Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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After her Father's death, Mother underwent intrauterine insemination using Father's cryopreserved sperm. The procedure was successful, and Mother gave birth to a child. Mother subsequently applied to the Social Security Administration (SSA) for surviving child's insurance benefits on behalf of the child. SSA denied the application. An ALJ decided that the child was entitled to child's insurance benefits on Father's Social Security record. SSA's appeal council reversed. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the following question to the Nebraska Supreme Court: "Can a child, conceived after her biological father's death through intrauterine insemination using his sperm, and born within nine months of his death, inherit from him as the surviving issue under Nebraska intestacy law?" The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that under the relevant Nebraska statutes, a child conceived after her biological father's death cannot inherit from her father as surviving issue for purposes of intestacy. View "Amen v. Asture" on Justia Law

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After the Department of Public Health and Human Services was given temporary legal custody of D.B., a youth in need of care, the Department developed a treatment plan for Father. Following twenty months of poor cooperation from Father, the Department determined it would seek termination of his parental rights. The district court terminated Father's parental rights to D.B. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Department proposed an appropriate treatment plan; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Father's behavior would be unlikely to change within a reasonable amount of time; and (3) Father lacked any basis for the Court to determine that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

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Defendant F.M. (Fernanda) appealed the termination of her parental rights to her now five-year-old daughter, Quinn, and four-year-old son, Troy, Jr. Both children were born of a relationship between Fernanda and T.J. (Troy). The family court found that Troy had committed an act of domestic violence against Fernanda, had an intractable drug-addiction problem, and suffered from mental illness that induced delusional thoughts that he was God. On this basis, the court considered Troy a danger to the physical well-being of the children. The termination of Fernanda's parental rights was premised on the court's findings that she was incapable and unwilling to protect her children from the dangers presented by Troy. The court barred Troy from having unsupervised contact with Quinn, the only child born of their relationship at the time. In violation of court orders and earlier consent agreements with the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), Fernanda allowed Troy to have access to Quinn in her home. Fernanda's inability to shield Quinn from her father led to the child's removal from the home and later to the removal of Troy, Jr. after his birth. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Fernanda never raised any objection to "care or custody" before the family court, she was barred from doing so on appeal based on laches. Furthermore, the Court upheld the family court's determination to terminate Fernanda's parental rights, deferring to the lower court's findings as adequately supported by the record. View "New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. F.M." on Justia Law

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The Montana Public Employees' Retirement Board (MPERB) denied death benefits to Petitioner Erene Briese (Erene) because her deceased husband, who had originally named her as his beneficiary under the Montana Sheriffs’ Retirement System (SRS), had later filed a new designation, dropping her as a beneficiary, while marital dissolution proceedings were pending. Erene appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the MPERB’s order. Erene then appealed the District Court’s order to the Supreme Court. "At a minimum," the Supreme Court agreed with those courts that have held that "a court has equitable power to order a return to the status quo when a party violating a temporary restraining order has died. Thus, in this case, the District Court should have invalidated the husband's 2006 change of beneficiaries because it was made in violation of the statutorily-mandated restraining order, and should have determined that his 2001 designation of Erene was "the most recent membership card filed with the board." View "Briese v. MPER Board" on Justia Law

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James Mallard and Tonya Mallard (now Tonya Mallard Burkart) were divorced on in 2001. Incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce was the Child Custody and Support and Property Settlement Agreement executed by the parties. A significant portion of the financial settlement that Burkart received in the property settlement agreement consisted of forty percent of Mallard's "disposable military retirement pay" for ten years. Following the divorce, Mallard elected to adopt a sixty-percent disability rating as part of his retirement pay. Mallard did not provide any of these disability benefits to Burkart. When Mallard filed a Petition for Modification of Judgment of Divorce in chancery court pursuant to child-support and custody matters, Burkart filed a counterpetition for contempt, asserting that Mallard had structured his retirement in such a way as to defeat her forty-percent interest in the total retirement pay. The chancellor determined that Burkart was entitled to forty percent of the disability benefits, but he declined to find Mallard in contempt. Mallard appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since federal law preempts state law, state courts are precluded from allocating military disability benefits to a nonmilitary spouse; therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mallard v. Burkart" on Justia Law

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Birth mother N.S. (Mother) and birth father K.R. (Father) appealed a district court order that terminated their parental rights to their four-year-old twin daughters, T.R. 1 and T.R. 2. Mother also appealed the District Court’s order denying her a new trial. The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the District Court abused its discretion by terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights; (2) whether the District Court erred in finding it was in the children’s best interests to terminate those rights; (3) whether the District Court erred in finding the Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; (4) whether the District Court adequately addressed the appropriateness of the treatment plans in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Furthermore, Mother asserted that the District Court abused its discretion by denying her a new trial based on new evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence in the record to support the District Court’s findings that the conditions rendering Mother and Father unfit were unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights. "It [was] manifest on the face of the briefs and the record that there was not an abuse of discretion." View "Matter of T.R.1 and T.R.2" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Eleventh Circuit centered on the grant of qualified immunity to two social workers who violated clearly established federal rights during an investigation of alleged child abuse. After Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen Loftus petitioned a Florida court to help him protect his two children from his allegedly abusive former wife, social worker and Defendant-Appellee Ester Clark-Moore, investigated the safety and welfare of Loftus's children, Savonna and Dylan. In the course of her investigation, Clark-Moore allegedly interviewed Savonna without Loftus's consent, and Clark-Moore's supervisor, Myra Ferguson, allegedly twice threatened to remove both children from Loftus's care. Loftus filed a civil complaint that the social workers had violated Savonna's right to be free from unreasonable seizures and the family's right to be free from governmental interference. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that because the social workers did not violate any clearly established federal civil rights in the investigation that Loftus had invited, it affirmed the dismissal of Loftus's complaint against them.

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William and Sarah Smith are the grandparents of Jason Wells. Jason's mother, Tara Wells, is Sarah's daughter. The Smiths filed a petition for temporary and permanent custody of Jason. They later filed a separate petition for adoption and to terminate the parental rights of Tara and Robert Johnson, the biological father. The chancellor declined to terminate Tara's and Robert's parental rights but awarded the Smiths primary custody of Jason. In awarding the Smiths custody, the chancellor found that Tara had "by her long and continuous absences from [Jason] failed to exercise her parental rights and fulfill her parental responsibilities." He found that this had caused the Smiths to assume the role of parents to Jason for virtually his entire life and that the Smiths thus stood in loco parentis. The chancellor then conducted a best-interest, "Albright" analysis and concluded that Jason should remain with the Smiths. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the chancellor found that the natural-parent presumption under "Albright" had been overcome based on the doctrine of loco parentis (which would have been in error), or based on a finding of desertion by Tara which necessitated the Smiths standing as in loco parentis for Jason. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the latter and therefore affirmed the judgment of the chancery court.

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J.A. appealed a juvenile court order terminating parental rights to his daughter, A.W. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the court's findings that J.A. abandoned the child, that the child was deprived, and that the conditions and causes of the deprivation were likely to continue were supported by clear and convincing evidence and were not clearly erroneous.

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John Doe (Father) is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States illegally in 2003. In mid-2007, he married Jane Doe (Mother) in Payette, Idaho. After they were married, Father was arrested in Ontario, Oregon, when he attempted to open a bank account with a false social security number. He served three months in jail, and was then transferred to a jail in Portland to be held for deportation. He agreed to voluntarily leave the United States and did so, returning to his parents’ home in Salamanca, Guanajuato, Mexico. Mother also went to Mexico, but she returned to the United States after she became pregnant. Their child (Daughter) was born in the United States in November 2008. Mother also had a four-year-old son by another man. In March 2009, Father reentered the United States illegally in an attempt to be with his wife and Daughter, but he was caught in Arizona and returned to Mexico. In March, 2009, Mother was living in Middleton, Idaho, with her boyfriend, who had a son who was about seven years old. Mother and her boyfriend took his son to the hospital regarding severe bruising on his head. Because Mother and her boyfriend gave conflicting accounts of how the boy was injured, the medical personnel notified law enforcement. The investigation disclosed Mother’s son had struck her boyfriend’s son several times with a hairbrush. Daughter and the boyfriend’s son were taken into custody by law enforcement, and on the same day the county prosecuting attorney filed a petition under the Child Protective Act with respect to those children. The petition alleged that the name of Daughter’s father was unknown and that he was in Mexico at an unknown address. Father spoke by telephone from Mexico with the Department’s caseworker that he would like to be involved in Daughter’s life and to be reunited with Mother and her son. He also said he would like Mother to begin the process that would allow him to come into the United States lawfully. In August, the Department’s caseworker told Father she would present a home study to the court if it was received in time. On September 15, 2010, the Mexican consulate emailed the report to the caseworker. The termination hearing was held on September 29. At that hearing, the Department did not present the study to the court. The caseworker testified that she disregarded the report because the Department had decided to terminate Father’s parental rights. Thus, default was entered against Father, even though he had clearly not been properly served with process regarding the termination proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the magistrate court and remanded this case with instructions for the court to order the Department to take all reasonable steps to promptly place Daughter with Father in Mexico.