Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

C.S., who turned eighteen in March 2012, received special education services from the Butte School District until June 2013. In January 2013, the Montana Office of Public Instruction directed the School District to obtain appointment of a surrogate parent for C.S., who lived with his Foster Father, for educational purposes. The district court subsequently appointed Mary Jo Mahoney as C.S.’s surrogate parent. In March 2013, C.S. filed a motion to vacate the appointment of Mahoney and to substitute Foster Father as his surrogate parent. The court denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court’s refusal to vacate its appointment of Mahoney was not mooted even though C.S. no longer qualified for special education services from the School District; and (2) the district court erred when it refused to remove Mahoney and appoint Foster Father as C.S.’s surrogate parent for educational purposes. View "In re C.S." on Justia Law

There are five children involved in this case: C.C., M.R., G.C., M.C.C., and A.C.C. The children have four different fathers. This appeal is the culmination of several child protection actions involving their mother Jane Doe. The State petitioned to terminate Jane Doe's parental rights as to all children, and Jane Doe appealed the ultimate termination order. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Re: Thermination of Parental Rights (mother)" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the principle of "priority jurisdiction" when it held that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to terminate Emmanuel Alizota's parental rights and erred in granting Ryan and Melissa Stanfield's petition for the adoption of S.K. The Court of Appeals determined that because the juvenile court had previously exercised jurisdiction over a deprivation proceeding involving Alizota and S.K. and had entered a temporary long-term custody agreement, the doctrine of priority jurisdiction deprived the superior court of jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. Based on that, the Court of Appeals vacated the superior court’s order and declined to consider Alizota's appeal on the merits. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. View "Standfield v. Alizota" on Justia Law

In January 2011, the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of three children. The children had been in the care of their maternal grandparents, but before their removal had returned to their parents. OCS, under the impression that the children were being cared for by the parents at the time of removal, placed the children with the maternal grandparents. The day the trial to terminate the mother’s parental rights was to begin, the mother moved to have the grandmother joined in the proceeding as the children’s Indian custodian. The court denied both the mother’s motion to join the grandmother and the grandmother’s motion to intervene, finding that shortly after the removal the parents revoked the grandmother’s Indian custodian status by asking OCS not to place the children with her. The grandmother moved for reconsideration and argued that her due process rights were violated at the time of the removal. She argued that OCS did not provide her with notice of the right she was entitled to as the children’s Indian custodian, including notice of her right to intervene in the proceeding and of her right to be represented by counsel. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that although OCS breached its duty to provide the grandmother with notice required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because of the short time between the children’s removal and the parents’ revocation of the grandmother’s status as the children’s Indian custodian the grandmother had suffered no significant detriment to her rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that any error OCS may have made regarding the notice provisions of ICWA was harmless. View "Molly O. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Simone H. appealed the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her son, Irving. Simone challenged the trial court's denial of her request to have Irving's therapy records released to her for use during the termination trial and the trial court's finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide services designed to enable Irving's safe return to her custody. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Simone's request for access to Irving's therapy records and that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that OCS made reasonable efforts to reunify Simone with Irving. View "Simone H. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

A mother sued the Department of Human Services (DHS) after the death of her son in the home in which DHS placed him. Austin Watkins was removed from the home of his mother, Tammy Watkins, and placed in the home of his paternal grandmother, Janice Mowdy. Approximately a year and a half after Mowdy was awarded durable legal custody of Austin, Austin died from starvation. The trial court granted DHS’s motion for summary judgment, determining that DHS enjoyed sovereign immunity from liability for the acts alleged in the complaint. Upon review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Watkins v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

Mother S.L.-C., and father N.P., separately appealed a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to their three children. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court's findings that the children were deprived and had been in foster care more than 450 out of the previous 660 nights were supported by the evidence and were not clearly erroneous. As such, the Court affirmed the termination of both parties' parental rights. View "Interest of R.L.-P." on Justia Law

The father of L.M. appealed the trial court's finding L.M. to be a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). He raised numerous arguments. The Supreme Court found that while father's unstable living situation, standing alone, might not be sufficient to support a CHINS determination, there were multiple elements of risk under the facts of this case leading to the trial court's conclusion that father and L.M. could end up in an unsafe living situation. Furthermore, father's inability to follow through on recommendations designed to promote L.M.'s safety enhanced the potential risk of harm to L.M.'s well-being. Given these factors, including mother's concession, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court record supported the decision that there was a risk of prospective harm to the child sufficient to justify the State’s temporary intervention to ensure that L.M. was safe. View "In re L.M." on Justia Law

After K.L. was removed from her parents’ custody, K.L. was adjudicated a youth in need of care, and the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents. After a hearing, the district court terminated the parents’ rights to K.L. Both parents appealed the order of termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) granting the Department’s motion for an extension of temporary legal custody over K.L; (2) terminating Father’s parental rights after finding that the condition rendering Father unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; and (3) terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

After the Department of Family Services (DFS) received reports regarding the care Children were receiving from Mother and Stepfather, the State filed a neglect petition. DFS’s efforts to reunify Children with Mother failed. The juvenile court subsequently ordered Children to remain in the custody of Father and that DFS move to terminate the parental rights of Mother to Children. DFS appealed, claiming it could not move to terminate Mother’s parental rights because it did not have custody of Children and therefore was not an “authorized agency” that may file a petition to terminate one’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DFS was an “authorized agency” under the relevant statute regardless of whether it had physical and/or legal custody of Children. View "In re LB" on Justia Law