Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Lisa Argabright and Respondent Wayne Argabright were formerly married, are now divorced and share joint custody of their minor daughter. Appellant appealed the family court's issuance of a restraining order enjoining her from permitting any contact between her boyfriend, a convicted sex offender, and the parties' minor daughter. The family court further required Appellant to pay Respondent's attorney's fees and the guardian ad litem fees. Appellant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant was the only person available to supervise contact between Child and the boyfriend. And given Appellant's pattern of deception and pursuit of her own interests over those of Child, an order entrusting Appellant to ensure no future unsupervised contact between Child and the boyfriend would be suspect. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order.

"Jade" is the biological daughter of Roy and Sheila. Jade is an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Between 1998 and 2007, the Office of Children's Services (OCS) received at least 12 reports of drug abuse and child neglect in the family. Before Jade's birth in September 2004, the couple's older children were transferred to OCS custody for two years. Roy and Sheila attempted to complete drug treatment programs but were unsuccessful. Sheila relapsed while pregnant with Jade; her discharge report from the treatment program indicated she tested positive for cocaine in August 2005 and stopped attending treatment sessions or contacting drug counselors in October 2005. Roy was discharged for positive drug tests and missing treatment. Since being taken into OCS custody in July 2008, Jade has lived in five separate placements. In its termination order, the superior court found that termination of parental rights was in Jade's best interests and that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Roy contested three of the superior court's findings: that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family; that termination was in Jade's best interests; and that good cause existed to deviate from the ICWA placement preferences. Sheila did not appeal the superior court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the superior court's conclusions with regard to OCS's efforts to keep the family together, and that it was in Jade's best interests to terminate Roy's parental rights.

M.K. is a 34-year-old mentally ill Alaska Native woman who lived in a rural village. In 1999, when M.K. was 22, her father A.K. sexually assaulted her. M.K. reported the crime to police, but soon changed her story and A.K. was not tried at that time. A.K. continued to live with the family for four years until advances in DNA evidence led to his case being reopened, and to A.K. being charged and convicted in 2003 of the sexual assault. M.K.'s mother remained married to A.K., who has since been released from prison and was on probation and prohibited from living with M.K. M.K.'s mother had no plans to divorce A.K., and testified that she is not sure whether A.K. will return to live with the family when his probation ends. The Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) petitioned for guardianship of M.K. in July 2008 based on M.K.'s mental illness and her inability to manage her own care. The court visitor completed a report, and a hearing was held over several days, following which the superior court appointed the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) as M.K.'s full guardian. M.K. objected to this decision. The superior court treated her written objection as an implicit motion for reconsideration and denied it. M.K. appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in its application of the guardianship statutes in her case, in its best interest finding that OPA should be appointed in place of M.K.'s mother, and in appointing OPA as a full (as opposed to partial) guardian. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

A father appealed various procedural actions taken by the superior court in his divorce and custody proceeding. Appearing pro se, he alleged that the court’s expedited procedures violated his due process rights and reflected judicial bias. He also argued that the court abused its discretion in its award of attorney’s fees. Because the court’s procedures did not violate the father’s due process rights and the father has not shown that the court was biased against him, the Supreme Court affirmed the procedural decisions of the superior court. But because the superior court did not follow the established process for the award of attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s attorney’s fees order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Bani Chatterjee and Taya King are two women who were in a committed, long-term domestic relationship when they agreed to bring a child into their relationship. King adopted a child from Russia. Chatterjee supported King and Child financially, lived in the family home, and co parented Child for a number of years before their commitment to each other foundered and they dissolved their relationship. Chatterjee never adopted Child. After they ended their relationship, King moved to Colorado and sought to prevent Chatterjee from having any contact with Child. Chatterjee filed a petition in the district court to establish parentage and determine custody and timesharing. Chatterjee alleged that she was a presumed natural parent under the former codification of the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act, (NMSA), and was the equitable or de facto parent of Child, and as such, was entitled to relief. In response to Chatterjee’s Petition, King filed a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the Petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Chatterjee then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court. The Court of Appeals held that Chatterjee did not have standing to seek joint custody absent a showing of King’s unfitness because she is neither the biological nor the adoptive mother of Child. The Court further held that presumptions establishing a father and child relationship cannot be applied to women, and a mother and child relationship can only be established through biology or adoption. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Chatterjee pleaded sufficient facts in her Petition to give her standing to pursue joint custody of Child under the Dissolution of Marriage Act. The Court concluded based on the facts and circumstances of this case, that the facts pleaded by Chatterjee were sufficient to confer standing on her as a natural mother because: (1) the plain language of the UPA instructs courts to apply criteria for establishing a presumption that a man is a natural parent, to women because it is practicable for a woman to hold a child out as her own by, among other things, providing full-time emotional and financial support for the child; (2) commentary by the drafters of the UPA supports application of the provisions related to determining paternity to the determination of maternity; (3) the approach in this opinion is consistent with how courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted their UPAs, which contain language similar to the New Mexico UPA; and (4) New Mexico’s public policy is to encourage the support of children, financial and otherwise, by providers willing and able to care for the child.

Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, denies federal economic and other benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts and to surviving spouses from those couples, by defining "marriage" as "only a legal union between one man and one woman." "Spouse" refers "only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." DOMA absolves states from recognizing same-sex marriages solemnized in other states; prevents same-sex married couples from filing joint federal tax returns, affecting tax burdens; prevents a surviving same-sex spouse from collecting Social Security survivor benefits; leaves federal employees unable to share health insurance and other benefits with same-sex spouses. DOMA may result in loss of federal funding of programs such as Medicaid and veterans cemeteries if states recognize same-sex marriages in determining income or allowing burials. The district court declared Section 3 unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed, but stayed injunctive relief, anticipating certiorari review. The court applied "a closer than usual review" based on discrepant impact among married couples and on the importance of state interests in regulating marriage and tested the rationales for DOMA, considering Supreme Court precedent limiting which rationales can be counted and the force of certain rationales.

Several months after being granted sole legal and physical custody of Patrick D. (Child), Brian D. and Peggy D. (Grandparents) filed a petition for guardianship and custody pursuant to the Kinship Guardianship Act. Julie Ann D. (Mother), Grandparents’ daughter, consented to the guardianship, but Freedom C. (Father) opposed it. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found both Mother and Father unfit to raise Child. The district court granted guardianship to Grandparents, granted time-sharing privileges to both Mother and Father, and held that it would review the guardianship arrangement in twenty-four months. Father appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court. The Court of Appeals held that the consent provision in Section 40-10B–8(B)(1) was not satisfied because both parents did not consent to the guardianship. The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari filed by Grandparents to consider: (1) whether application of the Act is appropriate under the circumstances of this case; and (2) whether any of the prerequisites for its application were met. Because the Court concluded that Section 40-10B-8(B)(3) was met under the facts, circumstances, and procedure of this case, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remand to the district court to schedule a hearing to review the guardianship arrangement as previously anticipated by its order.

Respondent gave birth to twins conceived through in vitro fertilization using her deceased husband's frozen sperm. Respondent applied for Social Security survivors benefits for the twins, relying on 42 U.S.C. 416(e) of the Social Security Act, which defined child to mean, inter alia, "the child or legally adopted child of an [insured] individual." The Social Security Administration (SSA), however, identified subsequent provisions of the Act, sections 416(h)(2) and (h)(3)(C), as critical, and read them to entitle biological children to benefits only if they qualified for inheritance from the decedent under state intestacy law, or satisfied one of the statutory alternatives to that requirement. The Court concluded that the SSA's reading was better attuned to the statute's text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime. And even if the SSA's longstanding interpretation was not the only reasonable one, it was at least a permissible construction that garnered the Court's respect under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

A father appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). He challenged the superior court's findings that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the breakup of his Indian family, arguing that OCS failed to investigate placement with his extended family members and did not provide him with adequate visitation and remedial services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that OCS made active efforts, and accordingly affirmed OCS's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Parizek appealed a district court order that affirmed an administrative enforcement action which placed a lien on his personal property held by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The State, through the High Intensity Enforcement Unit of Child Support Enforcement, placed a lien on any funds or accounts the Department was holding for Plaintiff to secure payment for his past due child support obligation. Plaintiff unsuccessfully requested judicial review of the lien, arguing the lien was improper because the Department was not a financial institution and therefore the property did not qualify for an account lien. Plaintiff them moved to dismiss the lien with prejudice, arguing the lien was improper because the Department was not a financial institution and an account lien could not be enforced against the accounts it managed, and his spending account did not qualify as personal property. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued the Department and the State violated state law by entering into an agreement or relationship under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, with the sole purpose of enforcement of an administrative action upon him. Furthermore, Plaintiff claimed the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the lien without allowing him a hearing as he requested. He maintained the court erred when it failed to allow him 14 days from the service of the "notice of proposed order" before denying his motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the order denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss was filed after the notice of appeal, and therefore it was not appealed and was not properly before the Court.