Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Thea G. challenged the superior court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two children, twelve-year old Zach, and six-year old Abbie. The superior court terminated Thea’s parental rights based on her unremedied substance abuse issues. Thea raised three issues on appeal: (1) the superior court’s finding that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the breakup of her family; (2) the finding that if her custody over Zach and Abbie were continued the children would likely suffer serious emotional or physical damage; and (3) the finding that termination of her parental rights is in Zach’s and Abbie’s best interests. Because each of these findings was supported by sufficient evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order terminating Thea’s parental rights to Zach and Abbie. View "Thea G. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (ex-wife) and her parents sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant is a psychiatrist who was court-appointed to make recommendations in connection with plaintiff’s custody dispute with her ex-husband, following the 1998 entry of a marriage dissolution judgment. Plaintiff initially requested the evaluation, but was unhappy with the results. Defendant reported that plaintiff and her parents were delusional and that the children should be removed from their mother’s custody and have no further contact with her. A change of custody was granted. The Department of Children and Family Services later made a finding of abuse and neglect against the plaintiff. Plaintiff accused defendant of making false statements and a false evaluation. The trial court dismissed on the basis of res judicata; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on a separate civil rights class action that plaintiff had filed earlier in federal court against defendant and others for their role in custody proceedings. That action was dismissed for the immunity of such evaluators, and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal.View "Cooney v. Rossiter" on Justia Law

After allegations arose of sexual abuse and sexual risk involving A.B., A.B.'s Mother and Father were reported to child protective services. Following an investigation, the Department of Family Services (DFS) filed an abuse and neglect petition in the juvenile division of the district court, seeking to have A.B. declared a child in need of protection. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on the petition before a dependency master, after which the dependency master filed her findings of fact, recommendations, and order of approval. The master found A.B. was a child in need of protection and that Mother had neglected A.B. Upon Mother and Father's objection, the juvenile court held a hearing and dismissed the abuse and neglect petition, finding that the juvenile court improperly admitted hearsay testimony at the previous hearing. The Supreme Court denied the subsequent petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the juvenile court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in sustaining the objection to the dependency master's findings and dismissing the abuse and neglect petition. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

Mother appealed a CHINS decision by the superior court based on a finding that she repeatedly induced the child to make false allegations of abuse against father. On appeal, Mother contended the judgment was unsupported because there was no evidence or finding that the allegations of abuse were the product of intentional coaching or mental illness. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.A." on Justia Law

A Mother appealed a superior court's decision that terminated her parental rights to her son, D.C. D.C. spent the first years of his life with both parents, who at the time were not married. When his parents separated, the father took D.C. to stay with him. Although a child-custody order granted mother parental rights, she allowed father to take the child because she had difficulty finding a residence, and she knew that father had the support of his mother in caring for D.C. This arrangement lasted for a few years longer when mother obtained police help to assert her custodial rights to D.C. Mother moved into a motel with D.C., and the Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned that D.C. was a child in need of care due to a lack of proper parental care. The affidavit in support of the petition stated that: (1) five years earlier mother’s parental rights had been terminated with respect to an older child because of unsafe and unsanitary living conditions and the child’s exposure to the risk of being sexually abused; (2) mother had a relationship with a known, untreated sex offender who had been seen frequently with mother at her motel room; (3) the motel room was filthy and unsanitary; (4) D.C. was suffering from an untreated respiratory illness; and (5) school officials had reported D.C. arriving at school hungry and not dressed properly for the cold. On appeal, mother argued that the termination order is invalid because the court failed to: (1) consider whether the State had met its burden of showing changed circumstances, which was required because the State’s termination petition sought modification of the initial disposition order; (2) determine by clear and convincing evidence that mother was presently unfit to care for D.C.; and (3) find that DCF had made reasonable efforts to prevent the unnecessary removal of D.C. from his home. Finding that the record supported the family court’s undisputed findings that during the lengthy period when mother played a limited role in D.C.’s life and agreed to other family members assuming custody of the child, she made no progress in reaching a point where she could care for the child.  The Court concluded that Mother could not challenge the TPR order through a belated claim that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent D.C.’s removal from his home. Accordingly, the Court affirmed termination of Mother's rights. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

This case arose from the death of a minor child, 23-month-old Brooklyn Coons (BIC) at the hands of her father's girlfriend. Plaintiffs-Appellants, Larry and Mary Crosetto and the Estate of BIC, filed an action alleging that a social worker, Defendant-Appellee Linda Gillen, created the danger that resulted in the death of their granddaughter and denied them their rights to familial association. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Gillen, and declined to hear a supplemental state law claim. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that qualified immunity was unwarranted on their state danger-creation and familial association claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that qualified immunity was not appropriate on the state danger-creation claim given genuine issues of material fact. Thus the Court reversed in part. The Court affirmed summary judgement on the familial association claims. View "The Estate of B.I.C., et al v. Gillen" on Justia Law

At issue in this interlocutory appeal was the scope of the special relationship doctrine and whether it would apply to the facts alleged to expose two human services employees to potential individual liability for the death of a seven-year-old child in foster care. After their son Chandler died while in the care of Jon Phillips and Sarah Berry, Chandler's biological parents, Christina Grafner and Joshua Norris, and Melissa R. Schwartz, personal representative and administrator of Chandler’s estate, filed suit against two county human services departments and two employees alleging, among other things, a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for violation of Chandler's substantive due process rights. The two employees, Defendants-Appellants Margaret Booker and Mary Peagler, appealed denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts, when taken as true, showed Booker and Peagler plausibly violated Chandler's substantive due process right to be reasonably safe while in foster care, which right was clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "Schwartz, et al v. Booker, et al" on Justia Law

A mother appealed a magistrate court's order terminating her parental rights with respect to her youngest child. John Doe was born in September, 2011, and was declared to be in imminent danger two days after birth. John's mother, Jane Doe (Mother) had eight other children, all with her ex-husband (Father). One died shortly after birth, and the others are aged three to fifteen years old. Mother was not caring for any of these children when the Department of Health and Welfare (DHW) removed John from her care. In its Memorandum Decision and Order issued the same day, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother "cannot parent this child now and that inability will continue indefinitely" and termination of her parental rights would be in the child's best interest. Mother's argument on appeal focused on whether the magistrate court properly weighed the evidence in making its best interest of the child determination. Upon review, the Supreme Court was satisfied that substantial evidence supported the magistrate court's findings, and accordingly held that the magistrate court did not err in determining that termination of Mother's parental rights was in John's best interest. View "Idaho Dept of Health & Welfare v. Jane (2012-05) Doe" on Justia Law

In this juvenile dependency proceeding, a father was found by the court to have subjected one of his children to sexual abuse. Although the child was unavailable to testify at the proceedings, the juvenile court admitted into evidence child's out-of-court statements. Father contended that the juvenile court's theory for admitting the statements - that they were the statements of a party-opponent and, therefore, not hearsay -was a fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence rule pertaining to statements of party-opponents. Furthermore, Father argued that the court's admission of child's out-of-court statements under OEC 801(4)(b)(A) violated his (father's) right to due process and to a proceeding that was fundamentally fair. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with father that the juvenile court erred in admitting the child's statements under OEC 801(4)(b)(A), and concluded that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed the juvenile court's judgments and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dept. of Human Services v. G. D. W." on Justia Law

A mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her young son. The mother had a long history of substance abuse and relinquished parental rights to her older daughter in 2008 because she was unable to care for her. During the 18 months following the child’s removal, the mother continued to abuse drugs until she was incarcerated. At that point, she entered an intensive residential substance abuse program at the prison, which she successfully completed two weeks prior to the termination trial. In appealing the superior court’s order terminating her parental rights, the mother argued to the Supreme Court that the court erroneously: (1) denied her motion to continue the termination proceedings; (2) determined that termination was in the best interests of the child; and (3) failed to consider legal guardianship as an alternative to termination. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Hannah B. v. Alaska" on Justia Law