Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In consolidated cases, the Supreme Court addressed disputes over child support. The disputes were described as "so stale that the parties' children are in and approaching their thirties." The basic questions were whether father could register and enforce a child support order obtained in Oklahoma against mother and, inversely, whether mother could register and enforce an earlier child support order obtained in Georgia against father. Upon review, the Court concluded that mother's various jurisdictional challenges to the Oklahoma order were without merit and precluded by the unappealed adjudication in Oklahoma. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Vermont court had personal jurisdiction over father with respect to mother's child support claims against him and a statutory immunity provision in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) did not apply. As a result, the Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of mother's enforcement action, affirmed the superior court's jurisdictional holdings with regard to the Oklahoma order. The Court remanded the adjudication of father's enforcement action for consideration of counterclaims raised by mother. View "OCS/Pappas v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

B.F. (father) appealed a district court judgment that appointed G.S., G.J., and K.C. as guardians over J.S.L.F. J.S.L.F. was born in the summer of 2008 to B.F. and S.M.L. They lived in Grand Forks for the first few months of the child's life, and were the subject of several complaints received by Grand Forks County Social Services. Father, mother, and child moved to Glenburn allegedly to avoid social services. While they were in Glenburn, there were at least three more reports from social services about their supervision of the child, the condition of the house they lived in, and the feeding of the child. In November 2010, the mother left the child with two of the co-petitioners so she could move to Bismarck. She signed a co-petition for appointment of a guardian in which she gave consent for G.S., G.J., and K.C. to be appointed guardians. Several weeks later, the mother arrived at G.S. and G.J.'s home with the police and took the child back. The next day, the district court entered an ex parte order giving G.S., G.J., and K.C. a temporary guardianship over the child. In the order, the court found an emergency existed because the mother was unable to care for the child, and found the mother's parental rights had been suspended by the circumstances. The father was not given notice before the guardianship was entered, and no hearing was held before the temporary guardianship. The temporary guardians made a motion to make the guardianship permanent, and B.F. was served with notice of the petition. A hearing on the petition for permanent guardianship was held late summer 2011. The district court ruled that both parents' rights had been suspended by the circumstances, and that it was in the best interests of the child to appoint G.S., G.J., and K.C. as the child's permanent guardians. On appeal, B.F. argued his parental rights were not suspended by circumstances. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the facts in the record did not support a finding of abandonment (to preclude suspension of rights by the circumstances), and therefore the district court's finding that B.F. abandoned J.S.L.F. was clearly erroneous. View "Guardianship of J.S.L.F." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether foster parents who intervene in a dependency and neglect action possess limited rights to participate in a hearing on a motion to terminate parental rights. The Court construed C.R.S. 19-3-507(5)(a) and concluded that foster parents who have properly intervened are afforded the same degree of participation as all other parties at a termination hearing. Furthermore, the Court concluded that parents' due process rights are not impacted by the full participation of foster parents in the termination hearing. View "A.M. v. A.C." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) initiated this action to terminate the parental rights of John Doe. The matter proceeded to trial where the magistrate court found that Doe had neglected and abandoned his minor child, D.C., and that it was in the best interest of the child that Doe's parental rights be terminated. Doe appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed: Doe failed to show that the magistrate erred in finding that he had abandoned D.C. "Even if the Department failed to implement the case plan in an appropriate fashion, the magistrate's finding of neglect was supported on a prong of neglect essentially independent of case plan performance. Doe has made no effort to show that it is not in the best interest of D.C. to terminate Doe's parental rights. There are no grounds to reverse the termination order." View "Health & Welfare v. Doe" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on what the State must prove when seeking to terminate parental rights. The Court of Appeals interpreted language from the Court's decision in "In re Dependency of J.C.," (924 P.2d 21 (1996)), to mean that when the State presents evidence sufficient to prove the element codified in RCW 13.34.180(1)(e), it necessarily proved the element codified in RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of the parental rights of K.D.S.'s father, Derek Gladin, because the State proved RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm on these grounds. However, because the trial court properly found that the State had proved each element, the Court affirmed the decision to terminate Gladin's parental rights. View "In re Dependency of K.D.S." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Colorado law recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege between a guardian ad litem and a minor child with respect to a dependency and neglect proceeding. The Court held that a guardian ad litem holds a minor child's psychotherapist-patient privilege when: (1) the child is too young or otherwise incompetent to hold the privilege; (2) the child's interests are adverse to those of his or her parent(s); and (3) section 19-3-311 C.R.S. (2012) does not abrogate the privilege. In this case, the Court found that the guardian ad litem partially waived the child's privilege when she disseminated a letter from the child's therapist to the juvenile court and to all parties. The Court remanded the case to the juvenile court for a determination of the scope of that waiver. View "L.A.N. et al. v. L.M.B." on Justia Law

Petitioner's child care license was revoked by the Department of Children and Families pursuant to Wis. Stat. 48.685(5)(br), the "caregiver law," which permanently bars those who have ever been convicted of specified predicate crimes from holding a child care license. An ALJ dismissed Petitioner's appeal of the revocation without a hearing based on her conviction on a guilty plea of violating Wis. Stat. 49.12(1) and (6) for a food stamp offense twenty years earlier. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a remand for an administrative hearing was required to determine whether the facts underlying the conviction established it as a conviction barred under the caregiver law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) due deference should be accorded the Department's interpretation and application of the caregiver law; (2) Petitioner had a right to a hearing; and (3) because genuine issues of material fact existed, the ALJ erred in dismissing Petitioner's appeal without a hearing for factual development. View "Jamerson v. Dep't of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Thea G. challenged the superior court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two children, twelve-year old Zach, and six-year old Abbie. The superior court terminated Thea’s parental rights based on her unremedied substance abuse issues. Thea raised three issues on appeal: (1) the superior court’s finding that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the breakup of her family; (2) the finding that if her custody over Zach and Abbie were continued the children would likely suffer serious emotional or physical damage; and (3) the finding that termination of her parental rights is in Zach’s and Abbie’s best interests. Because each of these findings was supported by sufficient evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order terminating Thea’s parental rights to Zach and Abbie. View "Thea G. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (ex-wife) and her parents sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant is a psychiatrist who was court-appointed to make recommendations in connection with plaintiff’s custody dispute with her ex-husband, following the 1998 entry of a marriage dissolution judgment. Plaintiff initially requested the evaluation, but was unhappy with the results. Defendant reported that plaintiff and her parents were delusional and that the children should be removed from their mother’s custody and have no further contact with her. A change of custody was granted. The Department of Children and Family Services later made a finding of abuse and neglect against the plaintiff. Plaintiff accused defendant of making false statements and a false evaluation. The trial court dismissed on the basis of res judicata; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on a separate civil rights class action that plaintiff had filed earlier in federal court against defendant and others for their role in custody proceedings. That action was dismissed for the immunity of such evaluators, and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal.View "Cooney v. Rossiter" on Justia Law

After allegations arose of sexual abuse and sexual risk involving A.B., A.B.'s Mother and Father were reported to child protective services. Following an investigation, the Department of Family Services (DFS) filed an abuse and neglect petition in the juvenile division of the district court, seeking to have A.B. declared a child in need of protection. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on the petition before a dependency master, after which the dependency master filed her findings of fact, recommendations, and order of approval. The master found A.B. was a child in need of protection and that Mother had neglected A.B. Upon Mother and Father's objection, the juvenile court held a hearing and dismissed the abuse and neglect petition, finding that the juvenile court improperly admitted hearsay testimony at the previous hearing. The Supreme Court denied the subsequent petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the juvenile court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in sustaining the objection to the dependency master's findings and dismissing the abuse and neglect petition. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law