Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-Appellees Carl and Pamela Morton filed a petition for guardianship against Defendant-Appellant Terry Hanson. An in-house attorney who did not carry malpractice insurance was appointed by the Family Court to represent Defendant. The Family Court certified a question to the Supreme Court concerning in-house attorneys appointed to represent indigent parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that in-house counsel appointed by the Family Court had qualified immunity under the Delaware Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, lack of malpractice insurance is not "good cause" for an attorney to withdraw from court-appointed representation. View "Hanson v. Morton" on Justia Law

The Denver Department of Human Services placed "A.C." in foster care when he was two days old. Before his first birthday, the juvenile court terminated his biological parents' rights, which made him available for adoption. The issue in this case centered on whether the prospective adoptive parents' due process rights were violated when the Department removed the child from their home without prior notice. At the time of the removal, the prospective parents had not yet initiated the adoption process. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that preadoptive foster patents do not possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest, and therefore, no due process violation occurred. View "M.S. v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Respondent Cheryl C. appealed a circuit court order that granted a special petition to terminate her guardianship over her grandchildren Raven G. and Salem G. filed by the children's biological mother, petitioner Jessica B. Following a hearing in January 2008, at which both parents appeared and testified, the court found that respondent had established by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the temporary guardianship was in the best interests of both children because their parents, petitioner and Stacey G., engaged in domestic violence and in the illegal use of controlled drugs while the children were in their care. The court ordered that the temporary guardianship would remain in effect until petitioner and Stacey G. complied with a number of conditions to "demonstrate[] that they are responsible enough to act as parents." In May 2008, after another hearing, the court found that neither the petitioner nor Stacey G. was complying with the conditions imposed by the court. The court made the guardianship permanent and provided for supervised contact between the children and their parents at respondent's discretion. Petitioner was subsequently incarcerated for several months as a result of a criminal conviction and then released on probation. In January 2010, she filed a motion seeking appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL). A GAL was appointed, and the parties worked out an agreement allowing gradually increased contact between petitioner and the children. In February 2011, petitioner moved to terminate the guardianship, asserting that she had complied with all of the conditions set forth by the court in January 2008. Respondent objected to terminating the guardianship. Stacey G. also opposed termination, but argued that he should be given unrestricted and unsupervised time with the children. The court held a hearing; petitioner admitted that she had not complied with a January 2008 order but argued that the court should permit her to integrate the children into her life rather than continue the artificial relationship imposed by the guardianship. The GAL testified that he believed it would be in the best interests of the children to terminate the guardianship gradually. The respondent and Stacey G. took issue with the GAL's recommendation, arguing that he had limited contact with the children and was biased. The respondent's expert witness concluded that both children had been physically and sexually abused by petitioner and opined that forcing the children to spend time with their mother would be emotionally devastating for them and recommended that any such contact be supervised by a professional. Upon review of the issue of whether the guardianship should have been continued, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court applied an erroneous burden of proof, and therefore vacated its order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re guardianship of Raven G." on Justia Law

In March of 2007, Mother gave birth to Child. Five months later, the Pickens County Department of Social Services (DSS) received a report of neglect from a sheriff's deputy. Three families (six adults and eleven children) resided in Child's home, trash was overflowing, moldy dishes and food were strewn about, Mother and Father admitted to using cocaine, and Child had a visibly flat head which Mother explained resulted from her being left in a car seat for extended periods. Mother also admitted that Child had received her immunizations from the health department, but had not seen a doctor since birth. DSS filed a complaint for removal of Child and her older half-sister (Sister) due to abuse and neglect. The following day, Child tested positive for cocaine. Child and Sister were removed from the home and placed in emergency protective custody. A week later, Child was placed with the Appellants the Brooms for foster care. Following a hearing, the family court found probable cause for removal of Child based on the positive drug test and Mother's admission of substance abuse. The court also gave legal custody of Child to DSS and directed the appointment of counsel for Mother. At some point thereafter an attorney was appointed to represent Mother. "This would [have been] a straightforward appeal in a termination of parental rights action but for the fact that the mother whose rights were terminated was erroneously denied counsel." Because, after its review, the Supreme Court held that the Mother was not prejudiced by the error, the grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence, and termination was in the child's best interest. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Broom v. Derrick" on Justia Law

A mother, appearing pro se, appealed a child support order. She claimed that the superior court erred in requiring her to pay child support to a father who shared physical custody and erred in refusing to allow a deduction for her direct support of two children from a prior relationship. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the support order was justified despite the shared custody, but the Court vacated the order and remanded the case back to the superior court for consideration of the deduction that Alaska Civil Rule 90.3 allowed for the mothers' direct support of her other children. View "O'Neal v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Providers brought suit against the State, asserting that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (CWA), 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq., gave them a privately enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to receive payments from the State sufficient to cover the cost of certain statutorily enumerated components of foster care. At issue was whether Congress, in enacting the CWA, evinced a clear intent to grant foster care providers an individually enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments sufficiently large to cover the costs of each item enumerated in section 675(4)(A). The court held that Congress did not ambiguously confer such a right and, therefore, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Providers' complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Midwest Foster Care, etc., et al v. Kincade, et al" on Justia Law

In 2009, Julie was reported to the Department of Children and Family Services by her estranged husband concerning events involving alcoholism. After an investigation, DCFS made an indicated finding of child neglect and an ALJ issued an opinion that the mother had created an environment injurious to the health and welfare of her minor daughter under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act. The circuit court upheld the results. The appellate court reversed and the supreme court agreed. The Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act permitted a finding of neglect, prior to 1980, based on placing a child in an environment injurious to the child’s welfare. The “injurious environment” language was deleted in 1980 and was not restored until 2012, after the events at issue. During that time DCFS had promulgated rules describing specific incidents of harm constituting abuse or neglect that included “Substantial Risk of Physical Injury/Environment Injurious to Health and Welfare;” the court held that, after the legislature specifically removed the injurious environment language from the Act, DCFS was without authority to reestablish an injurious-environment definition of neglect. The fact that the Juvenile Court Act, a different statute, includes injurious environment in its definition of neglect does not mandate a different result. View "Julie Q. v. Dept. of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Sarah W. (Mother) is the biological mother of a minor boy and a minor girl. In 2007, Mother and the children's father, Vaughn S. (Father; parents collectively, defendants), and the children resided in a home without heat, electricity, or running water. Mother arranged for her brother and sister-in-law, Thomas W. and Brittney W., to take primary responsibility for the children. The South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) requested that the family court issue an ex parte order granting DSS emergency protective custody of Boy. DSS alleged it had probable cause to believe that Boy faced imminent and substantial danger to his health or physical safety. The family court agreed, basing its determination on the fact that Defendants were "unable to provided[sic] even marginally suitable housing" for Boy, and finding that Thomas W. and Brittney W. "apparently abused a sibling" of Boy. The family court awarded emergency protective custody to DSS. The family court held a probable cause hearing and found sufficient probable cause to issue the ex parte order. The family court also found that Thomas W. and Brittney W. were no longer willing to maintain custody of Girl, and the court ordered DSS to take emergency protective custody of Girl. Ultimately DSS moved to terminate Mother's rights to both children; the appellate court disagreed with the trial court and reversed. Upon further review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly terminated Mother's parental rights, and reversed the appellate court. View "SCDSS v. Sarah W." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether former foster parents had standing to petition to adopt a child placed for adoption by the Department of Social Services (DSS) with a different family. Upon review of the trial court record in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the former foster parents possessed neither statutory or constitutional standing, and therefore vacated the order that granted the parents' petition, and remanded custody of the child to DSS for adoptive placement. "[R]ecognizing that children develop rapidly, and that stability and attachment are important components in their growth and development, [the Court directed] DSS to consider [the] child's present best interests in placing her for adoption." View "Youngblood v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Svcs" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court granted an application for certiorari from the Court of Appeals' decision in "In re: W.L.H.," (723 SE2d 478 (2012)) to determine whether a child in a deprivation action had standing to appeal when the child was represented by counsel and the child's guardian ad litem chose not to appeal. "Because the guardian ad litem is the legal protector of a child's best interests in deprivation proceedings, we find that a child lacks standing to appeal a deprivation ruling except through a guardian ad litem." View "In the Interest of W.L.H." on Justia Law