Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Father, Jonathan Pahnke, appealed the modification of a foreign child support order. He argued that he was never properly served with the motion to modify child support, that the Vermont family division lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction over him and this matter, and that the magistrate improperly ruled that mother did not owe him arrears for the period preceding the modification. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, but remanded the case for recalculation of the mother's child support arrearage. View "Pahnke v. Pahnke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff agreed to an increase in his monthly support obligation. The increase was applied retroactively to the date the child’s mother requested the increase, which created an arrearage in Plaintiff’s account. Although Plaintiff arranged to pay off the arrearage, the State of Montana, Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) reported the arrearage to national consumer credit reporting agencies. Prospective employers subsequently rejected Plaintiff as an otherwise qualified candidate for being delinquent in his child support payments. Plaintiff filed suit against CSED for its erroneous report to the credit agencies. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s arrearage constituted a delinquency or overdue child support, but the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint must be upheld because Plaintiff did not avail himself of the statutory and administrative processes for challenging this action by CSED; and (2) the resulting injustice in this case required remand with directions that the credit reporting agencies that reported Plaintiff’s arrearage remove from their data base any reference to Plaintiff having been in arrears or delinquent in the payment of his child support obligations. View "Kenck v. State, Child Support Enforcement Div." on Justia Law

Philip J. has nine children. The superior court terminated his parental rights to eight. Philip appealed two separate termination orders (Case No. S-14810 and Case No. S14994) which were consolidated in this decision. Philip argued that the superior court erred in finding that active efforts were made to keep this Indian family together in both termination orders. He also argued that the superior court erred when it determined that his eighth child was a child in need of aid. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed both orders. View "Phillip J. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Parents who adopted special needs children challenged decision by the Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide a lower assistance subsidy for the children than the assistance subsidy that would be paid if the children were in a foster placement. The decision was upheld upon administrative review by DHS and sustained by the district court and Court of Civil Appeals. Parents filed a petition for certiorari, seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court concluded DHS was attempting to apply a predetermined fixed amount of subsidy without allowing adoptive parents to show greater need up to the amount provided for special needs children in foster care. This was contrary to the policy and purpose of the statutory law providing and regulating financial assistance to people who undertake parental responsibility and care of special needs children. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was therefore vacated and the district court order sustaining the decision of the Department of Human Services was reversed. The case was remanded to the Department of Human Services for redetermination of the monthly subsidy amount. View "Troxell v. Oklahoma Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

Irma E. asked the State Office of Children’s Services to place her granddaughters with her, but OCS denied her request. Irma repeatedly asked the superior court to hold a hearing to review OCS's decision, but the superior court denied Irma’s requests for a hearing. Based on AS 47.14.100(m), the Supreme Court concluded that a family member who has been denied placement of a child in OCS’s custody is entitled to a review hearing to contest the OCS placement decision. View "Irma E. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

This case concerned one of the exceptions to the Georgia Tort Claims Act known as the "discretionary function" exception. The guardians of two infant boys sued the Department of Human Services (DHS), alleging that the Clayton County Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) was negligent in several respects in its investigation of a report that the boys were neglected by their parents. On motion of DHS, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the “discretionary function” exception properly applied, but the Court of Appeals disagreed, and it reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether the "discretionary function" exception applied in this case, and concluding that it did, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia Dep't. of Human Svcs. v. Spruill" on Justia Law

Appellant had four children who tested positive for cocaine at birth. After her fourth child was born, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took custody of the child and placed him with his maternal grandmother. Based on the mother’s history of untreated substance abuse, OCS filed a petition for termination of the appellant's parental rights three months after the child was born. After trial, the superior court concluded that: (1) the mother’s substance abuse placed her child in need of aid; (2) the mother failed to remedy the conditions that placed her child in need of aid within a reasonable time; (3) OCS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; and (4) termination was in the best interests of the child. Appellant argued on appeal that she was not given a reasonable time to remedy her substance abuse issues, that OCS did not exercise reasonable efforts over the short period prior to termination, and that termination eight months after birth was not in her child’s best interests. After its review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court because it properly considered the mother’s history with OCS, her conduct after the child’s birth, and the best interests of the child. View "Amy M. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her child. On appeal, she questioned: (1) the child was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011; (2) that she failed to remedy the conduct that placed the child in need of aid; (3) the finding that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; and (4) that the termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Because all of the superior court’s rulings were supported by the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights. View "Casey K. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A.H. was born in 2010 with extreme medical needs. A.H. required hospitalization three times when she was in the care of her parents. Eventually, the Department of Health and Human Services placed the child in a foster home. After being placed in a foster home, A.H. began receiving adequate nutrition and became healthier. Because A.H.'s parents demonstrated that they had limited intellectual capacity and failed to progress in rehabilitation, the Department petitioned for the termination of each parent's parental rights. After a hearing, the district court terminated both parents' parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) the parents were not able to protect A.H. from jeopardy; (2) the parents were unable to take responsibility for A.H. within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs; and (3) the termination of parental rights and adoption by the foster parents was in A.H.'s best interest. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

Lisa Kisling, the legal guardian of two children with special needs, applied for and received child care assistance benefits up until the time she enrolled in law school. At that time, the Department of Family Services (Department) denied child care assistance benefits to Kisling because her participation in a graduate program in college rendered her ineligible for receipt of such benefits. After a contested case hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the denial of benefits. The district court reversed, holding that the Department was equitably estopped from denying benefits to Kisling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in considering Kisling's estoppel claim because that issue was not raised in the proceedings before the OAH. View "State ex rel. Dep't of Family Servs. v. Kisling" on Justia Law