Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

William and Sarah Smith are the grandparents of Jason Wells. Jason's mother, Tara Wells, is Sarah's daughter. The Smiths filed a petition for temporary and permanent custody of Jason. They later filed a separate petition for adoption and to terminate the parental rights of Tara and Robert Johnson, the biological father. The chancellor declined to terminate Tara's and Robert's parental rights but awarded the Smiths primary custody of Jason. In awarding the Smiths custody, the chancellor found that Tara had "by her long and continuous absences from [Jason] failed to exercise her parental rights and fulfill her parental responsibilities." He found that this had caused the Smiths to assume the role of parents to Jason for virtually his entire life and that the Smiths thus stood in loco parentis. The chancellor then conducted a best-interest, "Albright" analysis and concluded that Jason should remain with the Smiths. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the chancellor found that the natural-parent presumption under "Albright" had been overcome based on the doctrine of loco parentis (which would have been in error), or based on a finding of desertion by Tara which necessitated the Smiths standing as in loco parentis for Jason. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the latter and therefore affirmed the judgment of the chancery court.

J.A. appealed a juvenile court order terminating parental rights to his daughter, A.W. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the court's findings that J.A. abandoned the child, that the child was deprived, and that the conditions and causes of the deprivation were likely to continue were supported by clear and convincing evidence and were not clearly erroneous.

John Doe (Father) is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States illegally in 2003. In mid-2007, he married Jane Doe (Mother) in Payette, Idaho. After they were married, Father was arrested in Ontario, Oregon, when he attempted to open a bank account with a false social security number. He served three months in jail, and was then transferred to a jail in Portland to be held for deportation. He agreed to voluntarily leave the United States and did so, returning to his parents’ home in Salamanca, Guanajuato, Mexico. Mother also went to Mexico, but she returned to the United States after she became pregnant. Their child (Daughter) was born in the United States in November 2008. Mother also had a four-year-old son by another man. In March 2009, Father reentered the United States illegally in an attempt to be with his wife and Daughter, but he was caught in Arizona and returned to Mexico. In March, 2009, Mother was living in Middleton, Idaho, with her boyfriend, who had a son who was about seven years old. Mother and her boyfriend took his son to the hospital regarding severe bruising on his head. Because Mother and her boyfriend gave conflicting accounts of how the boy was injured, the medical personnel notified law enforcement. The investigation disclosed Mother’s son had struck her boyfriend’s son several times with a hairbrush. Daughter and the boyfriend’s son were taken into custody by law enforcement, and on the same day the county prosecuting attorney filed a petition under the Child Protective Act with respect to those children. The petition alleged that the name of Daughter’s father was unknown and that he was in Mexico at an unknown address. Father spoke by telephone from Mexico with the Department’s caseworker that he would like to be involved in Daughter’s life and to be reunited with Mother and her son. He also said he would like Mother to begin the process that would allow him to come into the United States lawfully. In August, the Department’s caseworker told Father she would present a home study to the court if it was received in time. On September 15, 2010, the Mexican consulate emailed the report to the caseworker. The termination hearing was held on September 29. At that hearing, the Department did not present the study to the court. The caseworker testified that she disregarded the report because the Department had decided to terminate Father’s parental rights. Thus, default was entered against Father, even though he had clearly not been properly served with process regarding the termination proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the magistrate court and remanded this case with instructions for the court to order the Department to take all reasonable steps to promptly place Daughter with Father in Mexico.

PRG (Father) appealed a district court's order following a jury verdict terminating his parental rights to his four minor children. Father contended that the district court erred when it refused to use his proposed jury verdict form. He also claimed that the State Department of Family Services (DFS) presented insufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights and challenged the district court's denial of his motion for a judgment as a matter of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the special verdict form given to the jury was appropriate and the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Father's proposed verdict form. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights.

HJO (Mother), the biologic mother of nine minor children, appealed a district court's order following a jury verdict terminating her parental rights. Mother contested the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State. Department of Family Services (DFS) to terminate her parental rights, the appropriateness of the special verdict form submitted to the jury, the constitutionality of the termination statute which set out the burden of proof, and alleged cumulative errors. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and accordingly affirmed the termination of Mother's parental rights.

This case came before the Supreme Court from an interlocutory transfer without ruling from the superior court on the following question: "Does the Due Process Clause of the New Hampshire Constitution (Part I, Articles 2 and 15) or the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution require the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent from whom the State seeks to take custody of a minor child based on allegations of neglect or abuse?" Parents Larry and Sonia M. were served with petitions by which the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) sought custody of their two minor children C.M and A.M. DCYF alleged that the parents were neglecting their children by failing to provide a safe and sanitary home and adequate supervision and by exposing them to domestic violence in the form of threatening and intimidating behaviors by the father. An adjudicatory hearing was held at which the parents were represented by appointed counsel. The court issued an order maintaining legal custody of the children with DCYF and directing the parents to undertake certain measures before the children might be safely returned to them. Each parent filed an appeal to superior court contending that without appointed counsel, their protected liberty interest in raising their children was threatened. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that while due process did not require that counsel be appointed for indigent parents in every proceeding (such as the proceeding at issue in this case), a determination of whether appointed counsel is necessary to adequately reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation should be made on a case-by-case basis in the first instance by the trial court. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the superior court to make that determination.

Appellants Richard and Durena Tracy appeal the superior court’s dismissal of their state law negligence and federal constitutional claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS). This case arose from Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceedings to protect their granddaughter, Annie. The Tracys also appealed the superior court’s denial of summary judgment in their favor and its award of attorney’s fees against them. The Tracys are the biological grandparents of "Annie" and now her adoptive parents. When Annie was five, a kindergarten teacher erroneously suspected Annie had been victim to sexual abuse by Richard. OCS investigated the allegation, all the while Richard was not permitted contact with Annie until the investigation was complete. When the allegations were deemed groundless by an OCS expert, Richard and Durena sued OCS for damages stemming from the fees and expenses they incurred defending themselves from the OCS investigation. Ultimately the Tracys lost that battle, and the district court granted OCS's request for attorney fees. Affirming the superior court's dismissal of the Tracys' claims, the Supreme Court vacated the award of attorneys' fees against the Tracys. The Court found that because there was no bad faith nor asserted with improper motive, the superior court should not have given OCS an award of fees.

I.M. (Father) appealed a district court order that terminated his parental rights to his children A.J.M (daughter) and C.J.M. (son). The children's biological mother already had her parental rights to terminated. The Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) contacted the family and made recommendations, but the parents did not follow through. Father reported Mother to DPHHS in July of 2009 with concerns about her drinking and inability to care for the children. After Father’s call, the children were removed. Upon stipulations by both Mother and Father, the children were adjudicated Youths in Need of Care on August 14, 2009. The District Court found that: 1) termination was statutorily presumed to be in both A.J.M.’s and C.J.M.’s best interest due to the length of time each had been in foster care; 2) Father’s treatment plans were appropriate; 3) Father did not comply with the treatment plans; 4) the conditions rendering Father unfit or unable to parent would not likely change within a reasonable amount of time, and 5) the best interests of A.J.M. and C.J.M. would indeed be served by termination of Father’s parental rights. Father then appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Father's parental rights.

Eight days after relinquishing her parental rights to twin children, their mother filed a motion requesting that the superior court order the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS) to release the children's annual Permanent Fund Dividends (dividends) to her. The superior court granted the motion. The guardian ad litem (GAL) and OCS opposed her motion. The superior court ordered OCS to provide proof of compliance with 15 AAC 23.223(i). OCS filed copies of the address change forms and an affidavit of the OCS employee who completed the forms stating OCS had complied with the Department's regulation. The superior court concluded OCS's filing did not comply with the regulation's "evidence of the change in legal custody" requirement and ordered OCS to release the dividends to the mother. The GAL sought reconsideration, which the superior court denied. The Supreme Court granted the GAL's petition for review. OCS and the GAL argued that the fact the Department paid the dividends to OCS suggests the Department itself thought the change of address forms were sufficient to comply with 15 AAC 23.223(i) and the superior court should have deferred to the Department's determination. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed: the superior court (and all of the parties in the superior court proceeding) knew of OCS's custody of the children because the superior court itself signed the custody order. "There was and could be no dispute that OCS actually was entitled to redirect and hold the children's dividends, regardless of the information provided to the Department." The Court reversed the superior court's decision.

M.A.S. (Father) appealed the termination of his parental rights to P.S.E. At the time P.S.E. was removed from Mother’s care, Father lived in California and did not know he had a child in South Dakota. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied to these proceedings because P.S.E. was an enrolled member of the Fort Peck Sioux Tribe. Father argued on appeal that the Department of Social Services (DSS) did not make active efforts to reunite the Indian family and that any efforts made were successful. Because the evidence presented shows that DSS provided active and reasonable, though abbreviated, efforts to place P.S.E. with Father, and those efforts were unsuccessful, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order terminating Father's parental rights.