Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Judith R. challenged the superior court's order terminating her parental rights to her son, "Dexter." The court terminated her rights based on her longstanding, unremedied mental illness. In its ruling on the record, the court sua sponte, directed the parties to consult with Dexter's therapist about the advisability of allowing continued contact between Judith and Dexter following termination of Judith's parental rights, but the court's written order made no mention of post-termination contact. On appeal, Judith challenged the superior court's finding that termination of her parental rights was in Dexter's best interests and the court's failure to issue a "detailed order regarding post-termination visitation." Because the court's best interests finding was supported by substantial evidence and because the court was not required to address post-termination contact in its termination order, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Judith R. v. Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

This decision resolved two consolidated appeals related to family division proceedings involving juvenile C.P. First, mother and father appealed termination of their parental rights to their son C.P. Father argued the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination proceeding. Mother joined father's jurisdictional argument and contended that the evidence and findings did not support the conclusion that termination was in C.P.'s best interests. Second, father challenged the court's post-termination order striking a sentence of the termination decision, and finding that the Department for Children and Families (DCF) made reasonable efforts toward achieving the permanency plan goal of reunifying C.P. with his parents. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no merit to either of the parents' arguments on appeal and affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "In re C. P." on Justia Law

The Jackson County Court sitting as Youth Court exercised jurisdiction over two minors following allegations of abuse and neglect. The foster parents of the two minor children subsequently filed adoption proceedings in the Lincoln County Chancery Court. The Mississippi Department of Human Services ("MDHS") sought interlocutory appeal after unsuccessfully challenging the chancery court's jurisdiction to consider the adoption proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings and affirmed the Chancery Court's judgment. View "Mississippi Dept. of Human Svcs. v. Watts" on Justia Law

After her Father's death, Mother underwent intrauterine insemination using Father's cryopreserved sperm. The procedure was successful, and Mother gave birth to a child. Mother subsequently applied to the Social Security Administration (SSA) for surviving child's insurance benefits on behalf of the child. SSA denied the application. An ALJ decided that the child was entitled to child's insurance benefits on Father's Social Security record. SSA's appeal council reversed. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the following question to the Nebraska Supreme Court: "Can a child, conceived after her biological father's death through intrauterine insemination using his sperm, and born within nine months of his death, inherit from him as the surviving issue under Nebraska intestacy law?" The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that under the relevant Nebraska statutes, a child conceived after her biological father's death cannot inherit from her father as surviving issue for purposes of intestacy. View "Amen v. Asture" on Justia Law

After the Department of Public Health and Human Services was given temporary legal custody of D.B., a youth in need of care, the Department developed a treatment plan for Father. Following twenty months of poor cooperation from Father, the Department determined it would seek termination of his parental rights. The district court terminated Father's parental rights to D.B. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Department proposed an appropriate treatment plan; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Father's behavior would be unlikely to change within a reasonable amount of time; and (3) Father lacked any basis for the Court to determine that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

Defendant F.M. (Fernanda) appealed the termination of her parental rights to her now five-year-old daughter, Quinn, and four-year-old son, Troy, Jr. Both children were born of a relationship between Fernanda and T.J. (Troy). The family court found that Troy had committed an act of domestic violence against Fernanda, had an intractable drug-addiction problem, and suffered from mental illness that induced delusional thoughts that he was God. On this basis, the court considered Troy a danger to the physical well-being of the children. The termination of Fernanda's parental rights was premised on the court's findings that she was incapable and unwilling to protect her children from the dangers presented by Troy. The court barred Troy from having unsupervised contact with Quinn, the only child born of their relationship at the time. In violation of court orders and earlier consent agreements with the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), Fernanda allowed Troy to have access to Quinn in her home. Fernanda's inability to shield Quinn from her father led to the child's removal from the home and later to the removal of Troy, Jr. after his birth. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Fernanda never raised any objection to "care or custody" before the family court, she was barred from doing so on appeal based on laches. Furthermore, the Court upheld the family court's determination to terminate Fernanda's parental rights, deferring to the lower court's findings as adequately supported by the record. View "New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. F.M." on Justia Law

The Montana Public Employees' Retirement Board (MPERB) denied death benefits to Petitioner Erene Briese (Erene) because her deceased husband, who had originally named her as his beneficiary under the Montana Sheriffs’ Retirement System (SRS), had later filed a new designation, dropping her as a beneficiary, while marital dissolution proceedings were pending. Erene appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the MPERB’s order. Erene then appealed the District Court’s order to the Supreme Court. "At a minimum," the Supreme Court agreed with those courts that have held that "a court has equitable power to order a return to the status quo when a party violating a temporary restraining order has died. Thus, in this case, the District Court should have invalidated the husband's 2006 change of beneficiaries because it was made in violation of the statutorily-mandated restraining order, and should have determined that his 2001 designation of Erene was "the most recent membership card filed with the board." View "Briese v. MPER Board" on Justia Law

James Mallard and Tonya Mallard (now Tonya Mallard Burkart) were divorced on in 2001. Incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce was the Child Custody and Support and Property Settlement Agreement executed by the parties. A significant portion of the financial settlement that Burkart received in the property settlement agreement consisted of forty percent of Mallard's "disposable military retirement pay" for ten years. Following the divorce, Mallard elected to adopt a sixty-percent disability rating as part of his retirement pay. Mallard did not provide any of these disability benefits to Burkart. When Mallard filed a Petition for Modification of Judgment of Divorce in chancery court pursuant to child-support and custody matters, Burkart filed a counterpetition for contempt, asserting that Mallard had structured his retirement in such a way as to defeat her forty-percent interest in the total retirement pay. The chancellor determined that Burkart was entitled to forty percent of the disability benefits, but he declined to find Mallard in contempt. Mallard appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since federal law preempts state law, state courts are precluded from allocating military disability benefits to a nonmilitary spouse; therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mallard v. Burkart" on Justia Law

Birth mother N.S. (Mother) and birth father K.R. (Father) appealed a district court order that terminated their parental rights to their four-year-old twin daughters, T.R. 1 and T.R. 2. Mother also appealed the District Court’s order denying her a new trial. The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the District Court abused its discretion by terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights; (2) whether the District Court erred in finding it was in the children’s best interests to terminate those rights; (3) whether the District Court erred in finding the Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; (4) whether the District Court adequately addressed the appropriateness of the treatment plans in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Furthermore, Mother asserted that the District Court abused its discretion by denying her a new trial based on new evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence in the record to support the District Court’s findings that the conditions rendering Mother and Father unfit were unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights. "It [was] manifest on the face of the briefs and the record that there was not an abuse of discretion." View "Matter of T.R.1 and T.R.2" on Justia Law

The issue before the Eleventh Circuit centered on the grant of qualified immunity to two social workers who violated clearly established federal rights during an investigation of alleged child abuse. After Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen Loftus petitioned a Florida court to help him protect his two children from his allegedly abusive former wife, social worker and Defendant-Appellee Ester Clark-Moore, investigated the safety and welfare of Loftus's children, Savonna and Dylan. In the course of her investigation, Clark-Moore allegedly interviewed Savonna without Loftus's consent, and Clark-Moore's supervisor, Myra Ferguson, allegedly twice threatened to remove both children from Loftus's care. Loftus filed a civil complaint that the social workers had violated Savonna's right to be free from unreasonable seizures and the family's right to be free from governmental interference. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that because the social workers did not violate any clearly established federal civil rights in the investigation that Loftus had invited, it affirmed the dismissal of Loftus's complaint against them.