Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A baby was born premature on a city street in Wichita. A child in need of care (CINC) petition was filed, and custody of the baby was granted to the Secretary of the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS). Foster Parents accepted the baby as their foster child, and Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. SRS then initiated efforts for Maternal Cousins to adopt the child. Foster Parents, however, also wanted to adopt the child. The CINC court concluded that SRS had failed to make reasonable efforts or progress towards the child’s adoption and granted Foster Parents custody of the child with permission to adopt. The district court approved Foster Parents’ adoption of the child. Maternal Cousins appealed from the CINC proceeding. Foster Parents filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the CINC order was not one of those enumerated in the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children (Revised Code) as appealable. The court of appeals denied the motion and then reversed the CINC court. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no appellate jurisdiction to review the post-termination decisions at issue under the Revised Code’s appellate jurisdiction statute. View "In re N.A.C." on Justia Law

Mother Y.Z. appealed a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her children, G.P. and A. P., and choosing adoption as the appropriate permanent plan. Mother contended the court erroneously found that the children should have been removed from their relative caregiver and placed in a foster home under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 387 deprived her of the ability to raise an exception to the adoption preference under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). Mother also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding that the beneficial relationship exception to the adoption preference was inapplicable. "Jose P.," the presumed father of G.P. and A.P., joined Mother's arguments and argued his due process rights were violated when the court terminated his parental rights without having made a detriment finding as to him. Upon review of the juvenile court order, the Court of Appeal concluded the court's findings under section 387 as well as its determination that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply were supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, the Court found that Father invited the error he appealed, and even if he did not do so, the juvenile court's findings were sufficient to support termination of Father's rights. View "In re G.P." on Justia Law

The trial court in this case ordered the Children’s Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services (Division) not to include Mother’s name in the child abuse and neglect central registry as a sanction for the Division’s failure to comply with the ninety-day statutory deadline for investigations and determinations. The Division noted that its investigation into Mother’s alleged neglect of her children would be extended for “good cause” before it eventually determined that the evidence substantiated the allegations of Mother’s neglect. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the legislature did not provide for a sanction in the event that the Division fails to meet the statutory deadline, and courts are not authorized to create one. View "Frye v. Levy" on Justia Law

The Certified Professional Guardianship Board (Board) has petitioned the Supreme Court to suspend guardian Lori Petersen for actions stemming from her guardianship of D.S. and J.S. Petersen has been a certified professional guardian since 2001. She owned and operated Empire Care and Guardianship, a large agency serving over 60 wards. From December 2009 until April 2010, the Board received a number of grievances and complaints regarding Petersen's treatment of three wards who were all, at one point, housed at Peterson Place, an adult family home. Petersen contended that suspension was improper and suggested:(1) the Board ran afoul of separation of powers principles; (2) violated the appearance of fairness doctrine; (3) impermissibly lowered the evidentiary standard; and (4) failed to consider the proportionality of the sanction. The Supreme Court agreed with Petersen as to her last contention: "She has questioned, albeit obliquely, the proportionality of the sanction, and so the Board should have considered the sanction's magnitude relative to those imposed in other cases. Accordingly, we remand to the Board to conduct a consistency analysis pursuant to its internal regulations" and the Court's opinion. View "In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Petersen" on Justia Law

Two sisters reported that they were abused by their grandparents while they were entrusted to the legal custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS). The sisters sued OCS, and a jury awarded them substantial damages, concluding that OCS was responsible for 95% of their damages and that their grandparents were not responsible for any of their damages. On appeal, OCS argued that the verdict should have been set aside. Because the evidence supporting the jury’s allocation of fault was so insubstantial as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that OCS was entitled to a new trial. View "State, Dept. of Health & Social Services v. Mullins" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kathrin Kinzer-Ellington was appointed guardian ad litem pursuant to Rule 1-053.3 NMRA to help determine the best interests of minor children whose parents were involved in a custody dispute. As the case grew more and more contentious, Father David Kimbrell sued both Mother Lorraine Kimbrell and the guardian ad litem in tort as next friend of his oldest daughter, Lily Kimbrell, alleging that their conduct had injured the child. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a parent has standing to sue a Rule 1-053.3 guardian ad litem during a pending custody proceeding. The Court held that a Rule 1-053.3 guardian ad litem is protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit arising from the performance of his or her duties unless the guardian ad litem’s alleged tortious conduct is clearly and completely outside the scope of his or her appointment. A parent does not have standing to sue a guardian ad litem appointed in a custody proceeding on behalf of the child because: (1) the parent has been found to be unable to act in the best interests of the child, and (2) such a lawsuit would create a conflict of interest in the custody case. View "Kimbrell v. Kimbrell" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) filed a petition to institute abuse and neglect proceedings against Mother regarding her child K.L. The DHHR’s petition against Mother was based solely on the prior involuntary termination as to another child C.W. The circuit court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding that Mother failed to meet her burden of showing a change in her circumstances since the termination of her parental rights to C.W. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error in shifting the burden to Mother in this abuse and neglect case. Remanded. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

In February 2008, the Department of Human Services (DHS) removed COH, ERH, JRG, and KBH from their mother’s care. The children were initially placed in two separate foster homes; however, in October 2008, all of the children were placed with Holy Cross Children’s Services. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court concerned the interplay between MCL 722.954a and MCL 712A.19c, and whether the preference for placement with relatives created by MCL 722.954a was relevant to a court’s consideration of a petition to appoint a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2). Because the Court concluded that the two statutes applied at different and distinct stages of child protective proceedings, the Court held that hold that there was no preference for placement with relatives as part of a guardianship determination under MCL 712A.19c(2). Accordingly, because the Court of Appeals in this case applied a preference in favor of creating a guardianship with a relative in support of its decision to reverse the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred. View "In re COH, ERH, JRG, KBH" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska and the Municipality of Anchorage exempt from municipal property taxation $150,000 of the assessed value of the residence of an owner who is a senior citizen or disabled veteran. But the full value of the exemption is potentially unavailable if a person who is not the owner’s spouse also occupies the residence. Contending that the exemption program violated their rights to equal protection and equal opportunities, three Anchorage same-sex couples in committed, long-term, intimate relationships sued the State and the Municipality. The superior court ruled for all three couples. The State and Municipality appealed. As to two of the couples, the Supreme Court affirmed: same-sex couples, who may not marry or have their marriages recognized in Alaska, cannot benefit or become eligible to benefit from the exemption program to the same extent as heterosexual couples, who are married or may marry. The exemption program therefore potentially treats same-sex couples less favorably than it treats opposite-sex couples even though the two classes are similarly situated. The identified governmental interests do not satisfy even minimum scrutiny. The exemption program therefore violates the two couples’ equal protection rights as guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution. As to the third couple, the Court reversed the ruling in their favor because it concluded that the program did not exempt a residence from taxation unless the senior citizen or veteran had some ownership interest in it. If the senior citizen or veteran has no actual ownership interest, the program treats a same-sex couple the same as a heterosexual couple by denying the exemption to both couples, rendering marital status and the ability to marry irrelevant. Because the senior citizen member of the third couple had no ownership interest in the residence, that couple had no viable equal protection claim. View "Alaska v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Respondent, the father of G.G., appealed a superior court order which, after de novo review, upheld a finding by the 10th Circuit Court – Portsmouth Family Division that the respondent had abused and neglected G.G. Respondent challenged the superior court’s denial of his request to cross-examine or subpoena G.G. after the court admitted her videotaped interview into evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that given the plain language of the pertinent statutes and the court’s inherent authority to control the proceedings before it, trial courts have the discretion in abuse and neglect proceedings to determine whether any witness, including the child, should be compelled to testify. The record was unclear as to whether the trial court adequately considered the competing interests of respondent and the child. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded this case for further proceedings: "[w]hen the court is considering whether to compel G.G. to testify in this case, the court may wish to consider whether she testified at the respondent's criminal trial and, if so, whether her testimony in the criminal proceeding would suffice for the instant proceeding." View "In re G.G." on Justia Law