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes.The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) filed a petition alleging abuse and neglect after Petitioner was seen living out of a car with two of his children and their mother. In an amended petition, DHHR added Father's two other children, despite the fact that the children had not seen Father for years and lived with a different mother. The circuit court ultimately terminated Father's parental rights to all four children - two on the basis of abandonment and two because of inadequate housing. The Supreme Court vacated the dispositional orders, holding that remand was required for further proceedings because the circuit court clearly erred by failing to follow the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes. View "In re C.L." on Justia Law

The parents in this case were brought to the attention of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("Department") regarding reports of neglect and physical abuse to their five children. The child protection case began in February 2023 as a protective supervision case. Nearly three months later, the magistrate court ordered that the children be removed from the home and placed in the legal custody of the Department. John Doe (Father) appealed the magistrate court’s order removing his five children from the parents’ custody and temporarily placing the children in the legal custody of the Department. Father argued the magistrate court’s order failed to contain detailed written findings as required by Idaho law, that the order was not supported by substantial and competent evidence, and that the magistrate court’s actions violated Father’s fundamental rights to the care and custody of his children. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court. View "IDHW v. John Doe" on Justia Law

At a dispositional hearing, a juvenile court placed R.Q. (minor) with her biological father, C.H. On appeal, defendant-appellant, K.Q. (presumed father), contended the court abused its discretion in placing minor with C.H. Plaintiff-respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the department), received a referral alleging physical abuse to R.Q. by A.P. (stepmother). Minor disclosed stepmother had choked her and pulled her hair. The family had an open, voluntary family maintenance plan due to stepmother hitting minor. The department had also received a previous referral alleging physical abuse to minor by stepmother. A.H., minor’s biological mother (mother), did not live in the home. The social worker spoke to minor and R.Q.2, the biological daughter of presumed father and mother, who both reported incidents of physical abuse by stepmother. Despite stepmother and presumed father both denying the allegations, the department took minor into protective custody pursuant to a warrant. The department filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 petition alleging mother and presumed father failed to protect minor from physical abuse; that mother and presumed father had substance abuse problems; and that mother had an untreated mental illness. C.H. indicated he had not found out about minor's birth until she was two years old. After paternity testing, supervised visits and ultimately a social worker review, at a dispositional hearing, it was recommended the minor be placed with C.H. Presumed father contended the court abused its discretion in placing minor with C.H. The department agreed that a juvenile court did not have authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2 to place a child with a “mere biological parent”; however, the department maintained that a juvenile court has discretion to order such a placement under its broad authority to act in a child’s best interest. Thus, the department argued the court acted within its discretion in placing minor with C.H. To this the Court of Appeal agreed with the department and affirmed the court order placing the child with her biological father. View "In re R.Q." on Justia Law

Child Protection Services (CPS) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents of three minor children who were sexually abused by their father. The mother, S.F., objected and argued that she should not lose her parental rights. The trial court granted CPS’s petition and terminated the rights of both parents. S.F. appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that through the totality of the circumstances and the evidence presented to the youth court satisfied the grounds for termination. Because S.F. lacked protective capacity toward her children, the youth court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that termination was appropriate. As such, the Court affirmed. View "S.F. v. Lamar County Department of Child Protection Services, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, nineteen children in New York City’s foster care system, filed suit alleging “systemic deficiencies” in the administration of the City’s foster care system in violation of federal and state law. The named Plaintiffs moved to represent a class of all children who are now or will be in the foster care custody of the Commissioner of New York City’s Administration for Children’s Services and two subclasses. As remedies, they sought injunctive and declaratory relief to redress alleged class-wide injuries caused by deficiencies in the City’s administration—and the New York State Office of Children and Family Services’ oversight—of foster care. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its analysis of the commonality and typicality requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying class certification and remanded. The court held that the district court erred in its analysis of commonality and typicality under Rule 23. The court explained that the district court did not determine whether commonality and typicality exist with respect to each of Plaintiffs’ claims. Instead, it concluded that commonality was lacking as to all alleged harms because “Plaintiffs’ allegations do not flow from unitary, non-discretionary policies.” The court held that this approach was legal error requiring remand. Further, the court wrote that here, the district court largely relied upon its commonality analysis to support its finding that typicality was not satisfied. Thus, the deficiencies identified in its commonality inquiry can also be found in its handling of typicality. View "Elisa W. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

A-J.A.B. tested positive at birth for methamphetamine. H.J.B. (“Mother”) admitted methamphetamine use during her pregnancy. In March 2020, less than a month after A-J.A.B.’s birth, the Adams County Human Services Department (“the Department”) filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning A-J.A.B. The Department’s petition noted that it had no information indicating that A-J.A.B. was an Indian child or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe, although the petition did not identify what efforts, if any, the Department took to determine whether A-J.A.B. was an Indian child. At the shelter hearing, Mother’s counsel informed the court that Mother may have “some Cherokee and Lakota Sioux [heritage] through [A-J.A.B.’s maternal great-grandmother].” However, Mother was uncertain if anyone in her family was actually registered with a tribe and acknowledged that she “probably [wouldn’t] qualify” for any tribal membership herself. The juvenile court ordered Mother to “fill out the ICWA paperwork,” but the court did not direct the Department to exercise its due diligence obligation under section 19-1-126(3). At the next hearing, Mother, who had not filled out the ICWA paperwork, again stated that she had “Native American heritage” through A-J.A.B.’s maternal great-grandmother. Because of these assertions, the juvenile court found that the case “‘may’ be an ICWA case.” By December 2020, the Department moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights. At the pretrial conference, Mother’s attorney informed the court that she spoke with A-J.A.B.’s maternal grandmother, who stated that she “thought that the heritage may be Lakota.” Mother’s attorney told the court “it doesn’t sound like there’s a reason to believe that ICWA would apply” and acknowledged that neither Mother nor A-J.A.B. were enrolled members of any tribe. The juvenile court subsequently concluded that “there [was] no reason to believe that this case [was] governed by [ICWA].” The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding that ICWA did not apply because the court had a reason to know that A-J.A.B. was an Indian child. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the Department satisfied its statutory due diligence obligation under section19-1-126(3), and affirmed in different grounds. View "Colorado in interest of H.J.B." on Justia Law

At issue in this case is the triggering event for the statute of limitations on childhood sexual abuse actions. Timothy Jones’ estate (Estate) brought negligence and wrongful death claims against the State of Washington. Timothy was born to Jaqueline Jones in 1990. In 2003, Jacqueline lost her home to foreclosure, and Timothy moved in with Price Nick Miller Jr., a family friend. A month later, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) was alerted that Miller was paying too much attention to children who were not his own. After investigating the report, DCYF removed Timothy from Miller’s home based on this inappropriate behavior. In November 2003, Timothy was placed in foster care and DCYF filed a dependency petition. Timothy’s dependency case was dismissed in 2006. Later that year, Timothy told a counselor that Miller had abused him sexually, physically, and emotionally from 1998 to 2006. In 2008, Miller pleaded guilty to second degree child rape connected to his abuse of Timothy and second degree child molestation related to another child. In 2007 or 2008, Jacqueline sued Miller on Timothy’s behalf. The attorney did not advise Timothy or his mother that there may be a lawsuit against the State or that the State may be liable for allowing Miller’s abuse to occur. Sometime in mid-2017, and prompted by a news story about childhood sexual abuse, Timothy and a romantic parter Jimmy Acevedo discussed whether Timothy may have a claim against the State. Acevedo recommended that Timothy consult a lawyer. In fall 2017, Timothy contacted a firm that began investigating Timothy’s case. In June 2018, Timothy committed suicide. Jacqueline was appointed personal representative of Timothy’s estate and filed claims for negligence, negligent investigation, and wrongful death against the State. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded the statute of limitations for negligence claims begins when a victim recognizes the causal connection between the intentional abuse and their injuries. The court granted summary judgment for the State and dismissed the Estate’s claims as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence was presented that Timothy made the causal connection between that alleged act and his injuries until August or September 2017, and the Estate filed its claims on March 12, 2020, within RCW 4.16.340(1)(c)’s three-year time period. View "Wolf v. Washington" on Justia Law

This lawsuit arose from an investigation into whether Appellant Kristine McCreery abused or neglected her fifteen-year-old son, B.M. McCreery filed a complaint against two physicians who reported the alleged abuse, the detective who investigated the reports, the deputy prosecutor who filed the Child Protection Act (“CPA”) action, and the social worker for the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare who submitted an investigatory report and testified in the CPA case (collectively “defendants” or “Respondents”), alleging they had violated her constitutional rights and Idaho’s false reporting statutes when they took actions to separate her from B.M. for over fifteen months. The district court dismissed McCreery’s claims with prejudice after finding Respondents were immune from liability and that the allegations in McCreery’s complaint failed to state any valid claim upon which relief could be granted. McCreery moved to amend her complaint, which the district court denied. McCreery appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the district court erroneously dismissed her claims. The Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "McCreery v. King, M.D., et al." on Justia Law