Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The father of L.M. appealed the trial court's finding L.M. to be a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). He raised numerous arguments. The Supreme Court found that while father's unstable living situation, standing alone, might not be sufficient to support a CHINS determination, there were multiple elements of risk under the facts of this case leading to the trial court's conclusion that father and L.M. could end up in an unsafe living situation. Furthermore, father's inability to follow through on recommendations designed to promote L.M.'s safety enhanced the potential risk of harm to L.M.'s well-being. Given these factors, including mother's concession, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court record supported the decision that there was a risk of prospective harm to the child sufficient to justify the State’s temporary intervention to ensure that L.M. was safe. View "In re L.M." on Justia Law

After K.L. was removed from her parents’ custody, K.L. was adjudicated a youth in need of care, and the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents. After a hearing, the district court terminated the parents’ rights to K.L. Both parents appealed the order of termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) granting the Department’s motion for an extension of temporary legal custody over K.L; (2) terminating Father’s parental rights after finding that the condition rendering Father unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; and (3) terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

After the Department of Family Services (DFS) received reports regarding the care Children were receiving from Mother and Stepfather, the State filed a neglect petition. DFS’s efforts to reunify Children with Mother failed. The juvenile court subsequently ordered Children to remain in the custody of Father and that DFS move to terminate the parental rights of Mother to Children. DFS appealed, claiming it could not move to terminate Mother’s parental rights because it did not have custody of Children and therefore was not an “authorized agency” that may file a petition to terminate one’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DFS was an “authorized agency” under the relevant statute regardless of whether it had physical and/or legal custody of Children. View "In re LB" on Justia Law

The Father, Jonathan Pahnke, appealed the modification of a foreign child support order. He argued that he was never properly served with the motion to modify child support, that the Vermont family division lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction over him and this matter, and that the magistrate improperly ruled that mother did not owe him arrears for the period preceding the modification. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, but remanded the case for recalculation of the mother's child support arrearage. View "Pahnke v. Pahnke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff agreed to an increase in his monthly support obligation. The increase was applied retroactively to the date the child’s mother requested the increase, which created an arrearage in Plaintiff’s account. Although Plaintiff arranged to pay off the arrearage, the State of Montana, Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) reported the arrearage to national consumer credit reporting agencies. Prospective employers subsequently rejected Plaintiff as an otherwise qualified candidate for being delinquent in his child support payments. Plaintiff filed suit against CSED for its erroneous report to the credit agencies. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s arrearage constituted a delinquency or overdue child support, but the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint must be upheld because Plaintiff did not avail himself of the statutory and administrative processes for challenging this action by CSED; and (2) the resulting injustice in this case required remand with directions that the credit reporting agencies that reported Plaintiff’s arrearage remove from their data base any reference to Plaintiff having been in arrears or delinquent in the payment of his child support obligations. View "Kenck v. State, Child Support Enforcement Div." on Justia Law

Philip J. has nine children. The superior court terminated his parental rights to eight. Philip appealed two separate termination orders (Case No. S-14810 and Case No. S14994) which were consolidated in this decision. Philip argued that the superior court erred in finding that active efforts were made to keep this Indian family together in both termination orders. He also argued that the superior court erred when it determined that his eighth child was a child in need of aid. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed both orders. View "Phillip J. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Parents who adopted special needs children challenged decision by the Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide a lower assistance subsidy for the children than the assistance subsidy that would be paid if the children were in a foster placement. The decision was upheld upon administrative review by DHS and sustained by the district court and Court of Civil Appeals. Parents filed a petition for certiorari, seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court concluded DHS was attempting to apply a predetermined fixed amount of subsidy without allowing adoptive parents to show greater need up to the amount provided for special needs children in foster care. This was contrary to the policy and purpose of the statutory law providing and regulating financial assistance to people who undertake parental responsibility and care of special needs children. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was therefore vacated and the district court order sustaining the decision of the Department of Human Services was reversed. The case was remanded to the Department of Human Services for redetermination of the monthly subsidy amount. View "Troxell v. Oklahoma Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

Irma E. asked the State Office of Children’s Services to place her granddaughters with her, but OCS denied her request. Irma repeatedly asked the superior court to hold a hearing to review OCS's decision, but the superior court denied Irma’s requests for a hearing. Based on AS 47.14.100(m), the Supreme Court concluded that a family member who has been denied placement of a child in OCS’s custody is entitled to a review hearing to contest the OCS placement decision. View "Irma E. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

This case concerned one of the exceptions to the Georgia Tort Claims Act known as the "discretionary function" exception. The guardians of two infant boys sued the Department of Human Services (DHS), alleging that the Clayton County Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) was negligent in several respects in its investigation of a report that the boys were neglected by their parents. On motion of DHS, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the “discretionary function” exception properly applied, but the Court of Appeals disagreed, and it reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether the "discretionary function" exception applied in this case, and concluding that it did, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia Dep't. of Human Svcs. v. Spruill" on Justia Law

Appellant had four children who tested positive for cocaine at birth. After her fourth child was born, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took custody of the child and placed him with his maternal grandmother. Based on the mother’s history of untreated substance abuse, OCS filed a petition for termination of the appellant's parental rights three months after the child was born. After trial, the superior court concluded that: (1) the mother’s substance abuse placed her child in need of aid; (2) the mother failed to remedy the conditions that placed her child in need of aid within a reasonable time; (3) OCS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; and (4) termination was in the best interests of the child. Appellant argued on appeal that she was not given a reasonable time to remedy her substance abuse issues, that OCS did not exercise reasonable efforts over the short period prior to termination, and that termination eight months after birth was not in her child’s best interests. After its review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court because it properly considered the mother’s history with OCS, her conduct after the child’s birth, and the best interests of the child. View "Amy M. v. Alaska" on Justia Law